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Anglo-French Relations and the ‘Protestant Party’: The Earl of Leicester and His 
Circle, 1636-41 
 
Fraser John Dickinson 
 
This thesis considers the foreign policy of Charles I of England towards the France 
of Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu between 1636 and 1641 in the context of the 
Paris embassy of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, the English King’s 
extraordinary ambassador to the French King and a leading Caroline Protestant 
diplomat. Against the background of the Thirty Years War, the earl was dispatched 
to Paris in May 1636 to negotiate an anti-Habsburg Anglo-French alliance. The 
objective of such a league would be to secure the restitution of Charles’s nephew, 
the dispossessed Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine, to the dignities and 
lands that his father, Frederick V, had lost in the early 1620s. 
 
The primary argument of the thesis is that, contrary to traditional historical 
thinking, Charles’s foreign policy was not directionless or consistently pro-Spanish 
throughout the 1630s, but that, between May 1636 and October 1639, he made a 
serious attempt to forge an alliance with Spain’s great continental rival, France. This 
thesis will also contend that the realization of an Anglo-French league represented 
the English King’s main diplomatic objective in the period between February 1637 
and October 1639. Charles’s commitment to an alliance with France, therefore, 
persisted well after mid-1637 or 1638, challenging the current orthodoxy on 
Caroline foreign policy in the later 1630s. It was only the political and strategic 
revolution brought about by Spain’s defeat at the Battle of the Downs in the autumn 
of 1639 that prompted the English King to revert to a pro-Spanish stance. The 
primary sources used to substantiate these contentions are the three surviving Anglo-
French treaties of 1637 and Leicester’s diplomatic correspondence, totalling more 
than 500 letters, the latter probably representing the largest body of unexamined 
manuscript material relating to Caroline foreign policy during the second half of the 




Leicester’s embassy is examined in nine chapters and six appendices. 
Chapter 1 sets out the European and English background to the earl’s mission. It 
considers the historiography regarding the embassy and states the main arguments 
that the thesis will advance. It also looks at the history of the Sidney family and the 
earl’s career preceding his embassy to Paris in 1636. The negotiations surrounding 
the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and their provisions and (immediate) fate are 
examined in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the continuing treaty 
talks with the French, and how these discussions impacted Charles’s foreign and 
domestic policies in the later 1630s as well as analysing Charles’s further 
instructions to Leicester of April 1639. Chapter 7 investigates the impact on the 
earl’s mission in particular, and on Caroline foreign policy more generally, of 
Spain’s naval defeat by the Dutch at the Battle of the Downs in October 1639, the 
English King’s loss to the Scots in the Second Bishops’ War in August 1640 and the 
revolts suffered by Spain in the Iberian Peninsula in that year. Chapter 8 assesses the 
final phase of the earl’s mission – his embassy concluded in October 1641 – against 
the background of the opening session of the Long Parliament, the Anglo-Dutch 
marriage alliance of May 1641, Leicester’s appointment as Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland in June and the Anglo-Scottish Union of August. The conclusions of the 
thesis are presented in chapter 9. Appendix 1 sets out the chronology of the key 
developments regarding the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and the significant 
proceedings in England and Europe between May 1636 and June 1637. Appendices 
2 to 6 contain the essential primary sources relating to Leicester’s mission, including 
the original manuscript texts and modern English translations (commissioned by 
myself) of the three extant Anglo-French treaties of 1637. The bibliography provides 
details of the primary (manuscript and printed) and secondary sources used in the 






Historical research and writing are collective activities. I did not appreciate the full 
truth of this statement when I started work on my thesis. I do now and I owe debts of 
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each version. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any of the three treaties has 
been translated into English and published. 
 
In sum, eight versions of the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 were drawn-up in 
February and June of that year – Latin and English versions of the main and the 
auxiliary treaties of February and Latin and French versions of the main and the 
auxiliary treaties of June. Only three versions of these treaties are available for study 
at present – the Latin versions of the main and the auxiliary treaties of February and 
the French version of the auxiliary treaty of June. It is these three treaties that are 





‘And if therin Hee [Charles I] goeth further than was expected on that side [the 
French]: they have cause to acknowledg not only the sense hee hath therin of his 
own honor, but also the great affection hee beareth to his brother the French king 
[Louis XIII] w[it]h whom Hee wil concurre in so brave a way. 
… 
Now both these [the so-called main and auxiliary] treaties [of 17 February 1637] 
thus ordered [and] accorded by his Maj[esty] [Charles I] and paraphed as you may 
see in the drawghts now sent unto you [Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester]: that 
the final dispatch therof may proceed w[it]hout delay his Maj[esty] hath now sent 
you … his ratification under the broade seale w[hic]h upon like ratification under the 
seale of that [the French] crown [and] signed by that king [Louis XIII] you may 
deliver unto them according as the treaties themselves do severallie direct. And the 
performance now resting on your hands: wee shal expect like expedition, …’ 
 
Sir John Coke, senior Secretary of State, to Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester 
and Charles I’s extraordinary ambassador to Louis XIII, 18/[28] February 1637 
commenting on the drawing up, signing and ratification of the main and the 
auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of 17 February 1637 by the English King, the letter 
having been annotated by Charles I himself. 
 
(London, TNA, SP France, SP 78/103, fol. 101-2: Coke to Leicester; see also 









On 24 May 1636, Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, arrived in Paris as 
Charles I’s extraordinary ambassador to Louis XIII, charged with negotiating an 
anti-Habsburg Anglo-French alliance.1 For the English King, the aim of such a 
league would be to bring about a satisfactory restitution of the dignities and the 
lands of his nephew, the Prince Elector Palatine, Charles I Louis.2 This problem for 
Charles had its root in the fact that both the electoral title (to Duke Maximilian I of 
Bavaria) and the related possessions, the Lower Palatinate (the right bank to Bavaria 
and the left bank to Spain) and the Upper Palatinate (to Bavaria), had been lost by 
the Prince Elector’s father, Frederick V, in the early 1620s. These losses were a 
consequence of Frederick’s doomed pursuit of the crown of Bohemia, traditionally a 
Habsburg title. Frederick’s quest had come to grief with his decisive defeat at the 
hands of the Empire and its allies at the Battle of the White Mountain, near Prague 
in Bohemia, in late 1620.3 Leicester’s embassy presented an opportunity to change 
fundamentally the direction of Caroline foreign policy by reorientating England 
away from Habsburg Spain (and Austria) towards Bourbon France. In so doing, the 
mission could satisfy the desire of powerful Protestants in England, at court and in 
the country in general, for effective English action in the Thirty Years War, 
potentially making the King popular with many of his most influential subjects. 
 
1 For the arrival of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), in Paris, see London, 
TNA, SP France, SP 78/101, fol. 83: Leicester to [Coke], 26 May/[5 June] 1636. 
 
2 For the objectives of Charles I (1600-49) with regard to Leicester’s mission, see SP 78/101, 
fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 (according to a note on the 
page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636, these instructions 
were drawn up on 28 April 1636) and SP 78/101, fols 35-9: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 
1636; see also Collins, II, 376-7. 
 
3 For the Battle of the White Mountain, which was fought just outside Prague on 23 October 
(old style), 3 November (new style), 1620 between the combined armies of the Empire and Bavaria 
under the command of the noted general, Jean Tserclaes de Tilly (1559-1632), and the forces of the 
Prince Elector Palatine, Frederick V (1596-1632), led by Christian I of Anhalt-Bernberg (1568-1630), 
see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 303-7. In Wilson’s opinion, the Imperial victory ‘proved to be the 





Leicester’s French embassy of May 1636 to October 1641 spanned a period 
of political and strategic change in Europe. The mission began at a time when 
Spain’s dominance on the continent was entering a period of what would prove to be 
terminal decline. In the summer of 1636, seemingly at the apogee of its power, 
Spain had invaded Picardy in North-West France, capturing Corbie and threatening 
Paris.4 Thereafter, starting with the victory of Sweden, France’s ally, in the autumn 
of that year over the Empire and Saxony at the Battle of Wittstock in North 
Germany, French fortunes, though subject to the occasional reverses – for example, 
at the siege of Fuenterrabía in the late summer of 1638 in Spain on the western side 
of the Franco-Spanish border – steadily improved.5 Thus, by 1641, France was 
arguably the most powerful state in Europe. 
 
The Paris embassy would dominate Charles’s foreign policy from the winter 
of 1636-7 to the autumn of 1639. It was part of a two-pronged diplomatic offensive 
that the King initiated in the spring of 1636. In April, the King had dispatched 
Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, to the Emperor, Ferdinand II, in 
Vienna. Arundel’s mission quickly proved to be fruitless.6 From then on, as will be 
argued in this thesis, Leicester’s embassy was the primary focus of Caroline 
diplomacy in the two-and-three-quarter years between the beginning of 1637 and the 
game-changing defeat of a Spanish armada by Dutch naval forces in the English 
 
4 For the implications of the fall of Corbie in August 1636, see Richard Bonney, Political 
Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
p. 42 and John H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
pp. 157-8 and Olivares, pp. 521-2. 
 
5 The Battle of Wittstock was fought in North Germany on 24 September (according to the 
Julian calendar), 4 October (under Gregorian dating), 1636. For a description of the victory of 
Sweden, France’s confederate, whose army was commanded by Johan Banér (1596-1641), over the 
Imperialists and their Saxon allies, led by Count Melchior von Hatzfeldt (1593-1658), see Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 580-3. For the siege of Fuenterrabía and the ensuing battle in the late summer 
of 1638, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 651-2. 
 
6 For comment and original documentation on the embassy of Thomas Howard, fourteenth 
earl of Arundel (1585-1646), to the Emperor, Ferdinand II (1578-1637), in Vienna, see Francis C. 
Springell, Connoisseur and Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel’s Embassy to Germany in 1636 as 
recounted in William Crowne’s Diary, the Earl’s letters and other contemporary sources with a 
catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Holler (London: 
Maggs Bros. Ltd, 1963). See also Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 348-409 and 410-63 for a 




Channel at the Battle of the Downs in the autumn of 1639.7 Even thereafter, the 
mission continued to play an important role in England’s foreign-policy calculations 
up to the beginning of 1641. 
 
Leicester’s embassy was contemporaneous with a number of momentous 
events in England that had a significant impact upon the mission. For example, in 
the summer of 1637, English domestic politics were dominated by major legal and 
religious controversies when William Prynne, John Bastwick and Henry Burton – all 
libellous and seditious Puritan polemicists in the view of the authorities – and John 
Williams, the Bishop of Lincoln and the former Keeper of the Great Seal and Lord 
Chancellor, were tried, condemned and punished by Star Chamber for affronting the 
Caroline political and religious establishment. Charles may have used the possibility 
of an Anglo-French league to distract and placate some of his leading courtiers who 
sympathized with Williams’s anti-Laudian stance, and who shared some of the anti-
popish fervour of Prynne, Bastwick and Burton. The embassy also overlapped with, 
and was adversely affected by, the King’s troubles in Scotland, which reduced the 
attraction of England as an ally to foreign powers. Charles’s difficulties began with 
the Scots’ rejection of the new prayer book in July 1637, progressed through the 
Scottish National Covenant of February 1638, to the First and Second Bishops’ 
Wars of 1639 and 1640. The culmination was the King’s disastrous defeat by the 
Covenanters at the Battle of Newburn on 28 August 1640.8 The Short Parliament of 
mid-April to early May 1640 sat during and had considerable bearing on Leicester’s 
mission, for he was required by Charles to seek out evidence for presentation to the 
two Houses that the French were aiding his rebellious subjects north of the border. 
The embassy would continue into the first eleven months of the Long Parliament in 
1640-1, meaning that the last year of Leicester’s mission coincided with many of the 
 
7 For descriptions of the Battle of the Downs, which was fought between 7/17 September and 
11/21 October 1639, and the implications of its outcome for the three countries directly involved – 
that is, England, Spain and the United Provinces – see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 58-69; 
Elliott, Olivares, pp. 549-51; and Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and 
Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 537 respectively. For the battle and its 
place in the Eighty Years War between Spain and the United Provinces and the Thirty Years War in 
general, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 662-3. 
 
8 For the Battle of Newburn of 28 August 1640, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 192-4 




major events in the lead-up to the outbreak of the English Civil War in August 1642. 
Of particular significance for Leicester would be the execution of Thomas 
Wentworth, earl of Strafford and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, on 12 May 1641, as he 
would succeed Strafford to the Lieutenancy on the following 14 June.9 
 
In the first thirty years of the seventeenth century, the Stuarts had made a 
number of attempts at accords with France, only one of which bore fruit. In 1610, 
there had been a proposal to marry Prince Henry, the first-born son of James I and 
Charles’s elder brother, to Elizabeth of France, Henry IV’s eldest daughter.10 These 
plans had ended with the assassination of the French King in that year. In 1613, 
following Prince Henry’s death in 1612, the proposal had been revived but this time 
with Prince Charles as the putative groom.11 However, James had switched his 
attention to obtaining a Spanish match for Prince Charles and would remain 
committed to this course until his death. Nonetheless, in the winter of 1623-4, Sir 
Edward Conway, James’s senior Secretary of State, had drawn up a scheme for an 
anti-Habsburg ‘common cause’ – a league encompassing France, Sweden, the 
United Provinces, Denmark, England, Venice and Savoy.12 In other words, apart 
from the Venetians, the same coalition that the Anglo-French treaties of February 
1637 would attempt to bring into existence.13 Nothing came of Conway’s plan, but it 
 
9 There is a reference in CSPI, 1633-1647, 302, The King to the Lords Justices for the Earl of 
Leicester, 11 June 1641 stating that ‘The Earl is to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland,’ while in CSPD, 
1641-43, 11-2, Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, 14/24 June 1641, The Hague; see also Akkerman, 
Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 966, Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662), Charles I’s sister, noted 
that ‘… and since my Lord of Leicester is Deputy [of Ireland] …’ See again, De L’Isle and Dudley 
Manuscripts, VI, 555: Diary of Events 1636-1650. Both Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, 
p. 269 and Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ give 14 June 1641 as the date of 
Leicester’s appointment as Lord Lieutenant, which is the date used here. 
 
10 For a brief reference to a French marriage for Prince Henry (1594-1612), see Maurice Lee 
Jr., James I and Henry IV (London: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 74. 
 
11 See Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 
1621-1624 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 123. 
 
12 See Cogswell, Blessed Revolution, pp. 69-76, especially pp. 71, 128 and 243. Sir Edward 
Conway, (senior) Secretary of State, 1623-31, was a soldier and administrator under James I (1566-
1625) and Charles I. See Sean Kelsey, ‘Conway, Edward, first Viscount Conway and first Viscount 
Killultagh (c. 1564-1631)’, ODNB. 
 
13 See TNA, SP Treaties, SP 103/11, fols 599-601 and 603-4: main and auxiliary Anglo-




suggested a willingness in court circles to consider a strategy for restoring the 
Palatine Wittelsbachs that was centred upon an Anglo-French alliance. 
 
On succeeding James in 1625, Charles had concluded an Anglo-French 
marriage treaty that had made Henriette Marie his Queen.14 But the nuptials had 
been followed by war with France in 1627-9, which left Charles distinctly cool on 
the idea of a league with the French. The peace negotiations that led to the Treaty of 
Susa of 1629 and the ending of the Anglo-French War had also involved talks about 
an alliance between the two countries, but these had come to nothing.15 Leicester 
and his political allies would have been all too aware of these mixed precedents for a 




Charles’s foreign policy in the 1630s and the early 1640s has been characterized by 
most historians as aimless and confused – if it had any pattern at all it was that of 
being pro-Spanish. The implication is that Leicester’s Paris embassy was not 
important. In the late nineteenth century, S. R. Gardiner entitled a whole chapter of 
his History of England on the period 1629-35 as ‘Futile Diplomacy.’16 At the 
beginning of that chapter, Gardiner set out his opinion of the King’s foreign policy 
in general, which was entirely negative: 
 
Whatever he [Charles I] wanted he must achieve by wise foresight and by 
the confidence inspired by honesty of purpose and by readiness to postpone 
considerations of his own welfare to considerations of the general good. 
 
14 For the Anglo-French alliance of 1625 that resulted in the marriage of Charles I and 
Henriette Marie (1609-69), see Cogswell, Blessed Revolution, pp. 121-7 and 278-81 and Roger 
Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 
(1592-1628) (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 222-89. ‘Although styled “Henrietta Maria” by modern 
historians, she signed herself “Henriette Marie”, as one would expect of a French princess, and was 
known in England as Queen Mary.’ See David Scott, Leviathan: The Rise of Britain as a World 
Power (London: HarperPress, 2013), p. 497, footnote 68. 
 
15 For the putative Anglo-French alliance of 1629, see John S. A. Adamson, ‘Policy and 
Pomegranates: Art, Iconography and Counsel in Rubens’s Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy of 1629-1630’, 
in The Age of Rubens: Diplomacy, Dynastic Politics and the Visual Arts in Early Seventeenth-
Century Europe, ed. by L. Duerloo and R. Malcolm Smuts (Tourhout: Brepols, 2016), pp. 159-63. 
 




Nothing of this kind was to be expected from Charles … James [I] … at least 
… had a European policy. Charles had no European policy at all.17 
 
Gardiner also dismissed the possibility of an Anglo-French alliance. Writing on 
Leicester’s embassy in 1636, he confirmed his view that Charles was predominately 
pro-Spanish and by implication anti-French, stating that ‘Leicester’s negotiation 
[with France] was not rendered more easy by the evident leaning of Charles to 
Spain.’18 
 
Gardiner’s sentiments have pervaded much of the later historical writing on 
Charles’s diplomacy, in general, and on the Anglo-French negotiations of 1636-41, 
in particular. Towards the end of the twentieth century, Simon Adams and Lawrence 
Reeve both depicted the King’s foreign policy as fundamentally and irreversibly 
pro-Spanish. In an article written at the beginning of the 1980s on early Stuart 
diplomacy, Adams saw Charles as inherently distrustful of France (and the United 
Provinces), favouring Spain throughout the 1630s.19 He stated that ‘Charles I was 
equally, if not more, [than James I] fascinated by the Habsburg alliance.’20 On this 
reading, Charles’s support for war against Spain in the mid-1620s derived solely 
from his feelings of humiliation and betrayal arising from his failed wooing of the 
Spanish Infanta in Madrid in 1623. It was not the product of any deeper, principled 
hostility to Spain. In essence, Charles was virulently anti-French, as expressed in a 
letter to Henry Rich, Viscount Kensington (and future earl of Holland), of 13 August 
1624: ‘were [it] not for the respect I have for the person of Madame [Henriette 
Marie], I would not care a fart for their friendship. I mistrust them wholly.’21 In his 
book on the origins of the Personal Rule, Reeve expressed similar views later in the 
decade.22 In his opinion, at ‘an international level it was ultimately England’s 
 
17 Gardiner, History of England, VII, 169. 
 
18 Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 162. 
 
19 See Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, pp. 89-90, 93 and 101. 
 
20 Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, p. 89. 
 
21 Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, p. 90. 
 




relationship to Spain, Spanish policy in the Low Countries and in Germany and to 
the Spanish war economy, which had the greatest influence upon internal English 
developments during this period.’ And the ‘orientation of Charles’s regime towards 
the Hispanic world was an attitude of wide significance.’23 
 
Other historians have attached little or no significance to Leicester’s 
embassy. Jonathan Scott, in his study of the earl’s second son, Algernon Sidney, the 
republican politician and writer, wrote off the Paris mission: 
 
… the earl [Leicester] served a King [Charles I] attempting to run his foreign 
policy on a shoestring, by capricious flirtation with Europe’s leading 
[France], rather than secondary [Spain], power … [and] … sent to France [in 
1636] only in response to a temporary snub received from the Habsburgs, the 
increasingly frustrated Leicester was the doomed handmaiden of a strategy in 
which no serious commitment was ever intended.24 
 
Thea Lindquist, in her doctoral dissertation of 2001 on England’s relations with the 
Empire in the 1630s, viewed the King’s negotiations with the French in the second 
half of the 1630s as ‘a brief flirtation.’25 She does state that on ‘27 February 1637 
[new style], Charles signed the French treaty with some emendations.’ However, 
Lindquist does not note that there were two treaties – the so-called main and 
auxiliary treaties – or say that Charles had ratified both.26 Thereafter, she argues, in 
the summer of 1637, the ‘slow progress of the negotiations in Paris and the King’s 
subsequent embroilment in domestic affairs eventually conspired to block the 
[Anglo-French] alliance and precipitated a dramatic change in the direction of 
English foreign policy [back towards the Habsburgs].’27 
 
 
23 Reeve, Road to Personal Rule, pp. 4 and 182 respectively. 
 
24 Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic 1623-1677 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 75. 
 
25 See Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 479-88. 
 
26 Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, p. 481. For Charles I’s signing and ratification of the 
main and the auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to 
Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-located). 
 




Given this generally dismissive approach to Charles’s dealings with France 
in the 1630s, the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 that Leicester negotiated have been 
afforded little, if any, space in more general histories of the period.28 Gardiner in his 
History of England during the early Stuart period allocated only nine (out of a total 
of around three-and-a-half-thousand) pages to the treaties and to Leicester’s Paris 
embassy.29 Veronica Wedgewood and Conrad Russell when dealing with the years 
1637-41 and 1637-42 respectively – in other words, those covering the period of 
Leicester’s mission – both commented only briefly on the embassy.30 Where 
Leicester’s mission is mentioned, the references tend to be to peripheral aspects of 
the embassy itself and not to its scope and impact. Russell, for example, twice refers 
to the earl’s struggles to have his ambassadorial expenses paid and the implications 
of this for Leicester’s lukewarm support for Charles after 1642.31 However, he gives 
no space to the treaties themselves and the related discussions. Both Geoffrey Parker 
(in the 1990s) and Peter Wilson (in the 2000s) in their accounts of the Thirty Years 
War devote only a single paragraph to the treaties – a major diplomatic initiative that 
occupied the King and Leicester for five-and-a-half years.32 
 
Despite these assessments, four historians have adopted a more positive 
approach to the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and to the possibility of Charles 
concluding an alliance with Louis and Richelieu in the second half of the 1630s. The 
result is the development at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-
first centuries of a new orthodoxy towards Leicester’s embassy. As opposed to the 
wholly negative stance of the writers noted in the preceding paragraphs to the 
treaties of 1637, these authors’ view is that Leicester’s embassy and associated 
negotiations were of some importance up to the middle of 1637. However, they 
 
28 SP 103/11, fols 595-605: main and auxiliary Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637 and 
Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637. 
 
29 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 160-4, 204-5, 210 and 217. 
 
30 See C. Veronica Wedgwood, The King’s Peace 1637-1641 (London: Fontana, 1955), pp. 
243-4 and Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 124 and 497. 
 
31 See, for example, Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 165 and Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 497. 
 




conclude that the talks had little significance thereafter, or at least from 1638 
onwards, when the King was alleged to have reverted to his pro-Spanish position. 
These four historians, although more sensitive to the importance of Leicester’s 
mission, still regard the earl as ultimately having little chance of concluding an anti-
Habsburg league based upon France. 
 
Commencing in the late 1970s (and restated in the 2000s), Malcolm Smuts, 
in two articles dealing with the court circles surrounding Charles’s Queen, Henriette 
Marie, in the 1630s, was the first and foremost exponent of this new interpretation of 
the King’s dealings with France during the later 1630s.33 He argues that the 
prospects for a league with France were strong during the first half of 1637, and that 
their significance has not been properly appreciated: 
 
Historians have minimized the importance of the campaign within Whitehall 
for war with Spain, from 1635 to 1637. We know that nothing came of it; 
that in 1638 Charles was once again as pro-Spanish as he had been in 1634. 
Yet the efforts of Seneterre [Louis XIII’s extraordinary ambassador to 
Charles I] and his English allies are well worth careful scrutiny … because 
they came closer to success than is generally recognized …34 
 
Smuts further states that: ‘[d]uring the summer [of 1637], however, the entire 
scheme [for an Anglo-French league] slowly fell apart;’ ‘[b]y 1638, negotiations 
over the Anglo-French alliance became bogged down as Charles had second 
thoughts and resumed negotiations with Spain;’ and ‘[i]t is not entirely clear exactly 
when or why the momentum toward a French and Protestant alliance stalled, 
although there is some evidence that things were already starting to go wrong by the 
summer of 1637.’35 
 
In the early 1980s, the second historian in this group, Caroline Hibbard, in a 
book on the King and Catholic agitation and plotting in England prior to the Civil 
 
33 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9. 
 
34 Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36. 
 
35 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 40, for the first quotation and ‘Religion, 




War, adopted a similar approach.36 Hibbard describes what she terms as Charles’s 
‘rush to war [via the Anglo-French treaties].’ However, she concludes that this 
warlike momentum ‘slowed to a stroll by the late spring of 1637, then ground to a 
halt.’37 As with Smuts, she sees the King’s foreign policy in the late 1630s returning 
to a pro-Spanish groove: ‘… by the summer of 1637 it was clear that the English 
government was falling back on the familiar pattern of negotiation with the 
Habsburgs.’38 Kevin Sharpe, writing at the beginning of the 1990s on the Personal 
Rule, was the third historian to advance this view.39 He has written more extensively 
on the Anglo-French treaty negotiations than any other author, but even so only 
devotes ten-and-a-half pages to the topic out of a total of more than a thousand in his 
book on Charles’s government in the 1630s. Sharpe, too, argues that the treaties 
were an irrelevance by the end of 1637. 
 
The fourth and most recent historian to offer a positive interpretation of 
Leicester’s negotiations with the French – at least during the first half of 1637 – is 
Richard Cust. Yet his opinion is that Leicester’s negotiations, though they promised 
much, proved to be merely a brief aberration in the course of Caroline foreign 
policy: 
 
… in Paris the earl of Leicester laid the foundations for a treaty [sic] by 
which the English would offer France the assistance of their ship money fleet 
in return for French agreement to offer Lorraine as an exchange for the 
Palatinate. … By February 1637 there was widespread expectation … that 
the country [England] was about to go to war. However, in March the French 
started to quibble over the terms of the agreement … [and] By the end of the 
year England was firmly back in the Spanish camp and was to stay there for 
the remainder of the Personal Rule.40 
 
36 See Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5. 
 
37 Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 74. 
 
38 Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 75. 
 
39 See Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 525-36 and 825-34. 
 
40 Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also the brief reference to an Anglo-French 
league in Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English 
Protestant Thought, 1600-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 507-8: ‘This 
was simply one aspect of a fleeting attempt to muster anti-Habsburg forces through an alliance with 
France that was eventually abandoned in the wake of the Scottish troubles.’ See again Andrew D. 




Finally, Ian Atherton has advanced a further interpretation of Charles’s 
foreign policy in this period.41 Writing on the life of John Scudamore, Viscount 
Scudamore, Leicester’s uncooperative fellow ambassador in Paris, Atherton has 
suggested that the English King was trying to strike a balance between Bourbon 
France and Habsburg Spain and to keep diplomatic channels open to both. The aim 
was to exploit any contingencies that might arise to effect Charles Louis’s 
restoration. In Atherton’s words: 
 
Charles’s policy in the 1630s found considerable support. … There were … 
those who advocated that England should play what was seen as her 
traditional role in Europe, that of holding the balance between France and 
Spain and thereby make Charles the arbiter of war and peace. … This is what 
Charles was trying to do.42 
 
The three extant Anglo-French treaties of 1637 have not been examined in 
detail. For example, Gardiner limited himself to a short – one page – summation of 
the terms of the treaties of February.43 Smuts in the latter of his two articles on 
Henriette Marie’s court circle refers only to the French version of the auxiliary 
treaty of June 1637. He does not mention either of the two Latin versions of the 
treaties of February of that year.44 The Latin versions were important. Not only did 
Charles specifically authorize the drawing up of the two Latin treaties – the main 
and the auxiliary – but he also signed and ratified them.45 These treaties may be 
 
London, 1990), p. 13: ‘… as late as June 1637 the King [Charles I] was evidently prepared to go to 
war with Spain over the Palatinate if he could secure favourable terms of alliance with the French.’ 
 
41 See Ian J. Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-71): A Career at Court and in the 
Country, 1601-43’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1993), 
pp. 241-5 and Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career of John, First Viscount 
Scudamore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 171-219, especially pp. 177-9. 
 
42 Atherton, ‘Viscount Scudamore’, p. 243. 
 
43 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 210. 
 
44 See Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 28 and footnote 
83. See also BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637. 
 
45 See SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 
(mis-located) for Charles I’s drawing up, signing and ratifying the Latin versions of the main and the 




presumed to embody his views on an Anglo-French league. And they represented a 
clear commitment on his part to an Anglo-French military alliance. (See Chapter 3 
for a detailed discussion of the provisions of the two treaties.) In disregarding the 
Latin versions of the treaties, almost all historians have ignored the King’s 
perspective on a league with France. In an article written in the 1920s on the mission 
of Sir Thomas Roe, the Caroline diplomat, to the conference regarding the treaties 
held at Hamburg in 1638-40, Elmer Beller did refer to Charles’s Latin versions of 
the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637. However, Beller only 
considered their provisions in a single paragraph.46 Atherton also briefly notes the 
provisions of the treaties of February and June.47 Nevertheless, in many ways, the 
Latin versions of the treaties in The National Archives, Kew, in London, have been 
lost to history.48 Apart from Gardiner, Smuts, Beller and Atherton, few other 
historians have consulted, or even commented on, any of the three full (manuscript) 
versions of the treaties.49 
 
Leicester’s diplomatic correspondence, totalling more than 500 manuscript 
letters in the State Papers, France, again held at The National Archives, on the 
treaties and the French negotiations of 1636-41 has been neglected. Much of the 
ambassador’s correspondence was published by the antiquarian Arthur Collins in the 
eighteenth century but neither accurately nor exhaustively.50 The original manuscript 
letters have been only sporadically consulted and rarely cited by historians.51 
Leicester was in Paris and effectively negotiating with Richelieu through three 
important intermediaries – Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and Louis’s 
 
46 See Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 61-2. 
 
47 Atherton, ‘Viscount Scudamore’, pp. 201-3, especially p. 202, footnote 107 and Ambition 
and Failure in Stuart England, pp. 193-4. 
 
48 SP 103/11, fols 595-605: main and auxiliary Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637. 
 
49 See the (very) brief references in Parker, Thirty Years’ War, p. 149 and Wilson, Europe’s 
Tragedy, p. 594. 
 
50 See Collins, II, 370-666. 
 
51 See SP 78/101-11. See also Collins, II, 374-662 and De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 
44-412. For example, Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 525-36 primarily cites Collins and De L’Isle and 




Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Claude de Bullion, one of the French King’s 
surintendants des finances, and Père Joseph, the Capuchin friar François Leclerc du 
Tremblay, the famous ‘éminence grise’ and Richelieu’s confidant. The earl was in a 
prime position to advance the talks with the French and to report on their thinking to 
Charles and his advisors regarding an alliance between England and France. 
Leicester’s surviving correspondence is comprehensive, as, for more than five years, 
the earl wrote almost weekly to London. The recipients of his letters and co-
correspondents – Sir John Coke, Sir Francis Windebanke and Sir Henry Vane senior 
– were all Secretaries of State and influential in framing the King’s foreign policy. 
Key missives that the ambassador received from London, notably Coke’s letter of 18 
February 1637, in which the Secretary outlined Charles’s thoughts behind the 
drawing up, signing and ratification of the Latin versions of the Anglo-French 
treaties, contain material in the King’s own hand.52 These letters reveal Charles’s 
direct involvement in the negotiations with the French and the significance of 
Leicester’s embassy. The earl’s correspondence is, therefore, not only the largest, 
but also the most significant body of evidence on the King’s diplomacy in the 
second half of the 1630s and arguably of the entire Personal Rule. 
 
Most historians, subject to some notable exceptions, have based their 
conclusions on Leicester’s Paris embassy, the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and the 
related negotiations on, at best, a cursory examination of (some of) the sources and, 
thereafter, a series of assumptions. This thesis will rectify the neglect of these two 
sets of key (manuscript) sources – the three treaties and Leicester’s correspondence 
– in respect of Charles’s foreign policy in the period 1636-41. It will also challenge 
the view that Leicester’s mission was essentially futile, and that the King’s 
diplomacy in the late 1630s was uncomplicatedly pro-Spanish. Such a perspective is 
myopic and inaccurate. As this thesis will demonstrate, there was a reasonable 
prospect of a successful outcome to the Anglo-French negotiations and Charles 
maintained his pro-French policy up to October 1639 – well beyond the period when 
his supposedly insincere flirtation with an Anglo-French league is thought to have 
ended. 
 






Leicester’s embassy to Louis of 1636-41 presents an opportunity to reassess 
Charles’s foreign policy and court politics. The main consideration here is not 
merely the possibility that the King might have been more committed to an alliance 
with France than has previously been thought. For, in establishing, as this thesis 
aims to do, that an Anglo-French league was his primary diplomatic objective 
between February 1637 and October 1639, it becomes necessary to reassess our 
understanding of Charles as a king and politician. To make such a case requires 
recognition of the fact that he was more appreciative of the nuances of the European 
diplomatic and strategic scene than he has generally been given credit for. It would 
also refute one of Gardiner’s central contentions that the King lacked a credible 
‘European’ foreign policy.53 Moreover, the assessment of Charles’s diplomacy 
offered here challenges the idea that he was largely devoid of political skills. For 
instance, it is likely that the King pursued an Anglo-French alliance partly with an 
eye to retaining the loyalty and services of several very influential and capable 
figures in his court and government – notably, Algernon Percy, tenth earl of 




Based on an examination of the three surviving Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and 
Leicester’s diplomatic correspondence, this thesis will argue that all previous 
interpretations of the English King’s negotiations with France in 1636-41 are either 
erroneous or inadequate. In particular, four propositions will be advanced. Firstly, it 
will be contended that for the three-and-a-half years between May 1636 and 
October1639, Charles tried his best to secure an alliance with France. For two-and-
three-quarter years from February 1637 to October 1639, it will be asserted that 
securing an anti-Habsburg French league was the King’s primary foreign-policy 
aim. So much for Charles’s pro-Spanish stance throughout the 1630s or his time-
limited commitment to an alliance with France that has been insisted on by 
historians. 
 





Secondly, it will be advanced that the King’s diplomacy during the later 
1630s was realistic in that it was a rational response to the predicament that he faced 
as the ruler of a second-rank power. First-rank nations, notably France and Spain, 
were happy to negotiate with Charles with no serious intention of entering into an 
alliance with him but merely as a means of stringing him along in order to ensure 
that he did not ally with their enemies.54 The King, therefore, while primarily 
focussing on securing a league with France, kept open low-level communications 
with the Spanish as a way of applying diplomatic pressure to Louis and Richelieu. 
Charles’s objective was to remind the French that he was not without other options 
should they refuse to negotiate with him for a treaty in good faith. 
 
The third proposition will argue that the King’s policy was a practical 
solution to the impasse that Maximilian of Bavaria posed to any restoration of the 
dignities and lands of the Prince Elector. Overall, Charles had two possible 
approaches to overcoming this problem. He could attempt to attain his objective by 
way of an alliance with France – this, in spite of the fact that Louis and Richelieu 
were courting Maximilian as an ally.55 Such an approach, though difficult, held out 
at least the possibility of success. The English King could make an offer to the 
French King and the Cardinal that they might, under certain circumstances, accept. 
For example, France’s international position might deteriorate to such an extent that 
Louis and Richelieu had little choice but to negotiate an alliance with Charles. 
 
54 See, for example, Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. See also John H. Elliott, 
‘England and Europe: A Common Malady?’, in The Origins of the English Civil War, ed. by Conrad 
Russell (London: MacMillan, 1973), p. 246, who regards this aim as a secondary objective of 
Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) and Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645). 
 
55 See, for example, the secret Franco-Bavarian Treaty of Fontainebleau of May 1631, 
applying up to 1638 when French forces came into conflict with those of the Catholic League, which 
was controlled, in effect, by Maximilian I of Bavaria (1573-1651), at the Battle of Rheinfelden of 
February/March of the latter year. For the Treaty of Fontainebleau, see Parker, Thirty Years’ War, p. 
108 and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 465. It is not apparent if Charles I was aware of the treaty. 
However, the treaty only had a limited effect on Leicester’s embassy of May 1636 to October 1641, 
as, for most of the period of its existence, both sides regarded it as unenforceable and it ceased to 
have any operative implications in early 1638, only a year and a half into the earl’s mission, when 
hostilities broke out between France and the Catholic League led by Bavaria. For the Battle of 
Rheinfelden, fought in South-central Germany between 18/28 February and 21 February/2 March 
1638, in which an army in the pay of France, led by the German Protestant mercenary, Duke Bernard 
of Saxe-Weimar (1604-39), defeated the forces of Bavaria and the Empire, see Wilson, Europe’s 




Alternatively, the King could try to obtain the restitution of the Prince Palatine by 
way of the Empire directly or indirectly through Spain. However, given the 
diplomatic, dynastic, financial and military dependence of the Imperialists on the 
Bavarian duke, any such policy was almost certainly doomed to failure, as 
Maximilian would not consent to the Emperor offering the kind of concessions that 
would make an Anglo-Imperial alliance worthwhile from Charles’s perspective.56 
Consequently, between February 1637 and October 1639, the King realistically 
pursued the difficult, yet attainable, route of a French alliance, as opposed to the 
essentially impossible course of a league with the Habsburg powers. 
 
Fourthly, it will be maintained that the diplomatic and strategic position in 
Europe was subject to revolutionary change as a result of Spain’s defeat by the 
Dutch at the Battle of the Downs in October 1639. Given Spain’s pressing need to 
re-establish communications with Flanders via the ‘English Road’ through the 
Channel, the battle fundamentally altered that country’s position. Charles was 
presented with an opportunity for a naval alliance with the Spanish in respect of 
which Maximilian would not represent an insuperable obstacle. The purpose of such 
an alliance would not be the restitution of the dignities and lands of Charles Louis. 
By then both the English King and Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, the 
chief minister of Philip IV of Spain, had more pressing problems to contend with – 
for Charles, how to restore domestic order in his realms and, for the Spanish 
minister, how to reopen communications with Flanders. It was this transformation of 
the European strategic situation, the diplomatic implications of which have gone 
generally unnoticed by historians, rather than the embarrassment to the English King 
of two foreign powers fighting in England’s waters, that represents the true 
importance of the Battle of the Downs.57 The possibility of an Anglo-Spanish league 
 
56 Which is what happened to Arundel’s abortive mission to Ferdinand II of April to 
November 1636. 
 
57 For comments of historians regarding the embarrassment to Charles I of the Dutch victory at 
the Battle of the Downs in October 1639, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 69; Thrush, ‘The 
Navy under Charles I’, p. 14; Bernard S. Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, in The Civil Wars. A Military 
History of Scotland, Ireland and England 1638-1660, ed. by John P. Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 157; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, pp. 191-2. 
Patricia Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Southampton, 1978), p. 188 is an exception in ascribing some diplomatic 
importance to the battle. 
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ended with the destabilization of the Spanish monarchy by the Catalonian revolt and 
the Portuguese revolution of June and December 1640 respectively and Charles’s 
defeat by the Scots at the Battle of Newburn in August of the same year. The latter 
event was immediately followed by the King’s loss of control of his southern 
kingdom. 
 
The perspective of Charles’s most powerful Protestant subjects will be 
considered in what is, in effect, a fifth proposition of this thesis. It will be argued 
that between 1624 and 1642, these individuals pursued a consistent policy of 
championing the Protestant cause at home and abroad and that the Anglo-French 
treaty negotiations of 1636-41 formed an integral part of their plans. It will also be 
maintained that the ultimate failure of the French negotiations was one reason why 
previously faithful and influential royal servants and Leicester’s political allies, 
notably, Northumberland and Vane senior, would oppose the King in the Civil War. 
Thus, Charles’s turning away from an Anglo-French alliance towards one with 
Spain in 1639-40 did much to alienate key members of his Protestant nobility, and 
contributed greatly to the political breakdown of 1640-2. 
 
Within the framework of these propositions regarding the three (surviving) 
Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and Leicester’s embassy to Louis, this thesis will also 
consider a number of more specific questions – why did the King choose Leicester 
for the French embassy, why did the earl accept the mission to Paris, and how 
effective was Leicester as a diplomat and politician? More generally, this thesis will 
explore what the earl’s mission has to tell us about the Thirty Years War (and the 
concurrent Franco-Spanish War) in the second half of the 1630s and about court 
politics during the increasingly fraught years between the outbreak of the 










ambassador to Louis? Leicester came from a long line of ambitious and loyal, if 
often frustrated, servants of the crown. It was no coincidence that Tacitus’s 
biography of his father-in-law, Agricola, a long-suffering governor of Roman 
Britain, was a favourite read for many of the Sidney men.58 In their various roles as 
royal servants, the Sidneys frequently demonstrated ambition and considerable 
administrative ability and political skill. Although generally devoted servants of the 
crown, they were hostile to the trend at court and in the church from the 1580s 
onwards that exalted royal prerogative relative to Parliament and the idea of a 
legally-bounded monarchy.59 
 
The Sidney family were steadfast champions of the Protestant cause from the 
time of the English Reformation onwards. For the Sidneys and other godly members 
of the political nation, supporting Protestantism entailed more than just passively 
defending England against the threat from continental Catholicism. As Adams stated 
in his thesis on the Protestant cause and English foreign policy between 1585 and 
1630: 
 
… the Protestant Cause should be seen not merely as a response to Catholic 
threats, but as a positive force which posed the central problem to English 
foreign policy in this period. Not only did England have the central role to 
play in the creation of working religious alliances with continental Protestant 
states; but the defence of religion was the leading motive for English 
intervention on the continent …60 
 
 
58 See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 48-52 for a discussion of the Sidneys’ attitude 
towards royal service and the importance of Tacitus’s Agricola to the family. See also Blair Worden, 
‘Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution’, in History and Imagination: Essays in Honour 
of H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl and Blair Worden (London: 
Duckworth, 1981), pp. 182-200. For Leicester, in particular, see Germaine Warkentin, ‘The World 
and the Book at Penshurst: The Second Earl of Leicester (1595-1677) and His Library’, The Library, 
6th ser., 20 (1998), 325-46 and ‘Humanism in Hard Times: The Second Earl of Leicester (1595-
1677) and His Commonplace Books, 1630-60’, in Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of 
Dominic Baker-Smith, ed. by Ton Hoenselaars and Arthur F. Kinney (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 229-53. 
 
59 See, in general, Worden, ‘Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution’. For 
Leicester, in particular, see Warkentin, ‘The World and the Book at Penshurst’ and ‘Humanism in 
Hard Times’. 
 
60 Simon L. Adams, ‘The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the West European 
Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 




Support for the Protestant cause in Europe embraced those Englishmen at Charles’s 
court and in the country at large, who wished to see England’s prestige restored by it 
playing an active role in Europe, especially in the Thirty Years War. The 
programme found its clearest expression in opposition to the forces of the Counter-
Reformation that were marshalled under the banners of the Austrian and Spanish 
Habsburgs during the first half of the seventeenth century. The alarm felt by 
Protestant Englishmen at the rise of continental Catholicism had substance. 
According to Wilson ‘[w]hereas half of Europe had been under Protestant rule in 
1590, that proportion fell to a fifth a century later with the most significant Catholic 
gains made in the Habsburg monarchy.’61 And as Jonathan Scott states, the 1620s 
were ‘a decade of disaster for European Protestantism.’62 Bohemia and the 
Palatinate had fallen before the Catholic onslaught – would it be England’s turn 
next? 
 
The Sidneys exemplified the strong link in Elizabethan and early Stuart 
England between antagonism towards a ‘free [unfettered] monarchy’ and fervour in 
the Protestant cause.63 Arbitrary government was equated in Protestant minds with 
popish political and spiritual tyranny. Resisting these insidious forces demanded not 
only the defence of English ‘liberties’ at home, but also military intervention against 
Catholic aggression abroad.64 
 
61 Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 759, citing D. MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House 
Divided 1490-1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 669-70. See also Jonathan Scott, England’s 
Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 29-30: ‘Between 1590 and 1690 the geographical reach of 
protestantism shrank from one-half to one fifth of the land area of the continent.’ See again Johnathan 
Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 8: ‘It [the seventeenth century] was a century of disaster for European Protestantism, 
which was reduced in its course to the fringes of the continent, from more than 50 per cent to under 
20 per cent of its total area.’ See yet again Christopher Thompson, ‘The Divided Leadership of the 
House of Commons in 1629’, in Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History, ed. by 
Kevin Sharpe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 245: ‘The decade that began in 1620 was 
one of terrible conflict. It was a period of conflict in Europe that witnessed the almost continuous 
advance of Catholic armies and that threatened to end in the extinction of the cause of continental 
Protestantism.’ 
 
62 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 100. 
 
63 For the concept of ‘free monarchy,’ see Scott, Leviathan, pp. 65-6, 98-9, 104-12, 127-35 and 
140-9. 
 
64 For the Sidneys’ involvement in a faction that espoused such policies in the reign of 




Starting with the exploits of Sir William Sidney, Leicester’s great-
grandfather, at the Battle of Flodden in 1513, when an English force defeated an 
invading army led by the Scottish King, James IV, in North-East England, the 
Sidneys steadily rose in importance and influence in the reigns of the Tudor and 
Stuart Kings and Queens.65 Sir William was made a Knight of the Garter, and was 
selected to supervise the early education of Edward VI, Henry VIII’s only legitimate 
son and heir.66 He progressed the family’s fortunes by judicious marital and political 
alliances with other prominent aristocratic families, notably, under Edward VI, with 
John Dudley, duke of Northumberland, the most influential advisor to that king in 
the second half of his reign.67 So close did Sir William become to Dudley, that Sir 
William’s son and Leicester’s grandfather, Henry, wedded one of the duke’s 
daughters, Mary. Thus, the Sidneys were closely related by marriage to the doomed 
Lady Jane Grey – her husband was the duke’s youngest son, Lord Guildford Dudley 
– the ‘Nine Days’ Queen,’ whom Edward and Dudley tried to place on the English 
throne instead of Mary Tudor. The family showed its political fleet of foot in 
successfully negotiating the problems posed by the death of the teenage Protestant 
Edward, who had greatly favoured them, and the accession of the King’s older 
sister, the Catholic Mary I.68 This was a characteristic that the Sidneys would 
demonstrate during the remainder of the sixteenth century and frequently in the 
seventeenth. 
 
Sir Henry Sidney, the head of the family following his father’s death in 
1554, succeeded in obtaining preferment under Mary. He named his eldest son, the 
 
Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics (London: Yale University Press, 
1996), especially p. xxii. 
 
65 For Sir William Sidney (c.1482-1554) and his actions at the Battle of Flodden in 1513 in the 
time of Henry VIII (1491-1547), see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 2 and 8-11. 
 
66 For Sir William Sidney becoming a Knight of the Garter and his involvement in the 
education of Edward VI (1537-53), see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 2 and 20. 
 
67 See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 12-6, 16-9 and 20-6. 
 





future Sir Philip Sidney and the renowned Elizabethan poet, after the English 
Queen’s husband and co-ruler, Philip II of Spain. However, Sir Henry struggled to 
obtain advancement in the reign of Mary’s younger Protestant sister, Elizabeth I.69 
He served Elizabeth in the roles of President of the Council in the Marches of Wales 
(from 1571) and as Lord Deputy of Ireland for two terms (in 1566-71 and 1575-8). 
Sir Henry suffered from the fact that these posts were not at court, and kept him 
away from the royal presence and further preferment. The likeliest explanation for 
this royal reserve towards him is that Elizabeth was wary of the Sidneys as known 
allies of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester – one of the sons of the duke of 
Northumberland. The Queen was, therefore, trying to maintain some balance 
between the factions at her court by checking the power of the Dudleys and their 
supporters. The marriage of Sir Henry’s daughter, Mary, to Henry Herbert, second 
earl of Pembroke, in 1577 connected the Sidneys to another up-and-coming 
Protestant family in the Elizabethan aristocracy, whose power base in South-East 
Wales and political and religious interests were aligned with those of the Sidneys.70 
 
Sir Henry Sidney and his eldest son, Sir Philip Sidney, both died in 1586, the 
latter of a wound suffered in the Spanish victory over the Dutch and the English at 
the Battle of Zutphen in the eastern United Provinces. The leadership of the family 
passed to Sir Philip’s younger brother and Leicester’s father, Sir Robert Sidney. As 
with his father before him, Sir Robert obtained preferment under Elizabeth, but 
again, to his disappointment, not at court.71 He became governor of Flushing (1589-
1616), one of the two cautionary towns in the United Provinces (the other being 
Brill) granted by the Dutch to the English under the Treaty of Nonsuch of 1585. Sir 
Robert’s marriage in 1584 to the much sought-after wealthy Welsh heiress, Barbara 
Gamage, further increased the Sidneys’ fortunes.72 
 
69 For Sir Henry Sidney and Elizabeth I, see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 31-47 and 69-
92. 
 
70 See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 67, 69 and 72. 
 
71 For Sir Robert Sidney and Elizabeth I, see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 93-105 and 
Robert Shephard, ‘Sidney, Robert, first earl of Leicester (1563-1626)’, ODNB. 
 






Throughout the 1590s, Sir Robert Sidney was associated politically and by 
family ties with Elizabeth’s favourite, Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex.73 
However, as with his father before him during the transition from Edward to Mary 
in the 1550s, Sir Robert successfully avoided any fallout from Essex’s failed coup of 
1601 – when the earl attempted to take control of Elizabeth and her court. Once 
again he had demonstrated the family’s political acumen.74 Sir Robert had 
maintained good relations with the other main faction at the late Elizabethan court – 
the Cecils – represented first by William, Lord Burghley, the Queen’s Lord 
Treasurer until his death in 1598, and then by Burghley’s younger son, Secretary of 
State, Sir Robert Cecil. 
 
Sir Robert Sidney assiduously cultivated James VI of Scotland, who would 
become James I of England.75 On James’s accession to the English throne in 1603, 
he was made a baron. Shortly afterwards he was again favoured by the King, 
becoming Lord Chamberlain to James’s Queen, Anne of Denmark. In 1606, he 
moved further up the aristocratic pecking order, becoming Viscount Lisle, obtaining 
a seat in the House of Lords. In 1618, he was made the first Sidney earl of Leicester, 
adopting the title in honour of his maternal uncle, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester. 
 
Robert Sidney, the future second earl of Leicester, was born on 1 December 
1595 at Baynard’s Castle, the London residence of the earls of Pembroke and the 
Sidneys’ relatives by marriage.76 In 1610, he was created a knight of the Bath and, in 
 
73 Sir Robert Sidney was the nephew of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester (1532/3-88), while 
Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex (1565-1601), was Dudley’s godson and political heir in 
championing the Protestant cause. 
 
74 See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 105-13 and Shephard, ‘Sidney, Robert, first earl of 
Leicester’. 
 
75 For Robert Sidney, Baron Sidney, Viscount Sidney and the first Sidney earl of Leicester, in 
the reign of James VI and I, see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 114-8 and 125-31 and Shephard, 
‘Sidney, Robert, first earl of Leicester’. 
 
76 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’. The second earl was not the eldest 
son of the first earl. William (1590-1612), the eldest, had died in 1612, while another older brother, 




1613-14, served under his father with the Flushing garrison.77 He married Dorothy 
Percy, the eldest daughter of Henry Percy, ninth earl of Northumberland in 1616 – 
the ‘wizard’ earl, so-called because of his interest in science and alchemy – and 
Lady Dorothy Devereux (Perrott).78 The marriage was a risk for the young Sir 
Robert – and, indeed, remained secret until 1618 – for since 1605 his father-in-law 
had been imprisoned in the Tower of London under suspicion of involvement in the 
Gunpowder Plot. Moreover, Sidney’s mother-in-law was the elder sister of the 
second earl of Essex, who had been executed in 1601 following his rebellion against 
Elizabeth. Nevertheless, the union extended the Sidneys’ connections to two more of 
the most powerful aristocratic families in England – the Percy earls of 
Northumberland and the Devereux earls of Essex – adding to the Sidney-Herbert 
axis established in the previous century. Sir Robert’s marriage resulted in a close 
political partnership with Dorothy’s younger brother, Algernon Percy, tenth earl of 
Northumberland, who would figure prominently in Leicester’s career during the 
1630s as his prime supporter at the Caroline court.79 
 
During the 1610s and 1620s, Sidney served a political and military 
apprenticeship appropriate to his rank and his family’s distinguished record as royal 
servants.80 At home, he gained valuable political experience as MP for Wilton, in 
Wiltshire, in the Addled Parliament of 1614, for Kent in 1621 and for 
Monmouthshire in the Parliaments of 1624 and 1625.81 In August of 1618, on his 
 
77 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’. 
 
78 Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 214, Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 128 
and Germaine Warkentin, ‘Robert Sidney (1595-1677), Second Earl of Leicester’, in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to The Sidneys, 1500-1700, 1: Lives, ed. by Margaret P. Hannay, Michael G. 
Brennan and Mary E. Lamb (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 123-4 all give 1616 as the date of the 
marriage. Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ states that the wedding took place in 
1615, but 1616 is the year used here. 
 
79 For evidence of the closeness of the relationship between Leicester and Algernon Percy, 
tenth earl of Northumberland (1602-68), see, for example, Collins, II, 370-3: Leicester to 
Northumberland, [28 September]/8 October 1632: see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 
85/1. 
 
80 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ and Warkentin, ‘Humanism in Hard 
Times’, p. 229, the latter regarding the embassy of May 1619, when Viscount Lisle accompanied 
James Hay, Viscount Doncaster (c1580-1636), on an embassy to the Empire in an attempt to mediate 
between its conflicting political groups. 
 
81 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’. 
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father’s promotion to first earl of Leicester, Sir Robert became Viscount Lisle. His 
father died on 13 July 1626 and he acceded as second earl of Leicester.82 
 
The Sidneys’ estates were concentrated in Kent, the midlands and – 
following the first earl’s marriage to Barbara Gamage, the wealthy Welsh heiress, in 
1584 – South-East Wales. By Leicester’s time, the family was one of the wealthiest 
in England, and in terms of rank and status was second only to great aristocratic 
dynasties such as the Percy earls of Northumberland and the Howard earls of 
Arundel. The power base of the Sidneys was Penshurst Place, the family home in 
Kent.83 At the end of the sixteenth century, Leicester’s father fought a running battle 
for supremacy with the Cobhams in the county, only ending in 1604 with the latter’s 
downfall as a result of their involvement in the Bye and the Main Plots of 1603, both 
conspiracies against James I.84 Two of the parliamentary constituencies that 
Leicester sat for before becoming the second earl – Wilton (in 1614) and Monmouth 
(in 1624 and 1625) – were in the gift of the Herberts, further demonstrating the 
importance of the link between these two noble families. 
 
Leicester was a Calvinist, though his religious views were broad and 
relatively tolerant. For example, the earl was on very good terms with the Dutch 
Remonstrant (Arminian), Hugo Grotius, the renowned philosopher and Sweden’s 
ambassador in Paris.85 His favoured chaplain at Penshurst Place was Henry 
 
 
82 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’. 
 
83 Penshurst Place, the family home since the mid-sixteenth century, is near Tonbridge in West 
Kent. It was gifted to Sir William Sidney by Edward VI in 1552. See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, 
p. 3. See also https://www.penshurstplace.com. 
 
84 See Mark Nicholls, ‘Brooke, Henry, eleventh Baron Cobham (1564-1619)’, ODNB and 
‘Brooke, George (1568-1603)’, ODNB. 
 
85 Arminianism was a form of Protestantism that had been developed by the Dutch theologian 
Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609) towards the end of the sixteenth and at the beginning of the 
seventeenth centuries. Arminius’s theology denied or placed less emphasis on the orthodox Calvinist 
doctrine of predestination. For the Arminian-Calvinist controversy in England in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, see, in general, Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English 
Arminianism c.1590-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Milton, Catholic and 
Reformed. For the religious views of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), see Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, pp. 20, 
68, 70, 85 and 119 and Milton, Catholic and Reformed, pp. 264-6, 268, 350, 361, 391-2, 435-8, 445 
and 519. In the United Provinces, the Remonstrants upheld Arminius’s theology and were associated 
with the regents (the wealthy merchant class) and were opposed by the Counter-Remonstrants, based 
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Hammond, another reputed Arminian and future royal chaplain.86 He objected 
strongly to being called a Puritan, as he made clear in his letter to Charles regarding 
the allegation to that effect made against him by the Catholic Sir Kenelm Digby, the 
Caroline courtier and diplomat.87 Nevertheless, his attitude towards the Reformed 
(Calvinist) churches on the continent was positive. He honoured the Sidney family 
tradition of supporting the Huguenot cause in attending the Reformed Church at 
Charenton in Paris during his embassy.88 Predictably, Leicester was aligned with the 
court opponents of William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and had little 
sympathy for the latter’s objective of recasting the Church of England as both 
different and separate from the Reformed churches on the continent.89 Viscount 
Scudamore, Charles’s ordinary ambassador in Paris and Laud’s political and 
religious ally, did not attend the Reformed Church at Charenton, but, rather, the 
English Chapel in the French capital.90 The religious differences between the two 
ambassadors led to tension between them and disputes between their chaplains.91 
 
Leicester’s first major diplomatic appointment, and his earliest political act 
 
around the House of Orange and lower social groups. For details of the Remonstrant-Counter 
Remonstrant conflict in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 382, 
390, 393-5, 422-9, 452-77, 480-2, 487-96, 499-505 and 512-3. 
 
86 For Leicester and Dr Henry Hammond, who supported Charles I in the English Civil War, 
see Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 145, 152 and 157 and Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, 
p. 521. For Hammond becoming a royal chaplain in 1647, see Hugh de Quehen, ‘Hammond, Henry 
(1605-1660)’, ODNB. 
 
87 See De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 355-8: Leicester to Charles I, c.1640; see also De 
L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 124/2. Sir Kenelm Digby was, as well as being a courtier and 
diplomat, a natural philosopher, man of letters, writer on food and herbs, poet, sailor, notorious court 
Catholic and favourite of Henriette Marie. See Michael Foster, ‘Digby, Sir Kenelm (1603-1665)’, 
ODNB. 
 
88 See Michael G. Brennan, ‘The Sidneys and the Continent: The Stuart Period’, in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to The Sidneys, 1: Lives, ed. by Hannay, Brennan and Lamb, p. 232. 
 
89 See, for example, the education of Leicester’s two eldest sons, Philip Sidney, Viscount Lisle 
(1619-98), and Algernon Sidney (1623-83) at the official residence (palace) of John Williams, Bishop 
of Lincoln (1582-1650) – Buckden Towers, in Cambridgeshire – who was in trouble with Charles I 
through-out the 1620s and 1630s, especially in 1637, for his political and (Calvinist) religious views. 
 
90 See Brennan, ‘The Sidneys and the Continent’, p. 232. 
 
91 For the disputes involving the chaplains of Leicester and John Scudamore, Viscount 
Scudamore (1601-71), see Milton, Catholic and Reformed, p. 205. See also Scott, Algernon Sidney 
and the English Republic, pp. 76-7 for tension between Leicester and his two eldest sons, Viscount 




of significance in Charles’s reign, was his embassy to Christian IV, the King of 
Denmark, undertaken between September and November 1632.92 The ostensible 
reason for the mission was to offer the English King’s condolences to the Danish 
King on the death in 1631 of the latter’s mother, Sophie of Mecklenburg-Güstrow, 
reputedly the second wealthiest individual in Europe.93 However, the real motive 
behind the embassy was to try to secure Christian’s acceptance of Charles’s claim to 
a share of Sophie’s inheritance as payment for the monies that the English King’s 
late father, James, owed to the Danish monarch.94 Leicester was also to attempt to 
involve Christian in the Thirty Years War (again), and to sound him out on how he 
stood with regard to Sweden’s projected anti-Habsburg league.95 
 
Leicester would succeed in none of these aims. Christian had effective 
possession of his mother’s inheritance and was very unlikely to regard part of it as 
payment for the sums promised to him by James. Following his defeat at the Battle 
of Lutter in North Germany in 1626, the Danish King had scaled back his opposition 
to the Empire.96 Christian was also more likely to fight Gustavus II Adolphus, the 
Swedish King and his Nordic rival, than to ally with him. The earl’s mission was 
overtaken by events as a result of Gustavus’s death at the Battle of Lützen in 
November 1632 in eastern Germany.97 Nonetheless, Leicester had successfully 
 
92 See Reginald Cant, ‘The Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark in 1632’, EHR, 54 
(1939), 252-62 for details of the earl’s mission to Christian IV of Denmark (1577-1648) in 1632. See 
also De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 12-38: Leicester’s Journal of his Embassy to Denmark in 
1632. 
 
93 Cant, ‘Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark’, 253. For the relative wealth of Sophie 
of Mecklenburg-Güstrow (1557-1631), see Parker, Thirty Years’ War, pp. 64-5 and Wilson, Europe’s 
Tragedy, pp. 172-3. Europe’s wealthiest individual was seemingly Maximilian I of Bavaria, with 
Christian IV of Denmark, the third richest. 
 
94 Cant, ‘Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark’, 254. Sophie of Mecklenburg-Güstrow 
was Charles I’s maternal grandmother. 
 
95 Cant, ‘Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark’, 255. 
 
96 For a description of the Battle of Lutter in North Germany, which was fought on 17/27 
August 1626, between the forces of Christian IV of Denmark and the combined armies of the 
Catholic League and the Empire, under the victorious command of Tilly, see Wilson, Europe’s 
Tragedy, pp. 414-6. 
 
97 For a description of the Battle of Lützen in eastern Germany, fought on 6/16 November 
1632, between the armies of Sweden and its allies, led by Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632), and the 
forces of the Empire and the Catholic League, commanded by the seventeenth century condottieri 
Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Wallenstein (1583-1634) and the Imperial general Gottfried Heinrich 
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navigated his way through a potentially difficult embassy without causing damage 
or offence. 
 
Having passed the first major test of his political career, Leicester had 
established himself as an able statesman and one of Charles’s foremost diplomats. In 
so doing, he was following in the footsteps of his predecessors, for diplomacy in the 
monarch’s service was something that all three previous generations of Sidneys – his 
great-grandfather, Sir William, his grandfather, Sir Henry, his uncle, Sir Philip, and 
his father, the first earl – had all undertaken, generally successfully. Leicester’s own 
ambitions in this direction were greatly served by his connection to three influential 
noble families – the Devereuxs, the Herberts and the Percys – and their own 
distinguished record of crown service. Equally important was his membership of a 
group of leading anti-Spanish politicians at court that Charles could not ignore or 
sideline without risking destabilizing his government and alienating the political 
nation more generally. 
 
Leicester’s character and ability were not regarded with universal acclaim by 
his contemporaries. Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, the advisor to, and the minister 
of, Charles I and Charles II respectively, famously described Leicester as ‘very 
conversant in books, and much addicted to the mathematics,’ and ‘in truth rather a 
speculative than a practical man; and expected a greater certitude in the consultation 
of business than the business of the world is capable of,’ with a ‘staggering and 
irresolution in his nature.’98 Leicester’s second and favoured son, Algernon Sidney, 
noted that his father ‘writ his own mind to see what he could think of it another time, 
and blot it out again may be.’99 The earl revealed much about the workings of his 
mind in a letter to his sister-in-law, Lucy Percy Hay, the dowager countess of 
 
Graf zu Pappenheim (1594-1632), see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 507-11. Given the death of 
Gustavus II Adolphus, the battle can be regarded as only a Pyrrhic victory for the Swedes. 
 
98 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’, citing Lord Clarendon, The History 
of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, ed. by W. D. Macray, 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888-1992), II (1992), 531. See also Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 268-9. 
 
99 See Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’, citing Scott, Algernon Sidney and 




Carlisle, in the late summer of 1642:100 
 
… I am environed by such contradictions, as I can neither get from them, nor 
reconcyle them [Parliament or Charles I]. The Parliament bids me go 
presently [to Ireland]; the King commands me to stay till he dispatch me. 
The supplyes of the one, and the authority of the other, are equally necessary. 
I know not how to obtain them both, and am more likely to have neither; for 
now they are at such extremes, as to please the one is scarce possible, unless 
the other be opposed … How soon I shall get myself out of this labyrinth I 
cannot tell your ladyship …101 
 
This evidence points to a man of an insecure and nervous, even neurotic, 
temperament. However, Leicester would acquit himself well and with honour in the 
testing circumstances of the Paris embassy, caught between Charles’s insistence on 
only a limited naval commitment to any Anglo-French alliance and the greater 
demands and the obfuscation and prevarication of Louis and Richelieu.102 There was 
no evidence of indecision or of a lack of self-confidence in his correspondence with 
the three Secretaries of State with whom he dealt in 1636-41 – Coke, Windebanke 
and Vane senior – or with the King in relation to the often demanding, difficult and 
tense negotiations surrounding the Anglo-French treaties and the Paris mission in 
general. The challenge facing him was all the greater in that he had to contend, if 
only indirectly, with one of the ablest politicians of his age – Cardinal Richelieu. In 
his embassy to the French King, as this thesis will show, the earl demonstrated more 
political acumen and nerve than he has been credited with. Leicester’s panic in the 
late summer of 1642 is better viewed in the light of the predicament facing all 
leading politicians at that time – which side to choose in the impending Civil War.103 
 
100 See Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xx-ii: Leicester to countess of Carlisle, 25 August 1642. 
For further evidence of Leicester’s then fragile state of mind, see Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xxii-
iv: Leicester to countess of Carlisle, 12 September 1642 and Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 263-8: 
Leicester to Northumberland, 9 September 1642. 
 
101 Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xxi-ii: Leicester to countess of Carlisle, 25 August 1642. 
 
102 This is also the view of Germaine Warkentin. See Warkentin, ‘Humanism in Hard Times’, 
p. 234, who describes Leicester’s performance in his mission to Louis XIII (1601-43) as ‘capable.’ 
For Leicester’s correspondence during the Paris embassy of 1636-41, see SP 78/101-11; see also 
Collins, II, 374-666. 
 
103 Leicester was a diplomat and, therefore, somewhat out of his depth when the fighting began 
in August 1642. In this context, Sir Thomas Roe, another prominent Caroline envoy, also 
experienced significant difficulties in 1642-4. See Michael Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe 1581-1644: A 
Life (Salisbury: Michael Russell Publishing, 1989) pp. 265-83. 
 
29 
To this general quandary was added the earl’s particular problem in reconciling the 
conflicting demands of Charles and Parliament in relation to the Lord Lieutenancy 
of Ireland.104 Leicester was unable to resolve these personal and political dilemmas 
and, as a result, largely withdrew from public affairs for the remainder of his life (he 




A number of terms used in this thesis require explanation. The ‘Protestant Party’ 
refers to a circle of aristocrats and non-nobles, based around the earls of 
Northumberland and Leicester, with important positions and influence at the 
Caroline court, who, through-out the 1630s loyally served the King.105 In seeking to 
advance the Protestant cause in Europe and to restore the Prince Elector to his lost 
domains, this group was willing to ally with a Catholic power – France – against 
their mutual Habsburg enemies. It was also prepared to bolster royal power at home 
by, for example, supporting extra-parliamentary sources of revenue such as ship 
money. This position was unsurprising, for the imposition paid for the fleet that 
Northumberland commanded as Lord Admiral, while Charles’s enhanced naval 
power was Leicester’s best bargaining counter in his negotiations with the French. 
There were limits to the circle’s support for an authoritarian crown, however, as 
indicated by Northumberland’s dismay at the failure of the Short Parliament in May 
1640 and Charles’s turn to Catholic Spain for money (and possibly troops) to restore 
 
 
104 See, for example, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xx-ii: Leicester to countess of Carlisle, 25 
August 1642. In addition to having to reconcile the conflicting demands of Charles I and Parliament 
regarding Ireland, Leicester also had to deal with a number of further problems in respect of that 
country. In many ways, he had been forced on Charles I as Lord Lieutenant in June 1641 by the 
King’s political opponents and by mid-1642 Charles was looking for a loyalist to govern Ireland. 
This situation would explain Charles I’s promotion of Leicester’s rival, James Butler, twelfth earl of 
Ormond, to marquis on 30 August 1642. See Toby Barnard, ‘Butler, James, first duke of Ormond 
(1610-1688)’, ODNB. Leicester also had to contend with the complex military and political issues 
raised by the Scottish army, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Munro (d.1680), a 
veteran of the Thirty Years War, which had landed in Ulster on 3 April 1642. See Edward Furgol, 
‘The Civil Wars in Scotland’, in Civil Wars, ed. by Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, pp. 48-9. Thus, 
additionally, Leicester would have to consider how the Scots in Ulster would fit into the quarrel 
between Charles I and Parliament in relation to Ireland, as well as organizing the suppression of the 
Irish Catholic rebellion that had broken out in October 1641. 
 




order in his rebellious kingdoms.106 
 
Although Leicester and his court allies were firm Calvinists, they were 
satisfied with the Elizabethan religious settlement and did not wish to see further 
extensive reform of the Church of England. At the same time, they were hostile to 
‘popery’ – ‘Catholicism understood as political and spiritual tyranny.’107 In other 
words, they were doctrinal Calvinists, like James I, rather than practical or 
experimental ones, such as England’s foremost privateer and transatlantic coloniser 
Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, who expressed his faith through his extensive 
patronage of Puritan ministers and in countenancing forms of godly worship not 
allowed by the Caroline church authorities.108 
 
The Protestant Party consisted of Algernon Percy, tenth earl of 
Northumberland, Admiral, 1636-8, Lord Admiral, 1638-42, and Lord General, 1640; 
Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, Charles’s extraordinary ambassador to 
France, 1636-41, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1641-3; Philip Herbert, fourth earl 
of Pembroke, Lord Chamberlain, 1626-41; William Cecil, second earl of Salisbury, 
Captain of the Band of the King’s Gentlemen Pensioners, 1635-42; Sir John Coke, 
(ultimately) senior Secretary of State, 1625-40; and Sir Henry Vane senior, Coke’s 
replacement as senior Secretary, 1640-1. The members of the group were connected 
not only politically, but also by blood and marriage – for instance, Leicester and 
Pembroke were cousins and Northumberland was Leicester’s brother-in-law.109 
Despite sharing many of the same political and religious priorities and 
commitments, these individuals did not always work together harmoniously. 
 
106 See Collins, II, 652: Northumberland to Leicester, 7 May 1640, for the Lord Admiral’s 
dismay at the failure of the Short Parliament. 
 
107 Scott, Leviathan, p. 4. For the wide range of Leicester’s religious views, see, for example, 
Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 145, 152 and 157 and ‘The Sidneys and the Continent: The Stuart 
Period’, p. 232; and Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 521. 
 
108. See Sean Kelsey, ‘Rich, Robert, second earl of Warwick (1587-1658)’, ODNB. For the 
protection that Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, offered godly preachers at his family seat at 
Leez Priory, near Chelmsford in Essex, see, for example, Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 24-6, 28-30 
and 66-7. 
 
109 For the blood and marital relationships within the Protestant Party, see Adamson, Noble 




Leicester and Northumberland had a very strong personal bond, but Leicester’s 
relationship with Coke was often strained, both politically and financially.110 The 
phrase ‘Northumberland-Leicester circle or group’ is sometimes used in place of the 
‘Protestant Party’ to reflect the fact that that circle was not necessarily more 
Protestant than that based around Warwick. 
 
The other Protestant group at Charles’s court, though very much on its 
fringes, was that centred on the earl of Warwick.111 The members of the circle were 
anti-Spanish and England’s foremost champions of colonial ventures in the 
Americas. They were willing to countenance alliances with other Protestant powers, 
notably the United Provinces, to uphold European Protestantism, but were generally 
more cautious than Leicester and his friends about soliciting the support of Catholic 
France. Commitment to and investment in maritime and colonial projects in North 
America and the Caribbean, especially the Providence Island Company, bound many 
members of this group together.112 Politically, Warwick’s circle favoured the calling 
of Parliament and opposed ship money.113 For this group, the King’s resolve to rule 
without Parliament raised deep-seated fears of an unrestrained ‘free monarchy.’ 
 
In religious terms, the Warwick circle differed from the Northumberland-
Leicester group in that it espoused a more rigorous form of Calvinism, was more 
hostile towards Archbishop Laud’s view of a Church of England separated from 
European Protestant churches, and generally had little time for conformist clerics, 
 
110 For evidence of the close bond between Leicester and Northumberland, see Collins, II, 370-
3: Leicester to Northumberland, [28 September]/8 October 1632: see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 
U1475, fol. 85/1. For political tension between Sir John Coke (1563-1644) and Leicester, see, for 
example, SP 78/102, fol. 206: Coke to Leicester, 8 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 440. 
 
111 See Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 32. For more on Warwick and his circle, see Christopher 
Thompson, ‘Centre, Colony, and County: The Second Earl of Warwick and the Contexts of the 
“Double Crisis” of Politics in Early Stuart England in the Writings of Christopher Thompson 
Published between 1971 and 2012’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Buckingham, 2014). 
 
112 For Warwick’s group and the Providence Island Company, see Karen O. Kupperman, 
Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
 
113 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge 





such as Leicester’s chaplain, Henry Hammond.114 The genesis of Warwick’s circle 
went back to the York House Conference of 1626 on the direction of doctrinal and 
ceremonial travel of the Church of England, at which the earl and his allies had 
made clear their opposition to anything that smacked of popery.115 
 
These foreign-policy and religious commitments distinguished Warwick’s 
circle from the Northumberland-Leicester group; they also explain the exclusion of 
the earl and most of his adherents from positions of influence at the Caroline court. 
Warwick held no court office, though he had danced in the annual masque of 1632, 
indicating some royal favour.116 Other members of his circle included Francis 
Russell, fourth earl of Bedford, the developer of Covent Garden in London and the 
East Anglian Fen drainer in the 1630s, which again is evidence that he enjoyed some 
measure of royal approval; Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex, Lord Chamberlain, 
1641-2; William Fiennes, Viscount Saye and Sele; and Robert Greville, second 
Baron Brooke.117 Warwick’s brother, Henry Rich, earl of Holland, groom of the 
stole, 1636-42, and a favourite of Charles’s Queen, Henriette Marie, was an 
important outlier to this group.118 Holland’s favour with the Queen meant that, like 
the members of the Northumberland-Leicester circle, he held a senior position at 
court. Again, blood and familial relations represented important group building 
blocks – Essex, for example, was a cousin of Warwick and Holland.119 
 
114 For the wide spectrum of Leicester’s religious views, see, for example, Brennan, Sidneys of 
Penshurst, pp. 145, 152 and 157 and ‘The Sidneys and the Continent: The Stuart Period’, p. 232 and 
Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 521. 
 
115 For the significance of the York House Conference of 1626, see Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, pp. 
140 and 164-80 and Milton, Catholic and Reformed, pp. 114, 116, 145, 183-5, 245 and 544n. See 
also Nicholas Tyacke, ‘Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution’, in Origins of the English 
Civil War, ed. by Russell, pp. 132-3 and Lockyer, Buckingham, pp. 306-8. For the beginnings of 
Warwick’s circle, see Christopher Thompson, ‘The Origins of the Politics of the Parliamentary 
Middle Group, 1625-1629’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 2 (1971), 71-86. 
 
116 For Warwick and the 1632 court masque, see Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 26. 
 
117 For Francis Russell, fourth earl of Bedford, and the development of Covent Garden and Fen 
drainage, see Conrad Russell, ‘Russell, Francis, fourth earl of Bedford (bap.1587, d.1641)’, ODNB. 
 
118 For the position of Henry Rich, earl of Holland (1590-1649), as a favourite of Henriette 
Marie, see, in general, Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’ and ‘Religion, European 
Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’. 
 




The ‘Spanish Party’ comprised individuals, notably, Archbishop Laud and 
the earl of Strafford, at Charles’s court, who for financial, personal, political or 
religious reasons (and sometimes all four) favoured an accommodation with 
Spain.120 The group was pro-Spanish as it feared the growing power of France and 
its ally the United Provinces both on the continent and as maritime and colonial 
rivals. Moreover, an alliance with either of these countries could entail war with 
Habsburg Spain or Austria. Such an outcome could mean the calling of Parliament, 
threatening the circle’s authoritarian approach to government, the Arminian 
religious views of its members and their very lives. By contrast, a league with Spain, 
entailing peace and perhaps Spanish money (and possibly soldiers), offered the 
group an opportunity to suppress what it perceived to be dangerous Puritans in 
England and rebellious Presbyterians in Scotland. 
 
The leading members of the Spanish Party were William Laud, Archbishop 
of Canterbury, 1633-45, who opposed an alliance with France for political and 
religious reasons, and Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth, 1628-40, and Lord 
Deputy of Ireland, 1632-40, and, earl of Strafford and the Irish Lord Lieutenant, 
1640-1. Their associates included Sir Francis Cottington, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 1629-41, and Master of the Court of Wards, 1635-41, who had extensive 
experience of Spain and was said to favour Catholics; and Sir Francis Windebanke, 
junior Secretary of State, 1632-40, and an alleged crypto-Catholic.121 
 
These three groups had consistent memberships and common aims and 
policies. They were more than simply loose associations of vaguely like-minded 
individuals. Revealingly, of all those considered here, only Holland would change 




120 See Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 33-4; Albert J. Loomie, ‘The Spanish Faction at the Court of 
Charles I, 1630-1638’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 59 (1986), 37-49; and Reeve, 
Road to Personal Rule, pp. 181-2. 
 
121 For the religious views of Sir Francis Windebanke (bap.1582-d.1646), see Haskell, ‘Sir 









The stage is now set for the beginning of Leicester’s embassy to Paris and the court 
of Louis of France. A number of questions immediately present themselves. How 
will Leicester be received by the French? Will he be able to make progress towards 
concluding an Anglo-French alliance? What terms would Charles accept in order to 
win French support for restoring the Palatinate? How will Louis and Richelieu react 
to overtures from a state that had been at war with France just a few years earlier? 
How will the mission affect Caroline court politics? And what will its impact be on 
the European state system and diplomacy? 
 
 
122 This political posture was not universal. Apart from Holland, other individuals changed 
sides in the Civil War. Leicester’s two eldest sons – Philip Sidney, Viscount Lisle, and Algernon 
Sidney – switched from being Royalist to Parliamentarian in 1643-4, the latter being wounded at the 
Battle of Marston Moor in July 1644. See C. H. Firth, revised by Sean Kelsey, ‘Sidney, Philip, third 
earl of Leicester (1619-1698)’, ODNB and Jonathan Scott, ‘Sidney [Sydney], Algernon (1623-1683)’, 
ODNB. William Paget, sixth Baron Paget (1609-78), ‘who,’ in the words of Conrad Russell ‘had been 
deep into the junto [Charles I’s parliamentary opponents] in the House of Lords … caused general 
surprise by going to York in the middle of June [1642], saying he would not fight against the King.’ 
See Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 512. Others adopted a more nuanced approach to the 
political crisis of 1637-42. James Hamilton, third marquis of Hamilton, though ostensibly faithful to 
Charles I, spent much of this period trying to balance his English (loyalty to the King) and Scottish 
(his family’s lands and a claim to the crown of Scotland) interests. For Hamilton in general, see John 
J. Scally, ‘The Political Career of James, Third Marquis and First Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 
1643’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1992). For Hamilton’s 
break with Charles I in 1641, see Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 311 and 341. Arundel, despite being 
Charles I’s Earl Marshall, did not fight for the King in the Civil War – he left for the United 
Provinces in May 1642 and had not returned by the time of his death in 1646, limiting himself to 
raising 54,000 pounds for Charles’s cause. For Arundel, see R. Malcolm Smuts, ‘Howard, Thomas, 










In the spring of 1636, diplomatically and militarily, Europe was in a state of flux. 
The decisive Habsburg victory at the Battle of Nördlingen in 1634 in South-East 
Germany and the Imperial-brokered Peace of Prague of 1635 threatened the 
permanent loss of the electoral dignity and his lands for Charles I Louis, the Prince 
Elector Palatine.1 Following the Habsburg successes of 1634-5, France had declared 
war on Spain in the latter year and was now participating directly in European 
conflicts rather than, as it had until 1635, waging a proxy war through its 
confederates, Sweden and the United Provinces. The French were now looking for 
additional allies. The Empire had completed this scene of European-wide warfare by 
commencing formal hostilities with France in March 1636, bringing about the 
French entry into the Thirty Years War. 
 
Caroline court politics presented dangers and opportunities for Charles I and 
the Protestant Party in 1636. For the King, there was a possibility to regain the 
Elector Palatine’s dignities and lands by playing off Austria and France against each 
 
1 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Calvinist Prince Elector Palatine was one of 
the seven electors who chose the Holy Roman Emperor. At that time, the other six electors were the 
three ecclesiastical and Catholic Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, the Protestant Electors of 
Saxony and Brandenburg and the Habsburg and Catholic King of Bohemia. Charles I Louis, the 
Prince Elector Palatine (1618-80), was the second son of Frederick V (1596-1632) and the nephew of 
Charles I (1600-49). In 1636, he represented the claim of the Palatine Wittelsbachs to his father’s 
electoral dignities and lands, then held by Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria (1573-1651), (the electoral 
title and the Upper Palatinate and the right bank of the Lower Palatinate) and Spain (the left bank of 
the Lower Palatinate). Charles I Louis was important, as he was the English King’s nephew and 
Charles I felt that he should take action to restore him to his dignities and lands. However, the Elector 
Palatine also represented a potential focus of anti-Stuart feeling whom Charles I would wish to keep 
on side. For details of the clear-cut Habsburg victory at the Battle of Nördlingen, which was fought 
on 27 August (according to the Julian calendar) or 6 September (by Gregorian dating) 1634 near 
Nuremburg in South-East Germany between a combined Austrian and Spanish army, led by 
Archduke Ferdinand, the future Emperor Ferdinand III (1608-57), and the Spanish Cardinal-Infante, 
Ferdinand of Austria (1609/10-41), and the forces of Sweden and its German-Protestant allies, the 
Heilbronn League, commanded by the Swedish general Gustav Horn (1592-1657) and the German 





other. The risk was that he might be drawn into war with either of these powers or 
Spain with the implication that Parliament would have to be called to finance such a 
conflict. War and the calling of Parliament was something that Charles did not want, 
then or in the future.2 His Queen, Henriette Marie, having been courted by Cardinal 
Richelieu, Louis XIII’s chief minister, from 1635, had aligned herself by 1636 with 
powerful interests in both London and Paris that were keen to support the Protestant 
cause on the continent.3 The Protestant Party at the English court had benefitted 
greatly from the Queen’s support and had grown in influence.4 This change in 
Henriette Marie’s position increased the pressure on the King to ally with France 
against the Habsburgs. For the Protestant Party, the situation presented a chance to 
support the cause of ‘true religion’ in Europe in alliance with France and for 
England to play an effective role in the continent’s various ongoing conflicts. Failure 
could mean not only England’s continued impotence in Europe, but also a loss of 
influence for those courtiers who had advocated a vigorous Protestant foreign 
policy. 
 
Charles Louis, the King’s nephew, had arrived at the Caroline court in 
November 1635.5 He had been joined in the following year by his younger brother, 
Prince Rupert, the future renowned Royalist cavalry general in the Civil War.6 
Charles’s sense of honour and family loyalty as well as political necessity – he could 
not be seen to be abandoning his nephew as such action would be unacceptable to 
many Protestants within and outside his court – meant that he both wanted and had 
to support the Palatine cause. The Prince Elector had lobbied hard.7 By 1636 or 1637 
 
2 See, for example, CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 309-10: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England 
to the Doge and Senate, 30 October/[9 November] 1637. 
 
3 Caroline M. Hibbard, ‘Henrietta Maria [Princess Henrietta Maria of France] (1609-1669)’, 
ODNB. 
 
4 For these trends, see Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 37-41 and ‘Religion, 
European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-30. 
 
5 Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 99 and Ronald G. Asch, ‘Charles Lewis [Karl Ludwig] 
(1618–1680)’, ODNB. 
 
6 Ian Roy, ‘Rupert, prince and count palatine of the Rhine and duke of Cumberland (1619-
1682)’, ODNB. 
 
7 See, for example, Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 381-3: Charles I 
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– it is not clear when – Charles Louis’s pension from the King had been increased 
from a few thousand pounds per annum to the princely sum of 12,000 pounds a 
year.8 This level of royal support put the Prince Palatine’s income on a par with the 
greatest noblemen in Charles’s realms. Charles Louis had also unsuccessfully sought 
his uncle’s approval for Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex – a powerful member 
of the Protestant circle based around Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick – to 
accompany him on an expedition against Spain or the Empire.9 Nevertheless, in 
February 1636, Essex had accompanied the Prince Elector to Newmarket, where the 
King was hunting.10 Charles Louis had received further indications of support from 
other prominent members of Warwick’s group – notably Francis Russell, fourth earl 
of Bedford, and Warwick himself – as well as Algernon Percy, tenth earl of 
Northumberland, a leading member of the Protestant Party.11 
 
Charles was committed to the cause of the Palatine Wittelsbachs. At the very 
least, he was eager to be seen to be active in seeking Charles Louis’s restoration. Not 
only that, but the support that the Prince Elector had garnered from influential 
Protestants at court placed more pressure on the King to do something to ensure his 
restitution to his dignities and lands. This situation was a further impetus towards the 
conclusion of an anti-Habsburg Anglo-French alliance – a key policy aim of the 
Protestant Party. Though not completely overlooked, historians have laid insufficient 
 
Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1/[11] February 1636; Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of 
Bohemia, II, 390-1: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 12/[22] March 1636; and Akkerman, 
Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 420-4: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 5/[15] 
May 1636. 
 
8 Asch, ‘Charles Lewis’. See also the talk presented by Dr Thomas Pert (Lincoln College, the 
University of Oxford), ‘“The Prince Elector is going from hence to London, I imagine for no good”: 
The Elector Palatine, Parliament, and the Civil War c.1638-1644’, Early Modern Britain Seminar, 24 
January 2019. 
 
9 Asch, ‘Charles Lewis’. 
 
10 Asch, ‘Charles Lewis’. See also Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 381-3: 
Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1/[11] February 1636, especially 382, footnote 3, citing 
Ceremonies of Charles I: The Notebooks of John Finet, Master of Ceremonies, 1628-1641, ed. by 
Albert J. Loomie (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), p. 193. 
 
11 See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 387-8: Elizabeth of Bohemia to 
Vane, [2]/[12] February 1636, especially 388, footnote 13, citing Martin Butler, ‘Entertaining the 





emphasis on the presence of the two Palatine princes in England in 1635-7 as a 
factor impelling Charles to seek an alliance with France to effect the Prince Elector’s 
restoration. 
 
The Paris embassy of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, in May 1636 
was framed by Charles’s failure to conclude a maritime treaty with Spain in 1633-4. 
The breakdown in the talks had been caused by the King’s insistence that any league 
with the Spanish should be defensive only.12 The absence of a deal with Spain meant 
that Charles could consider allying with other powers. In November 1635, during 
the then tentative negotiations with France, the English King had proposed that the 
French and the Spanish should act together to restore the Duchy of Lorraine and the 
Lower Palatinate to Charles IV, duke of Lorraine, and Charles Louis respectively.13 
France had invaded Lorraine, which was part of the Empire, in 1633. By so doing, 
the French had removed a danger to their territory and threatened to cut the Spanish 
Road by which Spain sent troops and money to Flanders. The Spanish had occupied 
the left bank of the Lower Palatinate in the early 1620s, which had formed part of 
the Electorate of Frederick V, Charles Louis’s father. In 1635, Spain still held the 
territory, which was important as it also lay near the strategically vital Spanish Road. 
Charles’s suggestion of a mutual exchange of Lorraine and the Lower Palatinate, 
therefore, had advantages for him, but offered nothing to France or Spain. 
Unsurprisingly, the French had rejected the proposal. 
 
Leicester’s Paris embassy was part of the King’s two-pronged diplomatic 
offensive in the first half of 1636. Charles had initiated this action to establish from 
whom he could obtain the best terms regarding the Prince Elector’s restitution – the 
Empire or France. In April, he had dispatched Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of 
Arundel, as an extraordinary ambassador to the Emperor, Ferdinand II, in Vienna to 
negotiate the Prince Palatine’s restoration.14 Arundel’s mission was followed 
 
12 O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 85-7. 
 
13 Charles IV, duke of Lorraine (1604-75) was a committed enemy of the French and his lands 
represented a threat to North-East France. 
 
14 For the mission of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel (1585-1646), to the Emperor, 
Ferdinand II (1578-1637), in 1636, see Lindquist, ‘The Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 348-409 and 410-
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quickly by Leicester’s embassy to Paris in May. 
 
In 1636, the French were looking to Charles either as an ally or to negate any 
threat from England as a confederate of their Habsburg enemies. Richelieu had put 
out tentative feelers to the English King for an alliance in 1634-5. The Cardinal 
might have been satisfied then with England’s neutrality, removing any danger to 
France from that source. The French approach to Charles intensified in February 
1635, when Henri de la Ferté Nabert, marquis de Senneterre, was sent as an 
extraordinary ambassador to London.15 Senneterre was told to resume the 
negotiations begun the previous year. He was to argue that a military approach was 
the best way to recover Charles Louis’s dignities and lands. France and its ally, the 
United Provinces, were well placed to help the English King achieve this end. 
Richelieu had instructed Senneterre to try to circumvent Charles’s hostility to an 
alliance with France by enlisting the support of his French Queen, Henriette Marie, 
which he had done with some success. This phase of the negotiations had ended with 
the proposal for the mutual restoration of Lorraine and the Lower Palatinate by 
France and Spain, which the French had spurned.16 
 
In the late spring of 1636, diplomatic relations between England and France 
were lukewarm at best and the two countries were far from agreeing any meaningful 
alliance. Given what had been on the table in his negotiations with Spain in 1633-4, 
Charles seemed likely to offer the French only a defensive league – which might 
have been acceptable in 1634, but not in 1636. The English King had annoyed the 
French by proposing the mutual restoration by France and Spain of Lorraine and the 
Lower Palatinate. Yet the French desire for more than just a defensive alliance and 
their suggestion of direct military involvement on the continent to recover the 
 
63 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 280-96. See also Francis C. Springell, 
Connoisseur and Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel’s Embassy to Germany in 1636 as recounted in 
William Crowne’s Diary, the Earl’s letters and other contemporary sources with a catalogue of the 
topographical drawings made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Holler (London: Maggs Bros. Ltd, 
1963). 
 
15 Henri de la Ferté Nabert, marquis de Senneterre (1599-1681), was a French general, 
occasional diplomat and the extraordinary ambassador of Louis XIII (1601-43) to Charles I in 1635-
7. 
 




Palatinate would be unacceptable to Charles. Louis and Richelieu were worried that 
the English King would use the negotiations to obtain concessions from the 
Habsburgs. Charles was concerned about the threat to his interests in the English 
Channel posed by the renewed Franco-Dutch alliance and the growth of French 
naval power.17 Ultimately, for the English King to move away from the Spanish, on 
whom he had focused since 1630, towards France, or even Austria, would constitute 
a genuine diplomatic revolution. Such was the far from promising context of 




Leicester was the obvious choice for ambassador to France.18 He was an experienced 
diplomat, having undertaken an embassy for Charles to Christian IV of Denmark in 
1632.19 By using Leicester and Arundel in 1636, the English King was employing 
the same two senior diplomats that he had used in 1632. (Arundel had been sent to 
the United Provinces in that year to transmit Charles’s condolences to his sister, 
Elizabeth of Bohemia, on the death of her husband, Frederick V.) His choice of 
ambassadors sent a clear signal to Louis and Ferdinand – negotiate with him or risk 
England siding with the other power. The earl was also a prominent member of the 
Protestant Party, and, at that time, favoured by Henriette Marie.20 Consequently, he 
was ideally placed at court to ensure that his circle’s desire for a French alliance and 
the advancement of the Protestant cause were represented in Paris. 
 
 
17 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, pp. 139-40. For the growth of French naval power, 
see Alan James, ‘The Administration and Development of the French Navy and the Ministry of 
Cardinal Richelieu, 1618-1642’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Manchester, 1997), pp. 
214-42 and 243-51 and The Navy and Government in Early Modern France 1572-1661 (Woodbridge: 
Royal Historical Society, 2004), pp. 1-9 and 77-91. 
 
18 Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), was appointed extraordinary 
ambassador to Louis XIII on 29 February 1636. See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of 
Bohemia, II, 379: Elizabeth of Bohemia to Scudamore, [6]/16 January 1636, footnote 3, citing Gary 
M. Bell, A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688 (London: Offices of the Royal 
Historical Society, 1990), F221. 
 
19 For details of Leicester’s embassy to Christian IV of Denmark (1577-1648), see Reginald 
Cant, ‘The Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark in 1632’, EHR, 54 (1939), 252-62. 
 




On 28 April and 9 May 1636 respectively, Leicester was given his original 
and additional instructions for the Paris embassy.21 There is no definitive indication 
as to who compiled the instructions. However, the hand in which they were written 
would appear to be either that of Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior Secretary of State, 
or Coke’s secretary.22 There are annotations in the King’s hand in one of the drafts 
of the additional instruction.23 Charles also signed the final version of that 
instruction.24 Thus, we can be reasonably confident that both of the ambassador’s 
instructions were drawn up by the Secretary, with input from, and the approval of, 
the King. Charles’s involvement in Leicester’s additional instruction, and 
presumably in the original instructions, indicates the importance that he attached to 
the earl’s mission to Louis. 
 
Leicester’s original instructions began by setting out the context to the 
negotiations with the French, the specific actions that he was to take, and the 
diplomatic niceties that he was to observe at Louis’s court.25 Charles noted that the 
French King had sent an ordinary and an extraordinary ambassador to him to 
negotiate a treaty in 1634 and 1635 respectively, but without result.26 He had 
 
21 London, TNA, SP France, SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see 
also Collins, II, 374-6 (according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s 
instructions, 9 May 1636, these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636) and SP 78/101, fols 35-
9: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 376-7. 
 
22 For the hand in question, see, for example, SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 
February 1637. 
 
23 SP 78/101, fol. 37: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636. For an example of 
Charles I’s hand, see SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637 and the King’s 
postscript regarding the problems of English merchants trading in France. 
 
24 SP 78/101, fol. 39: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636. 
 
25 SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6. 
 
26 In general, an ordinary ambassador is one who heads a permanent diplomatic mission, often 
for a fixed period. By contrast, an extraordinary ambassador is appointed for a special purpose, for 
example, to negotiate a treaty, or for an indefinite period. In the circumstances in question, Leicester 
was sent to Paris in May 1636 to take over the lead position in negotiating an Anglo-French alliance 
from John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore. Scudamore, however, not only remained involved in the 
negotiations, but also retained, probably for diplomatic and political reasons, the primary role in 
intelligence gathering. For the latter, see Ian J. Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-71): 
A Career at Court and in the Country, 1601-43’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, 
University of Cambridge, 1993), pp. 227-35 and Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career 
of John, First Viscount Scudamore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 201-6. 
Leicester only became involved as an intelligencer after Scudamore’s departure, for which, see, for 
 
42 
dispatched an ordinary ambassador to France. Now, he was sending Leicester as an 
extraordinary ambassador to Louis. The embassy was to advance a general peace in 
Europe and remove all misunderstandings that might have arisen between England 
and France regarding the Elector Palatine. On arrival in Paris, Leicester was to seek 
a first audience with the French King. He was to give his letter of credence to Louis 
and pay his compliments to the other members of the French royal family then in 
Paris, in particular, Anne of Austria, the French King’s Queen, and, if present, 
Gaston, duc d’Orléans, Louis’s younger brother and, at that time, heir apparent.27 
The ambassador was not to address Richelieu. The ostensible reason for this order 
was to do with diplomatic form. The Cardinal was excepted from Leicester’s 
representations at the French court as being someone ‘to whom you must not 
descend in anie derogation to our crown.’28 However, it may also have reflected a 
desire to prevent the ambassador becoming too close to a figure who would demand 
a greater military commitment from the English King than he was prepared to make. 
 
At his private audience with Louis, the ambassador was to raise the issue of 
the reciprocal restitution of Lorraine and the Lower Palatinate by France and Spain. 
Charles had proposed the mutual restoration in 1635 as a way of reinstating the 
Prince Elector to some of his possessions, though the French had rejected the idea. 
Leicester was to say that the English King, in his view, had not received a direct 
answer from the French regarding the proposal. Charles was raising the issue of the 
mutual restoration again not in his own interests but in those of the Elector Palatine. 
The earl was also to inform Louis that Arundel had been sent to negotiate with the 
Emperor in Vienna. 
 
Perhaps most important of all, Leicester was to advise the French King that 
the English King had prepared his ship-money fleet. This fleet, which had first sailed 
 
example, Chapter 7. 
 
27 Gaston, duc d’Orléans (1608-60) was the third son and, following the death of Nicolas Henri 
(b.1607) in 1611, the second surviving son of Henry IV (1553-1610) of France. In 1636, Gaston was 
heir to Louis XIII, as at that time Louis and Anne of Austria (1601-66) were childless, with the future 
Louis XIV (1638-1715) being born only in September 1638. Gaston was the centre of numerous 
conspiracies against Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) both before and after 1636. 
 




in 1635, was the only permanent military force available to Charles and his most 
effective bargaining counter in negotiations with the French and the Spanish, given 
that it might be able to dominate the English Channel.29 The ambassador was to say 
that the English fleet was not intended to threaten France, but the implication was 
that it could be used for or against French interests. For instance, it could be 
deployed to France’s advantage by preventing Spain reinforcing the Spanish 
Netherlands by sea, seriously undermining Spain’s position in Flanders. 
Alternatively, the fleet could be used to escort reinforcements to the Spanish 
Netherlands and thereby threaten France’s north-eastern frontier. This point would 
be driven home to Louis that summer, when the Spanish invaded from Flanders, 
capturing Corbie and menacing Paris itself. Spain’s invasion could have been much 
worse for the French had the Spanish received strong English naval support in the 
Channel. The potential advantage to France of having the English fleet on their side 
would become clear in October 1639 following the Dutch victory over the Spanish 
at the Battle of the Downs, which effectively cut off Flanders from Spain.30 Charles, 
for his part, had good reason for seeking to neutralize, at the very least, France’s 
growing naval power.31 Thus, Leicester was to say that Charles understood that 
Louis had assembled a fleet in the English Channel, and was to seek an explanation 
from the French King regarding its intended use. 
 
Charles provided the ambassador with an additional instruction.32 This 
instruction stated that, since the King had drawn up Leicester’s original instructions, 
he had received a response from the French regarding Arundel’s embassy to the 
 
29 See Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the 
Reign of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 128-59. See also Andrew D. 
Thrush, ‘The Navy Under Charles I, 1625-40’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University College, 
London, 1990), pp. 12-3. 
 
30 A further example of the influence of the ship-money fleet can be seen in 1635, when 
apparently it had been used to prevent the Dutch and the French from blocking the sea route to 
Flanders by keeping the French fleet out of the English Channel. See Andrews, Ships, Money and 
Politics, pp. 154-5. 
 
31 For France’s growing naval power, see James, ‘The French Navy 1618-1642’, pp. 214-42 
and 243-51 and Navy and Government in Early Modern France, pp. 1-9 and 77-91. 
 





Emperor (which has not survived). Charles instructed the earl that he was to say that 
the French reply did not address the proposed mutual exchange of Lorraine and the 
Lower Palatinate by France and Spain. Leicester was to raise the issue of the mutual 
exchange again, and repeat that the English King’s proposal was not intended for his 
own benefit but, rather, for that of a general peace in Europe, which would have to 
deal with the issue of the Elector Palatine. He was to say that Charles would be 
willing to engage himself in joint arms with the French to facilitate a general peace 
if he did not receive a satisfactory response from the Emperor. The ambassador was 
then to state that, should Louis consider the exchange of Lorraine and the Lower 
Palatinate to be unacceptable, he, Charles, would be willing to entertain any other 
suggestion that the French might have. This move was important, for it represented a 
concession on the English King’s part. In effect, Charles was inviting Louis and 




At the end of May 1636, Leicester arrived in Paris on his embassy that had the 
potential to revolutionize diplomatic relations between England and France and to 
change the course of the Thirty Years War.33 He had his first audience with Louis on 
30 May, which dealt with the formal aspects of the mission.34 The ambassador 
obeyed his orders not to contact Richelieu directly, but sent one of his servants to the 
Cardinal to make known his arrival in Paris. Richelieu responded by indicating his 
 
33 Leicester had left London on 12 May 1636 (see SP 78/101, fol. 196: Leicester to [Coke], 
20/30 June 1636 for a retroactive indication of when the ambassador had departed London). On 15 
May, Leicester wrote to Coke saying that he had arrived the previous night in Rye on the South coast 
of England on his way to Paris (see SP 78/101, fol. 63: Leicester to Coke, 15 May 1636; see also 
Collins, II, 377). Next, he reported to the Secretary that, after a stormy voyage, he had crossed the 
English Channel and was at Dieppe on 18 May (see SP 78/101, fol. 65: Leicester to Coke, 18/[28] 
May 1636; see also Collins, II, 378-9). The earl then said that he had reached Paris on 24 May (see SP 
78/101, fol. 83: Leicester to [Coke], 26 May/[5 June] 1636). Leicester’s arrival in Paris followed an 
eventful journey, which included an altercation involving the precedence of the coach of Scudamore, 
Charles I’s ordinary ambassador to Louis XIII, who for personal, political and religious reasons did 
not get on with Leicester. Appropriately for an extraordinary ambassador, Leicester was lodged at the 
Hostel des Ambassadeurs Extraordinaires. (For the first of these events, see SP 78/101, fol. 87: 
Leicester to [Coke], 27 May/6 June 1636; see also Collins, II, 379-81. For the latter, see, SP 78/108, 
fol. 69: Leicester to Charles I – petition for addition to allowance, 30 August/[8/[9] September] 1639; 
see also Collins, II, 606-8.) 
 




hopes for a successful outcome to the negotiations. The earl had further indirect 
contact with Richelieu in early June, via the Abbé de St. Mare, chief gentleman of 
the Cardinal’s chamber.35 Thus, Leicester had established communication with the 
French King’s chief minister, albeit via intermediaries. Immediately afterwards, the 
earl met Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and Louis’s Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs.36 He tried to begin the substantive part of his embassy, but 
Chavigny countered by accusing the English of trading with and supporting the 
Spanish in Flanders. The ambassador also anticipated meeting Chavigny’s father, 
Claude le Bouthillier, and Claude de Bullion, the French King’s surintendants des 
finances.37 These officials were important, as they would be the primary French 
representatives with whom Leicester would negotiate.38 They were also politically 
very near to, and dependant on, Richelieu – so close that they were described as his 
‘creatures.’39 Their relationship to the Cardinal implied that anything they 
communicated to the ambassador could be assumed to have Richelieu’s approval. 
The employment of these individuals to negotiate with Leicester indicated the 
importance that the Cardinal attached to the earl’s embassy. In effect, despite not 
having direct contact with Richelieu, Leicester was dealing with the Cardinal 
himself. 
 
35 SP 78/101, fol. 133: Leicester to [Coke], 10/20 June 1636. 
 
36 Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny (1608-52) was the son of Claude le Bouthillier, sieur 
de Fouilletourte (1581-1652), and had been appointed Secretary of State with the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in 1632. He was a close associate of Cardinal Richelieu and was involved in the 
signing of the treaties with Sweden and the United Provinces in 1635, the year in which France 
declared war on Spain. See Orest A. Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 77-99. 
 
37 Claude le Bouthillier, Chavigny’s father, had been appointed a surintendant des finances in 
1632. He was Cardinal Richelieu’s ally and was prominent diplomatically and politically in the 
1630s. See Ranum, Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 166-80. Claude de Bullion (1569-1640) was also a 
surintendant des finances, again appointed in 1632. He was yet another confidant of Cardinal 
Richelieu, being especially important in financial matters, though Bullion’s fiscal responsibilities did 
lead to conflict with Richelieu on occasion. His duties encompassed negotiating with the English 
ambassadors in Paris, including Leicester. See Ranum, Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 143-65; Richard 
Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589-1661 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp 159-92; and David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in 
France, 1624-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 110-63 and 399-462. 
 
38 SP 78/101, fol. 165: Leicester to [Coke], 12/[22] June 1636. 
 






The ambassador was optimistic about the negotiations with France. Leicester 
wrote to Coke saying that the French wished to progress the talks. He expressed his 
enthusiasm by stating that: 
 
[b]ut I must confesse they have dissembled farre above my skill, if there be 
not some integritie in their mindes, for the reall performance of their 
promises to endeavour the agreement of his Ma[jes]ties affaires with the 
service w[hi]ch they owe to their owne Master, for they have receaved me 
with wellcomes w[hi]ch seemed heartie, and have expressed their hope that I 
brought some good newes from the King my master; ...40 
 
Despite this positive view of his embassy, Leicester’s relations with his 
fellow diplomat in Paris, Charles’s ordinary ambassador to Louis, John Scudamore, 
Viscount Scudamore, were poor. In a letter of 6 June 1636 to his brother-in-law and 
political ally, Henry Percy, the earl stated that he was experiencing difficulties with 
Scudamore, whom he thought was jealous of him.41 However, the ordinary 
ambassador was closely allied to William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and had 
political and religious reasons, and not just personal ones, for opposing Leicester. 
Laud would not wish to see a treaty signed with France, as such an alliance could 
imply war with the Habsburgs and the calling of Parliament. In particular, the 
Archbishop would not welcome parliamentary scrutiny of his religious reforms 
before they could begin to have their desired effect. 
 
Leicester had made a good start to his mission, but he had been unable to 
commence the negotiations for an Anglo-French alliance. He had a second audience 
with the French King on 20 June 1636, three weeks after the first.42 The ambassador 
informed Louis that Charles had prepared his ship-money fleet for sea, though no 
threat to the French was intended. He raised the issue of France’s fleet, which the 
French King likewise said was not meant to menace England but, rather, Spain. As 
 
40 SP 78/101, fol. 185: Leicester to [Coke], 16/26 June 1636; see also Collins, II, 385-6. 
 
41 See Collins, II, 386-9: Leicester to Henry Percy, [6]/16 June 1636. Henry Percy (1604-59) 
was the younger brother of Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland (1602-68), and Leicester’s 
brother-in-law and a favourite of Henriette Marie (1609-69). See Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 33. 
 




instructed, the earl brought up the issue of the reciprocal restoration of Lorraine and 
the Lower Palatinate by France and Spain. The French King replied that the mutual 
restoration was irrelevant and that other solutions to the position of the Elector 
Palatine would have to be found that did not involve Lorraine. In a letter written at 
the end of June, Leicester recounted that he had visited the Capuchin friar François 
Leclerc du Tremblay – Père Joseph, the notorious ‘éminence grise’ – a key advisor 
to Richelieu on foreign policy and an inveterate opponent of the Habsburgs, who 
would play a not insignificant role in the ambassador’s talks with the French.43 Père 
Joseph expressed hope regarding the negotiations, but offered little of substance. 
The earl’s meeting with the friar is another indication of the importance that the 
Cardinal attached to the English talks and his intimate involvement in them. Writing 
at the beginning of July, Leicester stated that, though he had made initial contact 
with his French counterparts, Chavigny, Bouthillier and Bullion, Richelieu’s 
creatures and supporters in Louis’s administration, he had been unable to enter into 
substantive discussions with them.44 
 
In spite of this seeming set back, the ambassador was able to communicate 
positive developments regarding the negotiations. The French had indicated that 
they had no interest in the mutual exchange of Lorraine and the Lower Palatinate 
with Spain.45 However, in a letter in his own hand of early July 1636, the earl wrote 
to Coke informing him that the French had offered to assist in the restoration of the 
Elector Palatine to his dignities and lands in return for an offensive and a defensive 
league against the Habsburgs.46 Leicester did not say who had made the offer on the 
part of the French, but it was presumably Chavigny or Bullion, implying Richelieu’s 
approval of the proposal. In order to emphasize the importance of what had been 
 
43 SP 78/101, fol. 230: Leicester to [Coke], 27 June/7 July 1636. Père Joseph (1577-1638) was 
a close confidant of Cardinal Richelieu and was active diplomatically on behalf of his master in the 
1620s and 1630s. For Père Joseph, in general, see Aldous Huxley, Grey Eminence (London: Vintage, 
2005). 
 
44 SP 78/101, fol. 253: Leicester to [Coke], 1/11 July 1636. 
 
45 SP 78/101, fol. 261: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 July 1636. 
 




said, the earl quoted verbatim in French the offer that had been made.47 The earl’s 
quotation, the fact that the letter was in Leicester’s hand and that he had written to 
Charles regarding the proposition all demonstrated his enthusiasm for the French 
suggestion. The proposal was an important breakthrough – the French had linked the 
idea of an Anglo-French treaty with the restoration of the Palatinate. The 
ambassador stated that the proposal was: 
 
as great a busines as you [Coke] have had perhaps this good while [and] it 
hath drawn on a proposition from them [the French] here w[hi]ch I conceive 
may be of advantage to his Ma[jes]tye and the interests wherin he is pleased 
to be concerned. 
 
A month into the negotiations, Coke provided Leicester with his views on 
the talks to date and gave the earl further instructions.48 The Secretary expressed his 
distrust of the French and placed his hope in Arundel’s Vienna embassy. 
Apparently, Coke did not favour a French alliance as much as the ambassador. In his 
letter, he sometimes wrote in the first person singular, but more often in the first 
person plural, implying that he was expressing Charles’s opinions on the 
 
47 The French text in SP 78/101, fols 271-2: Leicester to [Coke], 9/19 July 1636 reads as 
follows: ‘… Que sa majesté … soit d’une bonne [deleted] confédération entre les deux couronnes ou 
autrement … Sa majesté de la grande Bretagne demeurant d’accord du contenu du présent écrit, Le 
Roy Très Chrétien proposera au Roy de la grande Bretagne par son Amb[assadeu]r extraordinaire qui 
est à présent en France, une ligue offensive et défensive conjointement avec autant de confédérés de 
la France qu’il se pourra, contre L’Espagne, et la maison d’Autriche, et de ne faire paix ni trêve sans 
le consentement la uns des autres, et sans que l’entier recouvrement, et conservation pour l’avenir des 
états des neveux de sadite [unclear] Majesté y soient comprises. Et quant à ce qui est de la dignité 
Electorale, on verra dans le traité de la paix générale, quel bon expédient on pourra prendre pour la 
Satisfaction des parties, et le bien public. 
Il est accordé entre nous qu’au cas que les propositions suscrites ne soient agrées par la majesté de la 
grande Bretagne, elles demeureront nulles, et seront lacérés en notre présence.’ (The spelling has 
been modernized.) 
(‘... Whether his Majesty ... is of a good [deleted] confederation between the two crowns or otherwise 
... His Majesty of Great Britain remaining in agreement with the contents of this present writing, the 
Most Christian King will propose to the King of Great Britain via his extraordinary ambassador, who 
is now in France, an offensive and defensive league in conjunction with as many of the Confederates 
of France as possible, against Spain and the house of Austria, and to make no peace or truce without 
the consent of everyone, and without including the full reclamation and preservation for the future of 
the states of his Majesty’s descendants; and as for the electoral dignity, we shall see in the general 
peace treaty what good expedient can be used for the satisfaction of the parties as well as the public 
good. 
It is agreed between us that if the propositions mentioned above are not approved by the [his] Majesty 
of Great Britain, they will remain null and will be torn up in our presence.’) 
(Transcription and translation by Dr Cédric Ploix, the University of Oxford.) 
 




negotiations. Writing in mid-July 1636 to the Secretary, Leicester indicated his 
hopes for a satisfactory outcome to the discussions with the French, possibly 
influenced by France’s deteriorating military situation following the successful 
Spanish invasion from Flanders and the capture of La Capelle in Picardy.49 
 
Coke wrote to the earl in the second half of July giving him more 
instructions regarding the talks.50 Leicester was not to commit the King to war, but 
Charles could offer the French an opportunity to levy troops in his realms and the 
assistance of his fleet. These proposals were the first indication of the King’s terms 
for an alliance. The earl was also authorized to abandon the proposal for a mutual 
exchange of Lorraine and the Lower Palatinate by France and Spain. The offhand 
way in which the Secretary instructed Leicester to forsake the exchange may be 
indicative of the lack of importance that Charles had placed on this diplomatic 
gambit despite referring to it twice in the ambassador’s instructions.51 These new 
orders represented a more flexible approach on the part of the English King to talks 
with the French and, therefore, another opportunity for progress. Lastly, were the 
French to ask about the movement of Spanish money from England to Flanders, 
Leicester was to say that Charles had given no such commands. If funds had been 
sent, it had been done against the King’s will. 
 
The ambassador then reported the first real progress in the talks. Shortly 
before 22 July 1636, Leicester and Scudamore had attended a conference at 
Bullion’s house at which the French had outlined their proposals for a future Anglo-
French alliance.52 Unfortunately, the details of the proposed treaty have not 
survived. But here was a major breakthrough, and it was obviously welcomed by 
Leicester, for he had suggested only minor amendments to the draft treaty. The 
 
49 SP 78/101, fol. 289: Leicester to [Coke], 15/25 July 1636; see also Collins, II, 392 for an 
edited version of this letter. 
 
50 SP 78/101, fol. 305: Coke to Leicester, 20 July 1636; see also Collins, II, 393-4. 
 
51 See SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 
(according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636, 
these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636) and SP 78/101, fols 35-9: Leicester’s additional 
instruction, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 376-7. 
 




French felt assured that they had provided satisfactory answers to all the questions 
that the English had raised. They had also made it clear that they would value the 
English King as an ally. The French were aware of Arundel’s embassy to Vienna, 
and they were somewhat aggrieved that England’s friendship could depend on 
negotiations with the Emperor. However, they did not think that these talks would 
succeed. In a letter written towards the end of July, Coke informed the ambassador 
that there was no truth in the reports that Charles was to sign a treaty with the 
Empire – the rumour was probably an Imperial ploy to divide England and France.53 
From the tenor of the Secretary’s remarks, and as Arundel had advised him that no 
trust could be placed in the Emperor, Coke seemed to be losing faith in the Vienna 
mission. 
 
In the high summer of 1636, events on France’s north-eastern frontier came 
into play. The Spanish had attacked Picardy from Flanders and, on 15 August, had 
captured the strategically important town of Corbie.54 Paris was threatened, which 
occasioned a panic there.55 Leicester continued to report mutual distrust between 
England and France regarding, on the French side, Spanish money allegedly being 
transferred via England to Flanders.56 At the beginning of August, the ambassador 
despatched a letter to Coke, in which he expressed his opinion on the negotiations so 
far.57 He thought that the French could do no more than they had done to 
accommodate Charles regarding the restitution of the Elector Palatine’s dignities and 
lands. Apparently, the French had even considered abandoning their attempts to 
court Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria as an ally, implying their support for the 
restitution of the Prince Palatine.58 There were suggestions that the Habsburgs had 
 
53 SP 78/101, fol. 328: Coke to Leicester, 25 July 1636; see also Collins, II, 397. 
 
54 See Richard Bonney, Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 42 and John H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 157-8. For the date of the fall of Corbie, see 
Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 161. 
 
55 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 44-6: Intelligence Report, August 5/[15], August 8/18 
and August 12/22 [1636]. 
 
56 SP 78/101, fol. 349: Leicester to Coke, 29 July/8 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 398-402. 
 
57 SP 78/101, fol. 399: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 402-6. 
 
58 De facto, and clandestinely de jure, Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria had acquired both the 
 
51 
also considered breaking with Maximilian if the English King would commit to an 
alliance with them.59 The Habsburg position was very likely known to the French 
and could have been why they seemingly put on hold their attempts to court the duke 
and intensified their efforts to conclude a league with Charles, if only to deny the 
resources of his realms to Austria and Spain. The possibility of France abandoning 
Maximilian for an alliance with the English King indicates the importance that the 
French attached to an agreement with England. 
 
Leicester noted that Charles was unhappy with the draft French treaty of July 
1636.60 Responding to French demands for a full English commitment to any 
alliance, the English King had said that it was unreasonable for England to break 
with the Habsburgs on the basis of what the French had so far offered. Greater 
guarantees regarding the Elector Palatine’s restoration would be required in return 
for Charles entering into a league with France. In increasing their demands, the 
French had asked how many men England could send to Germany, to which 
Leicester had given a non-committal reply. Writing in mid-August, he reported that 
he had tried to move Chavigny away from the French insistence on a formal alliance 
with England with promises of military and naval aid, but with only limited 
success.61 The ambassador now asked for powers to conclude a treaty with the 
French, despite the fact that he was aware that major differences remained between 
the two parties – the French were demanding an offensive and a defensive league, 
but Charles was offering only limited assistance and neutrality.62 
 
 
electoral title and the Upper Palatinate and the left bank of the Lower Palatinate from Frederick V, 
Charles I Louis’s father, in the 1620s. Maximilian I’s acquisitions of the Electorate and the Palatine 
territories were confirmed formally and publicly by the Peace of Prague in 1635. From 1630 
onwards, Cardinal Richelieu had been trying to detach Maximilian I from the Habsburg cause. See, 
for example, Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 464-5 and 491-2 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish 
Plot’, pp. 241 and 276. 
 
59 O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 241-2 and 276. 
 
60 SP 78/101, fol. 409: Leicester to [Coke], 16/26 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 406-8. 
 
61 SP 78/101, fol. 416: Leicester to [Coke], 19/29 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 409-10. 
 





Spain’s success in Picardy in the summer of 1636 galvanized the Anglo-
French negotiations. Leicester reported that the French had threatened to conclude a 
separate peace with the Habsburgs, and had stated their belief that Arundel would 
get no satisfaction in Vienna, and that Charles might not be able to avoid war in any 
event.63 The earl placed further pressure on the King to conclude an alliance with 
France by pointing out that, given the Spanish incursion into Picardy, the French 
might opt for peace with Spain, rather than ally with England. In his reply to 
Leicester, Coke reiterated his instruction not to agree to an offensive and a defensive 
league with the French.64 However, in an indication of movement on the English 
side, the Secretary said that Charles was willing to conclude a general treaty of 
neutrality with France and the United Provinces, though he would honour England’s 
existing treaty obligations with other states. Coke stated that the King would not 
assist France’s enemies, would grant the right to the French to recruit troops in Great 
Britain and would provide naval assistance to France. In return, he would require 
assurances that the French would not make peace without informing him, and that 
the Elector Palatine’s position would be secured. Slowly but surely, England and 
France were edging towards a treaty that had the potential to redraw the military 
map of western Europe. 
 
At the end of August 1636, Leicester’s negotiations moved onto considering 
the details of the projected Anglo-French treaty, and he continued to seek the power 
to treat with France under the Great Seal of England. He informed Coke that the 
French had responded to Charles’s proposals, but that they had inserted measures 
into a provisional treaty with England to which he knew the King would object – for 
example, they were still insisting on a formal league as the basis for an agreement.65 
Leicester again asked the Secretary, and, by implication, Charles, for the power to 
 
63 SP 78/101, fol. 426: Leicester to [Coke], 26 August/5 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 
413-4. 
 
64 SP 78/101, fol. 430: Coke to Leicester, 30 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 415-6. 
 
65 SP 78/101, fol. 434: Leicester to Coke, 30 August/9 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 
416-8: ‘… I told them [Bullion and Chavigny] it [the French proposal] came short of my expectation, 
that I found many exceptions might be taken unto it, and that it was not worth the sending into 
England, for I knew it would rather distaste than satisfye the King my master because they added to 




conclude a treaty with France. He also tried to persuade the French to move from 
their demand for a full alliance, though to little effect. 
 
The ambassador was now of the opinion that Charles would have to decide 
with whom he would ally. Leicester reported to Coke that the situation with the 
French was unlikely to change until the King determined on an alliance with France 
or a league with the Empire.66 Perhaps to encourage Charles to enter into an alliance 
with the French, the earl relayed a report from the Venetian ambassador to the effect 
that, at Regensburg (Ratisbon), the Emperor, the King of Spain and the duke of 
Bavaria had agreed that the Elector Palatine should never be restored to his dignities 
and lands. 
 
Despite reservations on the King’s and Coke’s part about French intentions 
and sincerity, Charles granted Leicester the power to negotiate under the Great Seal 
in early September 1636.67 However, the ambassador’s authority was greatly 
circumscribed by it being made clear that the King would have to approve all 
articles and any treaty with France first. The Secretary then informed Leicester that 
Charles would write to him shortly – presumably with an explanation for the grant 
of this additional authority to negotiate with the French – but this letter has not 
survived. At the beginning of September, the ambassador implored Coke, and by 
implication the King, to reconsider their conservative position to a league with 
France.68 He sought clarification of his new powers, specifically that he could not 
propose articles himself, and had to remit any treaty to Charles for approval. The 
earl was looking for greater room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, outwardly, he 
continued to adhere to his master’s cautious policy, repeating to Bullion that the 




66 SP 78/102, fol. 3: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 418-9. 
 
67 SP 78/102, fol. 5: Coke to Leicester, 5 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 419. 
 
68 SP 78/102, fol. 7: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 419-20. 
 




Coke responded to Leicester’s pleas for greater resolution from Whitehall by 
giving him revised instructions. Referring to the draft French treaty of July 1636, the 
Secretary noted that the ambassador had stated that these articles were ‘not for 
capitulation, but to keep in mind: And that his M[ajest]ie may ad or take away what 
hee pleaseth.’70 Coke accepted the earl could now proceed on this understanding, 
indicating a willingness on the Secretary’s and, by implication, the King’s part to 
allow the French to make the running in the negotiations on the basis of their draft 
treaty of July. However, he also referred to Leicester’s original instructions of May, 
and confirmed that the earl should not commit Charles to war and that any assistance 
given by the English King to the French should be limited and restricted to the 
general peace of Christendom and the restitution of all German princes to their 
dignities and lands. 
 
The State Papers contain a draft and a final version of the Secretary’s letter, 
dated 27 and 30 September 1636 respectively, with the former containing important 
clues to English thinking on a potential Anglo-French treaty.71 A significant portion 
of the draft letter commenting on the articles proposed by the French was omitted 
from the final version. Nonetheless, the contents of the 30 September package can 
be gleaned from the omitted section of the draft letter. The deletions indicate that, 
though some of the provisions were acceptable to Charles, anything committing him 
to war was not. This position was the sticking point in the treaty negotiations, and 
Coke ordered the ambassador to have the offending articles amended or deleted. 
 
The ambassador and the French were driving the English King towards an 
alliance. Before he had received Coke’s letter of 30 September 1636, Leicester 
informed him that Louis had repeated his offer of an offensive and a defensive 
league with Charles.72 The earl had replied, as per his instructions, that he could not 
commit England to such an alliance. Nevertheless, Leicester was apparently keen to 
 
70 SP 78/102, fol. 80: Coke to Leicester, 30 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 424-5 for the 
final version of the letter, which omits the section deleted from the draft letter of 27 September 1636. 
 
71 SP 78/102, fol. 78: Coke to Leicester, 27 September 1636 [draft letter] and SP 78/102, fol. 
80: Coke to Leicester, 30 September 1636; see also Collins, II, 424-5 [final version of the letter]. 
 




move the talks beyond the limits being imposed on him from Whitehall, informing 
the Secretary that he thought that Bullion was genuine in wanting the negotiations to 
succeed. At the beginning of October, the earl wrote to Coke informing him that 
Bullion had shown, but not given, him a draft treaty prepared by the French.73 
Shortly afterwards, Père Joseph provided the ambassador with a copy of this new 
draft French treaty. Here was further evidence that it was France which was making 
the running regarding the negotiations. Leicester informed the French that he had 
numerous objections to the draft treaty, especially the fourth article, the contents of 
which he did not specify, and that he would have to refer the proposed treaty to the 
King.74 The ambassador did inform Bullion that he had the power to treat with the 
French under the Great Seal, which pleased the surintendant. In a letter of mid-
October, the earl wrote to Coke making it clear that the French would not negotiate 
further until Charles’s intensions were made known.75 
 
The pressure from Leicester and the French was beginning to reap rewards. 
The King and the Secretary had considered the draft French treaty of July 1636, 
creating an opportunity for another breakthrough, which duly came in October in the 
form of detailed comments by Coke on the new set of French proposals.76 As 
instructed, the earl had transmitted the French draft treaty of October to Charles and 
his Secretary, who had amended its provisions sufficiently to constitute what 
amounted to a new English version of the projected alliance. After opting for a 
shortened version of the treaty preface, the King and Coke had proceeded to go 
through it article by article making significant changes. In the first article, the phrase 
relating to the withdrawal of English nationals from Habsburg lands had been 
deleted as such an act could be regarded as a declaration of war. The second article 
had been amended to limit the number of troops that the French could raise in Great 
Britain to 6,000. This provision was the first reference to the quantity of soldiers that 
 
73 SP 78/102, fol. 117: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 October 1636; see also Collins, II, 427-8. 
 
74 Unfortunately, there is no indication in Leicester’s letter of 8/18 October 1636 regarding the 
contents of the fourth article. See SP 78/102, fol. 117: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 October 1636; see 
also Collins, II, 427-8. 
 
75 SP 78/102, fol. 137: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 October 1636. 
 




the English King would permit the French to levy in his lands. By way of 
comparison, 6,000 was the number of men that James Hamilton, third marquis of 
Hamilton, had taken to Europe in 1631-2 for service with Gustavus II Adolphus in 
the Thirty Years War. The Swedish King had been unimpressed by the number and 
the quality of the troops provided.77 The third article, which dealt with the number of 
ships that Charles would provide to the alliance and their command structure, had 
been changed wholly and shortened, as it was, in effect, a declaration of war. The 
fourth article, concerning the free exercise of religion in the Palatinate, had been 
rephrased as the English King was not yet at war with the Habsburgs, and could not 
treat for peace. The fifth article, dealing with a ‘falling out or breach w[i]th the 
States [presumably the United Provinces],’ had been deleted, as the English King 
had not quarrelled with the Dutch and no mediation was required.78 What had been 
the sixth article, which related to ‘the cutting of the three lines of communication 
[with the Spanish Netherlands],’ had been omitted, as the severing of the routes 
whereby Spain could reinforce Flanders would be a declaration of war.79 This 
deletion was significant as blocking the English and the Spanish Roads, by which 
Spain could send men and money to Flanders via the English Channel and from its 
possessions in North Italy respectively, were very important to the French. The ninth 
article in the French version of the treaty, which entailed ‘a conquest by ioint forces 
in open warre [on the continent],’ had been omitted as Charles wanted no ‘share’ of 
such a proposition.80 The remaining articles were unaltered. 
 
In the autumn of 1636, Leicester laid his cards on the table regarding the 
negotiations. The earl indicated to Coke that he knew what was required to conclude 
a treaty with France and understood the diplomatic position and its dangers: 
 
77 James Hamilton, third marquis of Hamilton, was related to, and a close advisor and friend 
of, Charles I, and prominent in foreign affairs from the late 1620s onwards and deeply involved in the 
King’s problems in Scotland from 1637. See John J. Scally, ‘The Political Career of James, Third 
Marquis and First Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 1643’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn 
College, University of Cambridge, 1992), pp. 25-66 for details of Hamilton’s continental expedition 
of 1631-2. 
 
78 SP 78/102, fol. 152: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636; see also Collins, II, 431. 
 
79 SP 78/102, fol. 152: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636; see also Collins, II, 431. 
 





but yo[u]r Ho[no]r knowes that they are not Children who governe the 
affaires here, and therefore will not be frighted w[i]th shadowes nor pleased 
with Babyes, they have a good opinion of their strength, and thinke it 
sufficient for theire owne turne, at least to make their peace, but if yo[u] will 
have them doe more, and undertake the cause of others, who they knowe 
well enough are nearer to us, then to them, yo[u] must helpe them, or be 
assured that they will doe nothing. And if yo[u] will help them adde theire 
owne Phrase to please them the better, without costing yo[u] any more, and 
doe it de bonne grace (the want whereof hath spoyled many benefitts and 
destroyed the gratitude of the Receavers). And I am confident that a Treaty 
advantageous to his Ma[jes]ty may be concluded w[it]h them and their 
Confederates; but I am not ignorant that they must be well looked unto in 
making the bargaine first, and in performing it afterwards …81 
 
Leicester was saying that an alliance with the French could be agreed. In what was 
probably an attempt to sting Charles into action, he reported that there were those 
among the French, for example, Père Joseph, who thought that the English King 
would never sign a treaty with France. 
 
The ambassador’s comments provoked a swift and powerful response from 
Coke. The Secretary rebutted Leicester’s arguments and emphasized his, and 
presumably Charles’s, conservative position towards a French alliance: 
 
when you say the French are no children, to bee frighted w[it]h shadows, or 
pleased w[i]th babies for such you thinck they wil esteeme al the offers wee 
make unto them. But … wee must on the other side consider, not so much 
what pleaseth them, as what is fitt for us to do in reguards of our interests 
and the p[re]sent state of our affaires: and uppon serious consideration therof 
I p[re]sume your Lordship would not advise us to step one foote forwarder 
then wee have donne: …82 
 
Coke was implying that the ambassador had exceeded his instructions. The 
exchange is an indication of the divergent views of, and tension between, Leicester 
and the Secretary, and probably the King, towards an alliance with France. Coke 
also scolded the earl for apparently excluding Scudamore from the negotiations or, 
 
81 SP 78/102, fols 170-1: Leicester to Coke, 23 October/2 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 
435. 
 




at least, not confirming that the ordinary ambassador had been consulted. The 
Secretary softened his criticism by stating that it was better that Leicester heard such 
remarks from him, rather than from another, presumably Charles or someone 
opposed to the earl at court. 
 
In the final quarter of 1636, the improving military situation of France and its 
confederates in the Thirty Years War and the concurrent Franco-Spanish War had 
encouraged the French to press on with the talks. But now they were negotiating 
from a strengthening position. In late September, Sweden, France’s ally, had 
defeated the Imperialists and their Saxon allies at Wittstock in North Germany.83 
The French had retaken Corbie in early November.84 Leicester had given a copy of 
the draft English treaty, which he had received from Coke on 22 October, to Bullion. 
Bullion had asked how many warships the English King could provide.85 The earl 
had replied that Charles could supply between eighteen and twenty vessels. The 
French had also wanted the English King to pay some of the cost of the troops that 
they intended to recruit in Great Britain. Leicester had indicated that this demand 
would be unacceptable to Charles. 
 
There followed a two-month lull in the talks spanning November and 
December 1636. Nonetheless, Leicester was able to report that Richelieu had looked 
at the draft English treaty of October 1636, though the Cardinal had apparently 
reworked the treaty.86 At the very end of the year, the ambassador was instructed by 
 
83 The Battle of Wittstock was fought in North Germany on 24 September (according to the 
Julian calendar), 4 October (under Gregorian dating), 1636. For a description of the victory of 
Sweden, France’s confederate, whose army was commanded by Johan Banér (1596-1641), over the 
Imperialists and their Saxon allies, led by Count Melchior von Hatzfeldt (1593-1658), see Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 580-3. 
 
84 For Leicester’s report on the French recapture of Corbie in Picardy, see SP 78/102, fol. 201: 
Leicester to [Coke], 5/15 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 438-9. 
 
85 See SP 78/102, fol. 211: Leicester to [Coke], 11/21 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 
441-4 and SP 78/102, fol. 191: Leicester to [Coke], 4/14 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 437-8. 
 
86 See SP 78/102, fol. 231: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 





Charles to inform the French that he had prepared his fleet for 1637.87 This news 
was important as it demonstrated that the English King was serious about the talks 
with the French, and was anxious to show that he would have something to put on 
the negotiating table – his ship-money fleet. Bullion had accepted some of the 
responsibility for the delay – that is, the (diplomatic) indisposition of the French 
King and the Cardinal.88 The foot dragging on the part of the French might have 
been caused by a power struggle in France in November and December between 
Louis and Richelieu, on one side, and Gaston, duc d’Orléans, and Louis de Bourbon, 
comte de Soissons, on the other. It is likely that Gaston and Soissons had been 
conspiring against the Cardinal, aiming at Richelieu’s downfall.89 
 
The impasse broke in early 1637, possibly occasioned by the ending of the 
political crisis in France.90 Leicester wrote to Coke informing the Secretary that 
Bullion had presented three items to him and Scudamore.91 The first was the English 
draft treaty of October 1636 to which the French now agreed, and to which they had 
made no significant alterations. The second was a reversal letter required by Charles, 
which probably either related to an offer to Maximilian of Bavaria to retain the 
electoral title in his life time or the free exercise of religion in the Palatinate.92 The 
 
87 See SP 78/102, fol. 316: Leicester to [Coke], 23 December 1636/2 January 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 452-3. 
 
88 See SP 78/102, fol. 328: Leicester to [Coke], 30 December 1636/9 January 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 455. 
 
89 See, for example, SP 78/102, fol. 211: Leicester to [Coke], 11/21 November 1636, see also 
Collins, II, 441-4 and SP 78/102, fol. 277: Leicester to [Coke], 9/19 December 1636. See again 
Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 122. Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons (1604-41), was a second 
cousin of Louis XIII and, therefore, a prince of the blood. He along with Gaston, duc d’Orléans was 
involved, together with Marie des Médicis (1575-1642), the French Queen Mother, in numerous 
conspiracies against Cardinal Richelieu, including at the end of 1636. At that time, Soissons was 
fourth in line to the French throne. 
 
90 Seemingly, the crisis had been resolved by January 1637. See SP 78/103, fol. 32: Leicester 
to [Coke], 20/30 January 1637; see also Collins, II, 459-60. 
 
91 SP 78/103, fol. 28: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 January 1637; see also Collins, II, 456-8. 
 
92 It is not clear from Leicester’s letter of 14/24 January 1637 what was meant by a reversal 
letter for Charles I. However, in Coke’s letter to Leicester of 30 August 1636, the Secretary had 
referred to a reversal letter regarding the offer to Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria, for Maximilian to 
retain the title of Elector Palatine during his life time, which may provide some indication of the 
contents of the reversal letter referred to in Leicester’s communication of 14/24 January 1637. In his 
letter of 18 February 1637, Coke also indicated that a reversal letter could include secret provisions 
 
60 
French had added various provisions to the letter. The third was a French proposal 
for an offensive and a defensive league, which Louis wished to have sent to the 
English King. With regard to the latter, the ambassador had informed Bullion that 
Charles would not commit to war. Bullion had replied that the offensive and 
defensive league was not intended to be executed immediately, but only if 
necessary. Leicester had the three items couriered to the King and the Secretary, 
adding his endorsement of these documents. 
 
In December 1636 and January 1637, events in Vienna and London impacted 
the negotiations with the French. Arundel had returned empty handed from his 
Vienna embassy, in the oft reported words of Dorothy Percy Sidney, countess of 
Leicester, with ‘an ill Iourney, scourvei [that is, scurvy] Usage, and a base 
present.’93 His failure undermined Charles’s position abroad and at home. Arundel’s 
lack of success regarding the Prince Elector’s restitution meant that the King could 
no longer play off the Empire against France with the objective of getting the best 
deal for England and the Prince Palatine. Following the collapse of Arundel’s 
mission, Charles would also find it harder to resist the demands of the Protestant 
groups at his court for a French alliance. At the beginning of 1637, the King’s 
diplomatic and political options had been greatly circumscribed, and he risked being 
forced into a league with France by either the French or the Protestant groups at his 
court, or both. 
 
In January 1637, Charles was confronted at court by Robert Rich, second 
earl of Warwick, one of his leading Protestant subjects.94 Warwick began by 
 
that were not included in any formal treaty. See SP 78/101, fol. 430: Coke to Leicester, 30 August 
1636 (see also Collins, II, 415-6); SP 78/103, fol. 28: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 January 1637 (see 
also Collins, II, 456-8); and SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637 (see also 
Collins, II, 536-7 (mis-located)). It is also possible that the reversal letter concerned the free exercise 
of religion in the Palatinate referred to in SP 78/102, fol. 151: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636; 
see also Collins, II, 430-2. 
 
93 Collins, II, 455-6: Countess of Leicester to Leicester, 10 January 1637; see also 
Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, p. 95 and De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1500, fol. C2/40. 
 
94 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge 
and Senate, 16/[26] January 1637 for an extensive description of the confrontation between Charles I 
and Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick (1587-1658), most of which was originally written in code, 




denouncing the adverse effects of ship money and the problems of its imposition. 
The tax should have been collected by way of ‘the proper channels’ – by which he 
meant Parliament. He went on to state that he would support the King if he decided 
‘to make war against the House of Austria’ and to conclude ‘an alliance with France 
for the recovery of the Palatinate.’ Warwick made it clear that he was speaking not 
merely for himself, but also for a powerful interest among Charles’s subjects. He 
assured Charles that, if he adopted such a policy, ‘parliament would readily consent 
to supply him [the King] with all that he might desire to ask of it.’ Warwick was 
deliberately pressuring Charles when the King was at his weakest following the 
failure of Arundel’s embassy to the Emperor. The earl would have been well-
informed both about Arundel’s abortive mission and of the progress being made by 
Leicester for an alliance with France. Warwick’s intervention in January 1637 
echoed that of March 1636, when, in a letter to Richelieu, the earl had offered the 
services of his private fleet to Louis in a naval war against Spain.95 
 
Warwick would have been aware of the promising state of Leicester’s 
negotiations with the French through his brother, Henry Rich, earl of Holland. In the 
second half of 1636, Holland had helped in obtaining reimbursement of the costs of 
the ambassador’s embassy.96 The French mission was expensive, and Leicester was 
building Leicester House, in what is now Leicester Square in London, and needed 
funds.97 Holland’s involvement was by no means coincidental, and represented his 
and his brother’s support for the French talks. He was also a favourite of Henriette 
 
95 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 33, footnote and Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 28. 
 
96 See, for example, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 55-6: Countess of Leicester to 
Holland, 12 October 1636 (see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 64-5 and De L’Isle 
M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. C130/4); Collins, II, 429: Juxon, Lord Treasurer to Holland, 15 October 
1636; De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 62-3: Hawkins to Countess of Leicester, 9 November 
1636 (see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 72-3 and De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 
U1475, fol. C133/13); and De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 65-6: Hawkins to Leicester, 16/[26] 
November 1636 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. C132/9). Henry Rich, earl of 
Holland (bap. 1590-1649), was groom of the stole, a prominent Caroline courtier and, at that time, 
influential through his favour with Henriette Marie. For the latter, see Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of 
Henrietta Maria’ and ‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’. William Juxon 
(1582-1663) was Bishop of London. In March 1636, Juxon was made Lord Treasurer following the 
death of Richard Weston, earl of Portland (1577-1635) – hence Juxon’s involvement in paying 
Leicester’s ambassadorial expenses. Juxon was the first bishop to hold an office of state since 1626 
and the first ecclesiastic in the Treasury since 1470. 
 
97 See Lenard W. Cowie, ‘Leicester House’, History Today, 23 (1973), 30-7. 
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Marie at that time and action on his part on behalf of Leicester indicated her 
patronage of his mission and its objectives.98 Court gossip reflected this new 
alignment of forces in London. According to Leicester’s closest ally, 
Northumberland, ‘the busiest staits men [that is, statesmen] in the court do now 





The treaty negotiations were over. Charles had to decide whether he should conclude 
an alliance with France or abandon the attempt. The King made up his mind. On 17 
February 1637, reluctantly or otherwise, he had two treaties drawn up – the so-called 
main and auxiliary treaties.100 In a letter of the following day, Coke explained to 
Leicester that Charles had decided that the delays on the French side were genuine 
and due to sickness and affairs of state.101 He had determined to make up for lost 
time, and had had the two treaties drawn up under his own ‘iudgment [and] 
direction.’102 The treaties were based on the draft treaty of October 1636 to which 
the French had agreed in substance in January 1637, and which the ambassador had 
 
 
98 See, in general, Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’ and ‘Religion, European 
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99 See De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 81: Countess of Leicester to Leicester, 21 
January 1637; see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, p. 99 and De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 
U1475, fol. 82/13. 
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see Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 February 1637. At that time, Thomas Wentworth, 
Viscount Wentworth (1593-1641), was Lord Deputy of Ireland and opposed to an alliance with 
France for both personal and political reasons. Personally, conflict with Spain could damage Irish 
customs revenues, from which the Lord Deputy benefitted. Politically, a Habsburg war would risk the 
calling of Parliament and would endanger Wentworth’s reforming policy of ‘thorough.’ Given this 
situation, Charles I’s letter to the viscount can be read as an apology for his moving towards an 
alliance with France. 
 
101 SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536 (mis-
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had couriered to England.103 The main treaty was a ‘Preparative for the second,’ that 
is, the auxiliary treaty, which purportedly fleshed out the terms for a league 
offensive and defensive between Charles and Louis.104 The auxiliary treaty, 
therefore, represented a huge concession on the King’s part. By having that treaty 
drawn up, Charles had given in to French demands regarding his up to then 
consistent opposition to an offensive and a defensive alliance. It is possible that he 
was relying on Bullion’s assurance – as communicated by Leicester in his letter of 
14 January – that that treaty was not intended to be executed immediately, but only 
in case of necessity.105 (For a full discussion of the two treaties and their provisions, 
see Chapter 3.) 
 
Of even greater moment, Charles made a further concession to the French in 
signing and ratifying the two treaties of February 1637. He also expected Louis to do 
likewise.106 In Coke’s words: 
 
Now both these treaties thus ordered [and] accorded by his Maj[esty] and 
paraphed as you may see in the drawghts now sent unto you [Leicester]: that 
the final dispatch therof may proceed w[it]hout delay his Maj[esty] hath now 
sent you by Mr Augier his ratification under the broade seale w[hic]h upon 
like ratification under the seale of that [the French] crown [and] signed by 
that king [Louis XIII] you may deliver unto them according as the treaties 
themselves do severallie direct. And the performance now resting on your 
hands: wee shal expect like expedition …107 
 
Not only had Charles signed and ratified both treaties, and assumed that Louis 
would do the same, but he had also given Leicester the power to bring about such an 
end. These actions signalled the English King’s very strong commitment, forced or 
 
103 See SP 78/103, fol. 28: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 January 1637; see also Collins, II, 456-8. 
 
104 SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located). 
 
105 See SP 78/103, fol. 28: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 January 1637; see also Collins, II, 456-8. 
 
106 For evidence of Charles I’s confidence that Louis XIII would sign and ratify the Anglo-
French treaties of February 1637, see Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 February 1637: ‘… 
the Treaties are not yet ratified by France, but I make no question of their ratifying of them …’ 
 





otherwise, to an Anglo-French alliance in early 1637. They also reveal the very great 
extent to which Charles had placed his fate in the hands of the French King and the 
Cardinal – all that Louis had to do was to sign and ratify the treaties and the anti-
Habsburg Anglo-French league would become a reality. The English King had, 
therefore, moved far from his position of neutrality towards France from which he 
had started out in May 1636. 
 
Very few historians have appreciated that Charles signed and ratified the 
Anglo-French treaties of 1637, and gave his extraordinary ambassador in Paris the 
authority to finalize the alliance. S. R. Gardiner came closest when he stated that 
‘[f]ull powers were sent to Leicester to conclude everything by March.’108 However, 
he did not say that the English King had signed and ratified the treaties. Both Elmer 
Beller and Thea Linquist referred to the treaties as being ‘signed.’109 Nevertheless, 
these historians do not state that Charles had also ratified the treaties, and given the 
earl the power to conclude the Anglo-French alliance. Where, if at all, historians 
have referred to the English King’s actions regarding the treaties in early 1637, they 
have tended to use vague terms, for example, ‘approved,’ like Caroline Hibbard.110 
 
After nine months of often frustrating negotiations, caught between Charles’s 
policy of only offering a defensive alliance and a desire to avoid war and alternating 
French pressure and prevarication, Leicester had succeeded in attaining his objective 
– the signing and ratification of treaties for an Anglo-French alliance. How had this 
been accomplished, given that the English and the French had been so far apart in 
May 1636, and had not been close to concluding a league? Crucially, the King’s 
position, diplomatically and politically, had weakened very significantly over the 
nine months of talks. The failure to obtain any concessions from the Empire 
regarding the Palatinate as a result of the absence of any success for Arundel’s 
Vienna embassy and the public knowledge of this breakdown, enabled the French, 
 
108 Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 210. 
 
109 Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 61 and Lindquist, 
‘Politics of Diplomacy’, p. 481. 
 




Henriette Marie and Protestant courtiers in England, such as Warwick, as well as 
Leicester in Paris, to put pressure on Charles to agree to a French alliance. The 
presence in England of Charles Louis, the Prince Elector, and his brother, Prince 
Rupert, and the support that they had amassed at the Caroline court was a further 
powerful factor driving the King towards an alliance with France. Charles may have 
decided to jump before he was pushed. Of course, he could have been bluffing when 
he signed and ratified the treaties of February 1637. He may have calculated that the 
French would not respond by signing and ratifying the treaties. But such a gambit 
would have entailed considerable peril, for, if the French had called his bluff, the 
King would have risked being drawn further into their anti-Habsburg system of 
alliances with the concomitant danger of war. 
 
For France, Spain’s aggression in 1636, despite Sweden’s victory at 
Wittstock in September and the recapture of Corbie in November, might have 
concentrated Louis’s and Richelieu’s minds, resulting in a desire to further the treaty 
negotiations with England. The French wish for an additional ally would have been 
strengthened by the fact that – in contrast to the late 1620s and early 1630s – they 
were now fighting the Habsburgs on multiple fronts, and, despite some successes, 
were struggling.111 What is certain is that, at the beginning of 1637, the French and 
their Protestant supporters at the Caroline court had succeeded in pushing the 
English King harder and further than Spain and its friends had done in 1633-4. In 
February 1637, Charles had signed and ratified the main and auxiliary treaties, the 
latter ostensibly representing an offensive and a defensive alliance. In 1633-4, the 
negotiations for a maritime league with Spain had not resulted in the signing of any 
treaty and had foundered on the King’s refusal to consider offensive provisions 
regarding any agreement.112 
 
Charles had signed and ratified the main and auxiliary treaties of February 
1637. Would the French reciprocate and sign and ratify the two treaties, placing yet 
more pressure on the English King to risk war with the Empire and Spain? Could 
 
111 See Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 112-3. 
 




Louis and Richelieu and Henriette Marie, Warwick and Leicester effect a diplomatic 
revolution and compel Charles to align with the French against the Imperialists and 
the Spanish? In early 1637, the two European alliance systems, France, Sweden and 
the United Provinces and Spain, the Empire and Bavaria, were evenly matched. The 
addition of the English King’s resources to either side could tip the balance in favour 
of one or the other. Both sides had tried to negotiate an alliance with Charles, but 
only the French had succeeded in getting him to draw up, sign and ratify two 










What did the players in the courtly and diplomatic drama that formed the backdrop 
to the Anglo-French treaty negotiations want at the beginning of 1637? The chief 
participants at the Caroline court were Charles I, and his Queen, Henriette Marie; the 
Protestant Party, based around Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland, and 
Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester; the peripheral and disenchanted group 
centred on Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, which included other Protestant 
courtiers, notably Francis Russell, fourth earl of Bedford, and Robert Devereux, 
third earl of Essex; and the Spanish Party, headed by William Laud, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth. Diplomatically, other 
than England, the chief actor was France, represented by Louis XIII and Cardinal 
Richelieu. 
 
What were Charles’s aims in 1637? At the beginning of the year, the King’s 
main foreign-policy objective was to secure the restitution of the dignities and the 
lands of his nephew, Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine. Charles was 
anxious to have the problem of the Palatinate resolved not only to salve the honour 
and dignity of his House in the eyes of Europe, but also because he was keen to 
focus his attention on matters closer to home, particularly his ‘pious designe … to 
settle an Uniformity of serving God in all his three Kingdomes.’1 The King was 
willing to commit himself to providing maritime assistance to France or even to 
engage in a naval war against the Habsburgs, but definitely not to become involved 
in a land conflict in Europe. The projected Anglo-French alliance based on the so-
called main and auxiliary treaties of 17 February 1637, with its military focus firmly 
 
1 James Howell, Mercurius Hibernicus, Or, a Discourse of the Late Insurrection in Ireland 
Displaying, 1. the True Causes of It, Till Now Not So Fully Discovered: 2. the Course That Was 




on the Narrow Seas, appeared tailored to his strategic priorities and concerns.2 
Conversely, an agreement with Austria and Spain, though apparently distant at the 
beginning of that year, could enhance the security of Charles’s realms, as access to 
Habsburg funds would reduce significantly his financial problems and strengthen his 
ability to govern his multiple kingdoms. 
 
Domestically, the King was concerned to manage the various powerful 
interests at court. This aim involved keeping the Protestant and Spanish Parties on 
side as well as the outlying and increasingly estranged circle centred on Warwick, 
retaining the support of as many of his court grandees as possible and avoiding 
direct conflict with any group so as to maintain his authority. Within the British 
Isles, religious matters would be to the fore, especially relating to Archbishop 
Laud’s church reforms, which emphasized ceremony, and entailed harassing the 
godly and their ministers, strengthening the power of the bishops and introducing a 
new prayer book in Scotland. These policies were regarded by many of Charles’s 
subjects in his three kingdoms as ‘popery’ – ‘Catholicism understood as political 
and spiritual tyranny’ – and appeared to be part of a wider design by Catholic 
powers on the continent to destroy Protestantism entirely.3 
 
For Henriette Marie, 1637 would be a year of change. She would start off 
supporting an Anglo-French alliance as favoured by Richelieu. However, in the 
second half of the year, she would move to espousing the return of his enemy, Marie 
des Médicis, to France.4 Marie des Médicis was Louis XIII’s mother, that is, the 
French Queen Mother, an arch conspirator and from the late 1620s onwards an 
inveterate opponent of Richelieu. She was also Charles’s mother-in-law, Henriette 
Marie being her youngest daughter. Marie des Médicis would make relations with 
the French problematic from August 1637 onwards as well as giving rise to 
 
2 London, TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 
17 February 1637. 
 
3 David Scott, Leviathan: The Rise of Britain as a World Power (London: HarperPress, 2013), 
p. 4. 
 
4 See Smuts, ‘The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41-42 and ‘Religion, European 




complications at the Caroline court following her arrival in England in October 
1638. In many ways, she was Charles’s mother-in-law from hell – diplomatically, 
politically and in terms of the money that she and her extensive retinue would cost 
him.5 
 
What did the two Protestant groups at Charles’s court want at the outset of 
1637? The Northumberland-Leicester circle was keen to build upon its success with 
the main and the auxiliary treaties of February and to see the conclusion of an 
Anglo-French alliance. The anticipated result would be that England would play a 
full role in the Thirty Years War with concomitant benefits for the Protestant cause 
in Europe and at home, especially regarding the influence of Northumberland, 
Leicester and their allies at court over the King. The other Protestant group at court, 
though very much on its fringes – Warwick’s circle – was also eager for the league 
with France to be finalized. Warwick had made his support for some kind of military 
alliance clear when he had confronted Charles at court on this very issue in January.6 
 
In early 1637, the Spanish Party wanted to see the end of any possibility of a 
league with France. Ideally, it sought some form of agreement with the Habsburgs, 
formal or otherwise, perhaps stemming from a resumption of the negotiations for a 
maritime treaty with Spain, which had foundered in 1634.7 As with the Protestant 
Party, personal motives would play a role here. Laud would not wish to see the 
calling of a Parliament that a French alliance could necessitate, and the opposition 
that this would engender regarding his religious policies, given their unpopularity 
with an important section of the political nation. Charles’s Lord Deputy in Ireland, 
Viscount Wentworth, was keen to avoid any involvement in the Thirty Years War. 
Peace would afford him the time and resources to embed his reform programme in 
Ireland, and would be to his personal benefit, for his cut from the Irish customs 
 
5 For the cost of Marie des Médicis (1575-1642) and her 600 strong retinue to Charles I 
(1600-49), see Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 31. 
 
6 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge 
and Senate, 16/[26] January 1637. 
 




duties would be badly hit by war with Spain. 
 
France’s position at the beginning of 1637 was delicately balanced. Louis 
and Richelieu would be pleased with their success in persuading Charles to draw-up 
the main and the auxiliary treaties of February, which the English King had signed 
and ratified.8 The French had gained more from Leicester’s negotiations than 
Charles had. At the very least, the French King and the Cardinal had kept the 
English King talking and, after November, negotiating exclusively with France 
following the failure of the embassy of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, 
to the Emperor, Ferdinand II, in Vienna. These developments would help to bolster 
France’s military position with regard to the Habsburgs in 1637 following the 
setbacks of 1636 – notably the Spanish invasion of North-East France in the summer 
of that year and the threat that Spain’s incursion posed to Paris. However, there were 
important issues that an alliance with England would require Louis and Richelieu to 
address. It would necessitate a reorientation of the thrust of French diplomatic and 
military efforts away from keeping the Spanish Road between North Italy and 
Flanders closed towards shutting off the English Road in the Channel by which 
Spain could reinforce the Spanish Netherlands by sea. The question was, would this 
reorientation be desirable, especially if it resulted in the reopening of the Spanish 
Road? There would be issues regarding France’s allies, Sweden and the United 
Provinces, neither of whom were on good terms with Charles. The restitution of 
Charles Louis would also run counter to France’s efforts since 1630 to detach 
Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria, from his alliance with the Austrian Habsburgs.9 In 
other words, would a league with the English King be worthwhile, especially given 
the poor military record of the Stuarts and Charles’s known aversion to any 
commitment to a land-based conflict in Europe?10 Nevertheless, the French King 
 
8 For Charles I’s drawing up, signing and ratification of the main and the auxiliary Anglo-
French treaties of February 1637, see TNA, SP France, SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 
February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-located). 
 
9 For the French efforts to detach Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria (1573-1651) from the 
Austrian Habsburgs, see, for example, Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 464-5 and 491-2 and O’Neill, 
‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 241 and 276. 
 
10 See, for example, CSPV, XXIII, 1632-1636, 560: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France 
to the Doge and Senate, [2]/12 May 1636 and CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 309-10: Correr, Venetian 
Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate, 30 October/[9 November] 1637. 
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and the Cardinal would wish to keep the English King talking, if only to ensure that 
Charles remained neutral and to prevent him from falling into the Habsburg camp in 




It is now time to examine the provisions of the main and the auxiliary Anglo-French 
treaties of February 1637.12 (See Appendix 6 for the modern English translations of 
these treaties, from which all quotations in this section are taken.) Charles had had 
the two treaties of February drawn up, though they were probably based very largely 
on the draft French treaties of January that Leicester had forwarded to him on the 
fourteenth of that month.13 He had signed and ratified both treaties, and had sent 
them to Louis for the French King to sign and ratify as well.14 The English King’s 
position, both politically at home and diplomatically in Europe, was weak. As a 
result, he had either been forced into drawing up the treaties or had done so on his 
own volition so as to have some control over events. Charles had put the treaties 
together as part of a two-stage defensive and offensive league with France, with the 
auxiliary treaty intended to be the offensive alliance, though the purportedly 
defensive main treaty could be regarded as implying, in part at least, an offensive 
league. The question was would Louis sign and ratify the treaties, potentially 
effecting a European-wide diplomatic revolution in the first half of 1637? 
 
The treaties of February 1637 had a number of measures in common. These 
provisions were significant and, in many ways, committed Charles to an offensive 
alliance with France. In particular, the King would be required to put to sea a fleet of 
at least thirty ships of between ‘300 to 900 to 1,000 tonnes.’ Of even greater import, 
in the words of the main treaty, these ships were: 
 
 
11 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. 
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to guard and protect not only the ports and shores of both kingdoms, but also 
to prevent soldiers, money, supplies, any instruments of war or munitions 
from being transported to anyone, who opposes this common cause or the 
restitution of the said nephews.15 
 
The significance of this measure lay not only in the provision of a maritime force, 
but also that the latter part of the article implied an active role for Charles’s fleet, 
which entailed a considerable risk that – even under the main treaty – he would be 
drawn into war with Spain as a result of blockading Flanders.16 It could, therefore, 
be regarded as representing both an offensive and a defensive league. Such an 
alliance was something that the King had not agreed to in the negotiations with the 
Spanish in 1633-4.17 Thus, Charles had signed and ratified two treaties with France 
(and not Spain), and had gone far down the road to concluding an offensive league 
with the French. 
 
The King was also to make a ‘well-armed’ fleet of twelve to fifteen ships of 
at least 200 tonnes available to Charles Louis, so that the Prince Elector could 
achieve the restitution of his dignities and lands.18 This was the first time that 
reference had been made in relation to the treaties to providing a fleet for Charles 
Louis. The provision of a naval force to the Elector Palatine by Charles may have 
been discussed prior to February 1637, but it had not been commented on by 
Leicester in his letters to the King and Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior Secretary of 
State. Such a measure could have been included in the draft treaties that the English 
 
15 SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 of the main and the 
auxiliary treaties. The wording in the auxiliary treaty is essentially the same as that in the main treaty, 
reading ‘to guard and protect not only the ports and shores of both kingdoms, but also (as far as is 
possible) to prevent soldiers, money, supplies, any instruments of war or munitions being transported 
to anyone, who oppose this common cause or the restitution of the Palatine Elector.’ The words in 
brackets, ‘as far as is possible,’ were added by the French. 
 
16 For Charles I’s contemporaneous thoughts to this effect, see Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to 
Wentworth, 28 February 1637. 
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and French had had drawn up during the negotiations of the second half of 1636, 
copies of which have not survived. Making a fleet available to Charles Louis harked 
back to Warwick’s offer to Richelieu of around March 1636 to put his privateering 
fleet at the disposal of the French, an offer that Warwick repeated a year later.19 Sir 
Thomas Roe, the noted Caroline diplomat, would make a similar proposal to the 
King in that year – that is, to establish an English West India Company ‘to make war 
upon the King of Spain.’20 This venture had the support of Northumberland, 
Charles’s Lord Admiral, and presumably of Leicester as well. Including the 
provision of a fleet for Charles Louis was, therefore, not only an indication of the 
English King’s support for the restitution of the Prince Elector, but also a foreign-
policy option that had well-rehearsed Protestant precedents.21 
 
A related and very significant measure in the treaties of February 1637 was 
that ‘any places’ ‘taken’ by the French as a result of action under the Anglo-French 
alliance ‘pertaining’ ‘by right’ to the Elector Palatine were to be handed over to 
Charles ‘for the use of’ Charles Louis.22 The auxiliary treaty further specified that 
places captured in Flanders by the French King could fall within the definition of 
those places that should be handed to the Prince Elector.23 Unfortunately, neither 
treaty provides further details. There is no specific reference to places other than 
 
19 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 33, footnote and Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 28. 
 
20 For details of the proposal, see TNA, SP Colonial, CO 1/9, fol. 144: Northumberland to Roe, 
6 August 1637. See also CSPD, 1637, 358 and this letter and further papers in CSPC, 1574-1660, 
257. Sir Thomas Roe was a Stuart diplomat, who had travelled extensively in visiting South America 
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confidant of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia (1596-1662), and a staunch supporter of the 
Protestant cause. See Michael Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe, 1581-1644: A Life (London: Michael 
Russell, 1989) and History of Parliament Trust, London, unpublished article on Rowe, Sir Thomas 
(1581-1644) for 1640-60 section by Vivienne Larminie. I am grateful to the History of Parliament 
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21 See, for example, the scheme described in Thomas Cogswell, ‘“The Warre of the Commons 
for the honour of King Charles”: the parliament-men and the reformation of the lord admiral in 
1626’, Historical Research, 84 (2011), 618-37. 
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those taken in Flanders by the French or what the English King was thinking when 
he had the provision included in the treaties or whether Charles Louis’s fleet would 
be involved in joint operations with the French in the Spanish Netherlands. Most 
likely, the thinking behind the measure was to ensure that the places taken in 
Flanders could be held as surety by the Prince Elector to prevent the French 
conquering Palatine territories in the Rhineland, which they would then not return to 
him as being too strategically important in ensuring that the Spanish Road remained 
closed. Leicester would report in March that the French had objected twice to this 
provision, the implication being that they were contemplating just such action.24 
 
Charles agreed to the French raising a total of 6,000 soldiers in his realms.25 
This measure was a limited concession and in line with previous such allowances. 
Six thousand was approximately the number of troops that James Hamilton, third 
marquis of Hamilton, had taken to Europe in 1631-2 to serve with Gustavus II 
Adolphus in the Thirty Years War.26 The Swedish King had been unimpressed by 
both the number and the quality of the men provided on that occasion. The mission 
of the Swede Johan Oxenstierna in 1633-4 can be taken as an indication of the 
number of soldiers that foreign powers would have liked to raise in the British Isles. 
Oxenstierna, the son of Axel Oxenstierna, the regent for Queen Christina of Sweden, 
had come to the Caroline court seeking to raise between 10,000 to 12,000 troops.27 
Charles had not permitted Oxenstierna to levy that many soldiers and the Swedish 
envoy had left the King’s court in high dudgeon, refusing the traditional royal 
 
24 SP 78/103, fol. 125: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 467-71. 
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‘… of which a levy is to be made, if his Most Christian majesty believes he has need of them, as soon 
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As indicated, Johan Oxenstierna (1611-57) was Axel Oxenstierna’s son and a diplomat, who was 




present on his departure. These events had only served to confirm the Swedes in 
their poor opinion of Charles.28 However, restricting the number of troops that the 
French could levy to 6,000 would enable the English King to portray this article to 
Austria and Spain as only a limited concession to France. 
 
The treaties of February 1637 contained extensive provisions regarding the 
inclusion of France’s ‘confederates’ – Sweden and the United Provinces – as well as 
Denmark and Savoy in the projected Anglo-French league.29 Sweden and the United 
Provinces were to be encouraged by both Charles and Louis to join the alliance with 
a view to establishing the peace of Christendom and the liberty of Germany, 
including the restitution of the Prince Elector. The two countries were also to be 
invited to a conference to be held at Hamburg (the auxiliary treaty specified 
Hamburg or The Hague), at which they could ‘join this treaty’ and discuss the 
arrangements that would be necessary to bring the anti-Habsburg coalition into 
effect. A further measure stated that, if the English King did not obtain satisfaction 
from ‘the Austrian house and its adherents’ after a set period, he would conclude an 
offensive and a defensive treaty with France.30 This measure is another sign of how 
far Charles had compromised his position of neutrality towards the French in 
moving towards an offensive and a defensive league. Significantly, neither treaty 
stated that they would have to be approved by Sweden and the United Provinces 
before being signed by England and France. 
 
The inclusion of Denmark in the Anglo-French alliance would be 
problematic for the Swedes.31 Following Sweden’s break away from the Union of 
Kalmar in 1523, there had been ongoing tension between Denmark and Sweden.32 In 
 
28 See Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, p. 171. 
 
29 SP 103/11, fols 599-601 and 603-4: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, articles 5, 13 
and 14 of the main treaty and article 5 of the auxiliary treaty. Only the main treaty referred to the 
inclusion of Savoy in the alliance. 
 
30 SP 103/11, fols 599-601: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 5 of the main and 
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31 SP 103/11, fols 599-601: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 6 of the main 
treaty and article 5 of the auxiliary treaty. 
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1611-3, this distrust had resulted in war. Charles was regarded by the Swedes as a 
good Dane, given the dynastic connections between the Stuarts and Denmark, and as 
a good Catholic because of his perceived leanings towards Spain.33 The ineffective 
military assistance provided to Gustavus Adolphus in 1631-2 and the problems that 
Johan Oxenstierna had experienced in trying to raise troops in Great Britain in 1633-
4 had only reinforced the negative Swedish view of the English King.34 
Consequently, the potential inclusion of Denmark in the Anglo-French league would 
not be regarded favourably by the Swedes. However risky, Charles may have 
included the measure in the treaties as a fail-safe to ensure that they would not come 
into effect, and commit him to a military alliance against Spain. An alternative 
explanation is that Charles wanted Denmark included for reasons of honour (the 
Danes had fought for Frederick V in the 1620s, then the Elector Palatine) and family 
(Christian IV, the Danish King, was his uncle). 
 
Charles promised not to provide military aid to Austria and Bavaria and, in 
the auxiliary treaty, Spain as well.35 These countries were not to be allowed to 
recruit soldiers in the English King’s realms. In contrast to many of the other 
articles, this provision was in line with Charles’s treaty policy in that it represented a 
defensive alliance only. It probably also reflected French concerns regarding the 
continuing alleged English trade in war materials with the Spanish in Flanders.36 
 
Maximilian of Bavaria was to be permitted to retain the Palatine electoral 
 
Union of Kalmar. Sweden broke away from the Union in 1523 when Gustavus I Vasa (1496-1560) 
declared Sweden independent. There was suspicion on the part of Sweden through-out the remainder 
of the sixteenth century and in the first half of the seventeenth century that Denmark wished to re-
establish the Union, fears that were not entirely without foundation given the ambitions of the Danish 
King, Christian IV (1577-1648). See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 169 and 179. 
 
33 Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, p. 274. James VI and I had married Anne of 
Denmark (1574-1619), the sister of Christian IV. Christian IV was, therefore, Charles I’s uncle. 
 
34 See Scally, ‘James, Third Marquis and First Duke of Hamilton’, pp. 25-66 and Grosjean, 
‘Scots and the Swedish State’, p. 87. 
 
35 SP 103/11, fols 597-8: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 1 of the main and 
the auxiliary treaties. 
 





dignity during his lifetime. He had acquired the title from Frederick V, Charles 
Louis’s father, de facto in the 1620s and de jure following the Peace of Prague of 
1635.37 The offer was conditional on the Bavarian duke accepting the English and 
French peace proposals. If Maximilian did not accept the offer and forced war on 
England and France, Charles and Louis would deny the electoral title to him and his 
descendants. The duke might have been willing to consider some form of restitution 
for Charles Louis, but only to a very limited extent.38 For example, he might have 
been agreeable to returning the right bank of the Lower Palatinate to the Prince 
Palatine, but not the Upper Palatinate, which bordered on Bavaria, and definitely not 
the electoral dignity. The retention of the latter was especially important to 
Maximilian given the long-standing feud between the Bavarian and Palatine 
branches of the Wittelsbach family regarding the electoral title.39 His desire to 
remain an Elector would only have been strengthened by the birth of his heir, 
Ferdinand Maria, in 1636. In a further concession to the duke, it was stated that 
Charles Louis would grant the ‘free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion’ in his 
lands. 
 
An important aspect of the two treaties was how they referred to Charles 
Louis.40 The main treaty exclusively mentioned the Prince Elector as the nephew of 
Charles (nine times). However, the auxiliary treaty referred to Charles Louis as the 
Elector Palatine (five times) and to him as the English King’s nephew (three times). 
The use of Charles Louis’s electoral title in the auxiliary treaty is significant, given 
the sensitivity of the French to the use of his formal title to avoid alienating 
Maximilian of Bavaria. As Charles had drawn-up the treaties, it could be argued that 
 
37 SP 103/11, fols 601-2: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 8 of the main and 
the auxiliary treaties. De facto, and clandestinely de jure, Maximilian I of Bavaria had acquired the 
electoral title and the Upper Palatinate and the left bank of the Lower Palatinate from Frederick V 
(1596-1632), the father of Charles I Louis (1617-1680), in the 1620s. Maximilian I’s acquisitions of 
the Electorate and the Palatinate territories were confirmed formally and publicly by the Peace of 
Prague in 1635. 
 
38 See, for example, Lindquist, ‘The Politics of Diplomacy’, p. 31. 
 
39 For details of the family quarrel between the Bavarian and the Palatine Wittelsbachs 
regarding the electoral dignity that dated back to the fourteenth century, see Lindquist, ‘The Politics 
of Diplomacy’, p. 82, footnote 46. 
 




the numerous references to Charles Louis as both the Elector Palatine and his 
nephew, coupled with the number of times that reference was made to Bavaria – 
eight in the main treaty and five in the auxiliary one – were part of his gamble that 
the French would not sign and ratify the two treaties.41 The English King might have 
been drawing the attention of the French to the inherent conflict in the treaties 
between their promise to restore Charles Louis to the electoral dignity and his lands 
and their attempts to detach Maximilian from his alliance with the Empire. The 
references could, therefore, be regarded in the same light as Charles’s suggestion of 
including Denmark in the league – that is, as a way of ensuring that the treaties 
would not come to fruition. A more likely explanation, however, is that these 
numerous references to the Palatinate and Bavaria were a test on the English King’s 
part to establish if Louis and Richelieu were serious in their commitment to an 
Anglo-French alliance and the abandoning of Maximilian in favour of Charles 
Louis. The overall effect was to give Charles some ‘wriggle’ room regarding a 
league with France. 
 
Although broadly similar in intent, there were some differences of detail 
between the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637. The main treaty was 
fourteen articles long, whereas the auxiliary treaty contained only twelve.42 Article 6 
of the main treaty regarding the participation of Denmark (and Savoy) was omitted 
from the auxiliary treaty, with the provisions in respect of Danish (but not Savoyard) 
involvement being included in article 5 of the latter treaty.43 There was an additional 
concluding article 14 in the main treaty with regard to the participation of Sweden 
and the United Provinces in the projected Anglo-French alliance in a conference to 
be arranged at Hamburg.44 The auxiliary treaty was vaguer in referring in article 5 to 
either Hamburg or The Hague as the location for the conference.45 Finally, the main 
 
41 I owe this idea to a suggestion that Professor John Adamson made at a supervisor’s meeting 
in November 2017. 
 
42 SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637. 
 
43 SP 103/11, fols 599-600: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 5 of the auxiliary 
treaty. 
 
44 SP 103/11, fol. 604: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 14 of the main treaty. 
 
45 SP 103/11, fols 599-600: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 5 of the auxiliary 
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treaty was to be ratified in Paris on 15 August 1637, while the auxiliary treaty was to 
be ‘signed and subscribed’ to by ‘both kings’ by 1 March 1637 ‘English style.’46 
 
Charles had gone far towards concluding an offensive as well as a defensive 
alliance with France. This position was something that Coke acknowledged in his 
letter to Leicester of 18 February 1637: 
 
And if therin hee [Charles I] goeth further than was expected on that side 
[the French]: they have cause to acknowledg not only the sense hee hath 
therin of his own honor, but also the great affection hee beareth to his brother 
the French King with whom Hee wil concurre in so brave a way.47 
 
Such a situation was true of both the main and the auxiliary treaties, given that the 
main treaty included a number of provisions that, to a great extent, made it an 
offensive and a defensive league, especially in relation to article 3 regarding the 
proposed actions of the English King’s ship-money fleet.48 This stance on the part of 
Charles went against the oft repeated instructions to Leicester in the late summer and 
autumn of 1636 not to agree to an offensive and a defensive league with France.49 If 
the French had signed and ratified the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 
1637, as the English King might reasonably suppose they would, the result would 
have been a significant concession to French demands on the part of the English 




46 SP 103/11, fols 603-4: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 14 of the main 
treaty and article 13 of the auxiliary treaty. In Paris, 15 August 1637 would have been 5 August in 
London. 1 March 1637 ‘English style’ would have been 11 March under the new, Gregorian, calendar 
in France. Both deadlines, especially the latter, were very tight and probably not achievable. 
 
47 SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located). 
 
48 SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 of both the main 
and the auxiliary treaties. 
 
49 See, for example, SP 78/101, fol. 430: Coke to Leicester, 30 August 1636 (see also Collins, 
II, 415-6); SP 78/102, fol. 80: Coke to Leicester, 30 September 1636 (see also Collins, II, 424-5); and 
SP 78/102, fol. 151: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636 (see also Collins, II, 430-2). 
 
50 For Charles I thinking that the French would (sign and) ratify the Anglo-French treaties of 








The main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 were a dramatic breakthrough 
in Anglo-French relations, which Leicester used to try to finalize the conclusion of 
the league with France. The earl wrote to Coke on 24 February informing him that 
he had received the documents that the Secretary had given to René Augier, a low-
ranking Caroline diplomat and servant of the ambassador, to deliver to him.51 
Writing at the beginning of March, the ambassador confirmed to the Secretary that 
he had received the two treaties in both their Latin and English versions as brought 
over by Augier. (The English versions have not survived.) He had passed the treaties 
onto Claude de Bullion, one of Louis’s surintendants des finances, again via 
Augier.52 Leicester also reported that he had repeated to Bullion what Coke had said 
in his (the Secretary’s) letter of 18 February regarding the English King going 
further than they (the French) would have anticipated in respect of an alliance. He 
went onto say that the French were generally satisfied with the contents of the 
treaties, though, as noted, they had objected to the provision concerning the handing 
over of any places they would capture in Flanders to the Prince Elector as surety. 
Following Leicester’s next meeting with Bullion, the ambassador reported that the 
French had brought up the following three issues: again the handing over of places 
captured in Flanders by the French to Charles Louis; the lack of assistance promised 
by Charles to the French on land; and the length of time that the English King had 
indicated would be required to finalize the treaties. A further meeting was suggested, 
via Richelieu’s adviser and confidant, Père Joseph, for a conference with Bullion 
and Francois Sublet de Noyers, Louis’s Secretary of State for War.53 However, to 
 
51 SP 78/103, fol. 107: Leicester to [Coke], 24 February/6 March 1637, see also Collins, II, 467. 
René Augier (dates unknown) was a minor Caroline diplomat in Paris and the French secretary of 
Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), whom the earl favoured. It is possible that 
Augier was both a French and a Habsburg informant. See Brennan, Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 142 and 
Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, p. 189. 
 
52 SP 78/103, fol. 125: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 467-71. 
 
53 Francois Sublet de Noyers (1589-1645) had been Louis XIII’s Secretary of State for War 
since 1630. He was an important individual in the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642), 
though not as close to the Cardinal as Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny (1608-52), Louis XIII’s 
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the disappointment of Leicester and the French, this meeting did not materialize, as 
John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore, Charles’s ordinary ambassador in Paris, 
could not be located. Leicester would not risk holding such an important meeting 
with the French without the viscount being present. 
 
At all times between February and June 1637, Leicester was careful to let 
Coke know that he had included Scudamore in the talks. His concern here was to 
avoid a further severe scolding such as he had received from the Secretary in 
November 1636 regarding the viscount’s apparent exclusion from the negotiations.54 
The earl was worried that excluding Scudamore from the meeting with Bullion and 
Noyers would give rise to trouble with Charles and Coke. Leicester might have been 
over-cautious with regard to the viscount, but given his past difficulties with the 
King’s ordinary ambassador, he was right to be defensive. At the same time, he was 
probably concerned about the negative influence that Scudamore might exert on the 
talks. The viscount was close to the Spanish Party at Charles’s court, which was 
opposed to an alliance with France. There was the possibility that he would do all he 
could to scupper such a league, including deliberately avoiding important meetings 
with the French. Leicester took action to strengthen his support-base in Paris against 
such machinations. He informed Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, the noted German 
soldier of fortune, and the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, Sweden’s ambassador to 
Louis, with whom the earl was personally and politically on very good terms, of the 
existence of the treaties. The ambassador’s hope was that these individuals would 
use their good offices with the French to secure the treaties’ ratification.55 
 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Claude le Bouthillier (1581-1652), Chavigny’s father and one 
of the French King’s surintendants des finances, or Claude de Bullion (1569-1640), Louis’s other 
surintendant des finances. For Noyers, see Orest A. Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis 
XIII (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 100-19. 
 
54 SP 78/102, fol. 206: Coke to Leicester, 8 November 1636; see also Collins, II, 440. 
 
55 Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1604-39) was a German mercenary who had been allied 
with the Swedes in the first half of the 1630s. By early 1637, Bernard and his army were well on the 
way to being in the pay of the French. See David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and 
Society in France, 1624-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 125-6 and 129-
31. At the beginning of 1637, the famous Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), had been the 
Swedish ambassador to Louis XIII since 1634, and would remain so until his death in 1645. 
Personally, and politically, Leicester got on well with Grotius, presumably, among other things, 
sharing the latter’s interest in furthering an Anglo-French alliance and definitely regarding their 




Despite the problems raised by the French, Coke and Leicester continued to 
try to realize an Anglo-French alliance. The Secretary informed the ambassador at 
the beginning of March 1637 that the French and Swedish envoys to Charles had 
given assurances that persons of an appropriate rank would be sent to Hamburg to 
finalize the Anglo-French treaties.56 Simultaneously, Leicester was doing his utmost 
in Paris to advance matters regarding the treaties. On 10 March, he informed Coke 
that he had been using Augier to try to contact Père Joseph, Noyers and Bullion, but 
without success; Scudamore was still absent.57 The best news that the ambassador 
could give the Secretary was that it appeared that Richelieu and Père Joseph had 
discussed the treaties. 
 
Next, in a communication to Sir Francis Windebanke, Charles’s junior 
Secretary of State, Leicester had to deny being the source of the leaking of details of 
the Anglo-French treaties in an attempt to derail the talks.58 The earl referred to a 
‘Mr. Mountagu,’ who ‘had gotten the knowledge of some parte of this treaty among 
the French,’ and whom he blamed for the leak. ‘Mr. Mountagu’ was probably 
Walter (‘Wat’) Montagu, a Catholic convert and the second son of Henry Montagu, 
earl of Manchester.59 Wat Montagu was an enemy of the Cardinal, and did not 
favour an alliance with France. He would have been more than willing to sabotage 
 
 
56 Collins, II, 471: Coke to Leicester, 6 March 1637. 
 
57 SP 78/103, fol. 144: Leicester to [Coke], 10/20 March 1637. 
 
58 SP 78/105, fol. 222: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], [14]/24 March 163[7]8 (misfiled in 
SP 78/105 as being written in 1638); see also Collins, II, 473, who was correct in allocating the letter 
to 1637. It is not possible to confirm that Leicester addressed this letter to Sir Francis Windebanke 
(bap. 1582-d. 1646), Charles I’s junior Secretary of State, but given its contents and the fact that it 
was in Leicester’s hand, it seems likely that Windebanke was the recipient. Nothing in the letter 
would suggest that it was for Sir John Coke (1563-1644), the King’s senior Secretary. It is possible 
that Augier was the source of the leak. 
 
59 Walter (‘Wat’) Montagu (1604/5-77) was a Caroline courtier and diplomat, and an English 
Catholic convert. In 1637, he was involved in a conspiracy against Cardinal Richelieu, together with 
Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse (1600-79). He was opposed to any alliance with France, and 
would not have been averse to leaking the contents of the Anglo-French treaties. See Hibbard, Popish 
Plot, p. 77. For a letter from Henry Montagu, earl of Manchester (c.1564-1642), Montagu’s father, 
regarding the conversion of his second son to the Catholic faith, see De L’Isle and Dudley 
Manuscripts, VI, 43-4: earl of Manchester to Lord Montagu, 20 May 1636; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 




the negotiations. The incident is a clear indication that there were those at the 
Caroline court who would stoop at nothing to prevent a league with France 
becoming a reality. In concluding his letter, Leicester again stated that Richelieu was 
looking at the treaties, but the ambassador did not seem to be hopeful that there 
would be any developments soon. 
 
Vindicating Leicester’s pessimism, the French response regarding the 
prospective Anglo-French alliance was discouraging as they raised further obstacles 
to its conclusion. Leicester reported to Coke that Louis approved of Charles’s 
treaties of February 1637, and had endorsed the English King’s suggestion of 
Hamburg as where England and France and its allies could hold a general 
conference regarding the treaties.60 However, the French had complained about 
certain (unspecified) differences between the treaties that Charles had sent to them 
and the draft French treaties of January, which the ambassador had forwarded to the 
English King on the fourteenth of that month. Leicester had countered that the 
French were mistaken in claiming that Charles had proposed either Hamburg or The 
Hague as a venue for discussions on whether France and its allies should sign the 
treaties. He asserted that the King envisaged a conference at either Hamburg or The 
Hague where France’s allies would be invited to join an Anglo-French alliance that 
had already been ratified. The ambassador informed the Secretary that he had made 
it clear to the French that: 
 
… it would not be amisse for them to consider that they did mistake the 
intention of the King our Master, who had not proposed Hamburgh, or the 
Haghe for the place to make a Treatye, between himself and the Christian 
King, but for the reception of such confederats as would desire to enter into 
the Treatie, supposed to be allready made between their Majesties, and to 
consult further on the generall affaires, and principally the peace of 
Christendome …61 
 
The French were apparently employing delaying tactics to defer their signing 
and ratification of the main and the auxiliary Anglo-French treaties. The 
 
60 SP 78/103, fol. 158: Leicester to [Coke], 17/27 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 473-5. 
 




prevarication on their part might have been intended to pressure Charles into making 
further concessions – for example, in moving to a full offensive alliance or in 
committing troops to fight on the continent. Leicester had implied that this was the 
case in one of his letters in March 1637 by referring to potential problems if the 
French ‘be not assisted by land.’62 Alternatively, the French could have been 
stringing the English King along to prevent him negotiating with the Habsburgs. In 
these circumstances, the potential objection of the Swedes to the inclusion of the 
Danes in an Anglo-French league could come into play. The tension between 
England and the United Provinces regarding North Sea fishing rights could also be 
useful to this end.63 Leicester responded with a number of arguments to the issues 
raised by the French.64 He informed them that there was no need for a conference at 
Hamburg to conclude a treaty that England and France had been negotiating for the 
last two years, and that could now be ratified immediately; that the French should 
have raised their requirement for their allies to sign the treaties at the same time as 
England and France during the negotiations in the second half of 1636; that the 
French were deceiving themselves if they thought that by this ploy they could draw 
the English King sooner into an offensive and a defensive league; and that he wished 
to know whether the French would sign the treaties. Leicester also talked to the 
Dutch and the Swedish ambassadors in Paris who, possibly for diplomatic motives 
or reasons of friendship, did not comment adversely on the treaties. Most likely, the 
earl was testing the waters with a view to negating any French arguments that 
Sweden and the United Provinces were unhappy with the treaties. Despite Charles 
having gone a long way to meeting France’s demands, Louis and his ministers were 
prevaricating and playing a game of brinkmanship, probably to see if they could 
extract more favourable terms from the English King. 
 
The French continued to pressure Charles, most likely in the search for more 
concessions. Leicester reported that Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and 
Louis’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had claimed that the Franco-Swedish 
 
62 SP 78/103, fol. 127: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 469. 
 
63 See, for example, SP 78/101, fol. 282: Coke to Leicester, 10 July 1636. 
 




Treaty of Wismar had been ratified.65 However, this treaty had only been signed, 
and not ratified, on 10 March 1636 in Mecklenburg.66 Under its terms, France and 
Sweden agreed to a combined offensive against the Habsburgs, with France 
attacking on the left bank of the Rhine and Sweden fighting in Bohemia and Silesia. 
The treaty would not be ratified until 1638 by the Treaty of Hamburg.67 Chavigny’s 
deception may have been a gambit to put pressure on the English King to concede to 
what the French wanted – that is, to agree to French demands for a full offensive 
league – by demonstrating that France already had an ally, Sweden, that was 
committed fully to the Thirty Years War. 
 
Leicester speculated on the reasons for the delays on the part of the French, 
and, in a challenge to France’s prevarication, Coke implied that the English 
ambassadors should threaten to end the negotiations. The earl postulated that the 
motives for the French foot-dragging could include a desire to engage Charles in war 
as quickly as possible, but admitted that he did not know the real reason.68 He 
thought that the key to progress lay with Richelieu and that, ultimately, the French 
would sign and ratify the treaties. To this end, the ambassador had contacted Père 
Joseph again. At the end of March 1637, writing to Leicester and Scudamore, the 
Secretary rebutted the French objections to the treaties that the earl had relayed to 
him.69 Coke made it clear that to accede to what the French wanted – notably the 
agreement of Sweden and the United Provinces to the treaties before they were 
signed by England and France – would be to negotiate a new treaty. Implicitly, in 
order to concentrate the minds of the French, Leicester and Scudamore were being 
authorized to threaten that the English King would abandon the negotiations, 
together with the related threat that he might seek to conclude a treaty with the 
 
65 Collins, II, 477: Leicester to Coke, 23 March/2 April 1637. 
 
66 For details of the treaty of Wismar, which was signed on 10/20 March 1636, see Parker, 
Thirty Years’ War, pp. 133, 142 and 241, footnote 13 and 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Wismar. 
 
67 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 597, 613 and 617 for the Treaty of Hamburg. 
 
68 SP 78/103, fol. 174: Leicester to [Coke], 24 March/3 April 1637; see also Collins, II, 477-9. 
 





Habsburgs. The Secretary, and presumably Charles, had not accepted the need for a 
conference at Hamburg to sign the treaties, and appeared to be calling Louis’s and 
Richelieu’s bluff. 
 
The French continued to take issue with aspects of the treaties. Leicester 
informed Coke that Bullion and Chavigny had said that there were problems 
regarding the preface to the main treaty, and that France’s confederates would have 
to agree to any new commitments relating to Charles Louis.70 The French also had 
issues regarding the timing of Charles’s possible break with the Habsburg powers. 
Leicester relayed details of a long discussion in which he had tried to answer the 
points raised by the French and to persuade them to sign the treaties but to no avail. 
Once again, the ambassador contacted Père Joseph to try to resolve the impasse. As 
this was the second time in a short period in which he had approached Richelieu’s 
confidant, it is apparent that the earl regarded him as key to contacting the Cardinal 
to try to progress the talks. 
 
In mid-April 1637, Leicester was able to relay some seemingly good news to 
London.71 He had heard from Père Joseph, via Augier, that the Cardinal was eager to 
see a good conclusion to the negotiations with Charles. The earl also indicated that 
Duke Bernard, the German mercenary and the former ally of Sweden, who would 
shortly be on the French military payroll, had informed him that he (Bernard) 
thought that, ultimately, the French would agree to the treaties. 
 
In spite of these intimations of progress, the negotiations again became 
deadlocked. On 18 April 1637, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, having visited 
Richelieu, reported that: 
 
Last Friday I went to see the Cardinal at Sciaron. … in order to find out his 
sentiments about the treaty with England, I told him, what was actually true, 
that I had noticed the Ambassador Leicester was very troubled about not 
being able to conclude his treaty. The Cardinal remarked, They [the English] 
 
70 SP 78/103, fol. 186: Leicester to [Coke], 29 March/8 April 1637; see also Collins, II, 481-3. 
 




want things to suit themselves; to avoid pledging themselves and do nothing 
while we do a great deal.72 
 
The Venetian envoy explained that Richelieu was looking for the English King to 
commit land forces to the Thirty Years War as well as warships to a maritime 
conflict. The scale of the commitment envisaged by the Cardinal was: 
 
… if they [the English] declare war we [Louis and Richelieu] shall be 
satisfied if they provide thirty men of war, suitably equipped, and 6000 foot 
and 2000 or 1500 horse to send to Germany; in that case the deed is done … 
The Earl of Leicester knows nearly all of these particulars, but he complains 
that they [Charles and Coke] give him no definite answer …73 
 
Leicester was aware of the French demands for Charles to commit land forces to the 
continent – he had hinted in his correspondence with Coke at the problems that 
would arise if the French ‘be not assisted by land.’74 However, most probably in 
order to keep the negotiations alive, the ambassador may not have spelled out the 
French requirement clearly enough for the English King and his Secretary to 
appreciate fully the significance of Richelieu’s demand. In any event, Charles was 
very strongly averse to any commitment to a land war in Europe. A fundamental 
conflict of objectives, therefore, hung over the negotiations. 
 
Leicester set out the primary English problems with the ‘official’ French 
objections to the treaties, skating over, it seems, what he may have known about 
Richelieu’s demand that Charles commit land forces to the war in Germany. He 
informed Bullion and Chavigny that the French were not giving Charles Louis his 
full title of Prince Elector75 Their continued insistence that Sweden and the United 
Provinces should agree to the treaties at the Hamburg conference before they could 
 
72 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 191: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 
Senate, [18]/28 April 1637. 
 
73 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 192: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 
Senate, [18]/28 April 1637. 
 
74 SP 78/103, fol. 127: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 469. 
 
75 See SP 78/103, fol. 232: Leicester to [Coke], 21 April/1 May 1637 and SP 78/103, fol. 254: 




be signed by England and France was unacceptable. These issues were important 
sticking points for Charles, especially the absence of the proper reference to Charles 
Louis, as such use by the French would imply that they were willing to break with 
Maximilian of Bavaria and to seek the full restitution of the Prince Palatine. On an 
unspecified date in April 1637, Coke wrote to Leicester confirming his, and 
presumably the English King’s, support for the earl’s objections to the French 
requirement regarding the approval of the treaties at Hamburg, accusing the French 
of adopting delaying tactics.76 
 
Then, despite his recent defiance of French demands regarding the approval 
of the main and auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February 1637, Charles made yet 
another concession. Coke wrote to Leicester and Scudamore at the beginning of May 
instructing them to ask the French directly if they would sign the treaties, in which 
case, the earl and the viscount were to agree to the treaties on the English King’s 
behalf.77 Alternatively, if the French still insisted on a conference at Hamburg 
involving their allies, the two ambassadors were to say that Charles was willing ‘to 
remit both the treaties, and conclusion thither.’ Once again, and in spite of all that he 
had offered the French already, the English King had blinked, and made a further 
gesture towards Louis. Unaware of the latest concession on Charles’s part, the earl 
had written to the Secretary in mid-May reporting further delays, saying that the 
French were playing ‘fast and loose,’ and ‘the more they [presumably Père Joseph, 
Bullion and Chavigny] are sought, the more they retire and hyde.’78 Leicester 
speculated that the French foot-dragging may have owed something to the fraught 
situation at Louis’s court, where Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, fourth in line 
to the French throne, was attempting again to overthrow Richelieu as the King’s 
chief minister.79 
 
76 SP 78/103, fol. 268: Coke to Leicester, April 1637. 
 
77 SP 78/103, fol. 279: Coke to the Ambassadors at Paris, 6 May 1637; see also Collins, II, 492. 
 
78 SP 78/103, fol. 283: Leicester to [Coke], 12/22 May 1637; see also Collins, II, 492-4. 
 
79 At the end of May 1637, Leicester hinted that the crisis involving Louis de Bourbon, comte 
de Soissons (1604-41), could have been to blame for the delays on the French side: ‘Chavigny … 
hath had his hands full of the Count of Soissons businesse, w[hi]ch is not yet accom[m]odated, nor 
will be I beleeve these two days.’ See SP 78/103, fol. 319: Leicester to Coke, 26 May/5 June 1637; 




In the early summer of 1637, the French took action that moved the treaty 
negotiations forward, possibly responding to Charles’s concession and the resolution 
of the crisis involving Louis de Bourbon and Richelieu in the latter’s favour. 
Leicester reported that he and Scudamore had been called to a conference at 
Bullion’s house at the beginning of June, where Bullion, having apologized for the 
delays on the part of the French, presented four items to the English ambassadors.80 
These documents consisted of French versions of the main (which does not survive) 
and auxiliary treaties (Latin versions were to be provided later); a secret letter, the 
contents of which the earl did not disclose; and a commission for the Prince 
Elector.81 Leicester forwarded these papers to his master and Coke. Writing on 6 
June, the ambassador provided further information to the Secretary on the French 
version of the auxiliary treaty.82 He stated that Chavigny had ‘dispatched an 
expresse on Saturday, to M[onsieu]r. de Seneterre.’ These words almost certainly 
referred to the French version of the auxiliary treaty of June to be found in the 
papers of Henri de la Ferté Nabert, marquis de Senneterre, Louis’s extraordinary 
ambassador to the English King in 1635-7.83 It is now apposite to consider the 





The French version of the Anglo-French auxiliary treaty of June 1637 was based on 
 
as he had in the winter of 1636-7. 
 
80 SP 78/103, fol. 332: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 497. 
 
81 There were four versions of the French treaties of June 1637 – the French language versions 
of the main and the auxiliary treaties, together with the Latin versions of these two treaties. See SP 
78/103, fol. 332: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 497. Only the French 
version of the auxiliary treaty survives. See Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: 
auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637. This is the version that is commented on in this thesis. It 
might be thought that this version was the closest to what Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu 
envisaged an Anglo-French alliance being. 
 
82 SP 78/103, fol. 343: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 497-500. 
 




Charles’s auxiliary treaty of February, but there were important differences.84 (See 
Appendix 6 for the modern English translation of the French version of the auxiliary 
treaty of June, from which all quotations in this section are taken.) The only extant 
version of the June auxiliary treaty is the French one – which is potentially 
significant, for it was Latin versions of treaties that were usually signed and ratified 
by states. Louis and Richelieu did have French and Latin versions of the main treaty 
drawn up, but those versions have either been lost or cannot be located.85 Thus, only 
the French version of the auxiliary treaty is available for study and comment. 
 
The French version of the auxiliary treaty of June 1637 and that of February 
were broadly similar, in that both contained articles 1 through to 13 with no article 6. 
The contents of article 6 of the main treaty of February were included in article 5 of 
both the February and June versions of the auxiliary treaties. However, the French 
version of June had an additional article 14, which was derived from article 14 of the 
main treaty of February, though greatly extended, together with a further secret 
article.86 Overall, articles 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the French June version of the 
auxiliary treaty were the same as in that of February, but the preface and articles 2, 
4, 5, 7 and 13 differed significantly. Article 14 and the secret article were entirely 
new. 
 
The preface to the French version of the auxiliary treaty of June 1637 stated 
that the princes of the Empire were to be restored to their dignities and lands that 
they and their predecessors had enjoyed in 1616.87 This statement would have 
pleased Charles, as Frederick V, Charles Louis’s father, had lost his titles and lands 




84 See BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-32: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637 and SP 
103/11, fols 595-603: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, auxiliary treaty. 
 
85 See SP 78/103, fol. 332: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 497. 
 
86 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 230-2: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, article 14 and 
secret article. 
 




Article 14 of the French version of the auxiliary treaty set out the actions 
whereby the English King was to cut off Flanders from the supply of ‘armed men of 
war, food, ammunition and money’ by (only) Austria, Bavaria and their allies.88 
Notwithstanding this provision, ‘communication from Spain to [West?] India or 
America and Flanders, and from Italy to Germany’ was also to be prevented. Charles 
was entrusted with blocking the sea routes to the Spanish Netherlands, including the 
English Road and Louis the land route from Italy to Flanders – that is, the Spanish 
Road. The French King was to deal with the Swiss cantons and ‘other [Habsburg] 
allies.’ Significantly, Coke had instructed Leicester to delete similar proposals from 
the draft French treaty of October 1636, a predecessor to the draft French treaties of 
January 1637, which had formed the basis for the English King’s main and auxiliary 
treaties of February.89 These measures indicate how important the cutting of 
Habsburg links with Flanders were to the French, and, in many ways, were a sine 
qua non for France entering into an alliance with England. The article included 
detailed rules for the disposal of any places taken in Flanders by any members of the 
Anglo-French coalition with provision for consultation with France’s allies and the 
allocation of specific locations to Charles Louis. It also contained measures relating 
to France’s confederates – Sweden and the United Provinces – joining the league. 
Significantly, it was stipulated that this event was to occur at the same time as 
England and France signed the treaty. Finally, following ratification, Spain, Austria, 
Bavaria and their confederates were to be attacked if they refused ‘some articles of 
peace which will be offered to them.’ 
 
An important difference between the French version of the auxiliary treaty of 
June 1637 and that of February was that, in article 2 of the French version, there was 
no limit to the number of troops that Louis could raise in Charles’s kingdoms.90 In 
the main and auxiliary treaties of February, the maximum number of soldiers that 
 
88 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 230-2: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, article 14. 
 
89 See, for example, SP 78/102, fol. 151: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636; see also Collins, 
II, 430-2. 
 




could be recruited by France was 6,000.91 However, there was no reference to 
Charles having to commit land forces to Europe, which had been reported by the 
Venetian ambassador in April as being a key French demand.92 
 
The secret article in the French version of the auxiliary treaty stated that 
nothing was to be concluded by France and England with Austria, Bavaria and their 
allies without the agreement of France’s confederates, Sweden and the United 
Provinces.93 Along with England and France, Sweden and the United Provinces 
were to have ratified the French version of the auxiliary treaty by the end of July 
1637. The article reiterated the measures set out in other provisions of the auxiliary 
treaty of June and the main and the auxiliary treaties of February to the effect that 
Charles would assist actively in providing a fleet to the Prince Elector.94 In return, 
the French would make the important concession from the English King’s 
perspective of granting Charles Louis his full title of Prince Elector Palatine. 
 
Three further points should be noted regarding the French version of the 
auxiliary treaty of June 1637. Firstly, the French version contained nine references 
to ‘an offensive and a defensive’ league, while the auxiliary treaty of February only 
made two such mentions.95 This situation made the French version (even) more of a 
programme for an offensive and a defensive alliance. Secondly, there were only four 
references to the Elector Palatine in the French version.96 All other mentions of 
Charles Louis described him as Charles’s ‘descendent’ or ‘nephew.’ Such reference 
 
91 SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 2 of the main and the 
auxiliary treaties. 
 
92 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 191: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 
Senate, [18]/28 April 1637. See SP 78/103, fol. 127: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 469 for collaboration of this French demand in Leicester’s correspondence. 
 
93 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fol. 232: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, secret article. 
 
94 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fol. 228: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, article 7 and SP 
103/11, fols 600-2: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 7 of the main and the auxiliary 
treaties. 
 
95 See BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-32: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637 and SP 
103/11, fols 595-603: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, auxiliary treaty. 
 




implied a downgrading of support for the Prince Elector on the part of the French. 
Thirdly, the French version of the auxiliary treaty can be regarded as Richelieu’s 
attempt to renegotiate the projected Anglo-French alliance in accordance with many, 
though not all, of his wishes. Viewed in this context, there were still clear 
differences between what the English King, notwithstanding all his concessions, was 
willing to offer, and what the French King and the Cardinal would accept. 
 
Leicester commented on the French and Latin versions of the treaties of June 
1637 in a letter to Coke of early that month.97 (As noted, only the French version of 
the auxiliary treaty has survived.) The ambassador stated that there were a number 
of topics for discussion regarding the French and Latin versions and the differences 
between them. These divergencies are important, as, most likely, the French versions 
reflected more of what Louis and Richelieu wanted. It may even have been that they 
would have wished, in contravention of the then convention, that the French 
versions would be the ones that would be signed and ratified and not the Latin 
treaties. Leicester noted that it was only the French versions that specified 1616 as 
the year to which all lands and titles in Germany were to be restored. This was an 
important concession on the part of the French to Charles. The English King would 
wish to see this provision included in the Latin treaties, being the versions that, 
according to the then rules, should be signed and ratified by the two countries. 
 
The ambassador went on to remark on some of the wording used in the 
treaties. The title ‘Serenissma’ had been given to Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of 
Bohemia, Charles’s sister, Frederick V’s widow and the mother of Charles Louis, 
which Leicester stated was unusual, but which he implied was acceptable.98 The 
French versions only used the word ‘conclurre’ (to conclude) and not ‘traiter’ (to 
treat) as well. This usage troubled the earl as he thought that both words should be 
 
97 SP 78/103, fol. 343: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 497-500. 
 
98 Elizabeth of Bohemia had married Frederick V in 1613 and became Queen of Bohemia in 
1619, when Frederick assumed the title of King of Bohemia. Following Frederick V’s defeat at the 
Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the loss of the Palatinate in the early 1620s, she and 
Frederick had fled to the United Provinces, where she remained following the death of her husband in 





included in the French versions of the treaties as in the Latin versions (‘nihil tractare 
aut concludere’). Here, the ambassador was aiming at consistency between the two 
language versions of the treaties to negate any attempt by Louis and Richelieu to 
have the French versions signed and ratified rather than the Latin ones. The French 
claimed that the sole use of ‘conclurre’ was necessary given their ongoing 
negotiations with Austria and Spain in Cologne, then taking place under the auspices 
of the Papacy, which were intended to bring about a general peace in Europe. Using 
‘traiter’ could have compromised these talks. As it was thought that the Cologne 
conference would not have any significant results, the earl was inclined to accept the 
French explanation and the sole use of ‘conclurre.’ 
 
Leicester noted the removal of the limit on the number of troops that Louis 
could recruit in Charles’s lands in article 2. In the ambassador’s words, this measure 
‘will oblige the [English] King beyond a permission to an actual assistance [to 
France], but I doe not conceive that will touch upon breach of peace [that is, be an 
occasion for war with the Habsburgs].’99 The change was, therefore, acceptable in 
the earl’s opinion. The French had also not used the Elector Palatine’s full title in the 
treaties. This omission reduced France’s commitment to Charles Louis’s cause, and 
possibly left the door open to a reconciliation between the French and Maximilian of 
Bavaria. Finally, the earl remarked that the French version weakened the provisions 
for handing over captured towns in Flanders to the Prince Elector by subjecting 
decisions on this matter to discussion with France’s allies (and doubtless the United 
Provinces in particular). 
 
Charles’s envoy also set out his understanding of the complex arrangements 
for the signing of the treaties of June 1637.100 Broadly, Charles was to indicate that 
he accepted the treaties and then both he and Louis would invite Sweden and the 
United Provinces to send representatives to a conference to be held at Hamburg. If 
Sweden and the United Provinces wished to join the alliance, all the countries 
involved would sign the treaties in Paris, and would work on the arrangements 
 
99 SP 78/103, fol. 344: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 498. 
 




required to bring the offensive and defensive league into effect. Next, the English 
King would make his demands of the Emperor regarding the Prince Elector. If he 
received a satisfactory reply within ‘a month or six weekes,’ peace would ensue. 
However, if he did not, England, France, Sweden and the United Provinces would 
conclude an offensive and a defensive alliance in Paris against the Austrian 
Habsburgs. Thus, by Leicester’s reckoning, Charles was possibly only a few months 




Between February and June 1637 there had been important developments regarding 
the Anglo-French treaty negotiations. Reluctantly, or otherwise, Charles had drawn 
up, signed and ratified the main and the auxiliary treaties of February.101 In 
numerous aspects, the main treaty, particularly the aggressive naval actions he was 
to undertake according to its terms, committed him to an offensive as well as a 
defensive alliance.102 Consequently, he had modified his position of neutrality 
towards France that he had adopted consistently during the second half of 1636.103 
The English King had acquiesced to most of the demands made by the French in 
respect of the treaties of February, notably regarding their pre-approval by France’s 
allies, Sweden and the United Provinces.104 The French had then substantially 
revised the terms of the projected Anglo-French league as indicated in their version 
of the auxiliary treaty of June.105 Among all the compromises made by Charles, the 
one, though unstated, requirement of Richelieu that the English King had resisted 
was the Cardinal’s demand for the commitment of English land forces to fight in the 
 
101 SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, the main and the 
auxiliary treaties. For Charles I’s apparent reluctance to sign the Anglo-French treaties of February 
1637, see Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 February 1637. 
 
102 SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 of the main treaty. 
 
103 See, for example, SP 78/101, fol. 430: Coke to Leicester, 30 August 1636 (see also Collins, 
II, 415-6); SP 78/102, fol. 80: Coke to Leicester, 30 September 1636 (see also Collins, II, 424-5); and 
SP 78/102, fol. 151: Coke to Leicester, 18 October 1636 (see also Collins, II, 430-2). 
 
104 See, for example, SP 78/103, fol. 279: Coke to the Ambassadors at Paris, 6 May 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 492. 
 




Thirty Years War.106 Despite all these concessions on Charles’s part, the French had 
continued to delay and prevaricate. They had not signed and ratified the main and 
the auxiliary treaties of February, as the English King had. Nor had they signed and 
ratified their own versions of the treaties of June. England and France had made 
significant progress from the unpromising circumstances of May 1636 towards 
concluding a potentially ground-breaking alliance. But there were still areas of 
disagreement, notably relating to Charles’s strong desire to avoid sending troops to 
fight on the continent. The situation in June 1637 was still very much up in the air, 
with the English King apparently playing the role of the willing bride and the French 
that of the reluctant groom. 
 
 
106 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 192: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge 










The Anglo-French treaty negotiations were to dominate diplomatic relations 
between England and France up to September 1637, when the troublesome prospect 
of Marie des Médicis, the French Queen Mother, returning to France was raised by 
Charles I.1 The English King had had the so-called main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February drawn up.2 He had signed and ratified both treaties and sent them to Louis 
XIII.3 He had also given Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester and his 
extraordinary ambassador to the French King, the power to conclude the alliance.4 
He had agreed to most, but not all, of the French demands, notably that their allies – 
Sweden and the United Provinces – should approve the treaties prior to their 
conclusion by England and France.5 The only requirement of Louis and Cardinal 
Richelieu that Charles had not conceded to was the commitment of land forces to 
fight in the Thirty Years War. In response, the French had drawn up versions of the 
main and auxiliary treaties in June, of which only the auxiliary treaty survives.6 The 
 
1 For the formal raising of the issue of Marie des Médicis (1575-1642) returning to France, 
see London, TNA, SP France, SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 
September 1637; see also Collins, II, 4[5]17. As Sir John Coke (1563-1644), the senior Secretary of 
State of Charles I (1600-49), was referred to in the third person in this letter, it must have been 
written by Sir Francis Windebanke (1582-1646), the King’s junior Secretary of State and spymaster. 
 
2 TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 
February 1637. See SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 
536-7 (mis-located) for Charles I drawing up these treaties. 
 
3 See SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located) for Charles I signing and ratifying the Anglo-French treaties of 1637. 
 
4 See SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located) for Charles I granting Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), the power to 
conclude the Anglo-French alliance. 
 
5 For Charles I conceding to the French demand that Sweden and the United Provinces should 
approve the Anglo-French treaties of February 1637 prior to England and France concluding them, 
see SP 78/103, fol. 279: Coke to the Ambassadors at Paris, 6 May 1637; see also Collins, II, 492. 
 




French had revised the June treaties significantly in their favour, for example, by 
removing the cap on the number of troops that Louis could recruit in the English 
King’s realms.7 However, the French King and the Cardinal had taken no further 
action – and they had certainly not signed their versions of the treaties. Thus, the 
diplomatic position between England and France and the fate of the treaties was 
delicately poised between the successful finalization of the alliance and a breakdown 
in the talks. 
 
In Paris, Leicester continued his efforts to conclude the Anglo-French 
alliance. The earl stated in a letter of 9 June 1637 to Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior 
Secretary of State, that he hoped that Coke had received all of the items that he had 
sent him regarding the French versions of the treaties of June.8 The fact that the 
letter was in Leicester’s own hand and that he had had the items conveyed to 
England by James Battiere, his secretary, indicated the importance that he attached 
to these documents. 
 
Coke quickly informed Leicester that Charles accepted the French versions 
of the treaties of June 1637 – ‘his M[ajest]ie … is resolved to accept the treaties 
wherof you may give them [the French] p[re]sent notice …’9 So, despite all of the 
delays on the part of the French and having compromised more than Louis, the 
English King had made yet another concession. The Secretary spelt out four points 
that were intended to expedite the conclusion of the treaties. Firstly, Charles would 
send the earl his formal notice of his acceptance of the treaties. Secondly, Sweden 
and the United Provinces were to be invited to the Hamburg conference, at which 
the Anglo-French alliance would be finalized, with a view to joining the league. 
Thirdly, the agreement of the English and French Kings to the treaties was to be 
communicated to the Dutch and the Swedes. Fourthly, Charles would appoint a 
special agent to attend the Hamburg conference and arrange matters regarding the 
 
 
7 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637, article 2. 
 
8 SP 78/103, fol. 359: Leicester to Coke, 9/19 June 1637. 
 




demands to be made of the new Emperor, Ferdinand III, and whether the English 
King would declare war on Austria. In his next letter, Coke again confirmed 
Charles’s agreement to the French versions of the treaties.10 In this letter, the 
Secretary replied in detail to the issues raised by the earl in his letter of 6 June (for 
which, see Chapter 3).11 The only new point brought up by Coke was that the second 
part of the secret article in the French versions of the auxiliary (and presumably the 
main) treaties – which dealt with the provision of a fleet to the Prince Elector by the 
English King and included the use by the French of Charles I Louis’s title – could be 
misinterpreted as implying a declaration of war by Charles. The ambassador was to 
have the offending part of that article deleted. The Secretary next provided further 
instructions to Leicester, which, to some extent, represented the English King’s 
counter demands.12 The earl was to arrange for the conference regarding the treaties 
to be transferred to The Hague if the Emperor tried to prevent the allies meeting at 
Hamburg. He was also to insist that the French could not enter into a treaty with the 
Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs at the Papal-brokered Cologne conference, which 
was then underway. 
 
Despite Charles’s concessions, the French slowed the pace of the 
negotiations. Leicester stated that Claude de Bullion, one of Louis’s surintendants 
des finances, and Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and the French King’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been absent from Paris in the previous 
week due to the great heat, and, therefore, had been uncontactable.13 He was able to 
relay later that he had had a conference with Bullion and Chavigny, but could not 
report any meaningful progress, as the French officials wished to confer with 
Richelieu. The ambassador then informed Coke that he had had a further meeting 
with Bullion and Chavigny at which he had confirmed the English King’s 
 
10 Collins, II, 501-2: Coke to Leicester, 18 June 1637. 
 
11 For Leicester’s letter, see SP 78/103, fol. 343: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 June 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 497-500. 
 
12 SP 78/103, fol. 402: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 21 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 
502-3. Collins ascribed this letter as only being addressed to Leicester, but it is calendared correctly 
as being to both Leicester and John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore (1601-71), Charles I’s ordinary 
ambassador in Paris. 
 




acceptance of the French versions of the treaties of June 1637.14 Bullion and 
Chavigny seemed to be pleased with this news and the Cardinal was reported to 
have expressed his satisfaction with developments regarding the Anglo-French 
treaties. 
 
It was at this point that Leicester again experienced problems with John 
Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore, Charles’s disgruntled ordinary ambassador in 
Paris. The difficulties arose despite Leicester’s best efforts to ensure that his fellow 
ambassador was included in the negotiations with the French. Coke wrote to 
Leicester towards the end of June 1637 criticizing the earl for his conduct towards 
Scudamore.15 The Secretary stated that Leicester had crossed ‘L[or]d Scudamour in 
the businesse of de Voile.’16 It is not immediately clear from Coke’s letter who de 
Voile was and to what the ‘businesse of de Voile’ related.17 However, in an undated 
letter of June, the earl had provided an account of the affair and had revealed that a 
‘Claude Voille,’ that is, de Voile, had quarrelled with Philip Burlamachi over money 
that de Voile claimed was owed to him by Burlamachi.18 The latter was a key 
financial advisor to the King, who, in effect, had established a national clearing bank 
in England. He was, therefore, someone whom Charles would not wish to alienate. 
Scudamore’s complaint was that Leicester had not kept him fully informed of the 
dispute. The Secretary ordered the earl to repair his relations with Scudamore. He 
was also to inform Bullion that the criticism of Scudamore that he (Leicester) had 
relayed to Bullion was based ‘uppon misinformation,’ as he (Leicester) had failed to 
keep Scudamore involved in the affair.19 The seriousness of the allegations for 
 
14 SP 78/103, fol. 405: Leicester to [Coke], 22 June/2 July 1637; see also Collins, II, 503. 
 
15 SP 78/103, fol. 421: Coke to Leicester, 24 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 503-4. 
 
16 SP 78/103, fol. 421: Coke to Leicester, 24 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 503. 
 
17. It is likely that the dispute between Claude de Voile (dates unknown) and Philip Burlamachi 
(1575-1644) related to the payment of the dowery of Charles I’s Queen, Henriette Marie (1609-69), 
and dated back to the mid-1620s. Burlamachi was of French origin, though naturalized as English. He 
was an important financier for Charles I in the 1620s and 1630s. In the 1630s, Charles I was ruling 
without Parliament, and, therefore, had no access to parliamentary funds. Consequently, 
Burlamachi’s significance was potentially even greater in these years. 
 
18 SP 78/103, fol. 445: Leicester to [Coke], June 1637. 
 
19 SP 78/103, fol. 422: Coke to Leicester, 24 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 504. 
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Leicester can be gauged from the fact that the draft of Coke’s letter was annotated 
by Charles, and, therefore, can be assumed to have been approved by the King.20 
 
There was probably more to Leicester’s dispute with Scudamore than meets 
the eye. The earl had written to Coke in April 1637, accusing Scudamore of 
betraying all that he (Scudamore) knew to Charles’s enemies.21 The accusation 
might have sparked Scudamore’s complaint. However, it is also possible that 
Scudamore was trying to undermine the negotiations with the French. His patron and 
ally at the Caroline court, William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, was opposed to 
an alliance with France, and the concomitant risk of the calling of Parliament and the 
threat that this would pose to him, given the unpopularity of his religious reforms 
with a powerful constituency in Britain. Scudamore would have been more than 
willing to try to undermine the negotiations to aid the Archbishop. If this were the 
case, it would indicate that the success of Leicester’s negotiations with the French 
was worrying the Spanish Party at Charles’s court – that is, those who opposed 
English involvement against the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years War. Thus, the 
Spanish Party could have been trying to use the de Voile affair to drive a wedge 
between the King and his extraordinary ambassador in Paris in order to prevent the 
successful conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance. 
 
Charles’s actions in the summer of 1637 regarding the negotiations with the 
French are open to multiple interpretations. Leicester’s chastisement by Coke, with 
the King’s approval, is possibly evidence that Charles was not only pursuing a 
league with France, but also that, at the same time, and however seemingly 
contradictory, taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the opposition of the 
Spanish Party to the Anglo-French alliance to put a break on the talks. If so, the 
King would have been trying simultaneously to achieve three things: regain the 
Palatine dignities and lands for Charles Louis by way of an Anglo-French league; 
slow down the negotiations with the French to retain the support of the Spanish 
 
 
20 SP 78/103, fol. 419-20: Coke to Leicester, 24 June 1637. 
 




Party; and keep the Protestant groups at court onside with a prospective French 
alliance and distracted from the religious controversies in England that summer. 
 
Godly indignation was aroused in June 1637 by the Star Chamber sentence 
against three of the Caroline church’s leading critics, William Prynne, a lawyer and 
pamphleteer, John Bastwick, a doctor and religious controversialist, and Henry 
Burton, a minister and religious polemist. Having found all three men guilty of 
sedition and libel against the Caroline church, the court ordered that they be 
pilloried, have their ears cut off and be imprisoned. The day after this sentence was 
delivered, the Star Chamber trial of Archbishop Laud’s clerical rival, John Williams, 
Bishop of Lincoln, began. In mid-July, Williams was also found guilty and was 
sentenced to suspension from his benefices and offices with a significant loss of 
income, a fine of 10,000 pounds and imprisonment in the Tower of London at 
Charles’s pleasure for perverting the course of justice.22 These trials did little to 
enhance the popularity of the King and his government, particularly among the 
godly. The proceedings were perceived as anti-Protestant and the punishments as 
overly harsh, and, in the case of Prynne, Bastwick and Burton, generally elicited 
sympathy for the victims.23 
 
Charles’s apparent support for Scudamore in the ‘businesse of de Voile’, and 
the crown’s punishment of prominent godly ‘patriots’ in the summer of 1637, did 
not augur well for the successful conclusion of an anti-Habsburg alliance with 
France. In the second half of 1629, during the formalities regarding the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Susa, which had ended the Anglo-French War of 1627-9, it had 
appeared to many, especially Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, and his younger 
brother, Henry, earl of Holland, that Charles’s negotiations for peace with France 
 
22 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 226-34 and 251-5 for details of the two Star Chamber 
trials. William Prynne (1600-69), John Bastwick (1595?-1654) and Henry Burton (bap.1578-1647/8) 
were Puritan polemists who had attacked the Church of England in print. John Williams, Bishop of 
Lincoln (1582-1650), had fallen out with Charles I at the beginning of his reign regarding Williams’s 
apparent Puritan sympathies. Williams had been in trouble in the late 1620s and in the 1630s, 
culminating in his trial before Star Chamber. 
 
23 For the latter, see, for example, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 115: Hawkins to 
Leicester, 6/16 July 1637; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 132/39: ‘On Friday last, 
Bastwick, Burton and Prin had execution done upon them according to their sentence, which they 




would progress to an offensive alliance against Austria and Spain.24 In spite of these 
expectations, the King had avoided concluding an Anglo-French league in 1629, and 
had dashed the hopes of the Protestants at court. The question in 1637 was whether 
Charles was preparing to do the same as he had in 1629 and mollify the Protestant 
groups only to close down the possibility of an alliance with France? Leicester’s 
diplomatic correspondence indicates that the answer to this question was an 
emphatic no. Despite his manoeuvrings, in the summer of 1637, Charles’s primary 
aim remained that of concluding an Anglo-French alliance. He had gone much 
further in the negotiations of 1636-7 than in those of 1629. He had committed 
himself fully to a league with France. He had had the main and the auxiliary Anglo-
French treaties of February 1637 drawn up, signed and ratified.25 He had given 
Leicester in Paris the power to conclude an Anglo-French alliance.26 And recently he 
had agreed to the French versions of the main and the auxiliary treaties of June of 
the same year.27 These were not the actions of a monarch who was insincere about 
seeking a treaty – Charles was still doing all that he could to conclude an Anglo-
French alliance. 
 
Coke provided further instructions to Leicester, which, though not intended 
to delay the conclusion of the alliance with France, could have been seized upon by 
the French to do so. In an undated letter of June 1637, addressed to both Leicester 
and Scudamore, the Secretary yet again confirmed Charles’s acceptance of the 
French versions of the treaties of that month.28 However, the Secretary added several 
points, with regard to which he indicated that the English King did not intend to 
 
24 For more on the possibility of an Anglo-French alliance in1629, see John S. A. Adamson, 
‘Policy and Pomegranates: Art, Iconography and Counsel in Rubens’s Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy of 
1629-1630’, in The Age of Rubens: Diplomacy, Dynastic Politics and the Visual Arts in Early 
Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. by L. Duerloo and R. Malcolm Smuts (Tourhout: Brepols, 2016), 
pp. 159-63. 
 
25 See SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 
(mis-located). 
 
26 See SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located). 
 
27 See SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500. 
 




delay, but, rather, to expedite the signing and ratification of the treaties. Given the 
differences between the French and Latin versions, Charles insisted on the use of the 
Latin treaties. That part of the secret article committing the King to provide an 
armed fleet to the Prince Elector should be deleted, as it could be misunderstood as a 
declaration of war. The measures regarding the handing over of places taken in 
Flanders to Charles Louis as surety for the restitution of his Rhineland territories by 
France should be restored. This instruction indicated the importance to Charles of 
ensuring that the French would return the Prince Elector’s Rhenish lands to him and 
would not retain those possessions to guarantee that the Spanish Road remained 
closed. There followed detailed orders regarding the conference to be held at 
Hamburg to discuss the treaties and their signing by Sweden and the United 
Provinces in Paris. The Hamburg conference was also to agree the demands to be 
made of the Austrian Habsburgs and the time limits – one month or six weeks – in 
which the Emperor was to provide a satisfactory reply. Failing such a response, the 
offensive and defensive league was to be activated. Coke indicated that, these 
changes apart, the treaties were to be altered as little as possible to facilitate 
ratification. But there was a barb to the King’s instructions, as the Secretary 
informed Leicester and Scudamore that Charles’s agent in Copenhagen had been 
told to invite Christian IV, the King of Denmark, to join the alliance. This action 
would not please the Swedes. 
 
Coke’s letter of June 1637 was important – it had reaffirmed Charles’s 
acceptance of the French versions of the main and the auxiliary treaties of June, 
though subject to qualifications. The King had also agreed to the diplomatic 
procedures by which the treaty was to come into effect. Despite Charles’s 
reservations, this position indicated how eager the Secretary, and apparently the 
King, were to progress matters and to make the Anglo-French alliance a reality. By 
the beginning of July, Charles had conceded much to the French concerning the 
treaties of February and June, and was seemingly near to war with the Habsburg 
powers. Moreover, the King had annotated and corrected Coke’s letter, which 
reveals the extent of his involvement in the negotiations. For example, he had added 
the words ‘if you cann, but nether delay tyme nor breake the Treatie[s] for it’ to the 
stipulation that ‘you shal therfore do wel to strike out this article [‘[t]he second 
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article of the Secret act’ regarding the timing of the provision of warships to the 
Prince Elector that could ‘bee subiect to misconstruction’].’29 And after the 
statement ‘that his M[ajes]tie may not bee importunede w[it]h new conditions at 
Hamborough: nor more bee expected from him: then,’ the phrase ‘to make his warre 
by sea: [and] w[it]hal to permit such levies to bee made w[it]hin his kingdoms, as 
shal bee found convenient’ had been replaced with the words ‘what is now contained 
in the two Treaties.’30 These changes indicate both a softening and a clarification of 
Charles’s stance towards an alliance with France. 
 
Once again, however, the French raised issues that revealed the ongoing 
tension between them and the English. Leicester informed Coke that he and 
Scudamore had met Bullion at the end of July 1637.31 At that meeting, France’s 
representative had complained that Charles’s subjects were selling gunpowder to the 
Spanish in Flanders. The earl had responded by pointing out that it was due to delays 
on the part of the French that England and France were not allies yet, and the 
English King’s subjects were still free to trade with the Spanish Netherlands. He 
also affirmed that Charles had offered the French ambassador in England the same 
terms to trade in gunpowder, though Bullion said that he was unaware of such a 
proposition. Bullion responded that the delays in the negotiations were not the fault 
of the French, and implicitly blamed the Dutch and the Swedes, whom he thought 
would be unwilling to ally with a power that was aiding their enemies. The long-
standing French objection to English trade with Flanders had resurfaced.32 
Reflecting the apparent extent of French annoyance with the English, the earl wrote 
the next day saying that he had been unable to arrange a meeting with the French 
negotiators, as, despite Bullion being in Paris, Chavigny was absent.33 
 
 
29 SP 78/103, fols 442: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, June 1637 (endorsed August 1637). 
 
30 SP 78/103, fols 443: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, June 1637 (endorsed August 1637). 
 
31 SP 78/104, fol. 58: Leicester to [Coke], 27 July/6 August 1637; see also Collins, II, 563-4 
(mis-located). This letter was dated 1638, but, given its contents, the allocation to that year was 
clearly a mistake for 1637, an error which Collins repeated. 
 
32 See, for example, SP 78/101, fol. 133: Leicester to [Coke], 10/20 June 1636. 
 




Coke continued to press for a response to Charles’s acceptance of the French 
versions of the treaties of June 1637, but the French continued to prevaricate. At the 
beginning of August, the Secretary instructed the earl to put pressure on the French 
for an answer regarding the conference to be held at Hamburg with France’s 
confederates, Sweden and the United Provinces.34 Leicester related that he and 
Scudamore had had a further meeting with Bullion and Chavigny at which they had 
communicated Charles’s expectation that the issues which he had raised regarding 
the treaties, especially in respect of the secret article, would not give rise to delays.35 
He reported that he had told Bullion and Chavigny that awaiting a response for so 
long was unreasonable, especially as the English King had agreed to the treaties. The 
French again blamed the need to consult their allies, Sweden and the United 
Provinces. However, contradicting this claim, the earl obtained assurances from the 
Swedish ambassador in Paris, Hugo Grotius, that, in the latter’s opinion, the Swedes 
were content with the treaties. Leicester’s cultivation of, and friendship with, 
Grotius had paid dividends. 
 
At this juncture, Sir Francis Windebanke, the King’s junior Secretary of 
State, wrote to Leicester giving the ambassador important new orders.36 
Windebanke’s letter of 3 August 1637 instructed Leicester to seek permission for 
Madame de La Vieuville to return to France.37 This action was a confrontational 
move on the part of Charles, as the lady’s husband – the duc de La Vieuville – was a 
long-standing opponent of Richelieu.38 Thus, for the first time in 1637, the English 
 
34 Collins, II, 508: Coke to Leicester, 1 August 1637. 
 
35 SP 78/104, fol. 76: Leicester to [Coke], 4/14 August 1637. 
 
36 SP 78/104, fol. 74: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 3 August 1637; see also Collins, II, 
509-10. Collins correctly attributed the authorship of the letter of 3 August 1637 to Windebanke. In 
SP 78/104, fol. 116: Leicester to Coke, 18/28 August 1637, Leicester referred to a letter of 3 August 
1637, which he had received from Windebanke regarding the Hamburg conference. As the letter of 3 
August 1637 also related to the congress to be held at Hamburg, it is very likely that this letter was 
from Windebanke. 
 
37 Madame de La Vieuville (dates unknown) was the wife of Charles I Coskaer, marquis and 
later duc de La Vieuville (1582-1653). 
 
38 The duc de La Vieuville had risen to favour with Louis XIII (1601-43) in the 1620s, first as 
captain of the King’s guard and then as a surintendant des finances in 1623-4. He could be regarded 
as Louis XIII’s chief minister immediately before the resumption of power in 1624 by Cardinal 
Richelieu (1585-1642). On Cardinal Richelieu becoming chief minister of Louis XIII, De La 
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King had offered an overt provocation to the French King and the Cardinal. 
 
Five days later, on 8 August 1637, Windebanke raised the very contentious 
issue of Marie des Médicis returning to France.39 (The Queen Mother was then 
resident in the Spanish Netherlands following her flight from France in 1631.) Given 
the short time span between the two letters, it is possible that the move on behalf of 
Marie des Médicis and that in relation to Madame de La Vieuville represented co-
ordinated action by Charles to annoy or pressure Louis and Richelieu. In his letter, 
the junior Secretary gave Leicester the following instruction: 
 
That it is apparent still, 92 [Marie des Médicis] wil not long stay it out ther 
[in the Spanish Netherlands]. This, out of divers of your former Letters, I 
interpret, That 92 [Marie des Médicis] disposeth her Affairs to an 
Accommodation, that shee may returne Home [to France]; which is to bee 
wished, and furthered by al Meanes. Neither must you seeme suspitious of 
anie other Remove, or of anie Intention, which may not sute with her Honor 
and Word; which doubtless shee will not break; yet your own Wisdom wil 
admonish you to keep your Eies open, and when you see Grownd, to pursue 
your Instructions, in a fair and discreet Maner. Write on al Occasions, and 
make it your cheif Indevor, to prevent being surprised …40 
 
Leicester’s ‘former Letters’ to which Windebanke referred do not survive. The use 
of code and the junior Secretary’s words, notably ‘and make it your cheif Indevor,’ 
betray the seriousness of the orders regarding this matter. At the same time, Coke 
addressed Leicester and Scudamore telling them to continue their efforts to have the 
French versions of the treaties of June signed and ratified.41 Thus, despite his 
provocative actions towards the French King and the Cardinal, the English King was 
still trying to conclude an alliance with France. 
 
Vieuville had fled France, only being reinstated in 1643 following Richelieu’s death in the previous 
year. See Richard Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589-1661 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 109-14. 
 
39 Collins, II, 510: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 8 August 1637. It is not immediately clear 
from which Secretary of State this letter of 8 August 1637 came. Collins ascribed it to Coke. 
However, given the subject matter of the letter, it is more likely that Windebanke was its author. This 
impression is reinforced by the existence of another letter of the same date – Collins, II, 510-1: Coke 
to Leicester and Scudamore, 8 August 1637. 
 
40 Collins, II, 510: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 8 August 1637. 
 





Anglo-French diplomatic relations were deteriorating in the high summer of 
1637. The French were foot dragging and Charles was beginning to take actions that 
could only annoy Louis and Richelieu – that is, by supporting the return of Marie 
des Médicis and Madame de La Vieuville to France. Leicester was only too aware of 
the potential of Charles’s action to cause the French offence. He reported to 
Windebanke that while he would do his best to try to obtain permission for Madame 
de La Vieuville to return, ‘… I feare it will be without successe; … because as I am 
informed, the Cardinal holds this Ladie’s husband, and all that family for his capitall 
and mortall enemies …’42 
 
Leicester continued to experience difficulties with the French regarding the 
treaties of June 1637 and the posited return of Madame de La Vieuville to France. 
He wrote two letters on these issues in mid-August. In the first to Coke, the earl 
indicated that, as advised by Charles, he had informed the French that the Swedes 
were worried about attending a meeting at Hamburg for reasons of security, and now 
wished the conference to finalize the anti-Habsburg coalition to be held at The 
Hague.43 Leicester also reported that he had told the French that the English King’s 
representatives at The Hague and Hamburg had said that neither Sweden nor the 
United Provinces had received any notification nor an invite from France in respect 
of the conference to be held at one of these locations. The French replied that they 
had no objection to the conference being held at The Hague and accepted some of 
the responsibility for the delays. Nonetheless, they had issues with the secret article, 
despite the fact that, as the ambassador pointed out, they had included that article in 
the auxiliary treaty themselves. (As the main treaty of June is unavailable, it cannot 
be determined if this article was in that treaty as well.) The French indicated that 
they did not think that signing the auxiliary treaty including the secret article was in 
their interests, as their allies, Sweden and the United Provinces, had not been 
 
42 SP 78/104, fol. 96: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 11/21 August 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 511-2. Collins attributed this letter as being addressed to Windebanke. Given the history of 
Leicester’s correspondence regarding Madame de La Vieuville, such an attribution was probably 
correct. 
 




consulted. The French also claimed that their allies were worried that Charles could 
only provide thirty ships. Leicester did not accept the validity of these concerns. In 
his second letter, he informed Windebanke that he had spoken to Chavigny about 
Madame de La Vieuville.44 Chavigny had attached no blame to the lady, but had 
said that the disloyalty of her husband to Louis and Richelieu made it very difficult 
for her to return to France. Diplomatic affairs with France were now diverging over 
two matters – the delays and problems revolving around the French signing of the 
treaties of June and the English King’s open support for the return to France of an 
individual against whom Louis and Richelieu would have strong objections. 
 
Coke expressed dismay at the issues that the French had raised in relation to 
the treaties of June 1637. Writing towards the end of August, the Secretary stated 
that, in respect of the French objection to the secret article, ‘nothing was less 
expected’ – after all they had proposed that article in the first place.45 He referred to 
the French contention that their allies ‘would bee displeased’ with that article as a 
‘p[re]tence.’ Coke instructed the earl to proceed on the basis that the conference on 
the treaties would be held at The Hague. He was also dismissive of the French 
comments on the number of ships that the English King had agreed to provide, 
arguing that the French concerns would only serve to cause others to question 
France’s commitment to the prospective alliance. In this context, at the beginning of 
September, Leicester informed the Secretary that Grotius had indicated that there 
would be no difficulty for Sweden in signing the treaties.46 The earl went onto say 
that ‘[i]t is now vacation [time] in France as well as in England,’ and, therefore, that 
little progress on the treaties could be expected. 
 
Windebanke wrote to Leicester congratulating him on his efforts on behalf of 
Madame de La Vieuville, stating that both Charles and Henriette Marie were pleased 
 
44 SP 78/104, fol. 120: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 18/28 August 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 512-3. Collins probably correctly ascribed this letter as being addressed to Windebanke. 
 
45 SP 78/104, fol. 135: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 24 August 1637; see also Collins, II, 
513-4. 
 




with the ambassador.47 The junior Secretary also indicated that the King and the 
Queen were unhappy with the French delays regarding the treaties. He wished 
Leicester success in his mission, but, as would be expected from a member of the 
Spanish Party, offered no tangible advice or support. 
 
Leicester then received instructions from Windebanke that he may well have 
been dreading, given the forewarning intimated to him in the junior Secretary’s letter 
of 8 August 1637.48 On 22 September, Windebanke ordered the ambassador to take 
action to support the potentially very disruptive issue of the return of Marie des 
Médicis to France: 
 
His Ma[jes]ty having lately received ouvertures from Queene Mother for her 
retourne into france, [and] being willing to interpose in that businesse, if it 
stand w[it]h the contentment of the french King, hath commanded me to 
signify his pleasure to yo[u]r L[ordshi]p: that yo[u] finde, som handsom 
meanes to acquaint the Car[dinal]: de Richelieu herewith, [and] know from 
him, upon what conditions the french King may be persuaded to give way to 
her restitution: …49 
 
To make matters worse, Leicester was instructed to ask about the possible return of 
several of the Queen Mother’s supporters to France. The junior Secretary also made 
clear the secret nature of the ambassador’s orders: 
 
Yo[u]r L[ordshi]p is to keepe this businesse [deleted] very secret and is to 
communicat [deleted] it to none, but to the party whome yo[u] will employ 
to the Cardinal de Richelieu, [deleted] [and] that party must be a Confident 
[and] of greate trust, [and] commanded to keepe it extreme secret, for so is 
His Ma[jesty]s expresse pleasure.50 
 
The matter was so secret that Windebanke told Leicester that ‘His Ma[jes]ty … 
 
47 Collins, II, 515: Windebanke to Leicester, 8 September 1637. Given the contents of this 
letter – that is, the reference to the affairs of Madame de La Vieuville – it is very likely that Collins 
was correct in ascribing it to be from Windebanke. 
 
48 Collins, II, 510: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 8 August 1637. 
 
49 SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 4[5]17. 
 
50 SP 78/104, fol. 211: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see 




commandes me to give yo[u]r L[ordshi]p: order not to communicat this businesse to 
Mr Sec[retary]: Coke, nor to give him the least touch of it in any of yo[u]r 
l[ette]rs.’51 The senior Secretary was, therefore, to be kept out of the loop. The 
importance of the letter is emphasized by the fact that it was endorsed as ‘seene 
[and] allowed by both their M: M:[ajesties] at Hampden Court.’52 Up to that point, 
the French had been employing delaying tactics regarding the conclusion of the 
main and the auxiliary treaties of February and June 1637. However, given the 
animosity between Richelieu and Marie des Médicis dating back to the late 1620s, 




Four questions must now be answered. Firstly, why, between February and July 
1637, did Charles concede to almost all of the demands of the French regarding the 
main and the auxiliary treaties of February and June? Secondly, why in August and 
September did the King abandon his conciliatory stance towards the French and 
support the return to France of individuals whom he must have known Louis and 
Richelieu would find very objectionable, a step which could only jeopardize the 
conclusion of an alliance with France? Thirdly, why did the French not sign and 
ratify the main and the auxiliary treaties of either February or June, especially, as, on 
the face of it, such action would have been very beneficial for France? Fourthly, 
how do the conclusions of this chapter regarding Charles’s foreign policy fit with the 
historiography of English diplomacy in the 1630s? 
 
To begin with, why did Charles make so many concessions to the French 
regarding the main and the auxiliary treaties of February and June 1637 between the 
beginning of the year and July? Diplomatically and domestically, the King’s weak 
position governed his approach to the Anglo-French negotiations in that period. At 
home, the continued influence of Protestant groups at court circumscribed his room 
 
51 SP 78/104, fol. 211: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 4[5]17. 
 





for manoeuvre. And up to July the impetus for an Anglo-French alliance would have 
been supported by Henriette Marie. Diplomatically, Charles’s position had not 
recovered from the failure of the embassy of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of 
Arundel, to the Emperor in Vienna at the end of 1636, and he had yet to develop 
credible alternatives to a league with France. Thus, in those months, the King would 
have been interested in anything that held out the prospect of success in his primary 
foreign-policy aim – the resolution of the problems regarding the recovery of the 
dignities and the lands of the Elector Palatine – and that was undoubtedly Leicester’s 
negotiations for a military alliance with France. 
 
A further factor behind Charles’s concessions to the French between 
February and July 1637 were the religious problems he faced at home. That period, 
especially the months of June and July, witnessed religious controversy in England. 
The trials of Prynne, Bastwick and Burton and Bishop Williams, were viewed by 
many Protestants as strong evidence of creeping ‘popery’ – that is, ‘Catholicism 
understood as political and spiritual tyranny.’53 These events had adverse 
implications for the King’s perceived commitment to advancing the Protestant cause 
in Europe and the Americas. They also raised fears of a court-centred plot to 
introduce autocratic government and the ending of Parliament and the rule of law. In 
many ways, the turmoil of the summer of 1637 had the same effect in England as the 
contemporary events involving the imposition of the new prayer book had in 
Scotland – it portended the triumph of Catholicism and the introduction of arbitrary 
rule. These events were concurrent with Charles’s continued attempts to make 
diplomatic concessions to the French. Thus, it would have suited the King to keep 
the Protestant groups, including the Northumberland-Leicester circle, at court 
distracted from the religious events of the summer and quiescent by pursuing an 
alliance with France and the prospect of meaningful English involvement in the 
Thirty Years War. 
 
Charles’s policy of conciliation towards the French had another advantage – 
it demonstrated to the Protestant groups at his court that he had tried his best to 
 





secure an alliance with France.54 By conceding to all of the demands of the French, 
except Richelieu’s requirement for a military presence on the continent, the King 
could say to his domestic Protestant critics that he had done all that he could to 
conclude a league with France.55 It was not his fault that the negotiations for a 
French alliance had failed. It was Louis’s and Richelieu’s. In other words, it was 
impossible to make a deal with France and Charles could walk away from a 
potential Anglo-French entente in all good conscience. Such a position towards an 
alliance with France would be even more attractive to the King at a time when its 
supporters at the Caroline court, for example, Algernon Percy, tenth earl of 
Northumberland, were beginning to lose faith in the possibility of a league with 
France. In the summer of 1637, Northumberland wrote to Sir Thomas Roe, the noted 
Caroline diplomat, criticizing England’s potential allies and not Charles: 
 
For our treaties [with France?], I look for no great matter from them, for 
whatsoever shall be concluded at these meetings will never bind our 
confederates [France and its allies?] longer than they find it for their own 
advantages. That we shall by this means either eclipse the house of Austria’s 




In answering the second question posed in the preceding section, one immediate 
reason for Charles abandoning his conciliatory stance towards the French and taking 
aggressive actions against Louis and Richelieu – especially in sponsoring the return 
to France of Marie des Médicis and Madame de La Vieuville – could well have been 
anger with the French King and the Cardinal. For approximately six months, the 
 
54 I owe this idea to comments made by Professor John Adamson at a supervisor’s meeting of 
August 2018. 
 
55 For Charles I’s conceding to French demands regarding the main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February 1637 and agreeing to those of June of that year, see SP 78/103, fol. 279: Coke to the 
Ambassadors at Paris, 6 May 1637 (see also Collins, II, 492); SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 
12 June 1637 (see also Collins, II, 500-1); and Collins, II, 501-2: Coke to Leicester, 18 June 1637. For 
Cardinal Richelieu’s demand for an English military presence on the continent, see CSPV, XXIV, 
1636-1639, 191-2: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and Senate, [18]/28 April 
1637. 
 
56 TNA, SP Colonial, CO 1/9, fol. 144: Northumberland to Roe, 6 August 1637; see also 




English King had conceded almost everything to France. He had had the main and 
the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 drawn up, signed and ratified and sent to 
Louis.57 He had accepted Richelieu’s revised versions of the treaties of June of that 
year with their not insubstantial amendments, subject to a few reservations.58 All 
that he had gained in return from the French was prevarication together with new 
demands, notably the pre-approval of the treaties by France’s allies, Sweden and the 
United Provinces. Charles could be viewed as being like the proverbial bride at the 
altar, constantly being stood-up by his none too willing suitor, the French, who, 
nonetheless, kept promising that next time all would be different. Thus, by August 
and September, the King was probably very frustrated with the French and willing to 
take aggressive action against France should the opportunity present itself. 
 
Another factor occasioning Charles’s change of diplomatic tack in these 
months was his improved personal and political position at court. In February 1637, 
it could be taken for granted that Henriette Marie favoured an alliance with France. 
But by August and September, the Queen had changed her position. According to 
Malcolm Smuts, from September onwards, Henriette Marie was actively promoting 
the return of her mother, Marie des Médicis, to France.59 Her endorsement of the 
letter of 22 September instructing Leicester to seek the return of the Queen Mother 
emphasized these altered circumstances.60 In the opinion of the Venetian 
ambassador, in September, the Queen’s health was suffering as a result of her 
mother’s predicament.61 The outcome was that the King, instead of being pressured 
into an alliance with France by his wife, was now being hassled by her into taking 
actions that would only serve to annoy the French. Moreover, given the delays on 
 
57 See SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 
(mis-located). 
 
58 See SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1 and 
Collins, II, 501-2: Coke to Leicester, 18 June 1637. 
 
59 See Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. 
 
60 SP 78/104, page following fol. 211: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 
September 1637. 
 
61 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 264: Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the 




the French side, influential members of the Protestant Party, for example, 
Northumberland, who supported an Anglo-French alliance, were beginning to doubt 
the likelihood of such a league coming into existence.62 Charles had more room for 
manoeuvre now, and, as such, an opportunity to row back on a league with France if 
he wished. By the late summer of 1637, given French prevarication in the 
negotiations between February and July, the English King had good cause to adopt a 
more aggressive stance towards France. 
 
Charles evidently grasped this opportunity, for there are strong indications 
that his provocations towards the French from August 1637 were not random or 
incidental acts but part of a concerted strategy of diplomacy by other means. Thus, 
his request that Madame de La Vieuville be allowed to return to France was quickly 
followed by an instruction to Leicester to pursue the even more controversial course 
of securing permission for Marie des Médicis’ remove there.63 The impression that 
the King was deliberately and provocatively undercutting his ambassador in Paris is 
strengthened by Charles’s use of Windebanke in these manoeuvres, for the junior 
Secretary was someone whom the King often employed when he wished to bypass 
likely opposition from his more Protestant councillors. It is also possible that 
Charles’s proposing the return of the two ladies to France was the result of efforts by 
the Spanish Party, of which Windebanke was a member, to scupper the Anglo-
French negotiations. If so, the King might have been willing to make use of that 
group at a time when optimism about an Anglo-French league was beginning to fade 
among members of the Protestant Party.64 
 
There is one more possible explanation for Charles deciding to pull back on 
an alliance with France in August and September 1637 – the importance of trade as 
represented by the receipts from tonnage and poundage for his finances. In the 
 
62 See CO 1/9, fol. 144: Northumberland to Roe, 6 August 1637; see also CSPD, 1637, 358 
and CSPC, 1574-1660, 257. 
 
63 See SP 78/104, fol. 74: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 3 August 1637 (see also Collins, II, 
509-10); Collins, II, 510: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 8 August 1637; and SP 78/104, fol. 210: 
Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637 (see also Collins, II, 4[5]17). 
 
64 See, for example, CO 1/9, fol. 144: Northumberland to Roe, 6 August 1637; see also CSPD, 




1630s, the King did have other sources of non-parliamentary income, such as 
traditional revenues from crown lands, purveyance and the Court of Wards as well 
as other new sources of finance that he was exploiting – for example, the imposition 
of fines regarding distraint of knighthood and contraventions of the forest laws and 
income from projects and patents and, of course, borrowing.65 There was also ship 
money, but the income from that source was being spent almost entirely on building 
up the royal fleet.66 This position left Charles with tonnage and poundage as not only 
his primary source of revenue, but also the one that was growing fastest.67 But any 
increase in this income depended on the expansion of maritime trade, which, in turn, 
required peace.68 English shipping and trade, and, therefore, the crown’s finances, 
were vulnerable to war.69 The King could ill afford to ignore the advantages of 
remaining at peace with the continental powers, for the integrity of his realms, which 
greatly depended on his revenues, was a major consideration for him. Thus, 
Charles’s reliance on tonnage and poundage and the continued expansion of trade 
could have been a contributing factor causing him to have second thoughts about the 
merits of an Anglo-French alliance and a potential war with the Habsburgs. 
However, the King’s actions during the first half of 1637 – in particular, the signing 
and ratifying of the treaties of February – indicated that restoring the Prince Palatine, 
despite the risk of war which that would entail, was more important to him, at least 
in the short term, than protecting his finances by remaining at peace.70 
 
 
65 See Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 105-26. 
 
66 See Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the 
Reign of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 129. For ship money being 
spent on the fleet, see M. D. Gordon, ‘The Collection of Ship Money in the Reign of Charles I’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4 (1910), 141-62. 
 
67 See Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 126-30. 
 
68 See J. S. Kepler, ‘Fiscal Aspects of the English Carrying Trade during the Thirty Years 
War’, EcHR, 2nd ser. 25 (1972), 261-83; Harland Taylor, ‘Trade, Neutrality, and the “English Road”, 
1603-1648’, EcHR, 2nd ser., 25 (1972), 236-60; and Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 22. 
 
69 See J. S. Kepler, The Value of Ships Gained and Lost by the English Shipping Industry 
during the Wars with Spain and France, 1624-1630’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 59 (1973), 218-21 for an 
estimate of the damage done to English shipping and, therefore, trade and government finances in 
Charles I’s wars of the second half of the 1620s. 
 





Whatever the reasons for his foreign policy towards France at that time, 
Charles was adopting a very risky strategy. In signing and ratifying the Anglo-
French treaties of February 1637 and sending them to Louis, the English King had 
transferred control over the fate of the treaties to France.71 Had the French King 
done likewise and signed and ratified the treaties, Charles would have given a major 
hostage to fortune, and may well have found himself drifting almost inexorably into 
siding with France in the Thirty Years War. He might have been able to extricate 
himself from such a situation by sabotaging the finalizing of an Anglo-French 
league, but it would have been very obvious that he was doing just that, with all the 
reputational damage that would likely follow. And, if such an approach had become 
apparent, some or all of the English King’s designs for avoiding war on the 
continent, regaining the Palatinate and the Electoral title for Charles Louis by 




The third question to consider is why did the French not sign and ratify the main and 
the auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February 1637, or sign their versions of the 
treaties of June of the same year? This is a key issue, as concluding an alliance with 
England based on any of these treaties could well have been very advantageous to 
France – notably as a way of closing the sea route to the Spanish Netherlands by 
way of the English Road. 
 
The most likely explanation for French prevarication and the failure of Louis 
to sign and ratify the Anglo-French treaties was that, of the two ways in which Spain 
could reinforce Flanders with men and money – the land-based Spanish Road and 
the maritime English Road – it was more important for the French to ensure that the 
land route remained closed.72 This policy would necessitate France concentrating on 
the Rhineland and relying on its continental allies, Sweden and the United 
 
71 See SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 
(mis-located). 
 





Provinces. It would also entail trying to persuade Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria, to 
break with the Empire, rather than concluding an alliance with England. The 
importance to France of an agreement with Bavaria as opposed to an Anglo-French 
league meant that, despite Leicester’s hopes of August 1636, Richelieu did not 
consider an alliance with Charles to be worthwhile.73 Allying with England, given 
the importance to the English King of the restitution of the Elector Palatine to his 
dignities and lands, would have entailed the French King and the Cardinal alienating 
Maximilian. Thus, it would have meant forgoing the opportunity to make the 
Catholic League a neutral coalition so depriving the Emperor of significant military 
resources.74 The French could also anticipate that their Dutch allies might be able to 
close the English Road, as they would do in October 1639 following the Battle of 
the Downes. That Louis and Richelieu were pursuing such a policy is supported by 
the fact that France’s primary war effort in 1635-42 was directed at Alsace, Lorraine 
and the Rhineland to ensure that the Spanish Road remained closed.75 
 
An alliance with England would also give rise to problems with France’s 
existing confederates – Sweden and the United Provinces. Charles’s relations with 
Sweden were poor. This situation was largely the result of the ineffectual military 
aid provided to Gustavus II Adolphus in 1631-2 and Johan Oxenstierna’s abortive 
recruiting mission to England of 1633-4, topped off by the English King’s inclusion 
of an invitation for Denmark to become a party to the Anglo-French alliance in the 
main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637.76 All of these factors would have 
confirmed the Swedes in their adverse opinion of Charles, and, despite Grotius’s 
 
73 See SP 78/101, fol. 399: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 August 1636; see also Collins, II, 402-6. 
 
74 See Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden 1611-1632, vol 2, 1626-
1632 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1958), p. 408 for speculation on such a possible aim being 
behind Cardinal Richelieu’s policy towards Maximilian I of Bavaria (1573-1651), albeit in the early 
1630s. 
 
75 See, for example, David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 
1624-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 110-63. 
 
76 For the first two instances, see John J. Scally, ‘The Political Career of James, Third Marquis 
and First Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 1643’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, 
University of Cambridge, 1992), pp. 25-66 and Alexia N. J. Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State: 
Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611-1660’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Aberdeen, 1998), pp. 87 and 171. For the latter, see, SP 103/11, fols 599-601: Anglo-French 




assurances to Leicester, would not be conducive to Sweden entering into an alliance 
with England.77 Tension between England and the United Provinces was largely a 
product of their maritime and trading rivalries – for example, English insistence on 
the Dutch buying licences from them to fish in the North Sea.78 
 
In many ways, the question for Louis and Richelieu was simple – was an 
alliance with Charles worth it? In considering this question in the 1630s, Cardinal 
Richelieu was significantly less enthusiastic about a league with England than his 
successor Cardinal Mazarin was in the 1650s. However, Mazarin was dealing with 
Oliver Cromwell who had an armada of 160 to 180 warships and a large, effective 
and tried and tested army of at least 30,000 men and not the English King with his 
modest fleet of thirty vessels and no available land forces.79 Thus, the question of an 
alliance with Charles was not so difficult for Richelieu to answer in the negative in 
1637. 
 
A further reason for the Cardinal’s lukewarm response to an Anglo-French 
alliance was the strengthening of the French fleet over the period of Leicester’s 
embassy.80 Between 1636 and 1641, the number of available French warships grew 
 
77 See, for example, CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 355: Correr and Contarini, Venetian 
Ambassadors in France to the Doge and Senate, [2]/12 January 1638, who related that: ‘[t]he 
[unnamed] Swedish ambassador asserts that his crown will never agree to the [Anglo-French] treaty 
as received from France, but that they will make such proposals to England as she cannot refuse if 
she really intends to do anything serious.’ For other somewhat more emollient and favourable (to the 
English) indications specifically attributed to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the Swedish ambassador in 
Paris, to Leicester, see, for instance, SP 78/104, fol. 76: Leicester to [Coke], 4/14 August 1637. 
 
78 See, for example, SP 78/101, fol. 282: Coke to Leicester, 10 July 1636. 
 
79 For the negotiations between Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) and Cardinal Mazarin (1602-61) 
in the 1650s, see Charles P. Korr, Cromwell and the New Model Foreign Policy: England’s Policy 
Towards France, 1649-1658 (London: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 158-67 and 180-95. 
For the 160 to 180 ships available to Cromwell in the mid-1650s, see Matthew C. Harrington, ‘“The 
Worke wee may doe in the World”: The Western Design and the Anglo-Spanish Struggle for the 
Caribbean, 1654-1655’ (unpublished master’s thesis, The Florida State University, 2004), pp. 20-41 
and Bernard S. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p. 5 respectively. For Charles I’s thirty ships in 1637, see SP 103/11, fol. 598: 
Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 of the main and the auxiliary treaties. For the land 
military resources available to the Protectorate, see, for example, article XXXVII of the Instrument of 
Government of 1653, which provided finance for an army of 30,000 soldiers. See Gardiner, 
Constitutional Documents, p. 414. In 1637, Charles I had no standing army in mainland Great 
Britain, with the small force that he had being tied up in Ireland. 
 
80 For what follows, see Alan James, ‘The Administration and Development of the French 
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substantially. However, in 1636 and in 1637, the majority of these vessels were in 
the Mediterranean, which was also the position in 1640 and 1641. Only in 1638 and 
1639 was most of France’s fleet in the Atlantic. This situation could well explain 
Richelieu’s interest in a league with England in 1636 and 1637, followed by his 
cooling off with regard to such an alliance in 1638 and 1639. If France’s naval 
forces were increasing, together with the availability of the powerful Dutch fleet, 
there was no need of Charles and his ships to sever the English Road. 
 
Richelieu might also have been unwilling to agree to an Anglo-French 
alliance due to personal and political suspicion of England. In 1626, during the 
course of the plot against the Cardinal based around Henri de Talleyrand, comte de 
Chalais-Périgord, a French courtier, Charles had conspired against Richelieu.81 In 
1633, the intrigue against the Cardinal centred on the former French ambassador to 
London, Charles de l’Aubespine, marquis de Châteauneuf, had involved Charles 
and, his Queen, Henriette Marie as well.82 These events would not have inclined 
Richelieu to trust the English King. 
 
Finally, the Cardinal had an acid test for Charles’s commitment to an alliance 
with France, and, therefore, whether a league with England was worth damaging 
relations with Sweden, the United Provinces and Bavaria – would the English King 
call a Parliament. If Charles did, he would be serious about raising the necessary 
funds to make a meaningful commitment to the Thirty Years War on the side of the 
 
Navy and the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu, 1618-1642’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Manchester, 1997), pp. 214-42 and The Navy and Government in Early Modern France 1572-1661 
(Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 2004), pp. 1-9 and 77-91. 
 
81 See Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First 
Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628) (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 336-7 for details of the Chalais 
conspiracy. Henri de Talleyrand, comte de Chalais-Périgord (1599-1626), was Head of the King’s 
Wardrobe to Louis XIII and was executed due to his involvement in the 1626 conspiracy against 
Cardinal Richelieu. 
 
82 See Smuts, ‘The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 34-5 and ‘Religion, European 
Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 23-5 for information on the Châteauneuf plot. Charles de 
l’Aubespine marquis de Châteauneuf (1580-1653) was a French diplomat and government official, 
embroiled in the 1633 plot to overthrow Cardinal Richelieu, as a consequence of which he was 




French.83 If he did not, he would not be a worthwhile ally. The English King 
pledging his realms to fight in a land war in Europe was a key issue for Richelieu. 
As reported by the Venetian ambassador to Paris in April 1637, the scale of the 
commitment envisaged was 6,000 infantry and 1,500 to 2,000 cavalry.84 If Charles 
accepted this proposal, the league with France could be agreed.85 The French 
demands for military assistance on the continent had been hinted at in Leicester’s 
letter to Coke of 3 March.86 The Cardinal was looking for more than just the naval 
aid and the opportunity for the French to recruit soldiers in the English King’s lands 
as set out in the main and the auxiliary treaties of February and the French versions 
of those treaties of June.87 Charles’s failure to call a Parliament between February 
and September would only have confirmed his lack of commitment to the European 
war in Richelieu’s eyes, though this suspicion on the part of the French was never 
raised by them, even implicitly, during the negotiations. The English King’s 
(understandable) reluctance to commit his realm to full military engagement in the 
Thirty Years War doubtless explains the Cardinal’s comment of February 1638, as 
relayed by the Venetian ambassador to France: 
 
[t]he negotiations for an alliance with the King of Great Britain remain 
fluctuating u[a]s usual … But the Cardinal [Richelieu] in talking to me stated 
emphatically that at present England might be called a country where they 
talk of everything and conclude nothing.88 
 
 
83 See CSPV, XXV, 1640-1642, 6: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 
Senate, [7]/17 January 1640, for a contemporary concern, albeit expressed three years later, of the 
perceived potentially dangerous implications for foreign powers of Charles I acquiring funds from the 
Short Parliament. 
 
84 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 191-2: Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 
Senate, [18]/28 April 1637. 
 
85 See SP 78/103, fol. 127: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 469 for 
collaboration of this demand of the French in Leicester’s correspondence. 
 
86 See SP 78/103, fol. 126: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 March 1637; see also Collins, II, 468. 
 
87 See SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, articles 2 and 3 of the 
main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-7: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, 
June 1637, articles 2 and 3. 
 
88 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 375: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and 




But though Richelieu had few hopes of Charles as a serious military ally, he would 
nonetheless have wished to keep him talking in order to ensure that England 
remained neutral or to negate a possible English alliance with the Habsburgs.89 
Thus, if the signs had looked good early in 1637, by the autumn it was becoming 





The fourth question concerns the implications of the findings of this chapter for the 
historiography of Charles’s foreign policy in the 1630s. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, S. R. Gardiner typified the King’s diplomacy in this period as ineffectual 
and pro-Spanish.90 Simon Adams and Lawrence Reeve in the later twentieth century 
view Charles’s foreign policy in the 1630s as clearly favouring Spain.91 These and 
other historians also regard the English King as being innately distrustful of the 
French.92 Yet more authors, like Jonathan Scott and Thea Lindquist, have written off 
Leicester’s embassy.93 More recently, Malcolm Smuts, Caroline Hibbard, Kevin 
Sharpe and Richard Cust have expressed (limited) optimism regarding the chances 
of Leicester successfully negotiating an alliance with France in 1637.94 And there is 
Ian Atherton’s contention that Charles was seeking a balance between France and 
 
89 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. 
 
90 See Gardiner, History of England, VII, 169-219 and VIII, 162. 
 
91 See Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, pp. 89-90, 93 and 101 and Reeve, Road to 
Personal Rule, pp. 4 and 181-4. 
 
92 See, for example, Charles Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 175. 
 
93 See Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic 1623-1677 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 75 and Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 479-88. 
 
94 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Anthony Milton, Catholic 
and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 507-8 and Andrew D. Thrush, ‘The Navy Under 




the Habsburg powers so as to be able to exploit any contingencies that might arise.95 
 
The findings of this chapter dispute most of these interpretations of Caroline 
foreign policy, though an evaluation of Atherton’s proposition must await a 
consideration of events between 1637 and 1640. (See Chapter 9 for the conclusions 
of this thesis regarding Atherton’s arguments.). Charles’s personal pro-Spanish 
attitude may not have altered in 1637, but his actions between February and July 
make it clear that he was serious about allying with the French. Besides the main 
and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 and the French versions of those treaties 
of June of that year, there were seven known occasions between 1629 and 1640 on 
which Charles might have concluded an alliance with a foreign power.96 Only two of 
these seven occasions produced concrete results – the secret and inconclusive 
Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1631 and an unsigned maritime treaty with Spain in 1634. 
By contrast, in 1637, four treaties were drawn up, two of which Charles signed and 
ratified (the main and auxiliary treaties of February), and two to which he agreed 
(the French versions of those treaties of June).97 
 
95 See Ian J. Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-71): A Career at Court and in the 
Country, 1601-43’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1993), 
pp. 241-5 and Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career of John, First Viscount 
Scudamore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 172-219, especially pp. 177-9. 
 
96 These opportunities arose in 1629 with France during and after the ratification process 
regarding the Treaty of Susa that ended the Anglo-French War of 1627-9 (for which, see Adamson, 
‘Policy and Pomegranates’, pp. 159-63); in 1631 with Spain – the secret treaty associated with Sir 
Francis Cottington (1579?-1652), the English diplomat and politician, which followed on from the 
Treaty of Madrid that concluded the Anglo-Spanish War of 1625-30 (regarding which, see Gardiner, 
History of England, VII, 176-7 and Elliott, Olivares, p. 403); in 1633-4 again with Spain and the 
unsigned maritime treaty (in respect of which, see Gardiner, History of England, VII, 357-8, 367-8 and 
380-4 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 85-7); in 1636 with the Empire and the 
abortive embassy of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel (1585-1646), to Vienna (with regard 
to which, see Francis C. Springell, Connoisseur and Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel’s Embassy to 
Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne’s Diary, the Earl’s letters and other contemporary 
sources with a catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Holler 
(London: Maggs Bros. Ltd, 1963), Lindquist, ‘The Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 348-463 and O’Neill, 
‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 280-96); in 1637-8 with Spain yet again via intermediaries in the 
Spanish Netherlands (for which, see Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 377 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I 
and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 297-321); in 1639 with France again – Leicester’s third set of instructions 
of April on his continuing negotiations for an Anglo-French league and Charles I’s offer of terms to 
Cardinal Richelieu during the lead-up to the Battle of the Downs in September (regarding which, see 
SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the Earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639 and Gardiner, 
History of England, IX, 63); and in 1640 with Spain for a fourth time for Spanish funds and troops (in 
respect of which, see Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, pp. 166-81 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and 
the Spanish Plot’, pp. 386-475). 
 




The main and auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February and June were 
important and unique departures from Caroline foreign policy during the Personal 
Rule. Only in the summer of 1640, following the diplomatic and strategic revolution 
brought about by Spain’s defeat by the Dutch at the Battle of the Downs in October 
1639, would Charles come as remotely as close to an alliance with a foreign power – 
this time Spain – as he did in the first half of 1637. Thus, if the events of the first 
seven months of that year did not constitute a revolution, they serve to undermine 
the traditional view that Charles was primarily pro-Spanish throughout the 1630s. 
 
 
(mis-located); and SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1 





Four Ladies, Two Princes, an Army and a Conference – September 1637 




In spite of the efforts of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester – Charles I’s 
extraordinary ambassador to Louis XIII – Anglo-French relations had deteriorated in 
the third quarter of 1637, threatening the conclusion of an alliance between the two 
countries. The optimism surrounding the so-called main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February – which the English King had had drawn up, signed and ratified – and the 
revised French versions of those treaties of June – to which he had agreed subject to 
some reservations – had evaporated.1 Charles had provoked the French by 
supporting the return to France of Marie des Médicis, the French Queen Mother, and 
Madame de La Vieuville. Given the bad blood between Marie des Médicis and 
Cardinal Richelieu dating back to the late 1620s and as Madame de La Vieuville’s 
husband had been ousted as France’s chief minister by Richelieu in 1624, these 
individuals were deeply objectionable to the French King and the Cardinal.2 
 
Why had Charles taken action that seemingly could have only damaged the 
prospects for an Anglo-French alliance? He may have become disenchanted with the 
possibility of a league with France, given French prevarication. The personal and 
domestic pressures on him to conclude an alliance with France had decreased. 
 
1 See London, TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French 
Treaties, 17 February 1637 and Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-
French Treaty, June 1637. For Charles I (1600-49) drawing up, signing and ratifying the main and the 
auxiliary treaties of February 1637, see TNA, SP France, SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 
February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 (mis-located). For Charles I agreeing to the French versions 
of these treaties of June 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 500-1 and Collins, II, 501-2: Coke to Leicester, 18 June 1637. 
 
2 For Charles I supporting the return of Marie des Médicis (1575-1642) to France, see Collins, 
II, 510: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 8 August 1637 and SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of 
State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see also Collins, II, 4[5]17. With regard to 
Madame de La Vieuville (dates unknown), see SP 78/104, fol. 74: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 3 
August 1637 (see also Collins, II, 509-10); SP 78/104, fol. 96: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 
11/21 August 1637 (see also Collins, II, 511-2); and SP 78/104, fol. 120: Leicester to 




Henriette Marie, his influential Queen, had ceased to back a French league and was 
espousing the return of her mother, Marie des Médicis, to that country.3 The 
religious turmoil of the high summer of 1637 had abated following the prosecutions 
of the Puritan controversialists William Prynne, John Bastwick and Henry Burton 
and Bishop John Williams of Lincoln before Star Chamber in June and July 
respectively. The hopes of leading Protestants at the Caroline court, for example, 
Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland, regarding the successful conclusion 
of an Anglo-French alliance had also faded.4 
 
There is an alternative explanation, however. Despite the apparently 
aggressive actions on Charles’s part, the English King’s dealings with the French 
from the summer of 1637 can be interpreted as his way of pressuring Louis and 
Richelieu into negotiating with him in earnest by demonstrating that he could be a 
threat or a nuisance to them if they did not take his offer of a league seriously. 
Therefore, this thesis will argue that, in contrast to the recent historical assessments 
of the treaties of 1637, which insist that the forces pushing for an Anglo-French 
league ceased during the second half of that year, the conclusion of an alliance with 




Four issues undermined Anglo-French relations in 1637-8, the most harmful of 
which was Charles’s support for the return of Marie des Médicis to France.6 
 
3 See SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637 
(see also Collins, II, 4[5]17); CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 264: Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in 
England to the Doge and Senate, 11/[21] September 1637; and Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. 
 
4 See, for example, TNA, SP Colonial, CO 1/9, fol. 144: Northumberland to Roe, 6 August 
1637; see also CSPD, 1637, 358 and CSPC, 1574-1660, 257. 
 
5 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Anthony Milton, Catholic 
and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 507-8 and Andrew D. Thrush, ‘The Navy under 
Charles I, 1625-40’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University College, London, 1990), p. 13. 
 
6 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41-2 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
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Leicester confirmed to Sir Francis Windebanke, Charles’s junior Secretary of State, 
that, on 28 September 1637, he had received Windebanke’s instructions of the 
twenty second of that month to further the Queen Mother’s return.7 At that time, 
Marie des Médicis was still in the Spanish Netherlands.8 
 
The French reaction to the posited remove of Marie des Médicis to France 
came sooner than Leicester had anticipated. The ambassador told Windebanke that 
Claude de Bullion, one of Louis’s surintendants des finances, had requested a 
meeting with him on 29 September 1637, only one day after he had received 
Windebanke’s instructions.9 The meeting started uneventfully, but to the earl’s 
surprise, Bullion then said that the French King ‘understood by divers 
advertisements, that the Queene mother was to goe into England.’10 Leicester’s 
consternation can be imagined – as ordered, he had spoken to no one about Marie 
des Médicis returning to France. He had also been told to seek the return of the 
Queen Mother to France and not England. Somehow the French had discovered her 
intentions, though not entirely accurately. Speaking in an unofficial capacity, but in 
a way that obviously had the approval of Louis and Richelieu, Bullion said that the 
French King could not countenance Marie des Médicis being in either France or 
England, as ‘she was alltogether Spanish.’11 Moreover, if in England, the Queen 
 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 31 for Marie des Médicis being the most dangerous enemy of 
Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) to take refuge at the Caroline Court. 
 
7 In SP 78/104, fol. 257: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 4[5]17-9, Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), confirmed that he had 
received SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 4[5]17 on 28 September 1637 (English or Julian style) or 8 October 1637 (according 
to the French or the Gregorian calendar). Given the subject matter of Leicester’s letter of 6 October 
1637 and the fact that the missive of 22 September 1637 from Sir Francis Windebanke (bap.1582-
d.1646) stated that Leicester should not communicate with Charles I’s senior Secretary of State, Sir 
John Coke (1563-1644), regarding Marie des Médicis, Collins was correct in ascribing the recipient 
of Leicester’s letter of 6 October 1637 to be Windebanke. 
 
8 See Jean Dubost, Marie de Médicis: La Reine Dévoilée (Paris: Biographie Payot, 2009), pp. 
819-20. 
 
9 SP 78/104, fol. 257: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 4[5]17-9. 
 
10 SP 78/104, fol. 257: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 518. 
 




Mother would try to undermine Louis’s friendship with Charles, and hinder any 
cooperation between the two crowns. A reconciliation with her was ‘une affaire 
domestique’ (‘a family matter’) for the French King.12 The ambassador did not try to 
alienate Bullion by denying what the Frenchman had said, nor did he confirm its 
truth. He decided to present his representations regarding Marie des Médicis at a 
later date. The earl bluffed his way out of the immediate situation by throwing 
Bullion’s words back at him, insisting that any possibility of the Queen Mother’s 
‘reception’ in England was also a ‘une affaire domestique’ for the English King.13 
 
Leicester officially communicated Charles’s support for Marie des Médicis’ 
return to France to Louis and Richelieu via Bullion on 1 October 1637.14 Bullion 
doubted that anything that the ambassador said would be acceptable to the French 
King and the Cardinal. The next day, Bullion visited the earl, who read out his 
proposal, which Bullion wrote down. Two days later, Bullion informed Leicester 
that the French King would reply in due course. The ambassador concluded his letter 
by stating that he was not confident of Marie des Médicis being able to go back, as 
‘… it is the opinion of many, that the Cardinal will perish rather then assent unto the 
returne of Q.[ueen] mother into France.’15 
 
The French duly confirmed their opposition to any suggestion of Marie des 
Médicis returning to their country. Leicester advised Windebanke that, on 6 October 
 
 
12 SP 78/104, fol. 258: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 518. 
 
13 SP 78/104, fol. 258: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 518. 
 
14 SP 78/104, fol. 257: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, 
II, 4[5]17-9. The exchange of notes regarding Marie des Médicis generally reflected Leicester’s 
conversations with Claude de Bullion (1569-1640), one of the surintendants des finances of Louis 
XIII (1601-43), of 29 September and 2 October 1637, though the ambassador also relayed the Queen 
Mother’s request that some of her followers – including the ‘Marquis de la Vieuville,’ Cardinal 
Richelieu’s old adversary from the early 1620s, and, therefore, very unlikely to be welcome – should 
be permitted to return with her to France. See SP 78/104, fol. 255: Proposal of Leicester to the French 
King regarding the Queen Mother, 1/11 October 1637. 
 





1637, Louis had rejected his proposal of the first of that month.16 The further 
arguments that he had made in the Queen Mother’s favour had not moved the 
French. The ambassador also informed the junior Secretary that he had denied the 
allegation that Marie des Médicis was planning to go to England but to no avail. He 
believed that, for the French King and the Cardinal, the only acceptable destination 
for the Queen Mother was Florence. 
 
In spite of the negative French response, Windebanke instructed Leicester to 
continue pressing for Marie des Médicis to remove to France. The junior Secretary 
stated that he, like Leicester, was surprised by the advance knowledge of the French 
for Charles’s support for the Queen Mother.17 The earl was to approach Richelieu 
and assure him that Marie des Médicis was his ‘friende,’ would comply with 
anything that the Cardinal might require of her, and had forgotten the past and only 
wanted to live ‘peaceably [and] quietly’ in France. Windebanke next dealt with 
Louis’s written rejection of the earl’s proposal regarding Marie des Médicis.18 He 
informed Leicester on 26 October 1637 that the English King was unhappy with the 
French King’s response.19 Charles thought that viewing the issue of the Queen 
Mother’s return to France as being ‘wholly particular [and] domestique’ was too 
narrow an approach to the fate of a ‘Greate Princes.’ The ambassador should say 
that, despite past conflicts, Marie des Médicis offered ‘to putt her selfe into the 
 
16 SP 78/104, fol. 270: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 13/23 October 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 519-20. This letter is calendared as being addressed to Coke, but as the senior Secretary is 
referred to in it in the third person, it cannot have been sent to him. Given its contents, Collins was 
correct in ascribing the letter as being addressed to Windebanke. See SP 78/104, fol. 282: French 
King’s answer to Leicester’s proposal of 1/11 October 1637, [6]/16 October 1637 for the formal 
rejection by Louis XIII of Leicester’s proposition regarding the return of Marie des Médicis to 
France. 
 
17 SP 78/104, fol. 289: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 19 October 1637, see also Collins, II, 
521. This letter is calendared as being from Coke, but, given the hand in which it was written, the 
topic with which it dealt, that is, Marie des Médicis, and the reference to SP 78/104, fol. 257: 
Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 October 1637; see also Collins, II, 4[5]17-9, the letter was 
almost certainly from Windebanke. 
 
18 SP 78/104, fol. 282: French King’s answer to Leicester’s proposal of 1/11 October 1637, 
[6]/16 October 1637 for the rejection by Louis XIII of Leicester’s proposition regarding the return of 
Marie des Médicis to France. 
 
19 SP 78/104, fol. 306: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 26 October 1637; see also Collins, II, 
522-3. Given the hand in which this letter was written, Collins most probably correctly ascribed it as 




power of her sone,’ and that, if she broke her promise, Louis had the means to 
secure her compliance.20 Leicester was to present the same arguments to Richelieu. 
He should also state that the English King denied wishing to have the Queen Mother 
in England. However, if she were to go there, that outcome was a ‘domestique’ issue 
for Charles as well. Finally, the English King was unhappy that the French King 
thought that his friendship with him could be impaired by the issue of where Marie 
des Médicis should reside. Windebanke’s letter was endorsed as ‘seene [and] 
allowed by both their M:M:[ajesties],’ indicating royal approval of its contents.21 
 
Further English action regarding the possible return of Marie des Médicis to 
France ensued. Leicester compiled a second proposal in November 1637 based on 
Windebanke’s instructions of 26 October.22 Broadly, he repeated the arguments that 
had been made already in support of the Queen Mother’s relocation to France. 
Shortly afterwards, the ambassador informed the junior Secretary that he had met 
with Bullion, who had formally conveyed Louis’s rejection of the earl’s first 
proposal.23 Bullion justified his master’s negative reaction on the basis that Marie 
des Médicis was the French King’s subject. Leicester replied that the issue was not 
whose subject she was, but her (reduced) circumstances. Bullion confirmed that the 
only place that Louis and Richelieu would consent the Queen Mother going to was 
Florence. The ambassador argued that that city would be very difficult for Marie des 
Médicis to reach if she went by sea or by land through Germany. Alternatively, she 
could go via France, in which case she might as well reside permanently in some 
distant part of that country. Bullion accepted neither of these arguments. At the end 
of the meeting, Leicester presented his second memorandum to Bullion. 
 
 
20 SP 78/104, fol. 307: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 26 October 1637; see also Collins, II, 
522. 
 
21 See SP 78/104, page following fol. 308: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 26 October 1637. 
 
22 SP 78/104, fol. 346: Paper [written by Leicester] delivered to M. Bullion, [8]/18 November 
1637. 
 
23 SP 78/104, fol. 344: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 10/20 November 1637; see also 
Collins II, 524-6. This letter is calendared as being to Coke, but, given its subject matter, that is, 




Unsurprisingly, the French rebuffed the ambassador’s second proposal.24 
Leicester informed Windebanke of the French King’s negative reply in the closing 
days of November 1637.25 Bullion reinforced this message by saying that as 
France’s ‘affaires stand now he saw no probability of perswading this king [Louis 
XIII] to consent unto the returne of the Queene his mother into France.’ The 
ambassador tentatively suggested that Marie des Médicis might go to Avignon. 
Bullion rejected this idea as well, stating that the French ‘understood Avignon to be 
France, and under that title they could not hearken to her comming thether.’ 
 
Nothing more was heard about Marie des Médicis going back to France from 
either the English or the French for the next nine months. However, in August 1638, 
the issue of where she should reside resurfaced.26 At the very end of that month, 
Leicester for the first time acknowledged to Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior 
Secretary of State, that England might be the Queen Mother’s ultimate destination.27 
 
Then, almost fifteen months after he had first received the unwelcome news 
that Charles would support the return of Marie des Médicis to France, Leicester 
received the even worse tidings of her arrival in England. Coke informed Leicester 
and John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore, the English King’s ordinary ambassador 
to Louis, that the rumours that the Queen Mother had arrived in England were true – 
she had disembarked at Harwich on 18 October 1638.28 The two ambassadors were 
instructed to inform the French King that his mother had repaired to England for her 
health. 
 
24 See SP 78/104, fol. 379: French King’s answer to his [Leicester’s] paper [of [8]/18 
November 1637], 24 November/4 December 1637; see also Collins, II, 4[5]29. 
 
25 SP 78/104, fol. 377: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 24 November/4 December 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 528-4[5]29. The letter is calendared as being to Coke, but given its topic, Collins was 
right to hold that it was sent to Windebanke. 
 
26 Marie des Médicis had written a short note to Charles I on 23 June 1638, but it contained 
nothing of substance. See SP 78/105, fol. 466: Marie des Médicis to Charles I, 23 June/2 July 1638. 
 
27 SP 78/106, fol. 135: Leicester to [Coke], 31 August/10 September 1638. Coke is the most 
likely addressee of this letter. 
 






If Anglo-French relations had worsened since the late summer of 1637, 
permitting Richelieu’s arch-enemy, Marie des Médicis, to come to England would 
only make dealing with France a lot harder. Charles had persisted in his support for 
the Queen Mother between August and November 1637. In the autumn of that year, 
the English King had had Leicester write two separate memoranda proposing 
solutions to Marie des Médicis’ predicament.29 And he had allowed the issue to be 
revived in the late summer and early autumn of 1638. In other words, he had not 
accepted no for an answer. This attitude on the part of Charles and the subject matter 
of his perseverance could only have annoyed Louis and Richelieu profoundly. 
 
The second event that damaged Anglo-French relations was the warm 
welcome given to Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse – the friend of Henriette 
Marie and Richelieu’s arch-enemy – on her arrival in England in April 1638.30 
According to the Venetian ambassadors in Paris, the French were particularly 
exercised about the duchesse moving from Spain, where she had fled in late 1637, to 
the Caroline court. Also, they were concerned about the assistance that seemingly 
Charles had afforded her in making the transition.31 The arrival in England of the 
duchesse in April and that of Marie des Médicis six months later changed the 
 
29 See SP 78/104, fol. 255: Proposal of Leicester to the French King regarding the Queen 
Mother, 1/11 October 1637 and SP 78/104, fol. 346: Paper [written by Leicester] delivered to M. 
Bullion, [8]/18 November 1637. 
 
30 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 378. For the warm welcome given to Marie de 
Rohan, the duchesse de Chevreuse (1600-79), in England, see Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta 
Maria’, 41 and ‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. The duchesse de 
Chevreuse, was a French courtesan, arch conspirator and dedicated enemy of Cardinal Richelieu. She 
had been involved in secret correspondence with Louis XIII’s Queen, Anne of Austria (1601-66), 
and, as a result, had fled from France to Spain in December 1637 and then to England in April 1638. 
For the latter, see again Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41 and ‘Religion, European 
Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. Elliott has the duchesse arriving in Madrid on 26 
November/6 December 1637 and leaving for England in February 1638. See Elliott, Olivares, p. 572, 
footnote 61. Gardiner, Smuts and Elliott do not provide reasons for the duchesse moving to England. 
However, it might be speculated that Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645), the 
chief minister of Philip IV (1605-65), wished to see the duchesse in England to improve the Spanish 
position at the Caroline court and thwart any movement towards an Anglo-French alliance. 
 
31 CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 371-2: Correr and Contarini, Venetian Ambassadors in France to 
the Doge and Senate, [6]/16 February 1638, according to whom: ‘The ministers here have received 
well authenticated advices that in addition to the ships of war which the King of Great Britain has 
designated for the passage to England of the Duchess of Chevreuse, he has sent her remittances of 




dynamics at the English King’s court. In particular, it strengthened the position of 
the Spanish Party and the opposition to an Anglo-French alliance to the detriment of 
support for the Protestant cause in Europe. 
 
The adverse implications of the duchesse de Chevreuse being at Charles’s 
court quickly became apparent. Leicester reported to Coke in the middle of May 
1638 that he had heard from Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and Louis’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Pomponne de Bellièvre, the new French 
ambassador in London, had been ordered to demand the Tabouret – the privilege of 
sitting on an ornate stool in the Queen’s presence – for his wife.32 This move by the 
French was in response to the news that Henriette Marie had granted this honour to 
the duchesse on her arrival at the English court. Diplomatic privilege required that 
the same be granted to the French ambassador’s wife. The earl had been informed 
that Louis and Richelieu had stated that, if the wife of the French ambassador in 
London was not given this privilege, the honour would be withdrawn from the wives 
of the English ambassadors in Paris. Indeed, Lady Scudamore had already been 
refused the Tabouret. The situation might appear to be a mere squabble over 
diplomatic niceties, but there was a serious underlying issue. The Tabouret, though 
not important in itself, was a status symbol, which, by its denial, the French King 
and the Cardinal could communicate their displeasure to the English King at the 
welcoming of the duchesse to his court. 
 
Much of Leicester’s time was occupied with the fallout from the quarrel 
involving the Tabouret. Coke instructed the English ambassadors in Paris to refute 
the arguments advanced by the French regarding its denial to their wives.33 The 
 
32 SP 78/105, fol. 333: Leicester to Coke, 18/28 May 1638. The addressee of this letter is 
assumed to be as it is calendared – that is, Coke. The Tabouret was a French courtly convention, 
whereby courtiers, particularly high-status ladies, were permitted to sit on a specially upholstered 
stool in the presence of the Royal family. It was a much-prized honour. By the time of Louis XIV 
(1638-1715), the rules regarding the Tabouret had been formalized. However, in Louis XIII’s reign, 
the rules were not so clearly defined, and gave rise to protests and uncertainty, as on this occasion. 
For the grant of the Tabouret to the duchesse de Chevreuse, see Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. Pomponne de Bellièvre (1606-57) was a French magistrate, 
diplomat and statesman. He was Louis XIII’s ambassador to Charles I between 1637 and 1640. 
 




significance of the issue can be gauged from the fact that the senior Secretary’s letter 
was amended by Charles, indicating royal interest in, and agreement with, its 
contents. At the beginning of June, Leicester informed Windebanke that the French 
were ‘much animated by the affront, as they understand it, in giving publick honors 
to a subiect [the duchesse de Chevreuse] of this King [Louis XIII], and denying 
them to his Ambassadrice [in London].’34 In a further sign of the importance of the 
dispute, the earl wrote three times to Henriette Marie about the issue in that month.35 
Leicester reported that he had discussed the matter with Claude le Bouthillier, 
Chavigny’s father and the French King’s other surintendant des finances, who had 
stated that Louis would grant the privilege to the wives of the English ambassadors, 
‘provided I would tell him, or his Ministers, in the Name of the King my Master 
[Charles I], that Madam de Chevreuse should have the Tabouret no more in 
England.’36 The French had highlighted the link between the favour shown to the 
duchesse at the Caroline court and the denial of the privilege to the wives of the 
English ambassadors. 
 
The third area of tension between England and France was Charles’s 
marriage proposal for his nephew, Prince Rupert – the second surviving son of 
Elizabeth of Bohemia and the future commander of the King’s cavalry in the Civil 
War.37 Rupert’s intended bride was Mademoiselle de Rohan, the daughter of Henri, 
duc de Rohan, the recently deceased Huguenot leader.38 Charles wrote to Leicester 
 
34 SP 78/105, fol. 399: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 8/18 June 1638; see also Collins, II, 
554. This letter refers to ‘Mr. Secretary [Coke]’ and, therefore, cannot have been addressed to him 
and, hence, was to Windebanke. 
 
35 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 143-5: Leicester to Henriette Marie, 8/18 June 1638 
(see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 124/4); Collins, II, 558-9: Leicester to Henriette 
Marie, 22 June/2 July 1638; and De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 145-6: Leicester to Henriette 
Marie, 29 June/9 July 1638 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 124/5). Leicester again 
contacted the Queen regarding the Tabouret in August 1638. See De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, 
VI, 147-8: Leicester to Henriette Marie, 24 August/3 September 1638; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 
K.A.O., U1475, fol. 124/6. 
 
36 Collins, II, 558: Leicester to Henriette Marie, 22 June/2 July 1638. 
 
37 Prince Rupert (1619-82), who would become the renowned Royalist army and naval officer 
in the Civil Wars, was 18 years old in April 1638 and, therefore, of marriageable age. 
 
38 Henri, duc de Rohan (1579-1638), was a French soldier and writer and leader of the 
Huguenots. In the 1610s, he had quarrelled with Marie des Médicis. During the 1620s, he had 
opposed Cardinal Richelieu in the Huguenot wars of that decade. De Rohan died on 3/13 April 1638, 
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in April 1638 saying that, as the marriage would require the consent of Louis and 
Richelieu, he should choose ‘som fitt [and] able person whom y[o]u may trust, to 
move it to the Car:[dinal] de Richelieu, that by his Intervention the french K:[ing] 
may be brought to give way to it.’39 However, a marriage alliance between two 
Calvinist families, one of which was Huguenot, would be unlikely to hold any 
attractions for the French King and the Cardinal. One explanation for the English 
King’s suggestion is the presence at the Caroline court of Benjamin de Rohan, duc 
de Soubise, the Huguenot naval commander and the duc de Rohan’s younger brother 
and Mademoiselle de Rohan’s uncle.40 Following the death of the duc de Rohan, 
Soubise had become the leader of the French Protestants, and might have had some 
influence on Charles regarding this matter. It is also likely that Charles thought that 
an alliance between the Palatine Wittelsbachs and a prominent French aristocratic 
family, albeit Protestant, would give him some leverage over Louis and Richelieu, 
and would encourage them to seek to restore Rupert’s elder brother, Charles I Louis, 
as Prince Elector. However, as the Huguenots had significantly less influence in 
France in the 1630s than they had enjoyed a generation earlier, it was improbable 
that the English King’s plan would bear fruit. 
 
Over the next six months, Charles employed various tactics to bring about 
the marriage of Prince Rupert and Mademoiselle de Rohan, all without success. 
Leicester informed the English King in mid-May 1638 that Madame de Rohan had 
not had time to think about the matter, given the recent death of her husband.41 Later 
in that month, he told Charles that he had met Bullion, but the French representative 
had related that Richelieu was unhappy meddling in a marriage between two non-
Catholics, and that the Cardinal was unsure of Louis’s reaction and thought that the 
 
having been mortally wounded at the Battle of Rheinfelden, which had been fought between 18/28 
February and 21 February/3 March of that year. 
 
39 SP 78/105, fol. 277: Charles I to Leicester, 26 April 1638; see also Collins, II, 546. 
 
40 Benjamin de Rohan, duc de Soubise (1583-1642), was a privateer and the brother of the duc 
de Rohan and a prominent Huguenot. He had been present at Charles I’s court since late 1628, 
following the fall of La Rochelle. 
 




French King might oppose the match.42 In June, Windebanke instructed Leicester 
and Scudamore to bypass the French King and his chief minister and to approach 
Madame de Rohan directly.43 The earl replied to the junior Secretary saying that he 
had spoken to Madame de Rohan but without success.44 Two months later, he 
reported that he had visited Madame de Rohan again, who had outlined her terms for 
her approval of the marriage, subject to the agreement of Louis and Richelieu.45 She 
was looking for the English King to settle land worth ‘20000 crownes a yeare’ and 
an annual pension of ‘10000 crownes’ on Prince Rupert, plus an English dukedom. 
Taken together with the need for the approval of the French King and the Cardinal, 
which almost certainly would not be forthcoming, Madame de Rohan’s demands can 
be viewed as her diplomatic way of saying ‘no’ to Charles’s proposal. Again, the 
English King’s persistence with the marriage plan for more than half a year, in the 
face of clear opposition to the match from several quarters, is noteworthy. 
 
The fourth and final bone of contention between England and France was the 
English suggestion that Charles Louis should take control of the army of the late 
Landgrave William V of Hesse-Kassel. Coke wrote to Leicester and Scudamore in 
November 1637 on this issue.46 There are two versions of the senior Secretary’s 
letter – a shorter one in the State Papers and a longer one in Collins. As the second 
part of the longer letter in Collins has no manuscript source, its contents must be 
treated with caution. The manuscript version of Coke’s letter stated that the Prince 
 
42 Collins, II, 551-2: Leicester to Charles I, 25 May/4 June 1638. 
 
43 SP 78/105, fol. 395: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester and Scudamore, 7 June 1638; see also 
Collins, II, 553-4. Given the hand in which this letter was written and the reference to SP 78/105, fol. 
348: Leicester to [Coke], 25 May/4 June 1638; see also Collins, II, 551, Collins was correct in 
ascribing the letter as being from Windebanke. 
 
44 SP 78/105, fol. 450: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 22 June/2 July 1638; see also 
Collins, II, 559-61. The topic of this letter suggests that Collins was right in determining it as being 
addressed to Windebanke. 
 
45 SP 78/106, fol. 123: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 24 August/3 September 1638; see 
also Collins, II, 567-8. This letter is calendared as being to Coke, but given the subject matter with 
which it deals, the references to previous correspondence and the fact that it was written in 
Leicester’s hand, it is likely that Collins was correct in ascribing its recipient to be Windebanke. 
 
46 SP 78/104, fol. 362: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 17 November 1637; see also Collins, 




Elector, on his own initiative, was seeking to take command of the army of the 
deceased Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel and to make use of its general, Peter Melander, 
Graf von Holzappel, the German mercenary.47 Charles was to have no direct part in 
this endeavour, but would assist the Prince Palatine if he could. The senior Secretary 
stated that the French ambassador in The Hague had approved of Charles Louis’s 
plans and had said that France would support the project financially. Leicester and 
Scudamore were to try to obtain the agreement of Louis and Richelieu to the Prince 
Elector’s proposal. That was unlikely to be forthcoming, however, for the French 
may well have wanted to secure the services of the dead Landgrave’s army 
themselves.48 Nevertheless, the scheme was important from the Prince Elector’s 
perspective, as it could provide him with land forces for use in the Thirty Years 
War. This possibility was all the more significant, as the naval assistance promised 
to him might not materialize given the stalled status of the Anglo-French treaties.49 
 
The related issue of the French failure to use the Prince Elector’s full title 
occasioned more bad blood between England and France. Louis and Richelieu 
would have been unwilling to sanction the use of Charles Louis’s title, for to do so 
would have implied their approval of his claim to the Imperial Electorship. Such 
recognition would have alienated Maximilian I of Bavaria, who the French were still 
courting as an ally. In a postscript to his letter of November 1637, Coke reported 
that the French ambassador in The Hague had used the Prince Palatine’s full title.50 
Leicester and Scudamore were to highlight the ambassador’s titular usage on this 
occasion to pressure the French King and the Cardinal into following his example – 
 
47 Peter Melander, Graf von Holzappel (1589-1648), was a German mercenary, who in the late 
1630s was moving towards being in the service of the French. He had acted as a Lieutenant General 
for Landgrave William V of Hesse-Kassel (1602-37), hence his position with that leaderless army. 
Melander was said to entertain Imperial sympathies. 
 
48 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 376; David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, 
Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 
298; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 590. 
 
49 For the naval support envisaged for Charles I Louis (1618-80), see SP 103/11, fols 600-2: 
Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 7 of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, 
MS f. fr. 15993, fol. 228: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, article 7. 
 
50 SP 78/104, fol. 362: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 17 November 1637; see also Collins, 




a ploy that was unlikely to endear the English envoys to the Cardinal or his royal 
master. In the second part of that letter, which, as noted, is only reproduced in 
Collins, the senior Secretary reported that Elizabeth of Bohemia, the Prince 
Elector’s mother, had complained that the French ambassador to the United 
Provinces had now been directed ‘neither to give the Title of Elector, nor of 
Highness to this Prince [Charles I Louis].’51 Coke instructed Leicester and 
Scudamore to complain to Louis and Richelieu regarding the later action of the 
French emissary. The following month, Leicester informed the senior Secretary that 
he had had an audience with the French King where he had raised the matter of the 
Prince Palatine taking over the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel’s army and employing 
General Melander.52 The issue of the financing of these forces had also been raised. 
Louis had deferred his reply on this matter. The earl had also brought up the subject 
of the use of the Prince Elector’s full title by the French ambassador in The Hague 
and his later withdrawal of this courtesy. The French King – mistakenly in 
Leicester’s view – had said that Charles Louis was only to be given his full title once 
the conference to discuss the Anglo-French treaties was underway. Thus, Louis was 




As Leicester was negotiating with the French in Paris, Charles I was engaged in 
secret discussions with Spain in Brussels. From late 1637, the English King had 
been talking to the Spanish via his agent in Flanders, Sir Balthazar Gerbier, and 
Charles IV, duke of Lorraine, and the duke’s sister, Henriette, Princess of 
Pfalzburg.53 Charles IV and the Princess of Pfalzburg had conceived a scheme 
whereby, as part of an alliance between England and Spain, some of the Palatinate 
 
51 Collins, II, 527: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 17 November 1637. 
 
52 SP 78/104, fol. 434: Leicester to [Coke], 21/31 December 1637; see also Collins, II, 532-3. It 
is assumed that the recipient of this letter is as calendared – that is, Coke. 
 
53 For Charles I’s negotiations with Spain in Brussels in late 1637 and in 1638, see Gardiner, 
History of England, VIII, 377 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 297-321. Sir Balthazar 
Gerbier (1592-1663/7), was born Dutch though naturalized as English, and was an art agent, a 
miniature painter, an architect and a diplomat. Gerbier was the representative of Charles I in Brussels 




could be restored to Charles Louis, which his father, Frederick V, had lost to the 
Spanish and Maximilian of Bavaria in the 1620s. The territory that the Spanish had 
occupied – the left bank of the Lower Palatinate – could be restored to the Prince 
Elector, without involving Maximilian. Despite being their cousin, Charles IV and 
the Princess of Pfalzburg rightly viewed Maximilian as the primary obstacle to the 
success of their plan. The duke hoped that an Anglo-Spanish league would aid him 
in recovering Lorraine from the French, which they had occupied in 1633-4. The 
Spanish would be able to recommence negotiations with the English, and, like the 
French, would be happy to keep Charles I talking and frustrate any projected 
alliance with France. Consequently, for the first time since the second half of 1636 – 
that is, before the failure of the mission of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of 
Arundel, to Vienna – the English King would have another string to his diplomatic 
bow – a possible league with Spain. Charles I might have been able to use such an 
alliance to pressure Louis and Richelieu into concluding the Anglo-French treaties, 
which held out the prospect of recovering the Palatinate in its entirety as well as the 
Electoral dignity for Charles Louis. 
 
Leicester’s embassy was affected by the Brussels negotiations with Spain, in 
which he seemingly became involved, albeit passively. Writing to Windebanke in 
November 1637, the ambassador alluded in code to a package that he had received 
via the junior Secretary from Gerbier, which was addressed to Gaston, duc 
d’Orléans.54 Leicester did not provide details of its contents, but, given Gerbier’s 
involvement, the earl’s use of code, the fact that Gaston was then still Louis’s heir 
apparent and had a reputation for conspiracies against the French King and the 
Cardinal, the package could well have related to the Brussels talks. The ambassador 
had tried to deliver Gerbier’s letter to Gaston at court, but had not succeeded. 
Instead, he had arranged for it to be conveyed by René Augier – a minor English 
diplomat in Paris – via an intermediary.55 As Augier may have been a French 
 
54 SP 78/104, fol. 377: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 24 November/4 December 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 528-4[5]29. Collins correctly attributed this letter as being to Windebanke. 
 
55 SP 78/104, fol. 396: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 1/11 December1637; see also 




informant, Richelieu might have known of the letter’s contents before Gaston.56 
 
In the winter of 1637-8, Anglo-French relations deteriorated to such an 
extent that there was even rumour of conflict between the two states. Leicester 
reported a conversation that he had had with Archbishop Sourdis, the commander of 
the French Atlantic fleet.57 Given his position, the Archbishop’s opinion could not 
be dismissed lightly. Sourdis referred to the possibility of ‘open warre’ between 
England and France. At the beginning of 1638, Windebanke raised the issue of a 
possible attack on English territory by the French.58 The ambassador responded, 
saying that he did not dismiss the danger from France, but thought that, if true, any 
French aggression would be directed at England’s outlying territories.59 Leicester 
surmised that a French attack on the English mainland was unlikely. Nevertheless, 
the threat posed by France would be very real if it made peace with Spain. Such a 
likelihood was not as far-fetched as it might seem, for France and Spain had 
discussed a joint attack on England as recently as 1627-8.60 The seriousness of the 
rumours, as far as the English were concerned, can be gauged from the fact that the 
junior Secretary’s communication was almost entirely in code, as was much of 
Leicester’s reply.61 In February 1638, the ambassador confirmed to Windebanke that 
he would report any movements of the French fleet that could pose a threat to 
England, though, again, he did not believe that the French would attack English 
 
56 For René Augier (dates unknown) being a French (and a Habsburg?) spy, see Brennan, 
Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 142. 
 
57 SP 78/104, fol. 365: Leicester to [Coke], 17/27 November 1637. As this letter is in the hand 
of Leicester’s secretary, its addressee is taken as it is calendared, that is, Coke. Henri d’Escoubleau 
de Sourdis (1593-1645) was the Archbishop of Bordeaux and a French naval commander. In 1637, 
Cardinal Richelieu placed Sourdis in sole charge of the French Atlantic fleet. 
 
58 SP 78/105, fol. 14: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 11 January 1638. The hand in which 
this letter was written was most likely that of either Windebanke or his secretary, and, therefore, it 
can be assumed to have been sent by Charles I’s junior Secretary. 
 
59 SP 78/105, fol. 42: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 26 January/5 February 1638. As 
Leicester directly referred to SP 78/105, fol. 14: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 11 January 1638 in 
his letter of 26 January 1638, this correspondence was almost certainly between Leicester and 
Windebanke and not between Leicester and Coke. 
 
60 See Elliott, Olivares, pp. 326 and 329-30. 
 
61 See SP 78/105, fol. 14: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 11 January 1638 and SP 78/105, 






How far Charles’s secret negotiations with the Spanish in Brussels were 
responsible for the rumours of French aggression against England is not clear. The 
threat was almost certainly greater in Windebanke’s mind than in reality.63 
Nonetheless, the breakdown in relations between the two nations at the beginning of 
the English King’s reign between 1625 and 1627, when the marriage alliance with 
France that brought Henriette Marie to England as Charles’s bride had degenerated 
into war two years later, is an indication of just how quickly dealings between states 
could change in the first half of the seventeenth century.64 
 
Charles’s troubles in Scotland made their first appearance in Leicester’s 
correspondence during the summer of 1638. The ambassador reported in June that 
he had interrogated Sir Kenelm Digby, the Caroline courtier and diplomat, regarding 
a quarrel that Digby had had with a Mr Brisbain, a Scottish gentleman travelling on 
the continent.65 Digby was alleged to have accused Brisbain of saying that Scotland 
was in rebellion against Charles. Brisbain was also said to have stated that the 
English King was raising soldiers to crush the Scots. It is possible that this event was 
the origin of the ensuing quarrel between Leicester and Digby.66 Later in the same 
month, the earl reported that the French ‘were not ignorant of the stirrs in Scotland, 
 
62 SP 78/105, fol. 106: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 16/26 February 1638. Coke was 
referred to in the third person in this letter, and, therefore, it could not have been addressed to him. As 
such, the only possible recipient of the letter was Windebanke. 
 
63 But see Alan James, ‘The Administration and Development of the French Navy and the 
Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu, 1618-1642’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Manchester, 
1997), pp. 214-42 and 243-51 and The Navy and Government in Early Modern France 1572-1661 
(Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 2004), pp. 1-9 and 77-91 for the growth of French naval 
power in the second half of the 1630s and possible substance for Windebanke’s fears. 
 
64 For these events, see Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George 
Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628 (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 222-89, 290-355 and 
356-418. 
 
65 SP 78/105, fol. 437: Leicester to [Coke], 15/25 June 1638; see also Collins, II, 554-7 for an 
edited version of this letter. It is assumed that the letter was to Coke. 
 
66 The quarrel between Leicester and Sir Kenelm Digby (1603-65) led to Digby accusing 
Leicester of being a Puritan, something that Leicester vehemently denied to Charles I. See De L’Isle 
and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 355-8: Leicester to Charles I, 1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 




and that if we [the English] did not take heede our troubles in religion would ruine 
us.’67 At the same time, Leicester informed Windebanke, partly in code, that he was 
unaware of any direct French involvement in Scottish affairs, though France might 
have sent aid covertly to Scotland.68 In July, the ambassador relayed further rumours 
that the Scots had rebelled against Charles’s rule.69 The implications were obvious – 
given the English King’s problems north of the border, Louis and Richelieu had 





France’s military position in the Thirty Years War had prospered following a series 
of victories over the Empire and its allies. Their improving position was another 
reason for the French cooling towards an alliance with England. Starting in 
September 1636, when Sweden, France’s confederate, had defeated the Empire and 
Saxony at the Battle of Wittstock in North Germany, French fortunes had steadily, if 
inconsistently, rallied.71 In February 1638, a French army, led by Duke Bernard of 
Saxe-Weimar, routed Austrian and Bavarian forces at the Battle of Rheinfelden.72 
And at the end of July, an army under Bernard and the French general, Jean-Baptiste 
 
67 SP 78/105, fol. 474: Leicester to [Coke], 29 June/9 July 1638. This letter’s addressee is 
taken to be Coke. 
 
68 SP 78/105, fol. 475: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 29 June/9 July 1638; see also 
Collins, II, 561-2. Given Leicester’s use of code and its subject matter, that is, intelligence issues, 
Collins was right to ascribe the letter as being addressed to Windebanke. 
 
69 SP 78/106, fol. 12: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 July 1638. Again, given the 
topic that it dealt with, Collins was correct in holding that the most likely recipient of this letter was 
Windebanke and not Coke. 
 
70 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 375-6 and 382. 
 
71 For a description of the Battle of Wittstock, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 580-3. 
 
72 The Battle of Rheinfelden is described in Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 602-6. Leicester 
noted the Paris celebrations regarding the victory in SP 78/105, fol. 191: Leicester to 
[Coke]/[Windebanke], 10/20 March 1638; see also Collins, II, 542: ‘the Te Deum hath bin sung here 
in Notredame for the victory of Duke Bernard and a protestant army, against the troupes of the 
Catholick league.’ Given the subject matter of this letter, Collins was correct in arguing that the 




Budes, comte de Guébriant, overcame the Imperialists at the Battle of Wittenweier.73 
These two battles were fought in South-central Germany, near the current German-
Swiss border, close to the Spanish Road. The implication of these victories was that 
they reduced France’s need for a naval alliance with Charles. However, it was not all 
success for the French. They suffered a significant reverse in the Franco-Spanish 
War – which had broken out in 1635 – at the siege of Fuenterrabía at the end of 
August 1638 in Spain on the western side of the border between the two countries.74 
The setback might have led Louis and Richelieu to re-evaluate the benefits of a 
league with England in a more positive light, something which Leicester was quick 
to remind them of, though diplomatically.75 
 
The birth of the future Louis XIV reduced the threat to Louis XIII and 
Richelieu from intrigues based around Gaston, duc d’Orléans.76 Leicester informed 
Coke in April 1638 that Anne of Austria, Louis XIII’s Queen, was pregnant.77 Louis 
XIV’s nativity on the following 26 August meant that Gaston was no longer Louis 
XIII’s heir.78 As a result, the duc lost much of his political power and ability to 
destabilize France. His changed circumstances also reduced the opportunities for 
foreign powers, notably Austria and Spain, to meddle in French domestic affairs. 
 
73 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 607-9 for a description of the Battle of Wittenweier, 
which was fought on 2/9 August 1638. Jean-Baptiste Budes, comte de Guébriant (1602-43) was one 
of the best and most successful French generals of the Thirty Years War. 
 
74 For a brief description of the siege of Fuenterrabía and the ensuing battle, see Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 651-2. For the Spanish perspective, see Elliott, Olivares, pp. 539-41. The 
significance of the French defeat before Fuenterrabía can be judged from the fact that it led to 
quarrelling among the French commanders at the siege – Henri II de Bourbon, duc de Condé (1588-
1646), Admiral Sourdis and Bernard de La Valette, Duke d’Épernon (1592-1661) – with the resulting 
disgrace (and ultimate exile) of the last named. An arret was issued in respect of the duc de La 
Valette in May 1639. See SP 78/108 fol.18: Arret against the duc de la Valette, 14/24 May 1639. The 
duc de la Valette was sentenced to death, which given his absence in England, was carried out in 
effigy. 
 
75 SP 78/106, fol. 147: Leicester to [Coke], 7/17 September 1638; see also Collins, II, 569-70. 
The letter’s recipient is assumed to be Coke. 
 
76 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 381. 
 
77 SP 78/105, fol. 281: Leicester to [Coke], 27 April/7 May 1638 and SP 78/105, fol. 298: 
Leicester to [Coke], 4/14 May 1638. Both letters are assumed to be to Coke. 
 
78 SP 78/106, fol. 132: Louis XIII to Charles I, 27 August/6 September 1638. Louis XIV was 





Against the background of France’s generally improving military and 
dynastic situation Leicester continued to try to advance the conclusion of the Anglo-
French treaties. In a communication of 22 September 1637, the same day that 
Windebanke wrote to the ambassador instructing him to promote the return of Marie 
des Médicis to France, and, therefore, before he could have become aware of his 
new orders, he informed Coke that he was still struggling to progress matters 
regarding the treaties.79 Chavigny was ‘as hard to be found as a mouse in a barne.’ 
He and the other French negotiators were often ‘in their debauche’ and drunk. 
Leicester met Bullion, but not Chavigny, early in October.80 The timing and location 
of the conference on the treaties were discussed. There was still uncertainty as to 
where it should be held – The Hague or Hamburg. However, Hugo Grotius, the 
Swedish ambassador in Paris, clarified that Sweden wished to hold the conference at 
Hamburg and that it was its ambassador in The Hague who had muddied the waters 
by proposing that city as its location. 
 
Coke gave Leicester and Scudamore further instructions regarding the 
Anglo-French treaties and Leicester ensured that Scudamore was kept informed of 
developments. The senior Secretary wrote to the extraordinary and the ordinary 
ambassadors on 18 October 1637 informing them that, in his view, the Swedes and 
the Dutch were much less enthusiastic about a league with England than they had 
been.81 He speculated that the Swedes were more interested in concluding other 
treaties, and that maritime tensions between England and the United Provinces were 
discouraging the Dutch. The two diplomats were to try to establish from the French 
whether this was the case, if necessary, by seeking an audience with Louis. But 
Charles must not be seen to be to blame for any breakdown in the negotiations. 
 
79 SP 78/104, fol. 212: Leicester to [Coke], 22 September/2 October 1637. It is taken that the 
recipient of this letter was Coke. 
 
80 SP 78/104, fol. 214: Leicester to [Coke], 25 September/5 October 1637. Most of the 
substance of this letter was repeated in SP 78/104, fol. 235: Leicester to [Coke], 29 September/9 
October 1637, which, this time, was in the hand of Leicester’s secretary. Given the opening phrase in 
the letter of 29 September 1637 – ‘This is in a manner but the duplicate of that which I sent on 
Monday last … to advertise your Hon[o]r …’ – it is likely that the recipient of both letters was Coke. 
 




Leicester indicated at the beginning of November that he had received Coke’s 
missive of 18 October and stated that he had ‘immediately communicated [matters] 
to My Lord Scudamore.’82 The earl was being careful to ensure that the senior 
Secretary (and, therefore, the King) knew that he was keeping Scudamore in the 
loop. Given Leicester’s previous problems with his fellow ambassador, this act was 
a wise move on his part – it would help to counter any negative interference in the 
negotiations by the Spanish Party with which Scudamore was associated. 
 
Leicester brought up the issue of the conference on the Anglo-French 
treaties, and, as ordered, pressed the French to reveal their and their allies’ intentions 
towards the projected alliance with England. He told Bullion in November 1637 that 
it was for the French and the Swedes to determine where the conference should 
meet.83 The earl noted that, while Bullion had stated that Louis desired to conclude 
an alliance, the French had not provided firm answers, and had done little to advance 
agreement regarding the treaties. In January 1638, the earl advised Coke that Pére 
Joseph, the Capuchin friar and Richelieu’s confidant and longstanding advisor, had 
said that ‘his Ma:[jes]tie’ (Louis) wished the conference to be held at Hamburg.84 
Apparently, Hamburg had been settled on as the site for the congress. However, at 
the beginning of February, the senior Secretary wrote to Leicester and Scudamore 
with the news that, contrary to what the Capuchin had affirmed, France’s 
representatives in Hamburg had stated that they had not received any instructions 
regarding the treaties.85 The following day, Leicester reported another conversation 
with Père Joseph, who had blamed the Swedes for the delays.86 With regard to the 
war scare involving England and France over the winter of 1637-8, Richelieu’s 
 
82 SP 78/104, fol. 324: Leicester to [Coke], 3/13 November 1637. The most probable addressee 
of this letter was Coke. 
 
83 SP 78/104, fol. 341: Leicester to [Coke], 10/20 November 1637. The recipient of this letter 
was most likely Coke. 
 
84 SP 78/105, fol. 31: Leicester to [Coke], 19/29 January 1638. This letter was probably 
addressed to Coke. 
 
85 SP 78/105, fol. 55: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 1 February 1638. 
 





confidant had denied that the French had any ‘desseins [designs] against England.’87 
 
Late in February 1638, Leicester and Scudamore met with Chavigny in an 
attempt to apprise Charles of how the French and their allies stood with regard to the 
much-frustrated Anglo-French alliance.88 As instructed by the King, they put three 
questions to Chavigny – would the French sign (one of) the treaties if the Swedes 
would not; would the United Provinces conclude (one of) the treaties; and would the 
Dutch sign a treaty that contained the secret article set out in the French version of 
the auxiliary treaty of June 1637.89 (The secret article referred to, among other 
things, the provision of a fleet by the English King to the Prince Palatine and the full 
use of the Prince Elector’s title by Louis.) Unsurprisingly, the earl received only 
evasive replies from the French – the questions related to the use of Charles Louis’s 
full title, which the French wished to avoid using before the conference, and to the 
potential actions of France’s allies for whom the French could not speak. 
 
The issue of who should be Charles’s representative at the Hamburg 
conference on the Anglo-French treaties arose and the French continued to drag their 
feet regarding the negotiations. Coke informed Leicester on 6 March 1638 that he 
should ‘p[re]pare’ himself ‘accordingly to take your iourney to Hamborough’ – so 
seemingly he was to act for the King at the congress.90 However, four days later, 
when the earl was still unaware of Charles’s proposal that he should go to Hamburg, 
he suggested to one of the Secretaries of State that Sir Thomas Roe, the experienced 
Caroline diplomat, was the most suitable person to attend the conference.91 On the 
same day, Leicester wrote to Coke saying that he had been unable to make any 
 
87 SP 78/105, fol. 60: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 February 1638. 
 
88 SP 78/105, fol. 162: Leicester to [Coke], 2/12 March 1638; see also Collins, II, 539-40 for an 
edited version of this letter. The addressee of the letter is presumed to be Coke. 
 
89 BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 232: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, secret article. 
 
90 SP 78/105, fol. 175: Coke to Leicester, 6 March 1638; see also Collins, II, 471 (mis-located) 
for an edited version of this letter. 
 
91 SP 78/105, fol. 190: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 10/20 March 1638; see also Collins, 
II, 541-2 for an edited version of this letter. As this missive was written in Leicester’s hand, it would 




progress in obtaining answers from the French to the issues that the English had 
raised concerning the treaties at the end of February.92 
 
In the early spring of 1638, the French signalled to the English that they had 
other and better options as allies than England. Leicester informed Coke that 
Chavigny had told him that the Franco-Swedish Treaty of Wismar had been 
ratified.93 This time Chavigny was not bluffing, for the ratification of that treaty had 




Amid diplomatic bickering over the proposed return of Marie des Médicis to France, 
the arrival of the duchesse de Chevreuse at the Caroline court and the Prince Rupert-
Mademoiselle de Rohan marriage proposal, the Hamburg conference on the Anglo-
French treaties opened in June 1638. The congress has received little attention from 
historians. S. R. Gardiner in his History of England only referred to it three times.95 
Peter Wilson in his comprehensive study of the Thirty Years War merely mentions 
the conference once and then dismisses Roe’s mission as ‘a fool’s errand.’96 The 
only detailed consideration of the congress is an article written in the 1920s by 
Elmer Beller, which was critical of the English King.97 These views ignore the 
conference’s potential to transform the course of the Thirty Years War by realigning 
the strategic relationships between Europe’s powers. 
 
92 Collins, II, 540-1: Leicester to Coke, 10/20 March 1638. Collins was correct in thinking that 
Coke was the most likely recipient of this letter. 
 
93 SP 78/105, fol. 215: Leicester to [Coke], 23 March/2 April 1638. This letter was probably 
sent to Coke. See also SP 78/105, fol. 31: Leicester to [Coke], 19/29 January 1638 for the (advance) 
comments of François Leclerc du Tremblay, Père Joseph (1577-1638), to this effect. 
 
94 For the Franco-Swedish Treaty of Hamburg, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 597, 613 
and 617. 
 
95 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 217, 375-6 and 381. 
 
96 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 594. See also the very brief reference to the Hamburg 
conference in Parker, Thirty Years’ War, p. 149. 
 
97 See Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 64: ‘Coke might 
better have applied to the English his criticism that none could have assurance in a people [the 




Roe’s instructions of 9 May 1638 stated that Charles’s aim was a general 
peace and the restitution of the rights of the German Princes, especially those of the 
Prince Elector, as at 1618.98 Thus, the envoy’s orders were in line with the 
objectives of the Anglo-French treaties. However, Coke wrote to Roe at the end of 
May, and having reviewed the diplomatic situation in Europe and seeing a 
potentially advantageous position for England, proposed a different alliance system 
to that envisaged in the treaties: 
 
I see greate possibilities of contriving a new union betwixt the king of Greate 
Brittaine, the king of Denmark, [the] Swedes, and the Princes of Germanie, 
without France, in whome none can have assurances, as they are now ruled. 
And for the States Generall [the United Provinces], though now engaged to 
France, it may be presumed they will not be left out.99 
 
The sensitivity of these propositions, at least for the senior Secretary, is indicated by 
the fact that his letter was written entirely in code.100 
 
Coke’s concept (it is not clear if his missive reflected Charles’s thinking as 
well) was to construct a new system of alliances that excluded the French. In some 
ways, such a league would be a throwback to 1625, when the English King had 
concluded the Treaty of Southampton with the United Provinces and the Treaty of 
The Hague, the latter including Denmark as well, in an attempt to regain the 
dignities and the lands of Frederick V, Charles Louis’s father.101 The senior 
Secretary’s proposals could have been a reaction to French prevarication regarding 
the Anglo-French treaties of 1637. He could also have envisaged his plan as a way 
 
 
98 TNA, SP Germany (States), SP 81/44, fol. 70: Roe’s instructions, 9 May 1638. 
 
99 SP 81/44, fol. 83: Coke to Roe, 30 May 1638, with decipher and copy. 
 
100 SP 81/44, fol. 89-90: Coke to Roe, 30 May 1638, in code. 
 
101 The Treaty of Southampton of 8 September 1625 instituted an alliance between England and 
the United Provinces against Spain that led to the failed Anglo-Dutch expedition to Cádiz of later the 
same year. The Treaty of The Hague of 9 December 1625, again between England and the United 
Provinces, but this time also including the Danes, was intended to support Christian IV of Denmark 
(1577-1648) in his upcoming invasion of North Germany. For the English perspective on these 




for Charles to put pressure on the French – conclude the treaties or the English King 
would try to break up your alliance system. Louis and Richelieu could be expected 
to do everything in their power to prevent the realization of such a strategy, 
including even agreeing to the anti-Habsburg league as envisaged in the treaties of 
1637. Thus, Coke’s scheme can be regarded as an extension of the English King’s 
policy of making a nuisance of himself in order to force the French King and the 
Cardinal to negotiate. The stratagem would have appealed to Roe, who, though very 
supportive of Elizabeth of Bohemia and her sons, was suspicious of France and 
thought that England should only ally with other Protestant powers.102 Roe’s 
hardline position on France might also have been a possible factor in persuading 
Charles to follow Leicester’s suggestion that Roe should be his representative at 
Hamburg.103 
 
Worryingly for Charles, but perhaps not unexpected given Coke’s 
suggestions for an alternative alliance system, Roe’s first report from the Hamburg 
conference concerned a plot involving the Empire, Denmark and Sweden. Roe wrote 
to the senior Secretary on 18 June 1638, having visited Christian IV of Denmark at 
Glückstadt on 9 June.104 His initially favourable impression of the Danish King was 
dashed when he discovered that Christian was corresponding with, among others, 
Johan Adler Salvius, a prominent Swedish diplomat and that country’s 
representative at the congress, and Ferdinand Siegmund, Kurz von Senffenau, the 
Imperial vice-chancellor.105 The implication was that these countries would come to 
 
102 See Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 31. See also History of Parliament Trust, London, unpublished 
article on Rowe, Sir Thomas (1581-1644) for 1640-60 section by Vivienne Larminie for confirmation 
of the anti-French stance of Sir Thomas Roe. I am grateful to the History of Parliament Trust for 
allowing me to see this article in draft. 
 
103 See SP 78/105, fol. 190: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 10/20 March 1638; see also 
Collins, II, 541-2 for an edited version of this letter. 
 
104 Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 64-5. 
 
105 Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 65. Johan Adler Salvius 
(1590-1652) was a Swedish envoy and, after Axel Oxenstierna (1583-1654), was that country’s most 
important diplomat. He represented Sweden at the Hamburg conference. In general, he was not 
favourably inclined towards England, and was more critical of Charles I than Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), the Swedish ambassador in Paris, with whom Leicester was on very good terms. Ferdinand 
Siegmund Kurz von Senffenau (1592-1659) was the Imperial vice chancellor from 1627 onwards and 




an agreement that would disregard the interests of the Prince Elector. Such a 
situation would be significant, as Sweden, along with the United Provinces, was a 
key player in the proposed Anglo-French league, which was supposed to be 
formalized at Hamburg. The next day, Roe wrote to Leicester, repeating the rumour 
that Christian was negotiating with the Empire and Sweden.106 The good news was 
that Christian’s approaches had not been well-received by the Emperor, Ferdinand 
III. It is evident that Roe hoped to be able to bring Christian back to considering a 
Protestant league, as suggested by Coke, but he did not state this openly in his 
communications with Leicester.107 
 
In parallel with Roe’s accusations, Leicester in Paris confronted the French 
in June 1638 with separate allegations to the effect that Claude de Mesmes, comte 
d’Avaux, the French representative at Hamburg, was talking to the Imperialists and 
the Swedes, a charge which Bullion strongly denied.108 Moreover, the earl claimed 
that the Empire’s vice chancellor, Kurz von Senffenau, was in Lübeck – the 
Imperial, though technically neutral, city – and was conferring with the Swedes.109 
Bullion again denied that France was talking to the Empire, though he stated that he 
could not speak for Sweden. Leicester said that Charles was aware of ‘how the yeare 
passes away’ and wanted to know what the French intentions were towards the 
Anglo-French treaties. Bullion replied that there had been no change of policy on 
France’s part, and, as usual, blamed Sweden and the United Provinces for the 
delays. 
 
Coke informed the English ambassadors to Louis of further French and 
Swedish machinations at the Hamburg conference and how they should react. The 
 
106 SP 81/44, fol. 121: Roe to Leicester, 19/29 June 1638. 
 
107 SP 81/44, fol. 83: Coke to Roe, 30 May 1638, with decipher and copy. 
 
108 SP 78/105, fol. 473: Leicester to [Coke], 29 June/9 July 1638. As this letter was written in 
the hand of Leicester’s secretary, it is presumed that its addressee was Coke. See SP 78/105, fol. 365: 
Coke to the Ambassadors in France, 28 May 1638 for Coke’s allegations regarding the French and 
the Hamburg conference. 
 
109 Lübeck, the founding city of the Hanseatic League in 1160, was within the Empire, and 
though in theory neutral, generally supported the Swedes in the Thirty Years War. See Wilson, 




senior Secretary informed Leicester and Scudamore that he and the King had 
obtained information from Roe that France and Sweden would insist on wanting to 
progress the Anglo-French treaties, but that their real intention was to use d’Avaux 
and Salvius to negotiate with the Emperor at Lübeck.110 In particular, the Swedes 
had reservations about the fifth article of the auxiliary treaty. It is not clear to which 
version of that treaty – that of February or June 1637 – the Swedes were referring.111 
Among other things, the fifth article dealt with the making of demands by the 
English King of the Emperor, which, if not satisfied, would lead to England 
declaring war on Austria. In the Swedes’ opinion, this provision raised the prospect 
that they and the French would find themselves at war with the Imperialists, while 
Charles would be free to decide when he commenced hostilities. Coke instructed 
Leicester to inform Louis and Richelieu that his master was aware of these 
manoeuvres. However, rather than remonstrating with the French, the ambassador 
was to say that the English King would not insist on sticking to the original treaties. 
Rather, he had instructed Roe to participate in the Lübeck negotiations in the 
interests of peace. Yet again, Charles had compromised in pursuit of an alliance with 
France. 
 
In the summer of 1638, Coke ordered Leicester and Scudamore to continue 
pressing the French on the question of delays in finalizing the Anglo-French 
treaties.112 Leicester reported back that he had confronted the French with the senior 
Secretary’s information on their secret intentions at Hamburg.113 By now, the earl 
was worried that the French would abandon the Hamburg conference in favour of a 
 
110 SP 78/106, fol. 56: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 27 July 1638; see also Collins, II, 564-
5. SP 78/106, fol. 52: Coke to Leicester, 22 July 1638 is a draft of Coke’s letter of 27 July 1638 to 
Leicester and John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore (1601-71). The importance of the letter of 27 
July 1638 is emphasized by the fact that the draft letter of 22 July 1638 was annotated by Charles I. 
 
111 See SP 103/11, fols 599-600: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 5 of the 
auxiliary treaty and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 227-8: auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637, 
article 5. 
 
112 SP 78/106, fol. 69: Coke to the Ambassadors in France, 1 August 1638. 
 
113 SP 78/106, fol. 105: Leicester to [Coke], 17/27 August 1638; see also Collins, II, 566-7. See 
SP 78/106, fol. 56: Coke to Leicester and Scudamore, 27 July 1638; see also Collins, II, 564-5 for the 
senior Secretary’s allegations. Given the contents of the second letter, the first missive must have 




general peace congress at Cologne that the Papacy was sponsoring or at Lübeck as 
initiated by the Empire, either of which could prejudice the interests of Charles and 
the Elector Palatine. Coke informed the earl that, regardless of where any conference 
was held, Leicester was to ensure that the English King was not excluded.114 These 
orders indicate another reason for the importance of the Hamburg conference for 
Charles – it was one way of ensuring that he would be invited to participate in any 
general European peace congress. 
 
To complicate matters further, Leicester himself began to have second 
thoughts about aspects of the Anglo-French treaties. In September 1638, the earl 
wrote to Charles expressing concern regarding the King’s commitment in the 
treaties to provide a fleet (of fifteen) ships to Charles Louis and of the fate of any 
places captured in the Spanish Netherlands with the help of this naval force.115 
Leicester was worried that no agreement might be reached at Lübeck to protect the 
position of Charles and the Prince Elector in these circumstances, and that the Dutch 
and the French might retain any places captured in Flanders. The outcome could be 
that England would be drawn into war with Spain. The earl advised that the issue 
should be dealt with before any naval assistance was given to the Prince Palatine. 
Charles should also not provide any land forces to the Prince Elector for the same 
reason. 
 
The convoluted diplomacy at Hamburg and Lübeck indicated that all of the 
participants had ulterior motives towards the negotiations. Such a situation was not 
unusual in itself in the Thirty Years War – combatants and those countries not 
involved in the fighting were more than willing to take advantage of any 
opportunities that presented themselves as a result of the conflict. Nevertheless, the 
significant divergences regarding the possible outcomes of these manoeuvrings by 
the participants did not bode well for the successful conclusion of an anti-Habsburg 
alliance as envisaged in the Anglo-French treaties. 
 
114 SP 78/106, fol. 133: Coke to Leicester, 29 August 1638; see also Collins, II, 568. 
 
115 SP 78/106, fol. 164: Leicester to [Coke]/[Charles I], 14/24 September 1638, see also Collins, 
II, 570-1. This letter is calendared as being sent to Coke, but from the words used by Leicester, 







Three questions must now be addressed. Firstly, throughout this period, did Charles 
have a strategy with regard to the Anglo-French treaties and, if so, what was it? 
Secondly, why did Leicester remain in Paris when it appeared that the treaties had 
ceased to be a top priority for the English King by October 1638? Thirdly, what was 
the attitude of France towards an alliance with England at that time? 
 
To begin with, did Charles have a credible policy towards the Anglo-French 
treaties or were his actions based on false premises and an exaggerated sense of 
princely pride? Gardiner described the King’s diplomacy between 1630 and 1633 as 
‘futile,’ a term which might also be applied to the period 1637-8.116 Nonetheless, it 
can be argued that Charles took a realistic, if ultimately unsuccessful, line towards 
the French from the summer of 1637. Of course, the immediate context for his 
provocative actions towards Louis and Richelieu – especially in supporting the 
return of Marie des Médicis to France – was personal pressure from Henriette Marie. 
The same can be said of the welcoming of Henriette Marie’s friend, the duchesse de 
Chevreuse, to England. It is also very likely that Charles was indeed resentful 
towards the French for not responding to the numerous concessions that he had 
made in respect of the treaties between February and July 1637. 
 
But there was evidently more to Charles’s handling of relations with the 
French from the summer of 1637 than wounded pride or a desire to please his wife. 
The evidence suggests that he fully appreciated that he needed leverage to oblige the 
French to enter into serious negotiations with him. His primary diplomatic 
bargaining counter had been his ship-money fleet with its seeming ability to 
dominate the Channel.117 Nevertheless, by the summer of 1637 it was clear that he 
needed more than the strategic options afforded by his navy to persuade the French 
 
116 See Gardiner, History of England, VII, pp. 169-219. 
 
117 See Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the 




to negotiate with him in good faith. Richelieu’s bottom line was that he wished to 
keep the English King talking and not necessarily to enter into a league with him.118 
Despite this position on the Cardinal’s part, it is likely that Charles viewed the 
Anglo-French treaties, with their emphasis on a maritime rather than a land 
commitment to the Thirty Years War, as a good opportunity to restore Charles Louis 
to his dignity and lands. What he needed was something with which to pressure 
Louis and Richelieu into negotiating with him in earnest. One way of bringing about 
such a situation would be to demonstrate to the French King and the Cardinal that he 
could be a threat, or at least, a significant nuisance, to them. Espousing the return of 
Marie des Médicis to France was one method of achieving this end. Welcoming the 
duchesse de Chevreuse to his court was another. Proposing a marriage between 
Prince Rupert and Mademoiselle de Rohan was a further means by which the 
English King could bring pressure to bear on the French. The same could be said of 
Charles’s negotiations with Spain in Brussels at the end of 1637 and in 1638. The 
last option entailed the English King negotiating simultaneously with two powers 
and pursuing parallel policies, something that, almost inevitably, would occur from 
time to time. Thus, talking to more than one country at the same time was an effect 
of, and not a cause behind, Charles’s approach to diplomacy.119 Unfortunately for 
the English King, as of October 1638, he had yet to discover the key to persuading 
Louis and Richelieu to negotiate in good faith with him. However, in spite of this 
situation, an anti-Habsburg league with France remained Charles’s primary foreign-
policy objective. 
 
The English King’s failure to conclude an alliance in the 1630s had as much 
to do with the inaction of the other foreign power involved, be it France or the 
Empire or Spain, as it had to do with his limited offer – that is, naval forces only – 
 
118 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. 
 
119 Thereby negating Atherton’s thesis that Charles I was trying to strike a balance between 
Bourbon France and Habsburg Spain and keep diplomatic channels open to both, with the aim of 
exploiting any contingencies that might arise to effect the restoration of Charles I Louis. See Ian J. 
Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-71): A Career at Court and in the Country, 1601-43’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1993), pp. 241-5 and 
Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career of John, First Viscount Scudamore 




regarding a league. For example, Charles made a series of concessions to Louis and 
Richelieu in respect of the Anglo-French treaties of 1637, signing and ratifying the 
treaties of February and agreeing to the French versions of June.120 In effect, the 
English King had placed his fate in the hands of the French King and the Cardinal, 
but these actions were of no avail, as Louis did not sign and ratify any of the treaties. 
 
One of the pitfalls in analysing Caroline politics lies in the tendency to 
assume that Charles was almost invariably mistaken or at fault in his handling of 
policy.121 It is true that the English King did make spectacular errors, most notably 
with regard to the implementation of his policies towards Scotland.122 But, this 
situation was not necessarily true all of the time – and Charles’s negotiations 
surrounding, and his consistent pursuit of, an Anglo-French alliance can be viewed 
as an example of when he got policy right. A maritime league with France was the 
most feasible way of recovering the dignity and the lands of the Prince Elector that 
the English King had, especially because, given his known opposition to calling a 
Parliament in the 1630s, a commitment to a land war in Europe was not an option.123 
 
120 For Charles I drawing up, signing and ratifying the main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 
536-7 (mis-located). For the English King agreeing to the French versions of these treaties of June 
1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1 and 
Collins, II, 501-2: Coke to Leicester, 18 June 1637. 
 
121 For example, according to Conrad Russell, Samuel R. Gardiner was very critical of Charles 
I. See Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p. 188. 
 
122 For Charles I and Scotland in the late 1630s and early 1640s, see Peter H. Donald, An 
Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-1641 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Allan I. Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 
1625-41 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1991); and David Stevenson, The Scottish 
Revolution 1637-44, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 2003). For Charles I’s 
mistakes in dealing with Scotland from 1637 onwards, see, for example, Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
769-824 and 885-921 and John J. Scally, ‘The Political Career of James, Third Marquis and First 
Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 1643’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of 
Cambridge, 1992), pp. 214-62 and 263-97. 
 
123 For Charles I’s opposition to involvement in a land war in Europe and the calling of a 
Parliament that such a policy would necessitate, see CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 309-10: Anzolo Correr, 
Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate, 30 October 1637: ‘Foreign interests are not 
so highly esteemed as to make it worth while for the king [Charles I] on their account to put himself 
into a position in which he will be under the necessity of humbling himself to his subjects in order to 
support them. He will not be brought to this, and perhaps nothing will ever prevail upon this king to 
do so as long as he lives. Those who think they can lead him insensibly to this deceive themselves 




A strong drive for a naval alliance with a continental power, therefore, made sense. 
 
The second question that needs answering is why did Leicester stay in post? 
The best explanation for the earl’s behaviour is that he regarded it as important to 
remain in Paris to advance the cause of the Anglo-French treaties and represent the 
aspirations of the Northumberland-Leicester circle and the Protestant cause in 
Europe as best he could in difficult circumstances. If he were in Paris, he could do 
his utmost to ameliorate the harm that Charles appeared to be intent on doing to 
relations with France. (It is assumed that Leicester did not approve of the English 
King’s policy of antagonizing the French to force Louis and Richelieu to negotiate 
with him in earnest.) In this way, from his perspective, he could keep the possibility 
of the successful conclusion of an Anglo-French league alive, however remote that 
seemed to be by October 1638. Thus, the earl’s role was one of damage limitation. 
 
Thirdly, as for the French position in October 1638 – the bottom line for 
Louis and Richelieu regarding relations with England was that, if all else failed, they 
had to ensure that Charles remained neutral in the Thirty Years War.124 One obvious 
tactic was to string him along in treaty talks and prevent him entering into an 
alliance with either, or both, the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs.125 It was here that 
the English King’s problems in Scotland significantly weakened his hand. Charles’s 
troubles in his northern kingdom meant that in the eyes of Europe’s power-brokers 
his ability to make any meaningful intervention in the Thirty Years War was 
seriously undermined, at least in the short term.126 Yet for all Charles’s looming 
domestic crisis, the French reversal before Fuenterrabía at the end of the summer of 
1638 was a reminder to Louis and Richelieu that Spain was far from vanquished, 
and that they might yet require all the allies they could muster. Just maybe, they 




124 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. 
 
125 See Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. 
 









The ship carrying Marie des Médicis, the French Queen Mother, sailed into Harwich 
on 18 October 1638.1 Her arrival in England seemingly signalled the end of the 
hopes of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester – Charles I’s extraordinary 
ambassador in Paris – and of the Protestant Party at the Caroline court for the 
formation of an anti-Habsburg alliance with France and its allies, Sweden and the 
United Provinces. Marie des Médicis was the most important of three high-ranking 
ladies and enemies of Cardinal Richelieu whose causes the English King had 
espoused, apparently damaging beyond repair the prospects of a league with France. 
The second was Madame de La Vieuville, the wife of Richelieu’s rival from the 
mid-1620s, whom Charles had supported in her request to return to France in August 
1637. The third was Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse, the Cardinal’s arch 
enemy, whom the English King and his Queen, Henriette Marie, had welcomed 
warmly to their court in April 1638. To these three ladies, a fourth could be added – 
Mademoiselle de Rohan, the Huguenot heiress – whom Charles had had Leicester 
woo unsuccessfully for the previous seven months on behalf of Prince Rupert, the 
future Civil War cavalry general. The English King’s actions in relation to all four 
ladies would have annoyed Louis XIII and Richelieu. The scheme by which Charles 
I Louis, the Prince Elector, would take command of the army of the deceased 
Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel and its leader, Peter Melander, graf von Holzappel, the 
German soldier of fortune, could be regarded as a fifth point of tension between 
England and France. Ostensibly, these events had jeopardized the prospect of the 
successful conclusion of the Anglo-French treaties at the Hamburg conference.2 
 
1 See London, TNA, SP France, SP 78/106, fol. 253: Coke to the Ambassadors in France, 25 
October 1638; see also Collins, II, 573. 
 
2 See TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 
February 1637. See also Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-French 
Treaty, June 1637. For the Hamburg conference, see Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the 




(The conference had opened in June 1638 with the intension of finalizing the anti-
Habsburg coalition encompassing England, France, Sweden and the United 
Provinces; and possibly Denmark as well.) In retaliation, the French King and the 
Cardinal had withdrawn the Tabouret – the privilege of sitting on an ornate stool in 
the Queen’s presence – from the wives of the two English ambassadors in Paris, 
Leicester and John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore, in protest against the granting 
of this privilege to the duchesse de Chevreuse at the English court. 
 
Yet despite the outwardly aggressive stance of Charles in receiving the 
French king’s opponents, the most likely motive for the King’s behaviour was not 
simply to antagonize the French but, rather, to pressure Louis and Richelieu into 
negotiating with him in earnest. Between February and July 1637, Charles had 
adopted the role of the ‘good guy’ in trying to persuade the French King and the 
Cardinal to conclude a league with England. Between August 1637 and October 
1638, he had acted as the ‘bad guy’ but still with the same objective in mind. It is, 
therefore, the contention of this thesis that, for Charles, the Anglo-French alliance 
was his prime foreign-policy objective throughout these twenty-one months. This 
interpretation conflicts with recent historiography of Caroline foreign policy in the 
1630s.3 The question that must be addressed now is whether an Anglo-French 
alliance would continue to be the English King’s key diplomatic goal beyond the 
autumn of 1638? 
 
In the year to October 1638, the French had generally been successful in the 
Thirty Years War. France and its confederates had defeated the Empire and its allies 
at Rheinfelden and Wittenweier in February and July 1638 respectively. But the 
French had suffered a serious reverse in the Franco-Spanish War at the siege of 
 
3 See, notably, Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European 
Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal 
Rule, pp. 525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Anthony Milton, 
Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-
1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 507-8 and Andrew D. Thrush, ‘The Navy 
under Charles I, 1625-40’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University College, London, 1990), p. 13. 
See again Ian J. Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-71): A Career at Court and in the 
Country, 1601-43’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1993), 
pp. 241-5 and Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career of John, First Viscount 




Fuenterrabía in the late summer of that year. Charles had also endured a significant 
setback in his failure to bring his rebellious Scottish subjects to heel. While France’s 
successes, together with the English King’s difficulties in his northern kingdom, 
might have inclined Louis and Richelieu to discount him as a potential ally, their 
defeat at Fuenterrabía could have caused them to reconsider the value of having 
England on their side in the ongoing European conflicts.4 
 
The English Channel was a vital artery in the Eighty Years War between 
Spain and the United Provinces. By 1638, it was the only way in which the Spanish 
could send reinforcements and money to Flanders. Control of this strategic 
waterway could decisively affect the balance of power in western Europe. This 
situation was motivation in itself to keep the French King and the Cardinal talking to 
Charles, if only to prevent him allying with Spain and placing his navy at the 




A number of events adversely affected Leicester’s embassy. The most important of 
these developments were the Empire’s defeat of Charles Louis’s small army and the 
capture of his brother, Prince Rupert, at the Battle of Vlotho, in present day North-
West Germany, on 7 October 1638.5 The disaster at Vlotho for the Palatine 
Wittelsbachs ran in parallel with the negative French reaction to Charles’s talks in 
Brussels with the Spanish.6 The latter ultimately drew a rare concession from Louis 
and Richelieu that could have positively influenced Rupert’s fate (see below). On 26 
October, the earl relayed to Sir John Coke, the English King’s senior Secretary of 
State, the ‘unhappy newes of the Prince Elector’s being defeated and of Prince 
 
4 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 375-6 and 382. For the diplomatic reminder of Robert 
Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), to Louis XIII (1601-43) and Cardinal Richelieu (1585-
1642) that they might still need Charles I (1600-49) as an ally, see SP 78/106, fol. 147: Leicester to 
[Coke], 7/17 September 1638; see also Collins, II, 569-70. 
 
5 For a brief description of the Battle of Vlotho, which was fought on 7/17 October 1638, see 
Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 595. 
 
6 For Charles I’s negotiations in Brussels with Spain in 1637-8, see Gardiner, History of 




Roberts [Rupert] being taken prisoner.’7 The next day, Leicester informed Sir 
Thomas Roe, Charles’s representative at the Hamburg conference and the fervent 
supporter of the Palatine cause, of Rupert’s capture.8 
 
Notwithstanding Rupert’s captivity, the earl still had to deal with the Prince’s 
proposed marriage to Mademoiselle de Rohan. At the beginning of November 1638, 
Leicester wrote, probably to Charles’s junior Secretary of State, Sir Francis 
Windebanke, informing him that he had contacted Madame de Rohan about the 
match.9 However, Rupert being taken prisoner had changed matters. Madame de 
Rohan confirmed that Louis would have to approve any marriage of her daughter. 
The English King had also refused her demands in respect of the annual income 
(30,000 crowns) and the honours (an English dukedom) that would have to be 
bestowed on the Prince as a precondition of any wedding.10 The earl wrote again to 
the junior Secretary at the end of the month reporting that there was nothing further 
to say regarding the proposed match, as Rupert was now an Imperial captive.11 As 
this thesis will argue, one reason for Charles’s persistence with the prospective 
marriage between two Calvinists, one of whom was a Huguenot, was his desire to 
make a nuisance of himself in an attempt to persuade Louis and Richelieu to 
conclude the Anglo-French alliance. 
 
 
7 SP 78/106, fol. 257 (page following): Leicester to [Coke], 26 October/5 November 1638. As 
this letter is in the hand of Leicester’s secretary, its most likely recipient was Sir John Coke (1563-
1644). 
 
8 SP 78/106, fol. 268: Leicester to ‘My Lord’/[Roe], 27 October/6 November 1638. The letter 
is calendared as being to ‘My Lord,’ but its date, the codes used, the references made and the fact that 
it is in Leicester’s hand all strongly indicate that the addressee was Sir Thomas Roe (1581-1644). 
 
9 SP 78/106, fol. 281: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 2/12 November 1638; see also 
Collins, II, 575. The letter is calendared as being to Coke, but its contents and the fact that Leicester 
wrote it in his own hand suggest that, as Collins stated, it was addressed to Sir Francis Windebanke 
(1582-1646). 
 
10 See SP 78/106, fol. 123: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 24 August/3 September 1638; 
see also Collins, II, 567-8 for the financial and honour demands of Marguerite de Béthune, Madame 
la duchesse douairiere de Rohan (‘Madame de Rohan’) (1595-1660), regarding the marriage of her 
daughter to Prince Rupert (1619-82). 
 
11 SP 78/106, fol. 344: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 30 November/10 December 1638. 
The letter is calendared as being sent to Coke, but again its contents and the fact that it is in 




The English King’s negotiations with Spain in Brussels directly impacted the 
Paris embassy. At the end of October 1638, Coke relayed the news to Leicester and 
Scudamore, Charles’s ordinary ambassador in Paris, that the new Spanish 
representative in London, Alfonso de Cárdenas, was reported to have claimed that 
the English King was talking to the Spaniards in Flanders.12 When confronted, 
Cárdenas had refuted that he was the source of the rumour. Leicester and Scudamore 
were also instructed to deny to Louis and Richelieu that there were any such 
discussions. 
 
The French responded belligerently to Charles’s alleged talks with Spain in 
Brussels – the possibility of such negotiations clearly worried Louis and Richelieu. 
At the beginning of December 1638, Leicester informed his master that rumours 
were circulating in Paris to the effect that he, Charles, had been talking to the 
Spaniards.13 Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and the French King’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told the earl that Pomponne de Bellièvre, the 
French ambassador in London, had been instructed to raise the matter with the 
English King. Chavigny, most likely insincerely, said that the French had no 
problem with Charles talking to the Spanish in Brussels, just as they had the right to 
negotiate with the Empire and Spain at the Papal-organized talks in Cologne. 
However, as always, Chavigny argued that the best way to advance the interests of 
the Prince Elector was for the English King to conclude a treaty with France. 
Leicester thought that Charles could use this situation to his advantage, as the threat 
of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations might be employed to pressure the French into 
persuading the Swedes to moderate any military and financial demands that they 
might make of England at the Hamburg conference. This opportunity was important 
given the English King’s strong resistance to committing land forces to the continent 
 
12 SP 78/106, fol. 254: Coke to Ambassadors in France, 26 October 1638; see also Collins, II, 
573-4. Alfonso de Cárdenas (dates unknown) was the Spanish Gentilhombre at Charles I’s court in 
1638 to 1640 and ambassador to the Caroline court and Parliament between 1640 and 1648. For the 
former position, see Patricia Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 1978), p. 593 and, for the latter, Albert J. 
Loomie, ‘Alonso de Cardenas and the Long Parliament, 1640-48’, EHR, 97 (1982), 289-307. 
 
13 Collins, II, 579-81: Leicester to Charles I, [4]/14 December 1638. see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 




and the financial requirements of the looming war with Scotland. The earl indicated 
that Charles could advance this process by signing and ratifying not just the main 
and auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February 1637, but also the amended French 
version of the auxiliary treaty of June. 
 
Despite the fact that France had been at war with the Empire since August 
1636, Leicester noted that pressure was being placed on Louis to recognize the King 
of Hungary as Emperor Ferdinand III.14 Such action on the part of the French would 
have adverse implications for the Prince Palatine. Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria, 
had been one of those who had chosen Ferdinand as Emperor in November 1637. If 
the French King acknowledged Ferdinand’s title, he would be accepting 
Maximilian’s status as an Imperial Elector, undermining Charles Louis’s claim to 
that dignity. 
 
Louis and Richelieu now offered an unexpected and significant concession to 
Charles regarding Prince Rupert, probably because they were concerned about the 
Anglo-Spanish talks in Brussels. Leicester informed Coke on 14 December 1638 
that Chavigny had visited him and had suggested a prisoner exchange involving 
Rupert and the Polish Prince, John Casimir, the Habsburg soldier and administrator, 
who was then in French custody.15 The earl had been the first to raise the issue of 
Rupert’s captivity, but, surprisingly, it was Chavigny who brought up exchanging 
Rupert for Casimir. Given Casimir’s record of service with the Austrian Habsburgs, 
who held Rupert, a prisoner exchange was an obvious possibility. The French King 
had ordered Bellièvre in London to bring up the subject with the English King. The 
French offer was important, for, on the face of it, no vital interests of France were 
involved in Rupert remaining a captive in Vienna. It might, therefore, have been 
 
14 Collins, II, 579-81: Leicester to Charles I, [4]/14 December 1638. see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 
K.A.O., U1475, fol. 124/1. 
 
15 SP 78/106, fol. 374: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 December 1638. The most likely recipient of 
this letter was Coke. Prince John II Casimir Vasa (1609-72) was the half-brother of the King of 
Poland, Władysław IV Vasa (1595-1648). During the mid-1630s, he had fought for the Empire. In 
1638, he was captured by the French on his way to take up the position of Viceroy of Portugal and 
imprisoned on the orders of Cardinal Richelieu until 1640. Hence, his possible use as a bargaining 




expected that the French would have left Charles and the Prince’s mother, Elizabeth 
of Bohemia, to worry about Rupert being a prisoner of the Empire and whether he 
might not cut a deal with the Austrian Habsburgs at the expense of his older brother, 
Charles Louis. The English King’s negotiations with the Spanish in Brussels, of 
which the French were aware, seemed to have concentrated the minds of Louis and 
Richelieu. They apparently thought that an approach to Charles regarding Rupert 
would ensure that the English King would not consider a league with the Habsburgs. 
For the first time, Charles’s policy of taking aggressive actions against the French 
seemed to be paying dividends in persuading the French King and the Cardinal to 
make a genuine concession to him. 
 
The French quickly reverted to type, however, and issued threats. Chavigny 
informed Leicester that Louis would recognize Ferdinand III’s election as Emperor, 
implicitly accepting Maximilian of Bavaria as an Elector and damaging Charles 
Louis’s cause. The French also intended to be present at the Papal-brokered talks at 
Cologne, where the concerns of the Prince Palatine would not be considered. 
Chavigny indicated that the reason for these actions was the English King’s 
negotiations with Spain in Brussels. 
 
Charles reacted swiftly to the French concession regarding Prince Rupert and 
their complaints about his negotiations with the Spanish in Brussels. The speed of 
the English King’s reply demonstrated the importance of, and the link between, the 
two issues. In a letter of 18 December 1638, which indicated both how quickly 
Leicester had reported the offer relayed to him by Chavigny and the speed with 
which Coke (and Charles) had reacted, the senior Secretary wrote to the ambassador 
giving him instructions on how he should respond.16 Unsurprisingly, the English 
King accepted the French offer of the exchange of Prince Casimir for Rupert. The 
earl was, therefore, to do everything that he could to advance the proposal. Charles’s 
agent in Poland had also said that the Polish King, Władysław IV Vasa, would write 
to the ‘p[re]tended’ Emperor (Ferdinand III) concerning the exchange of his half-
brother, Casimir, for Rupert. 
 





Before the end of 1638, Coke wrote to Leicester saying that Bellièvre had 
again pressed the English King for a second time regarding the talks that Charles 
was alleged to be conducting with Spain in Brussels.17 In response, the English King 
had instructed Coke and Windebanke to swear that they had no knowledge of any 
such negotiations. Both Secretaries of State had done so, and Bellièvre had been 
informed accordingly. Leicester was to demand an audience with Louis to convey 
the same message to the French and uphold Charles’s honour. The importance of the 
senior Secretary’s letter is emphasized by the fact that it was extensively amended 
by the English King, indicating his approval of its contents. 
 
Leicester initially found it difficult to arrange an audience with Louis to 
broach the issues of the proposed exchange of Prince Rupert for Prince Casimir and 
the French worries about Charles’s negotiations with Spain in Brussels. He told 
Coke at the beginning of February 1639 that it was ‘11 or 12 dayes since I desired 
the honor of seeing this King [Louis XIII].’18 However, within a week, the 
ambassador was able to report that he had had an audience with the French King. He 
informed the senior Secretary that a number of issues had been covered at the 
audience, including the Rupert-Casimir exchange and the English King’s purported 
discussions with the Spanish.19 The ambassador passed on Charles’s thanks to Louis 
regarding the proposal in respect of the exchange of Rupert for Casimir. On behalf 
of his master, Leicester also denied that Charles had been negotiating with Spain in 
Brussels. He repeated that both of the English King’s Secretaries of State had sworn 
that there had been no such talks since the drawing up of the Anglo-French treaties 
at the beginning of 1637. Given the French King’s reported interruptions during 
Leicester’s statement, Louis did not seem to be impressed by what Charles was 
saying via his extraordinary ambassador – probably with cause, as for all the English 
 
17 SP 78/106, fol. 418: Coke to Leicester, 30 December 1638. 
 
18 SP 78/107, fol. 52: Leicester to [Coke], 1/11 February 1639; see also Collins, II, 588-9. The 
most likely recipient of this letter was Coke. 
 
19 SP 78/107, fol. 68: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 February 1639; see also Collins, II, 593-6. 
Again, as the hand in which this letter was written is Leicester’s secretary, Collins was probably 




King’s denials, the French claimed to have proof of Charles’s Brussels talks with the 
Spanish.20 Early in March, the earl told Coke that he hoped that the King of France 
would keep his promise regarding the exchange of Rupert for Casimir, but that the 
French had said nothing more on this issue.21 
 
The English King’s negotiations in Brussels with the Spanish continued to 
trouble the French. Coke wrote to Leicester in June 1639 informing him that Louis, 
via Bellièvre at Charles’s court, had let it be known that the French King was still 
concerned about the rumoured discussions in Brussels.22 Moreover, John Taylor, the 
English King’s representative in Vienna who had remained in post following the end 
of the abortive mission of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, to the 
Emperor in November 1636, had been recalled in January 1639.23 Taylor reached 
London in April. On arrival, he was reprimanded, ostensibly because of his 
indiscretion in revealing the existence of the Anglo-Spanish Brussels talks, but, in 
reality, because the negotiations in themselves were an embarrassment to Charles, 
given Leicester’s Paris embassy and the Hamburg conference on the Anglo-French 
treaties. Taylor was forced to deny that there were any such negotiations, and was 
committed to the Tower of London in September. Then, at the beginning of October, 
the senior Secretary relayed the disquieting information that Roe in Hamburg had 
reported that the French and the Poles had discussed the freeing of Prince Casimir 
by France but without any reference to Rupert.24 
 
Evidently, Charles’s discussions in Brussels had worried Louis and 
Richelieu. In a rare occurrence, they had made an unsolicited offer to the English 
 
20 See, for example, SP 78/106, fol. 374: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 December 1638. 
 
21 SP 78/107, fol. 103: Leicester to [Coke], 1/11 March 1639; see also Collins, II, 598-9. As 
before Coke was the most likely recipient of this letter. See again SP 78/108, fol. 99: Memorandum 
given by Leicester on exchange of Prince Casimir for Prince Rupert, [undated] 1639. 
 
22 SP 78/108, fol. 19: [Coke] to Leicester, 7 June 1639. Coke’s letter was written at Berwick in 
the course of the negotiations with the Scots that ended the First Bishops’ War. 
 
23 John Taylor (1597-1655) was a Catholic and an English diplomat who served Charles I in 
Brussels, Madrid and Vienna in the 1630s. He was not well thought of as an envoy. 
 




King in the form of the proposed Prince Rupert-Prince Casimir exchange. It is likely 
that the French King and the Cardinal were disturbed to learn that Charles I, 
contrary to what they had assumed since November 1636, had been talking to the 
(Spanish) Habsburgs in Brussels via Charles IV, duke of Lorraine, and his sister, 
Henriette, Princess of Pfalzburg. (The subject matter of the discussions was the 
possible partial restoration by Spain of the (Lower) Palatinate to the Prince Elector.) 
In spite of the fact that the French had not delivered on their promise regarding 
Rupert by October 1639, the English King’s strategy of playing the ‘bad guy’ to 
force Louis and Richelieu into making concessions had paid off to some extent. 
 
A further issue that soured Anglo-French relations was the English King’s 
efforts to procure a continental army for the Prince Elector. Despite, or, indeed, 
because of, Charles Louis’s defeat and Prince Rupert’s capture at the Battle of 
Vlotho in October 1638, Leicester continued to be involved in trying to obtain forces 
for the Prince Palatine to enable him to recover his dignities and lands. Coke wrote 
to the two English ambassadors in Paris informing them that Charles would support 
the Prince Elector in taking command of the leaderless army of the late Landgrave 
of Hesse-Kassel and its general, Melander, ostensibly to prevent them joining the 
Habsburgs, subject to a number of conditions.25 The English King’s stipulations 
were ambitious to say the least – that the French were to repay most of the 20,000 
pounds that Charles had advanced for the initial financing of the enterprise; that the 
French would provide the additional sums needed to pay the army, as they had 
promised; that arrangements would be agreed with the French regarding the 
maintenance of these forces; that any amounts paid by the English King would be 
regarded as voluntary contributions; that Charles would not be pressed to pay any 
other sums, especially by the Swedes; and that the auxiliary Anglo-French treaty 
would be concluded (the letter did not indicate whether the English King was 
referring to the February or the June version of that treaty). Effectively, Charles was 
asking Louis and Richelieu to bankroll the major part of the restitution of the Prince 
Palatine. This was something they were very unlikely to do. 
 






Predictably, Leicester was unable to report any positive developments in 
relation to French financial support for the Prince Elector’s putative army. In a 
postscript to a letter of December 1638, the ambassador informed Windebanke that, 
indirectly, he had heard via Leuchtmar, Charles Louis’s emissary to the French 
King, that Chavigny had said that his master was unwilling to provide the Prince 
Palatine with any funds, as he was already fully committed in supporting the Dutch 
and the Swedes.26 Any action to this end would also cause problems with the 
Emperor, who, for example, strongly disapproved of Charles Louis attending the 
Hamburg conference. At the end of the year, Coke confirmed to the earl that he and 
Charles were aware that the Prince Elector had been told that Louis would not 
provide any financial support for the Palatine cause.27 
 
Leicester wrote to Charles in January 1639 following the French refusal to 
aid the Prince Elector, suggesting how the English King might respond to this 
situation.28 With regard to the latter issue, the ambassador indicated that an attempt 
might be made to obtain the support of Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, the 
Protestant German mercenary then in the pay of France, for Charles Louis’s cause.29 
The ambassador confirmed that the French had no intention of aiding the Prince 
Palatine. They were afraid that, if the Prince Elector were provided with an army, he 
might form an alliance with the duke, which ‘would lessen theyr Authority, and 
prejudice theyr Desseins [Designs].’ The French wanted to retain sole use of 
Bernard’s army, which they had successfully employed at the Battles of Rheinfelden 
 
26 SP 78/106, fol. 386: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 21/31 December 1638. The letter is 
calendared as being to Coke, but its tone and content and the fact that it was written in Leicester’s 
own hand strongly suggest that the addressee was Windebanke. For Charles I Louis (1618-80), M. 
Leuchtmar (dates unknown) and Louis XIII, see SP 78/107, fol. 135: Louis XIII – reply to M. 
Leuchtmar concerning the Prince Palatine, 8/18 April 1639. Leuchtmar might have been a minister of 
George William, Elector of Brandenburg (1595-1640), or that individual may have shared the same 
name as Charles I Louis’s adviser. For the former, see Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A 
History of Sweden 1611-1632, vol 2, 1626-1632 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1958), p. 457. 
 
27 SP 78/106, fol. 418: Coke to Leicester, 30 December 1638. 
 
28 Collins, II, 584-5: Leicester to Charles I, 18/28 January 1639. 
 
29 See, for example, David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government, and Society in 




and Wittenweier in February and July 1638 respectively. The duke had also captured 
the strategically vital fortress of Breisach in December of that year, so conclusively 
cutting the Spanish Road. In spite of French concerns about an arrangement between 
Charles Louis and Bernard, the earl suggested that one way to help the Prince 
Elector might be for Charles to subsidize the duke and his army. By doing so, the 
English might persuade Bernard to support the Prince Palatine. French pressure on 
the duke to hand over Breisach could backfire, and tempt him to listen to overtures 
from Charles. The English King might conclude a treaty with Bernard that could 
include the duke marrying the Princess Palatine Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of 
Elizabeth of Bohemia. Such a union might encourage Bernard to advance her 
brother’s interests.30 In conclusion, Leicester suggested that Charles should send 
Prince Maurice – he specified the Prince Palatine’s younger brother and not Charles 
Louis in his letter – to Paris. The ambassador could introduce Maurice to the duke. 
The earl’s hope was that Bernard would be impressed by the Prince’s qualities and 
give him a command in his army. Should the duke die, Maurice would be well 
placed to take over those forces and further the cause of his brother, the Prince 
Elector. The proposal was a bold, if risky, one on Leicester’s part. 
 
The long-running attempts by Charles to obtain military forces for the Prince 
Elector derived from Charles Louis’s lack of money and men. The English naval 
support envisaged in the Anglo-French treaties had not materialized, and the Prince 
Palatine’s small army had been destroyed at Vlotho in the autumn of 1638.31 The 
English King’s efforts to enlist French financial support for the use of the Hesse-
Kassel army by the Prince Elector reflected Charles’s own lack of resources. These 
moves on the part of the English King would have antagonized Louis and Richelieu, 
who envisaged using these troops for their own purposes. The same could be said of 
Leicester’s scheme to enlist the aid of Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and his army, 
 
30 The Princess Palatine Elizabeth (1618-80) was the eldest daughter of Frederick V (1595-
1632) and Elizabeth of Bohemia (1596-1662) and was 20 in January 1639 and, therefore, of 
marriageable age. Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1604-39) was 34 at that time. 
 
31 For the naval support envisaged for Charles I Louis, see SP 103/11, fols 600-2: Anglo-
French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 7 of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 




which was already in the pay of France, in support of Charles Louis.32 Nevertheless, 
in spite of France’s refusal to provide financial assistance to the Prince Elector, 
annoying the French King and the Cardinal remained one of the few means available 
to Charles in his attempt to extract concessions from Richelieu and his royal master 
regarding the Anglo-French treaties. 
 
Marie des Médicis’ presence in London was yet another source of friction 
between England and France.33 In mid-November 1638, Leicester confirmed that he 
had received Coke’s letter of 25 October informing him of the Queen Mother’s 
arrival in England, although reports to this effect had already been circulating in 
Paris for ‘many dayes.’34 In letters to Coke and Windebanke, the earl reported that, 
at an audience he had had with Louis, the French King appeared to be non-
committal about his mother being at the English King’s court.35 Coke instructed 
Leicester in December to pass on a reassuring message from Charles to Louis and 
Richelieu regarding some of the advisors of Marie des Médicis being in England. He 
was to say that ‘they, nor anie other, shall have anie power, to harme the good 
correspondencie, betwine the two Crownes.’36 Significantly, these words were 
written in the English King’s hand. Charles also inserted the phrase ‘but also (if 
possible) that this may be a beginning to treat of Q[ueen] M:[other’]s returne.’37 So, 
fifteen months after first raising the issue, the English King was still angling for 
Marie des Médicis’ remove to France. Apparently, Charles remained determined to 
 
32 See, for example, Parrot, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 59 and 80. 
 
33 Marie des Médicis (1575-1642) arrived in London on 26 October 1638 (old style), which 
was 5 November 1638 according to the Gregorian calendar. Her residence in London was St James’s 
Palace. See Jean Dubost, Marie de Médicis: La Reine Dévoilée (Paris: Biographie Payot, 2009), p. 
823. 
 
34 SP 78/106, fol. 311: Leicester to [Coke], 16/26 November 1638; see also Collins, II, 575-6. 
It is likely that Coke was the addressee of this letter. 
 
35 For Coke, see SP 78/106, fol. 337: Leicester to [Coke], 24 November/4 December 1638; see 
also Collins, II, 576-7. For Windebanke, see SP 78/106, fol. 336: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 
24 November/4 December 1638. The latter letter is calendared as being to Coke, but, as Leicester had 
already written to the senior Secretary that day and as it is in Leicester’s own hand, it can be taken 
that Windebanke was the recipient. 
 
36 SP 78/106, fol. 356: Coke to Leicester, 5 December 1638. 
 




maintain pressure on the French King and the Cardinal by demonstrating that he 
could still be a thorn in their side. Ridding himself of the cost of the Queen Mother 
being at his court would also have influenced the English King in pushing for her 
return to France.38 At the end of 1638, the ambassador informed the senior Secretary 
that Chavigny seemed to be pleased with Charles’s statement regarding the 
counsellors of Marie des Médicis.39 However, towards the end of a letter to Coke of 
February 1639, Leicester said that Chavigny had relayed a veiled threat from Louis 
about the Queen Mother’s advisors, saying that the English King ‘might beware of 




In the summer of 1639, Charles’s problems in Scotland worsened to the point of war 
between his two British kingdoms. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
met in Glasgow late in 1638, and defied the King’s representative, James Hamilton, 
third marquis of Hamilton.41 By the spring of 1639, Charles was preparing for war 
against the Scots.42 The inconclusive outcome of the First Bishops’ War that 
summer and the collapse of the King’s party in Scotland resulted in the Pacification 
of Berwick of 18 June, which neither side had any intention of keeping.43 These 
 
38 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41 and ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 31 for indications of both the size of Marie des Médicis’ retinue and its 
cost for Charles I. 
 
39 SP 78/106, fol. 404: Leicester to [Coke], 28 December 1638/7 January 1639. As this letter is 
written in the hand of Leicester’s secretary, its most likely addressee was Coke. 
 
40 SP 78/107, fol. 71: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 February 1639; see also Collins, II, 593-6. 
 
41 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 368-73. For Charles I and Scotland at this time, see 
Peter H. Donald, An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-1641 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 78-118 and 119-71; Allan I. Macinnes, Charles 
I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 1625-41 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 
1991), pp. 155-82 and 183-95; David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44, 3rd edn 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 2003), pp. 88-126, 127-61 and 162-82; and John J. Scally, 
‘The Political Career of James, Third Marquis and First Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 1643’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 1992), pp. 214-62 and 263-
97. 
 
42 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 368-73 and IX, 6-7. 
 
43 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 1-32 and 33-47. For the implications of the 
disintegration of the King’s party, based around George Gordon, second marquis of Huntly (1592-
1649), Robert Maxwell, second earl of Nithsdale (1620-67), and William Douglas, first marquis of 
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events could have only further reduced the English King’s worth as an ally in the 
eyes of the French. 
 
From Paris, Leicester reported an apparent threat to Charles’s realms, which 
would have increased the English King’s distrust of the French. He informed 
Charles in a letter of February 1639 that a Catholic priest had told him that France, 
Spain, the Empire and the Papacy were each to raise and pay for 6,000 soldiers ‘for 
one common dessein [design] employd in Great Brittaine.’44 The French intended to 
levy their troops in Scotland. The project was at a standstill, as the Scots were 
unwilling to serve abroad. The ambassador said that ‘[w]hether the pretext were that 
these 24000 men should be employd for your Ma[jes]tye or against you, I cannot tell 
but … it is to be suspesed [suspected], that no good is intended either to your person 
or state ...’ Leicester wrote to Windebanke in the following month saying that the 
priest who had provided him with the scheme’s details was a Scotsman, Thomas 
Chambers.45 Chambers was well connected, being the nephew of George Con, the 
Papal representative at Henriette Marie’s court, and one of Richelieu’s chaplains.46 
According to Caroline Hibbard, this plan related to Charles’s (alleged) attempts to 
raise troops in Flanders for use in Britain, but this interpretation seems unlikely.47 
 
Douglas and eleventh earl of Angus (1589-1660), in Scotland, see Russell, Fall of the British 
Monarchies, p. 79. 
 
44 SP 78/107, fol. 87: Leicester to [Coke]/[Charles I], 15/25 February 1639; see also Collins, II, 
596-7. The letter is calendared as being to Coke, but its tone, the grammar used (Charles I is referred 
to in the second person, that is, as the recipient) and the fact that it is in Leicester’s own hand indicate 
definitively that the addressee, as Collins correctly stated, was Charles I and neither Coke nor 
Windebanke. 
 
45 SP 78/107, fol. 107: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 6/16 March 1639; see also Collins, 
II, 599-600. The letter is calendared as being to Coke, but the topic with which it deals and the facts 
that it is in code and in Leicester’s hand, indicate that Collins was correct in divining the true 
recipient to be Windebanke. Thomas Chambers (dates unknown) was the nephew of George Con, the 
Papal representative at the court of Henriette Marie (1609-69) in the late 1630s and Cardinal 
Richelieu’s almoner. See Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 125, 269, footnote 43 and 288, footnote 147. See 
also Malcolm Smuts, ‘Conn, George (d. 1640)’, ODNB. 
 
46 Gardiner characterized Chambers’ importance by stating that ‘Scottish visitors to Paris in 
need of protection were in the habit of going straight to Richelieu’s Scottish chaplain Chambers, 
seldom troubling themselves to pay even a visit of ceremony to the English Ambassador.’ See 
Gardiner, History of England, IX, 91. 
 
47 Hibbard regards the rumour as part of the ‘Gage’ plot. This intrigue, as advanced by the 
secular priest, Thomas Gage (1603?-56), the Dominican friar and writer, and his older brother, 
Colonel Sir Henry Gage (1597-1645), was for Charles I to borrow 10,000 troops from the Spanish in 
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Given Chambers’ connections to the Cardinal, the proposed recruitment of Scots by 
the French, and the fact that the rumour originated in Paris, it is more probable that 
Richelieu planted the story to play on the English King’s anxieties about Scotland. 
Perhaps the Cardinal was trying to push back against Charles’s moves to worry the 
French into concluding an alliance with England. Despite the story’s wild nature, the 
fact that Leicester’s letter to the junior Secretary was almost entirely in code 
indicated that the earl attached some credence to it. Coke also wrote to Leicester, 
informing him in June that Louis, via the French ambassador in London, Bellièvre, 
had denied any intention to aid the Scots.48 As, the English King was convinced that 
the Cardinal was behind his troubles in Scotland, it was unlikely that he believed 
France’s ambassador.49 
 
Between November 1638 and October 1639, France’s fortunes in the Thirty 
Years War and the concurrent Franco-Spanish War remained on an upward 
trajectory. The most important event was the capture of the key fortress of Breisach 
by Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar on 9 December 1638, which Leicester mentioned 
in a postscript to a letter of later that month.50 Breisach in Alsace commanded an 
important section of the Spanish Road, and its surrender to Bernard conclusively 
closed that route to Flanders and improved the strategic position of France.51 The 
Spanish Road had effectively been blocked in 1634 following the French occupation 
of Lorraine. Thereafter, all Spanish reinforcements to Flanders had gone via the 
 
Flanders for use in Great Britain, to be paid for by contributions from (English) Catholics and a Papal 
subsidy, in return for the Spanish being permitted to recruit 20,000 soldiers, most likely in Ireland, 
for deployment in the Spanish Netherlands. See Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 105-6. The scheme might 
be regarded as presaging what Charles I was to attempt in the summer of 1640 – that is, the use of 
Spanish men and money to suppress his rebellious subjects. 
 
48 SP 78/108, fol. 19: [Coke] to Leicester, 7 June 1639. 
 
49 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 382. 
 
50 SP 78/106, fol. 386: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 21/31 December 1638. The letter is 
calendared as being to Coke, but its tone and content and the fact that it was written in Leicester’s 
own hand indicate that the addressee was Windebanke. For a short commentary on the siege and the 
fall of Breisach on 9/19 December 1638, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 606-7 and 610-11. 
 
51 See, for example, Collins, II, 584: Leicester to Charles I, 18/28 January 1639: ‘The Taking of 
Brisac hath much raysed theyr [the French] Opinion of theyr own Strength, and Weakness of theyr 
Enemyes, who they presume would not have suffer’d such a Place to be lost, if they could have found 




English Road – that is, by way of the Channel.52 This situation improved France’s 
position in its war with Spain, which had broken out in 1635. It reduced the flow of 
Spanish men and money to Flanders, lessening the threat to North-West France and 





Against the background of his ongoing difficulties in Scotland and the improving 
position of the French in their wars in Europe, Charles revitalized the talks on the 
Anglo-French treaties by drawing up new instructions for Leicester.53 In mid-April 
1639, the ambassador returned to England, where he remained until the end of July 
to attend the marriage of his eldest daughter, Dorothy.54 The renewal of the Anglo-
French talks demonstrated not only the English King’s desire to secure his southern 
and eastern flanks against any threat from the continent during his invasion of 
Scotland in the late spring of that year, but also the continuing importance for him of 
the negotiations in themselves. Charles had been talking to the Spanish in Brussels 
in 1637 and 1638, albeit not that seriously, about a partial restitution of the Prince 
Elector’s territories. However, he did not explore those discussions as a way of 
protecting his realms – he most likely viewed them primarily as a device to 
encourage Louis and Richelieu to engage with him in earnest regarding an Anglo-
French alliance. Rather than give serious attention to treating with the Spanish, the 
English King put new energy into the possibility of an Anglo-French league. Here is 
further evidence that his commitment to an alliance with France did not end in the 
summer of 1637 or mid-1638, as argued by Malcolm Smuts, Caroline Hibbard, 
Kevin Sharpe and Richard Cust, but continued well into 1639.55 Indeed, an Anglo-
 
52 See Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972), Appendix C, pp. 278-9. 
 
53 SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
54 Dorothy Sidney (1617-84) married Henry Spencer, Lord Spencer (b.1620-43), at Penshurst 
on 20 July 1639. As earl of Sunderland, Spencer was killed at the first Battle of Newbury on 20 
September 1643. 
 
55 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
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French league remained Charles’s main foreign-policy objective from February 
1637 right through to the autumn of 1639. Any alliance with the Austrian or Spanish 
Habsburgs was, at most, a secondary aim, pursued, if at all, with the intention of 
persuading the French King and the Cardinal to talk to him sincerely. 
 
A few months before Charles’s attempt to revitalize the negotiations on the 
Anglo-French treaties, his ambassadorial team in Paris had lost a key player. Coke 
had informed Leicester in November 1638 of the request of Scudamore, his fellow 
ambassador, to be recalled, saying that Charles had agreed to Scudamore’s plea.56 
Scudamore’s withdrawal weakened the influence of the Spanish Party, and 
correspondingly strengthened that of the Northumberland-Leicester circle, with 
regard to Caroline foreign policy. In December, Leicester, unsurprisingly, had 
confirmed to Windebanke that he wished to stay on in Paris as the King’s 
extraordinary ambassador.57 These actions again indicate the importance that both 
Charles and the earl attached to the French negotiations. By keeping Leicester on in 
Paris, the King had signalled that he wished the talks to succeed – if he had wanted 
the discussions to fail, then all he would have had to have done was recall the 
extraordinary ambassador, leaving Scudamore in place to terminate the negotiations. 
 
Over the winter of 1638-9, the Hamburg conference on the Anglo-French 
treaties continued in parallel with Leicester’s negotiations in Paris. At the end of 
1638, Coke noted that the Emperor had refused to issue a safe conduct for Charles 
Louis to travel to Hamburg.58 The Imperial refusal of cooperation resulted in the 
Prince Palatine’s exclusion from the conference. In February 1639, Leicester 
 
525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Milton, Catholic and 
Reformed, pp. 507-8 and Thrush, ‘The Navy under Charles I’, p. 13. 
 
56 SP 78/106, fol. 341: Coke to Leicester, 27 November 1638; see also Collins, II, 577 and SP 
78/106, fol. 342: Coke to Leicester/[Scudamore], 27 November 1638. Despite the latter letter being 
calendared as being to Leicester, it was patently addressed to John Scudamore, Viscount Scudamore 
(1601-71), Charles I’s ordinary ambassador in Paris. 
 
57 SP 78/106, fol. 386: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 21/31 December 1638. The letter is 
calendared as being to Coke, but its tone and content, and the fact that it was written in Leicester’s 
own hand, indicate that the addressee was Windebanke. 
 




reported to Coke that, at an audience with Louis, he had relayed Charles’s wish that 
there should be ‘a speedy proceeding to the conclusion of the Treaty at Hamburg.’59 
The English King’s words demonstrated that he was still pressing Louis and 
Richelieu to finalize the treaties. 
 
Late in April 1639, shortly after Leicester’s arrival in England, Charles gave 
him new instructions. The King stated that the earl’s speedy return to Paris was 
necessary to ‘hasten [the conclusion of] the Treaties.’60 The King also assured the 
earl that ‘Our troubles at home [in Scotland] shall bee no impediment to Our royal 
and faithfull performance of what shall belong to us.’61 To make it clear that his 
intentions were genuine, the King made (yet another) concession to Louis in telling 
his ambassador to inform the French: 
 
that the Two Treaties Auxiliarie and for offence and defence may goe on 
together; And that the pretentions thereupon may bee at once debated and 
resolved, according to the true sense of the Articles allready aggreed upon 
betwixt us [Charles I] and Our brother [Louis XIII].62 
 
As with the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637, which he had had 
drawn up, signed and ratified, and the French versions of those treaties of June, to 
which he had agreed, Charles was taking a significant risk in once again giving 
control of the fate of the treaties to Louis and Richelieu.63 He might have assumed 
that the French King and the Cardinal would not take up his offer, but he could not 
be certain of that. Then, in a sign of the English King’s favour towards Leicester and 
of the importance that he attached to the French negotiations, on 5 May 1639 the 
 
59 SP 78/107, fols 68 and 71: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 February 1639; see also Collins, II, 593-
6. 
 
60 SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
61 SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
62 SP 78/107, fols 154-5: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
63 For Charles I drawing up, signing and ratifying the main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 
536-7 (mis-located). For Charles I agreeing to the French versions of these treaties of June 1637, see 
SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1 and Collins, II, 501-2: 




earl was made a Privy Councillor.64 
 
So, exactly three years to the day after Leicester’s first instructions to 
negotiate an alliance with France had been drawn up, he had been told to revitalize 
the talks on the Anglo-French treaties.65 Nevertheless, Charles had limited the extent 
of his commitment to a French alliance by telling his ambassador that he ‘must bee 
carefull not to cast us upon anie disadvantage of time, nor ingage us further then to 
what wee are tyed by the said Articles’ and ‘no conclusion’ was to be reached ‘til 
wee bee freed from our trobles at home [in Scotland].’66 Regardless of what the 
King had said about his northern kingdom, his problems there were affecting his 
position. The earl had also to ensure that Charles’s commitment to a French league 
would be limited to naval forces as envisaged in the treaties.67 However, given 
Hamilton’s planned maritime expedition to the Firth of Forth to outflank the 
Covenanters in the First Bishops’ War, the number of vessels that the King would be 
able to make available would be smaller as a result of his operations against the 
Scots. Despite these caveats, the revamping of the negotiations would have 
maintained the hopes of the Protestant Party at the Caroline court that an anti-
Habsburg Anglo-French alliance might yet become a reality. 
 
Why did Charles refresh the discussions surrounding the Anglo-French 
treaties? His immediate motivation was his difficulties in Scotland. The King was 
about to embark on the First Bishops’ War and invade his northern realm. In this 
 
64 See Sabrina A. Baron, ‘The Structure and Function of the Privy Council of Charles I, C. 
1625-41, with Special Reference to the Personal Rule’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Chicago, 1995), p. 287, citing PCR, fol. 335r, 12 April-14 July 1639. 
 
65 See SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 
(according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636, 
these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636). 
 
66 SP 78/107, fol. 155: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
67 For the restricting of Charles I’s obligations to an Anglo-French alliance to a fleet of 
warships, see SP 103/11, fols 598 and 600-2: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, articles 3 and 
7 of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 227-8 and 230-2: Anglo-French 
Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, articles 3, 7 and 14. Excluding the ships to be provided to the Prince 




regard, he referred twice to Scotland in his renewed instructions to Leicester.68 
These references indicate that Charles was concerned about threats from the 
continent, in particular, a revival of the ‘auld alliance’ between France and 
Scotland.69 He, therefore, wished to secure his southern and eastern shores against 
any possible attack during his sojourn in the north by way of a pact with France. 
Such threats were not so far-fetched as they might seem, given the war scare 
between England and France in the winter of 1637-8.70 But his problems in Scotland 
alone would not have revitalized the English King’s interest in a league with France. 
He might well have viewed the hostile French reaction to his talks with the Spanish 
in Brussels and the resulting concession regarding Prince Rupert as an indication 
that his tactic of acting the ‘bad guy’ was working in persuading Louis and 
Richelieu to negotiate with him in earnest.71 Now, he may have thought, was the 
time to revive the talks on the treaties. The renewed negotiations might also 
persuade the French King and the Cardinal to support the Prince Elector in his 
efforts to take control of the army of the late Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, and ensure 
that Richelieu and his royal master honoured their proposal to exchange Prince 
Casimir for Prince Rupert. Last but not least, the impetus given to the Anglo-French 
alliance would ensure that the Northumberland-Leicester group, which favoured 
such a league as a way of promoting the Protestant cause at home and abroad, would 
remain loyal at a crucial time in the build-up to war against the Scots Covenanters. 
 
Leicester returned to Paris late in August 1639 and resumed the talks on the 
Anglo-French treaties. In a memorandum of August 1639 to Claude de Bullion, one 
 
68 SP 78/107, fols 154-5: Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. 
 
69 The Auld Alliance between France and Scotland dated back to 1295. It only ended in 1560 
with the Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Edinburgh, which followed the successful English invasion of 
Scotland early in the reign of Elizabeth I (1533-1603) led by the naval commander Sir William 
Winter (c.1525-89). The alliance was used by both France and Scotland as a way of countering the 
numerous English invasions of the two countries between 1295 and 1560. 
 
70 For evidence of English concern about an attack by France in early 1638, see SP 78/105, fol. 
14: Coke/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 11 January 1638; SP 78/105, fol. 42: Leicester to 
[Coke]/[Windebanke], 26 January/5 February 1638; and SP 78/105, fol. 106: Leicester to 
[Coke]/[Windebanke], 16/26 February 1638. 
 
71 For the French suggestion of exchanging Prince Rupert for Prince Casimir, see SP 78/106, 




of Louis’s surintendants des finances, the ambassador related that Charles had 
commanded him to return to France, to hasten the conclusion of the treaties, to 
reassure the French King that the English King did not hold him responsible for 
events in Scotland, and to learn how Louis was disposed towards the conclusion of a 
league with England.72 In a second memorandum of September, Leicester replied to 
the points that the French had made in response to his August communication.73 In 
their memorandum, the French had included a proposal for a defensive and an 
offensive alliance between England and France coupled with the restitution of 
Charles Louis.74 Leicester was optimistic, reporting to Coke at the beginning of 
September that ‘[t]hey [the French] seeme here [in Paris] to be in great paine and 
haste to Know what the King [Charles I] will doe.’75 Writing to Coke again a few 
days later, the earl assured him that the French were eager to hear the English King’s 
reaction to Bullion’s proposal for a defensive and an offensive league between the 
two countries and the Prince Palatine’s restoration.76 A week later, he reiterated that 
the French were looking for a response to their proposal.77 In particular, Bullion had 
indicated that the French thought that their offer not to conclude peace without the 
Prince Elector’s restitution was generous. 
 
Coke professed to Leicester that the French memorandum ‘admitted’ of 
nothing ‘other then hath been formerly agreed on.’78 Nevertheless, in contradiction 
 
72 SP 78/108, fol. 55: memorandum of Leicester for M. de Bullion, 11/21 August 1639; see 
also Collins, II, 606. 
 
73 SP 78/108, fol. 71: Leicester – reply to memorandum delivered by Bullion, 2/12 September 
1639. 
 
74 Bullion’s memorandum is almost certainly SP 78/108, fol. 91: memorandum sent by Bullion 
to Leicester on the treaties, September 1639. 
 
75 SP 78/108, fol. 73: Leicester to [Coke], 6/16 September 1639. As the letter is in the hand of 
Leicester’s secretary, it may be supposed that it is correctly calendared as being to Coke. 
 
76 SP 78/108, fol. 79: Leicester to [Coke], 20/30 September 1639. It is not immediately clear to 
which Secretary of State this letter was addressed, but it can reasonably be assumed that it was sent to 
Coke. Again, Bullion’s memorandum is most probably SP 78/108, fol. 91: memorandum sent by 
Bullion to Leicester on the treaties, September 1639. 
 
77 SP 78/108, fol. 89: Leicester to [Coke], 27 September/7 October 1639. As the letter is in the 
hand of one of Leicester’s secretaries, the most likely recipient was Coke. 
 




to these words, the Secretary went onto say that in fact the French had raised four 
new issues – namely, that Charles should break with Austria without warning and 
not within a set time as agreed previously; that the English King should enter into an 
offensive and a defensive alliance with France but not with Sweden and the United 
Provinces, which differed from previous proposals; that the French King had not 
pledged himself to the recovery of the Palatinate, but merely the vaguer commitment 
that he would not make peace without Charles Louis’s restitution; and that the 
French only referred to the Palatinate and not to the Electoral dignity as well. The 
French offer was, therefore, deemed unsatisfactory by both Charles and Coke. 
 
As usual, however, Leicester was instructed to ensure that Charles should not 
be seen as the cause of any breakdown in the negotiations. He was to reassure the 
French that the English King was willing to proceed with (presumably) the French 
versions of the treaties of June 1637 as agreed – that is, the recovery of German 
liberties, the restoration of the German princes, especially the Prince Palatine, and a 
general peace. Later that month, the ambassador reported clarifications he had 
received of the French position.79 Bullion had conceded that it was reasonable to 
specify a period within which Charles should break with Austria. He had also 
confirmed that France intended that Sweden and the United Provinces should be 
included in the league offensive and defensive, and that in agreeing not to make 
peace without the Palatinate, the French King understood that such a position 
encompassed the recovery of Charles Louis’s territories. Bullion had further 
clarified that, by the Palatinate, the French meant the Prince Elector’s estates, and 
there had been no change in France’s policy regarding the Electoral dignity. 
Leicester, for one, did not think that these clarifications would advance the 
conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance, for, the French had said nothing new in 
substance. They were still pressing for an offensive and defensive league, and 
(implicitly) looking for the English King to commit to a land war in Europe, 
something to which he would not agree. And in spite of seeming concessions, their 
commitment to Charles Louis’s restoration was still too vague. Nonetheless, as 
 
79 SP 78/108, fol. 108: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 October 1639. Again, as the letter is in the 




ordered, the ambassador informed Bullion that Charles wished the talks to continue. 
The familiar pattern of English pressure and fluctuating French action and 
prevarication had been re-established. 
 
Given the lack of progress in the Anglo-French negotiations, why had the 
English King persisted with the seemingly fruitless Hamburg conference in the year 
to October 1639? Roe’s continuous presence at the conference, along with 
Leicester’s embassy in Paris, indicated Charles’s ongoing desire for an Anglo-
French alliance. The English King was employing his two most experienced 
diplomats – Leicester in Paris and Roe in Hamburg – in the negotiations for a league 
with France. In contrast, discussions with the Habsburgs were left, in general, to 
secondary officials, for example, Sir Balthazar Gerbier in Brussels and Taylor in 
Vienna, with Taylor being recalled in disgrace at the beginning of 1639. Walter 
Aston, Lord Aston of Forfar, Charles’s ambassador to Spain between 1635 and 
1638, and Sir Arthur Hopton, his agent, and from 1638 ambassador, in Madrid, were 
the English King’s only front-rank representatives at a Habsburg court, and they 
were inactive diplomatically in the second half of the 1630s.80 Charles also regarded 
the Hamburg conference as an entrée to any congress that might be convened to 
bring about a general peace in Europe. Such thinking is apparent in the English 
King’s willingness to send representatives to any spin-off talks from the discussions 
in Hamburg – for example, those at Lübeck. 
 
On 14 October 1639, Charles Louis, the Prince Elector, was arrested by the 
French at Moulins in central France. The Prince Palatine had been on his way to the 
army of Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar – who had died in July – with the intension 
of taking command of those forces.81 Writing probably to Algernon Percy, tenth earl 
 
80 Walter Aston, Lord Aston of Forfar was a Scottish nobleman, a Caroline diplomat and 
Charles I’s ambassador to the Spanish Habsburgs for a second time between 1635 and 1638. See 
Albert J. Loomie, ‘Aston, Walter, Baron Aston of Forfar (1584-1639)’, ODNB. Sir Arthur Hopton 
was an English diplomat, who was present in Spain from 1629 onwards, from 1630 as Charles I’s 
resident agent. He was recalled to England in early 1636, and was knighted in February 1638, 
returning to Spain as ambassador in that year and remaining there to the mid-1640s. See Albert J. 
Loomie, ‘Hopton, Sir Arthur (1588-1650)’, ODNB. Charles’s agents in Madrid, had been granted 
‘full powers to treat and conclude an alliance’ in 1635, but no treaty had followed. See Atherton, 
‘Viscount Scudamore’, p. 170. 
 
81 Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar had died on 18/28 July 1639. 
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of Northumberland, or possibly Windebanke, at the end of August, Leicester had 
mentioned for the first time that Charles Louis might seek to assume command of 
the duke’s army.82 In a letter of the following month to Windebanke, the earl had 
suggested that the French were also interested in obtaining control of Bernard’s 
troops.83 He thought that they could well succeed in this aim. Northumberland had 
advised Leicester on 3 October that the Prince Elector had started out on his 
journey.84 Nine days later, the ambassador had informed Roe in code that the Prince 
Palatine had passed by Paris on the eighth of that month.85 He had said that he had 
not seen Charles Louis, but was clearly worried about what he regarded as the 
Prince Elector’s very risky venture. 
 
News of Charles Louis’s arrest by the French filtered out in the second half 
of October 1639. Leicester informed Coke that, at a meeting with Bullion, Louis’s 
minister had made it clear that the French were aware of the Prince Elector’s arrival 
in France.86 The Prince Palatine had been detained at Moulins for travelling through 
France without a passport and without the French King’s knowledge in a time of 
war. Almost certainly, the French had taken this action to prevent the Prince Elector 
from taking over Bernard of Saxe-Weimar’s army, which they wished to control.87 
So, as well as Prince Rupert being a captive of the Austrian Habsburgs, his elder 
brother, Charles Louis, was now a prisoner of the French. These setbacks for the 
 
 
82 SP 78/108, fol. 57: Leicester to [Coke]/[Northumberland]/[Windebanke], 23 August/2 
September 1639. This letter is calendared as being to Coke, but its tone and the fact that Leicester had 
already written to Coke twice that day, indicates that its most likely recipient was Leicester’s brother-
in-law, Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland (1602-68), with a second possibility being that 
the addressee might have been Windebanke. 
 
83 SP 78/108, fol. 77: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 13/23 September 1639; see also 
Collins, II, 608-10. Collins correctly attributed this letter as being to Windebanke and not Coke, as it 
refers to a ‘Mr Windebanke,’ who was probably one of Sir Francis’s sons, who was visiting Leicester 
‘before his departure according to your appointment.’ 
 
84 Collins, II, 611-2: Northumberland to Leicester, 3 October 1639. 
 
85 TNA, SP Germany (States), SP 81/48, fol. 105: Leicester to [Roe], 12/22 October 1639. 
 
86 SP 78/108, fol. 108: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 October 1639. On the same day, Leicester 
had informed Roe of the bad news that the Prince Palatine had been ‘stayd’ at Moulins. See SP 81/48, 
fol. 111: Leicester to [Roe], 19/29 October 1639. 
 




Palatine Wittelsbachs meant that the English King would be forced to act in support 




In the early autumn of 1639, the Battle of the Downs profoundly altered the 
diplomatic and strategic position in Europe.88 Between 7 September and 11 October, 
a naval engagement was fought off the Kentish coast between a Spanish armada, 
under the command of Antonio de Oquendo, and a Dutch fleet, led by Admiral 
Maarten Tromp.89 The result was a decisive Dutch victory.90 If, before the battle, it 
was unclear which power or league controlled the English Channel – the United 
Provinces and its confederate, France, or Spain, with perhaps neutral England 
holding the balance – after the encounter it was clear that the Dutch dominated this 
vital waterway. As a result, Flanders was cut-off from Spanish reinforcements.91 
 
Over the course of the battle, Charles had been involved in complex three-
way discussions with the Spanish and the Dutch and the French.92 His immediate 
intension had been to extract the greatest concessions from the combatants and their 
allies. For example, the English King had been looking for cash from the Spanish in 
 
88 For descriptions of the Battle of the Downs, which was fought between 7/17 September and 
11/21 October 1639 and the implications of its outcome for the three countries involved, see 
Gardiner, History of England, IX, 58-69; Elliott, Olivares, pp. 549-51; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch 
Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 537; 
and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 662-3. See also SP 78/108, fol. 111: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 
October 1639 for Leicester’s report of the French celebrations of the Dutch triumph over the Spanish 
at the battle and for the importance that the French attached to the Netherlander’s victory: ‘[t]hey 
rejoyce much here [in Paris] at [th]e defeate of the Spanish fleet upon the coast of England, which 
they say is very great ...’ 
 
89 Antonio de Oquendo (1577-1640) was an experienced Spanish admiral. He was the defeated 
commander at the Battle of the Downs, which was fought over September and October 1639 in the 
English Channel. Maarten Harpertsz Tromp (1598-1653) was a renowned Dutch admiral, an 
innovator in maritime warfare and the victorious commander of the naval forces of the United 
Provinces at the Battle of the Downs. 
 
90 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 68. 
 
91 See Parker, Army of Flanders, Appendix C, pp. 278-9. 
 
92 For the diplomatic manoeuvrings during the Battle of the Downs involving England, Spain, 




return for gunpowder. Despite such actions, however, as an illustration of the still 
key role of the talks with France, on 26 September 1639, Charles had offered 
Richelieu an alliance on terms that were taken straight out of the Anglo-French 
treaties of 1637. In particular, he had included a promise of 6,000 troops to be levied 
in his realms to be paid for by the French, with Louis agreeing not to make peace 
without taking the Prince Elector’s interests into account.93 The Cardinal had 
rejected the English King’s offer on 8 October.94 Nevertheless, Charles’s proposal 
indicated the then continuing primary importance of a league with France from his 
perspective. This contention is supported by the comment of Northumberland made 
to Leicester in October to the effect that the English King was unhappy that the 
French had not signed and ratified any of the treaties of 1637.95 
 
The outcome of the Battle of the Downs was a profound humiliation for 
England and Charles, whose fleet had stood by passively as the Dutch and Spanish 
fought out the decisive engagement.96 The ineffectiveness of the English King’s 
ship-money fleet would only have convinced others, notably, the French, of the poor 
quality of England’s naval capabilities. The significance of the battle for Leicester’s 
Paris embassy was that, by closing the English Road – by which Spanish men and 
money could be sent to Flanders – it would change the focus of Charles’s foreign 
policy fundamentally. Spain’s pressing need to reopen this route to Flanders and the 
English King’s desire for men and money to suppress the rebellious Scots would 
relegate the Anglo-French talks from their pre-eminent position in Caroline 
 
93 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 63. See also SP 103/11, fols 598-9: Anglo-French 
Treaties, 17 February 1637, articles 2 and 4 of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 
15993, fol. 227: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637, article 4. 
 
94 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 67. 
 
95 Collins, II, 613-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 17 October 1639. 
 
96 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, IX, 69 (‘Damaging as was the true story of 
the fight in the Downs to Charles’s reputation …’); Thrush, ‘The Navy under Charles I’, p. 14 (‘The 
humiliation of the Battle of the Downs …’); Bernard Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, in The Civil Wars. A 
Military History of Scotland, Ireland and England 1638-1660, ed. by John P. Kenyon and Jane 
Ohlmeyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 157 (‘It [the Battle of the Downs] was a 
humiliating blow to national as well as royal honour.’); and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, pp. 191-2 
(‘And embarrassingly, there was nothing the navy could do to prevent a Spanish fleet from being 




diplomacy between February 1637 and October 1639 to one of secondary 
importance. 
 
Historians have concentrated on the damage done to Charles’s reputation by 
the battle.97 However, its true significance lies in the way in which it altered the 
diplomatic and strategic position of England and Spain from October 1639 
onwards.98 Before the engagement, the English King’s primary foreign-policy 
objective had been a naval alliance with France as the best, or perhaps, more 
accurately, the least bad, way of trying to recover the lands and the dignities of the 
Prince Elector. Charles could approach either the Austrian or the Spanish 
Habsburgs, as he did, to try to achieve this end, but he would always be stymied in 
such a course of action by Duke Maximilian of Bavaria.99 Maximilian possessed the 
Wittelsbach Electorate and all of the Upper and the right bank of the Lower 
Palatinate. Thus, the duke would oppose any effective restitution of Charles Louis’s 
dignities and lands. And Maximilian had the power to ensure this outcome. Since 
1619, the Austrian Habsburgs had been dynastically, politically, militarily and 
financially bound to Maximilian.100 Whether the English King tried to resolve the 
problem of the Palatinate via the Empire or Spain, he ultimately always ran up 
against the roadblock of the Austrian Habsburg’s dependence on the duke. An 
alliance with France was, therefore, the least difficult option in trying to obtain the 
restitution of the Prince Elector. If this aim was all but impossible by way of a 
league with either the Austrian or the Spanish Habsburgs, it might just be attainable 
via an alliance with France. The reason for this situation was that, from 1630 
onwards, the French had only been courting Maximilian as an ally, and were not as 
 
97 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, IX, 69; Thrush, ‘The Navy under Charles I’, 
p. 14; Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, p. 157; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, pp. 191-2. 
 
98 Patricia Haskell is an exception in ascribing some diplomatic importance to the Battle of the 
Downs: ‘The last year of Windebank’s Secretaryship witnessed a tentative rapprochement with 
Spain, following the decisive defeat of Oquendo’s armada in the Downs in October 1639.’ See 
Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank’, p. 188. 
 
99. Which is what happened to the abortive embassy of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of 
Arundel (1585-1646), to the Emperor, Ferdinand II (1578-1637), in the second half of 1636. 
 




closely bound to him as the Imperialists.101 Thus, Louis and Richelieu could move 
away from the duke, if need be. 
 
Nevertheless, a question remains that must be answered. Would Spain’s 
willingness to enter into serious negotiations with Charles after the Battle of the 
Downs have caused him to change his policy had he not been so concerned about 
the threat from Scotland? In other words, had he not had need of Spanish men and 
money would he have continued to pursue an Anglo-French alliance regardless, 
spurning Spain’s overtures in the aftermath of the battle? The answer to this 
question is ‘yes.’ Up to the autumn of 1639, the English King’s primary foreign-
policy aim was the recovery of the Palatinate. Given the hold that Maximilian of 
Bavaria had over the (Austrian) Habsburgs, an alliance with Spain, as considered in 
1631 and 1633-4, offered little or no possibility of attaining that end. The Spanish 
approach in late 1639 to Charles was only effective given the deepening Scottish 
crisis and Richelieu’s rejection of the English King’s most recent offer of an alliance 
in September of that year.102 As a result, Charles had to abandon the Prince Elector 
and prioritize his own domestic troubles.103 It was, therefore, not the battle alone that 
caused the shift in English foreign policy, but rather its outcome in the context of the 
King’s worsening position in Great Britain. 
 
The defeat of Spain’s armada presented Charles and Gaspar de Guzmán, 
Count-Duke of Olivares, Spain’s chief minister and that country’s effective ruler, 
with an opportunity to initiate discussions in which Maximilian of Bavaria would 
not figure.104 For the English King, the talks would relate to the provision of men 
 
101 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 464-5. 
 
102 For Cardinal Richelieu’s rejection of Charles I’s offer of an Amglo-French alliance during 
the Battle of the Downs, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 67. 
 
103 For an indication of this position, see Elliot, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, pp. 172-3, who 
recorded the initial Spanish offer of territorial concessions involving the Palatinate. This suggestion 
was rejected. Instead, Charles wanted, and got, the offer of Spanish money (and soldiers) with which 
to supress his rebellious subjects. See also O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 441-3. 
 
104 Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel, first duke of Sanlúcar, third count of Olivares (1587-1645), 
was the chief minister of Philip IV (1605-65), and had governed Spain since 1622, not only trying to 
reform the relationships between the Spanish King’s multiple kingdoms, but also struggling with the 
numerous problems raised by Spain’s international commitments. He occupied a more dominant 
position with regard to Philip IV than Cardinal Richelieu did towards Louis XIII, which was more of 
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and money by the Spanish, which he could use to defeat his rebellious subjects in 
Scotland (and perhaps in England as well). For Spain’s chief minister, such 
negotiations might enable Spain, with the help of Charles’s navy, to reopen the vital 
English Road, which, following the effective closure of the land-based Spanish 
Road in 1634, was the only way in which Spain could supply Flanders with soldiers 
and funds.105 
 
Two questions, therefore, arose as a result of the battle. Firstly, would 
Charles and Olivares seize the opening proffered by the changed strategic situation 
to enter into serious negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish alliance? Secondly, what 




a partnership. For Olivares, in general, see Elliott, Olivares. For diplomacy and international affairs 
involving the Cardinal and the chief minister, see John H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
 
105 For the importance of the English Road in reinforcing the Spanish Netherlands, see Parker, 
Army of Flanders, Appendix C, pp. 278-9. For the damage done to Spain’s strategic position by its 
defeat in the Battle of the Downs, see Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 169; Olivares, pp. 
549-50 and 574-5; and Bernard S. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 









Spain’s naval disaster in the Channel at the Battle of the Downs in October 1639 and 
the severing of the English Road had the potential to alter profoundly the European 
diplomatic scene.1 Such a transformation could damage the chances of Robert 
Sidney – second earl of Leicester and Charles I’s extraordinary ambassador to Louis 
XIII – bringing about an alliance with France. It could also adversely affect the 
fortunes of the Protestant Party at the Caroline court. Nevertheless, as late as the 
beginning of October, the English King was still offering terms to the French.2 Yet, 
although Charles had been willing to continue treating with France even as the 
Spanish and the Dutch closed in the Channel, Spain’s defeat and the breaking of that 
country’s last link with Flanders created the possibility for an Anglo-Spanish league. 
Such negotiations would not run up against the road block of Maximilian I, duke of 
Bavaria. Up to then, all the English King’s foreign-policy initiatives in the 1630s 
involving either Spain and Austria or France had failed, given the Empire’s 
dependence on Maximilian and French courting of Bavaria as an ally. Charles 
shifted his position following the changed diplomatic situation brought about by the 
Battle of the Downs – he was now prioritizing the defeat of the Covenanters over the 
restoration of Charles Louis. Spain’s position had also moved – but more in degree 
than kind. The Spanish were positively eager for an English alliance with the aim of 
 
1 Tactically, the defeat at the Battle of the Downs was not that bad for Spain, as ships and 
troops from its armada did reach Flanders. See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 69, Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, p. 663 and Collins, II, 614-5: Northumberland to Leicester, 24 October 1639 for 
confirmation that some of the Spanish fleet escaped the disaster. Much more serious was the ensuing 
cutting off of the Spanish Netherlands from reinforcements of men and money and the harm done to 
Spain’s strategic position and reputation. For the isolating of Flanders, see Geoffrey Parker, The 
Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
Appendix C, pp. 278-9 and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 663. For the extent of the adverse strategic 
implications for Spain of its defeat, see John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the 
Decline of Spain 1598-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 402 and 524 and 
Olivares, pp. 550 and 574 and Bernard S. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English 
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 6. 
 




reopening the Spanish Road so that they could send men and money to Flanders. 
Previously, they had been content to try to block any English league with France. 
The discussions would now focus on providing Charles with the resources with 
which to quell his rebellious subjects in Scotland (and maybe England as well) in 
return for the use of his navy to aid Spain in reopening communications with the 
Spanish Netherlands. 
 
Louis and Cardinal Richelieu would have been pleased with the situation in 
the autumn of 1639. France’s ally, the United Provinces, had cut the maritime route 
to the Spanish Netherlands, something that was welcomed in Paris.3 The Dutch 
victory significantly weakened Spain’s position in the Low Countries, while, 
simultaneously, defensively and offensively, improving that of France. Spain’s 
ability to threaten the North-East of the country and Paris had been reduced, creating 
an opportunity for the French to attack Flanders. The French King and the Cardinal 
also had the satisfaction of knowing that Charles was still negotiating with them, and 
that his ongoing problems in Scotland negated any threat that England might pose to 
France, if only temporarily.4 But if this was their reasoning, they may have been 
over-confident. Louis and Richelieu may have failed to appreciate that, for the first 
time in two-and-three-quarter years since the failure in late 1636 of the embassy of 
Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, to the Emperor in Vienna, the English 
King could have a serious alternative to an alliance with France in the form of a 
league with Spain. 
 
Spain’s position in the autumn of 1639 was damaged, but presented an 
opportunity for an alliance with England. There had been three sets of abortive 
Anglo-Spanish negotiations in the 1630s: in 1631, which resulted in the secret treaty 
negotiated by Sir Francis Cottington; in 1633-4, regarding the discussions for a 
maritime treaty; and in 1637-8, via intermediaries in Brussels.5 The first of these 
 
3 See, for example, London, TNA, SP France, SP 78/108, fol. 111: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 
October 1639. 
 
4 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 382. 
 
5 For the secret treaty with Spain of 1631 that was connected with Sir Francis Cottington 
(1579?-1652), who, in 1639, was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Master of the Court of Wards, and 
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talks had not been taken seriously by the English, the second had only resulted in a 
draft, unratified, treaty, and the third had not been conducted at a high level.6 In the 
fourth quarter of 1639, Charles and Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, 
Spain’s chief minister, had a chance to conclude an Anglo-Spanish league. The 
question was would the two men be able to turn this possibility into reality? 
 
In the final months of 1639, Leicester and the other members of the 
Protestant Party at the Caroline court could still entertain hopes of an anti-Habsburg 
league as envisaged in the Anglo-French treaties of 1637.7 Charles had reinvigorated 
the negotiations with France by issuing new instructions to his ambassador in April 
1639, who had restarted the talks with the French in August.8 Furthermore, over the 
course of the Battle of the Downs, the English King had offered Louis and Richelieu 
terms that were very close to those in the treaties.9 However, the altered strategic 
position of the Spanish and Charles’s shift of policy priorities meant that the 
opportunity for an alliance with France could be replaced by the possibility of one 
with Spain, though the ends would differ. A league with France would have been 
geared towards restoring the Palatinate, while an alliance with Spain would be 
aimed at defeating the Covenanters. Moreover, on 22 September, Thomas 
 
Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645), the first minister of Philip IV (1605-65), 
see Gardiner, History of England, VII, 176-7 and Elliott, Olivares, p. 403; for the Spanish negotiations 
of 1633-4, see Gardiner, History of England, VII, 357-8, 367-8 and 380-4 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and 
the Spanish Plot’, pp. 85-7; and for the discussions in the Spanish Netherlands of 1637-8, see 
Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 377 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 297-321. 
 
6 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 173 for indications that neither Charles I 
(1600-49) nor Cottington took the secret treaty of 1631 seriously. The third set of negotiations had 
been left in the hands of Sir Balthazar Gerbier (1592-1663/7), a relatively low rank official, who, 
though of Dutch origin, was naturalized English and was not thought of highly. Had Charles I been 
serious about these discussions he would have surely substituted Gerbier with an abler, more 
experienced and higher-ranking diplomat. 
 
7 See TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 
February 1637. See also Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: Anglo-French Auxiliary 
Treaty, June 1637. 
 
8 SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the Earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639 and SP 
78/108, fol. 55: memorandum of Leicester for M. de Bullion, 11/21 August 1639; see also Collins, II, 
606. 
 
9 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 63 and 67. See also SP 103/11, fols 598-9: Anglo-
French Treaties, 17 February 1637, articles 2 and 4 of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, 




Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth, Charles’s Lord Deputy in Ireland, arrived in 
London.10 Wentworth was a key member of the Spanish Party at the Caroline court. 
He would be the King’s most influential advisor in the coming months. His return to 
court strengthened the Spanish Party, and improved the prospects for a league with 
Spain. This event, together with the changed situation in the English Channel, 
increased the potential for an Anglo-Spanish rapprochement – a development that 




The Prince Elector’s arrest at Moulins in central France in October 1639 had a 
number of implications for Leicester’s embassy. Charles I Louis’s predicament now 
occupied much of the ambassador’s time. From the second half of October 1639 to 
the beginning of September 1640, the Prince Palatine’s detention was the primary 
topic of the earl’s communications.11 It took to March 1640 – around six months – 
for Leicester to be able to report any good news in the form of the potential partial 
release of the Prince Elector into his custody.12 Sir John Coke, still the senior 
 
10 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 73. 
 
11 See SP 78/108, fol. 108: Leicester to [Coke], 18/28 October 1639 to SP 78/110, fol. 117: 
Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 4/14 September 1640. It is likely that the addressee of the 
latter letter was the new senior Secretary of State from February 1640, Sir Henry Vane senior. Vane 
was a diplomat, for example, he had undertaken an embassy to Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632) in 
1631 and a courtier, from 1629 holding the post of comptroller of the King’s household (treasurer 
from 1640). He was a favourite of Charles I’s Queen, Henriette Marie (1609-69). For Vane being the 
senior Secretary of State, see History of Parliament Trust, London, unpublished article on Vane 
(Fane), Sir Henry I (1589-1655) for 1640-60 section by David Scott, p. 34 (‘Vane’s loyal service to 
Charles was rewarded with appointment early in 1640 to two of the most influential positions at court 
– that of treasurer of the king’s household and, in place of Coke, [senior] secretary of state.’). I am 
grateful to the History of Parliament Trust for allowing me to see this article in draft. See also R. 
Malcolm Smuts, ‘Vane, Sir Henry (1589-1655)’, ODNB (‘During the Short Parliament, Vane acted as 
the crown’s leading spokesman in the Commons …’). Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester (1595-
1677), had been touted unsuccessfully to replace Sir John Coke (1563-1644) as Secretary of State. 
See Michael B. Young, Servility and Service: The Life and Work of Sir John Coke (London: Royal 
Historical Society, 1986), pp. 254-7 and 262-5. 
 
12 SP 78/109, fol. 105: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 6/16 March 1640. It is 
not immediately clear to which Secretary of State, Vane or Sir Francis Windebanke (b.1582-1646), 
this letter was addressed, but as Coke had ordered Leicester to correspond with Windebanke 
regarding Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine (1618-80), in SP 78/108, fol. 112: Coke to 
Leicester, 24 October 1639; see also Collins, II, 615-6, it may be assumed that this letter was sent to 
Windebanke. The letter was one of two that Leicester sent to the Secretaries of State on that date, SP 
78/109, fol. 103: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 6/16 March 1640 being the other, which can 
be regarded as being addressed to Vane. 
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Secretary of State, sent letters of credence regarding Charles Louis to the 
ambassador in October 1639.13 Leicester was informed that he should use these as 
he saw fit. However, it was difficult for the earl to contact the French. Writing at the 
beginning of November to Coke, the ambassador reported that he was finding it hard 
to arrange an audience with Louis to bring up the issue of the Prince Palatine.14 As 
was often the case, Léon le Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny and Louis’s Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, could not be located. Coke also instructed Leicester to 
correspond with Sir Francis Windebanke, Charles’s junior Secretary of State, on 
matters relating to the Prince Elector.15 
 
The Prince Palatine’s detention halted any discussions on the Anglo-French 
treaties as Charles sought to put pressure on the French to release his nephew. As 
Leicester had been ordered to revitalize the negotiations with the French at the end 
of April 1639 and had restarted the talks in the following August, this situation was 
almost certainly very frustrating for him.16 Writing to Windebanke at the end of the 
year, the earl stated that he had had a meeting with Claude de Bullion, one of 
Louis’s surintendants des finances, who had raised the issue of the Anglo-French 
alliance.17 Leicester diplomatically told Bullion, that ‘till [th]e Pr:[ince] El[ecto]r: 
were at liberty the King [Charles I] would make no proposition concerning other 
affaires [that is, the treaty negotiations] unto this State [France].’ In January 1640, 
the ambassador informed Windebanke that Chavigny had contacted him directly and 
indirectly via the Venetian ambassador in Paris, Anzolo Correr, about Charles 
 
 
13 SP 78/108, fol. 112: Coke to Leicester, 24 October 1639; see also Collins, II, 615-6. 
 
14 SP 78/108, fol. 125: Leicester to [Coke], 1/11 November 1639; see also Collins, II, 616-7 for 
an edited version of this letter. Collins attributed the letter as being to Windebanke, but the fact that it 
was written in the hand of Leicester’s secretary implies that the recipient was Coke. 
 
15 SP 78/108, fols 150-1: Coke to Leicester, 20 November 1639. 
 
16 SP 78/107, fol. 154: Additional instructions for the Earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639 and SP 
78/108, fol. 55: memorandum of Leicester for M. de Bullion, 11/21 August 1639; see also Collins, II, 
606. 
 
17 SP 78/108, fol. 225: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 27 December 1639/[6 January 
1640]; see also Collins, II, 628. Despite being calendared as being addressed to Coke, given the 




Louis.18 Leicester recounted that he had advised both Chavigny and Correr that he 
could not enter into any discussions until the Prince Palatine had been freed. At the 
beginning of April, the earl wrote, probably to Windebanke, confirming his orders 
not to negotiate with the French until the Prince Elector was at (full) liberty.19 
Charles Louis’s confinement was also an embarrassment to Leicester, as one of 
Windebanke’s sons had been sent to Paris to negotiate for the Prince Palatine’s 
release.20 This action implied a lack of faith in the ambassador on the part of Charles 
and the junior Secretary. 
 
The Prince Elector’s confinement by the French played a role in deferring 
the start of the Anglo-Spanish talks until the spring of 1640. Charles could not 
ignore the fact that Louis and Richelieu were holding his nephew. He would have to 
be careful not to antagonize the French if he were to negotiate the Prince Palatine’s 
release. Nevertheless, the English King’s willingness to open discussions with the 
Spanish when Charles Louis was only partially freed in April 1640 reveals the limits 
of Charles’s commitment to the Palatine Wittelsbachs.21 The treaty talks with Spain 
began at the end of April, but the Prince Elector did not leave Paris until four 
months later at the beginning of September.22 Despite the initial delay that the Prince 
Palatine’s arrest may have caused to the start of the Anglo-Spanish discussions, the 
English King was not willing, or, perhaps, more accurately, able, to postpone the 
talks indefinitely simply to protect the Prince Elector’s position. If nothing else, 
 
18 SP 78/109, fol. 21, Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Windebanke], 17/27 January 1640. It is 
most probable that the letter was sent to Windebanke. Anzolo Correr (dates unknown) had been the 
Venetian ambassador to Charles I’s court between 1634 and 1637, but, at the end of the latter year, he 
had moved on to take up the Venetian ambassadorial position in Paris. 
 
19 SP 78/109, fol. 155: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 3/13 April 1640; see also 
Collins, II, 642. Collins attributed this letter as being sent to Windebanke, so it is possible that SP 
78/109, fol. 153: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 3/13 April 1640 was addressed to Vane. 
 
20 SP 78/108, fol. 156: Windebanke to Leicester, 22 November 1639. 
 
21 SP 78/109, fol. 157: Leicester to Roe, 4/14 April 1640. 
 
22 See SP 78/110, fol. 88: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 14/24 August 1640 (it is not 
stated to which Secretary of State the letter was addressed, but it may be presumed to be to Vane); SP 
78/110, fol. 100: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 21/31 August 1640 (despite the lack of a 
definitive indication, it might be thought that the letter was addressed to Vane); and SP 78/110, fol. 




following the failure of the Short Parliament in May to provide him with finance, 
Charles needed Spanish funds in order to fight the Second Bishops’ War. 
 
Leicester also reported bad news regarding Prince Rupert – Charles Louis’s 
younger brother and the future Royalist Civil War cavalry general – who was still 
being held by the Austrians. In a letter to Windebanke at the end of January 1640, 
the earl noted that the Polish ambassador had had an audience with Louis 
concerning the release of Prince Casimir, the Habsburg administrator and soldier, 
then in French custody.23 Leicester had reminded Chavigny of the French promise to 
exchange Casimir for Rupert. Chavigny had prevaricated despite the fact that the 
English ambassador had tried to hold the French to what they had promised with 
regard to Rupert in December 1638.24 Leicester relayed further adverse tidings about 
the Prince in February 1640. He reported that Casimir’s confinement had been 
relaxed.25 The situation boded ill for an exchange of Casimir for Rupert – it 
appeared that Louis and Richelieu were reneging on their promise.26 In the 
following month, the earl noted that the Polish ambassador was to leave Paris with 
Casimir.27 The French had not honoured their undertaking to exchange Casimir for 
Rupert. Consequently, the Wittelsbach Prince would remain in Imperial captivity 




23 SP 78/109, fol. 50: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 31 January/10 February 
1640. The recipient of this letter was almost certainly Windebanke. 
 
24 See SP 78/106, fol. 374: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 December 1638. 
 
25 SP 78/109, fol. 87, Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 21 February/2 March 1640. Vane 
was probably the letter’s recipient. 
 
26 SP 78/109, fol. 87, Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 21 February/2 March 1640: ‘… I 
perceive little likelyhood that the promise of this King [Louis XIII (1601-43)] and his ministers will 
be performed in favor of the Prince Palatin Robert [Prince Rupert (1619-82)] …’ 
 
27 SP 78/109, fol. 137: Leicester to Secretary of State, 20/30 March 1640. SP 78/109, fol. 139: 
Leicester to Secretary of State, 20/30 March 1640 is a shorter, though similar, letter. It is not clear to 
which Secretary a particular letter was addressed. 
 
28 See Robert B. Mowat, ‘The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Vienna, 1641-2’, EHR, 25 
(1910), 267 for details of Prince Rupert’s release in October 1641, which was facilitated by Sir 






At first, Leicester’s embassy was little-affected by Spain’s defeat at the Battle of the 
Downs in October 1639. Of greater immediate effect was the Prince Elector’s 
captivity and the resulting suspension of the negotiations on the Anglo-French 
treaties pending Charles Louis’s release.29 Towards the end of October, Coke 
acknowledged receipt of the ambassador’s letter of the eighteenth of that month, 
containing details of the earl’s conversation with Bullion regarding the treaties with 
the Secretary dismissing the Frenchman’s words.30 
 
As autumn moved into early winter in 1639, England’s rapprochement with 
Spain began to have a negative impact on the Paris mission. Algernon Percy, tenth 
earl of Northumberland, the Lord Admiral and Leicester’s leading ally at court, sent 
mixed messages to the ambassador regarding the Anglo-French treaties. (Much of 
what is known about the treaties at that time must be gleaned from the Lord 
Admiral’s letters to his brother-in-law, for, as instructed, Leicester refrained from 
negotiating with the French while they still held the Prince Elector.31) 
Northumberland noted in mid-November that the ambassador had recently reported 
that the French would conclude a treaty with England were Charles to break with 
Spain.32 However, the Lord Admiral stated that this would be difficult to achieve. 
William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Viscount Wentworth, who were both 
on the Privy Council committee dealing with foreign affairs and were among ‘the 
Persons that do absolutely governe,’ were pro-Spanish. They, therefore, naturally 
 
29 See, for example, SP 78/108, fol. 225: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 27 December 
1639/[6 January 1640]; see also Collins, II, 628. 
 
30 SP 78/108, fol. 112: Coke to Leicester, 24 October 1639; see also Collins, II, 615-6: ‘I wish 
them [the French answers] as effectual as they are spetious.’ See SP 78/108, fol. 108: Leicester to 
[Coke], 18/28 October 1639 for the ambassador’s letter. 
 
31 See, for example, SP 78/109, fol. 155: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 3/13 
April 1640; see also Collins, II, 642. 
 
32 Collins, II, 617-8: Northumberland to Leicester, 14 November 1639. See Collins, II, 614-5: 
Northumberland to Leicester, 24 October 1639 for an indication of the membership of the foreign 
affairs committee of the Privy Council. See also Patricia Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank and the 
Personal Rule of Charles I’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 1978), 




opposed a league with France. But by December, Northumberland had changed his 
tune and he informed Leicester that ‘I think the King [Charles I] is better disposed, 
to beleeve it of more Advantage for his Affaires, to conclude with 97 58 39 151 41 6 
44 40 438 [France and Hollande], then I have knowne him.’33 At the end of that 
month, the Lord Admiral reported that Charles had not come to any resolution 
regarding the treaties, as preparations for the war with Scotland were taking up all 
the available time.34 Northumberland was an influential and well-informed figure at 
the Caroline court. His observations regarding the Anglo-French treaties confirm 
that the English King was holding off on the talks with the Spanish, while the Prince 
Elector remained in detention. Confirming this position, writing to Windebanke, 
Leicester stated that he had had a meeting with Bullion, who had raised the 
possibility of an Anglo-French alliance.35 The ambassador had replied (again) that 
he could not negotiate with the French until the Prince Palatine had been released. 
 
At the beginning of 1640, Louis and Richelieu, probably concerned by 
England’s drift towards Spain, pressured Charles to show his hand regarding the 
Anglo-French treaties. Northumberland informed Leicester in the first days of 
January that the French King and the Cardinal were seeking an indication from the 
English King as to how he wished to proceed.36 However, later that month, he 
reported that Pomponne de Bellièvre, the French ambassador at the Caroline court, 
was to return to France, indicating that the French were downgrading the treaties.37 
In February, the Lord Admiral speculated that there would be no break with France 
but little progress regarding an alliance with that country.38 
 
 
33 Collins, II, 625-6: Northumberland to Leicester, 19 December 1639. 
 
34 Collins, II, 627-8: Northumberland to Leicester, 26 December 1639. 
 
35 SP 78/108, fol. 225: Leicester to [Coke]/[Windebanke], 27 December 1639/[6 January 
1640]; see also Collins, II, 628. 
 
36 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 219-20: Northumberland to Leicester, 2 January 
1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/5. 
 
37 Collins, II, 629: Northumberland to Leicester, 9 January 1640. 
 




Northumberland noted the adverse effect that Charles’s problems in Scotland 
were having on England’s international standing and by implication on the prospects 
of a league with France. He provided Leicester with his thoughts on this subject in 
mid-February, stating that: 
 
We are so sett upon the Reduceing [of] Scotland, as, till that be effected, we 
shall not intend the Restablishing the broaken Estate of Europe; nor can I 
perswade my selfe, that a Confederation with us, will be much sought by any 
of our Neighbours att this Tyme.39 
 
The Lord Admiral hinted at possible attempts by unnamed individuals, most 
probably Laud and his allies, to undermine his brother-in-law’s position as 
ambassador in Paris as well as the possibility of any Anglo-French alliance. Early in 
March, he informed the ambassador that: 
 
The recalling of your Lordship hath beene whispered here, by some that 
would be glad to breake the Correspondence betweene the two Crownes, 
feareing least France and we should growe to good Friends … Such an 
Advise as this may prevaile much, if the French should not think of sending 
an Embassadour hither …40 
 
Northumberland’s words expose his growing pessimism about the conclusion of an 
Anglo-French league. His comments about the possible failure of the French to 
replace Bellièvre with a new ambassador to Charles also reveal that he appreciated 
that the threat to the negotiations with France came from both opposition at the 
Caroline court and a lack of willingness on the part of the French to progress 
matters. 
 
Charles’s difficulties in Scotland divided the Protestant interests at his court. 
The Northumberland-Leicester circle still clung to its hope of finally concluding the 
Anglo-French treaties. In contrast, the out-of-favour group based around Robert 
Rich, second earl of Warwick, and his allies, Francis Russell, fourth earl of Bedford, 
 
39 Collins, II, 636-7: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 February 1640. 
 
40 Collins, II, 639-40: Northumberland to Leicester, 5 March 1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 




and Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex, were exploring the possibility of using the 
Scottish Covenanters to lever themselves into power in England and re-establish ‘the 
broaken Estate of Europe.’41 Striking a very different note, Leicester was very 
critical of the Scots, writing late in April 1640 that he ‘was confirmed in [his] 
opinion that [th]e Scots were starck mad, and … hope[d] the successe [that is, 
outcome, meaning failure] of their rebellion will demonstrate it.’42 As late as 
October of that year, Northumberland was wishing that the forthcoming Long 
Parliament would ‘free us [the English] from this Army of Rebells [the 
Covenanters].’43 The Scottish rebellion was politically divisive, and weakened the 
Protestant interests at the English King’s court. This division would last until the 
winter of 1640-1. 
 
Sir Thomas Roe’s mission as Charles’s representative at the Hamburg 
conference on the Anglo-French treaties involving the creation of an anti-Habsburg 
coalition based on England, France, Sweden and the United Provinces ended in the 
spring of 1640. The conference had become progressively less important for the 
English King as time passed, and the possibility of an alliance with Spain replaced 
that of one with France. In March, Northumberland informed Leicester that ‘I should 
the last Weeke have acquainted your Lordship with his Majestys Resolution of 
calling Home Sir Thomas Roe.’44 Roe took his leave of Christian IV, the King of 
 
41 For collusion between Charles I’s English opponents and the rebellious Covenanters in 
Scotland, see, in general, Gardiner, History of England, IX, 178-81; Russell, Fall of the British 
Monarchies, pp. 60-3, 68-70 and 165-71; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 22-3, 36-40, 44-50, 59, 72-
6 and 83. Peter H. Donald, ‘New Light on the Anglo-Scottish Contacts of 1640’, Historical Research, 
62 (1989), 221-9 and David Scott, ‘Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-Columnist during the 
Bishops’ Wars: The Case of Yorkshire’, Historical Research, 70 (1997), 269-93 deal with specific 
examples of collaboration and co-operation with the Scots in 1640. 
 
42 SP 78/109, fol. 187: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 25 April/5 May 1640; see 
also Collins, II, 645-8. As Vane is referred to in the third person in this letter, it can be taken as being 
addressed to Windebanke and that Collins was correct in ascribing the letter as being to the junior 
Secretary of State. Correspondingly, Windebanke is referred to in the third person in SP 78/109, fol. 
189: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 25 April/5 May 1640; see also Collins, II, 649-52, with 
which the first letter is coupled in the calendar. As a result, in agreement with Collins, the second 
letter was addressed to Vane. 
 
43 Collins, II, 662: Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640. 
 
44 Collins, II, 640: Northumberland to Leicester, 12 March 1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 




Denmark, in April and sailed for England at the beginning of June.45 
 
In the spring and early summer of 1640, Leicester noted revived French 
interest in the Anglo-French treaties, possibly stimulated by concern in France about 
the prospect of Anglo-Spanish talks. He relayed in March that Bullion had visited 
him and had stated that Louis and Richelieu were still interested in concluding an 
alliance with Charles.46 Probably to encourage the English King to engage with the 
French, Bullion had admitted that France was involved in talks for a truce with 
Spain, brokered by the Papacy.47 Nonetheless, if Charles were to agree to an Anglo-
French league, the French would abandon these discussions. Bullion had also been 
reported to have claimed that Maximilian of Bavaria, the English King’s great 
bugbear diplomatically, was not as powerful as he had once been: 
 
… [th]e D.[uke] of Bavaria is not so well now as he hath bin at Vienna, and 
[th]e Assembly of Noremberg [Nuremburg] hath called him in question, and 
demanded account of his proceedings and expenses of great summer of 
money which he hath received of [th]e Catholick League and hath converted 
to the use of his owne affaires …48 
 
The French were trying to entice Charles with the prospect that Maximilian’s 
difficulties might offer the opportunity for the (partial) restoration of the Prince 
Elector. However, with the Anglo-Spanish negotiations in the offing and the chance 
for England and Spain to deal with more pressing matters – in the English King’s 
case, the potential to obtain Spanish men and money with which to crush his 
rebellious subjects – the French blandishments regarding the Palatinate were a case 
of too little too late. In conclusion, Leicester stated that Roe’s putative recall from 
Hamburg, which was being discussed in English diplomatic circles, might give the 
 
45 Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 77. 
 
46 SP 78/109, fol. 151: Leicester to Secretary of State, 27 March/6 April 1640. It is not clear to 
which Secretary of State, that is, Vane or Windebanke, this letter was addressed. 
 
47 See SP 78/110, fol. 1: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 5/15 June 1640 for an, albeit 
later, indication that the French and Spanish were negotiating under the auspices of the Papacy. As 
Windebanke is referred to in the third person in this letter, it can be taken that it was addressed to 
Vane. 
 









The prospects for an Anglo-Spanish league improved from late 1639 as the strategic 
and diplomatic implications of the Battle of the Downs began to make an impression 
in London, Madrid and Brussels. In England, Wentworth seized the moment and 
began to push more forcibly for a pro-Spanish foreign policy. At the beginning of 
December, Northumberland advised Leicester that ‘There is not a Person, in this 
Court, more 394 [Spanish], then 115 [Lord Deputy, Wentworth].’49 The Lord 
Admiral also observed that Olivares was making tentative moves towards a 
reconciliation with Charles – a development that could only enhance Wentworth’s 
growing influence at court.50 
 
The opportunity for a league with Spain gained further momentum at the 
beginning of 1640. Northumberland relayed to Leicester the fact that the Spanish 
were pressing Charles for a declaration of his intentions.51 At the same time, 
rumours began to circulate at court that Wentworth would be made an earl – an 
honour that Charles duly conferred on him on 12 January.52 Seven days later, he was 
made Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.53 His advancement permitted him to remain at the 
Caroline court and, therefore, near the centre of events, no longer having to be 
permanently present in Ireland as he had been required to do as Lord Deputy. 
Wentworth’s promotion was both an indication of the King’s favour and of the 
 
49 Collins, II, 621: Northumberland to Leicester, 5 December 1639. 
 
50 Collins, II, 625-6: Northumberland to Leicester, 19 December 1639. 
 
51 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 219-20: Northumberland to Leicester, 2 January 
1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/5. 
 
52 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 218: countess of Carlisle to countess of Leicester, 2 
January 1640; see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 151-2. See Gardiner, History of 
England, IX, 83 for the date that Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth (1593-1641), was made 
earl of Strafford. 
 




growing power of the Spanish Party at court. This change boded well for an alliance 
with Spain, but ill for one with France. The Lord Admiral also informed the 
ambassador in Paris of the news that Don Antonio Sancho Dávila y Toledo, fourth 
marques of Velada, the second of the triumvirate of Spanish ambassadors in 
England in 1640, was to come to the country (he reached London in April). The first 
Spanish representative, Alfonso de Cárdenas, was already present in Charles’s 
capital. The third and final Spanish envoy, the marques Virgilio Malvezzi, would 
again arrive in April.54 
 
In February 1640, Northumberland reported that a marriage between 
Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of Charles and Henriette Marie, and Balthasar 
Carlos, the only son of Philip IV then alive and, therefore, the heir to the Spanish 
throne, had been suggested by Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse, the anti-
Richelieu and pro-Spanish conspirator at the Caroline court.55 Coming from the 
duchesse, the proposition carried little weight. Nevertheless, there are indications 
that Olivares himself was considering such a marriage, which added importance to 
the proposal.56 Reinforcing this understanding, in April Leicester noted rumours to 
the effect that Balthasar Carlos would marry Princess Mary.57 The next month, he 
relayed more talk of a marriage between Philip’s heir and Charles’s eldest 
daughter.58 
 
54 Collins, II, 629: Northumberland to Leicester, 9 January 1640. See Elliott, ‘Year of Three 
Ambassadors’, p. 165 for the timing of the arrival of the Spanish emissaries in London in 1640. Don 
Antonio Sancho Dávila y Toledo, fourth marques of Velada (dates unknown) was a prominent 
Spanish diplomat. Marques Virgilio Malvezzi (1595-1654) was of Italian origin. He was a soldier and 
diplomat and Olivares’ official historian at the Spanish court. Together with Alfonso de Cárdenas 
(dates unknown), Velada and Malvezzi formed the team of three ambassadors who would attempt to 
conclude an Anglo-Spanish league in 1640. For the former’s arrival in England, see Albert J. Loomie, 
‘Alonso de Cardenas and the Long Parliament, 1640-48’, EHR, 97 (1982), 289-90. 
 
55 Collins, II, 636-7: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 February 1640. See also Gardiner, 
History of England, IX, 89. In 1640, Balthasar Carlos (1629-46), Prince of Asturias, Prince of Girona, 
Duke of Montblanc, Count of Cervera and Lord of Balaguer and Prince of Viana, was heir apparent 
to all of the kingdoms, states and dominions of Philip IV of Spain until his (Carlos’s) death in 1646. 
Philip IV’s only other surviving offspring at that time was Maria Theresa of Austria, Infanta of Spain 
(1638-83), who would marry the future Louis XIV (1638-1715). 
 
56 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 171 and Olivares, p. 573. 
 
57 SP 78/109, fol. 153: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 3/13 April 1640. 
 
58 SP 78/109, fol. 196: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 1/11 May 1640. As Windebanke 




In the first months of 1640, Leicester had recorded signs of possible English 
naval assistance for Spain. He had stated in February that: 
 
… the Holland Amb[assado]r. [in Paris] one day told me, that he was desired 
by some of these [French?] ministers to speak to me, concerning some ships, 
which were to goe out of England to serve the King of Spaine, and that it 
would be of great conseque[n]ce and prejudice to the Hollanders; …59 
 
The ambassador had not elucidated whether the ships referred to were Charles’s or 
those of his subjects. If the former were the case, this potential development might 
be viewed as a harbinger of the Anglo-Spanish discussions of that spring and 





Leicester was involved in one of the two strategies that Charles used to try to win 
support from the Short Parliament – that is, the ‘Au Roi’ letter. (The other royal 
gambit was the offer to barter ship money in return for the granting of subsidies.60) 
The ‘Au Roi’ letter was from the Covenanters to the French King, whom they 
appeared to address as their sovereign. In an indication of the letter’s importance, 
the English King wrote to Leicester on 11 April 1640, noting what he regarded as its 
treasonable nature, stating that it was to be presented to Parliament in an attempt to 
stir-up English feelings against the Scots.61 The ambassador was to inform Louis 
 
wrote to one of the Secretaries of State on the same day in SP 78/109, fol. 207: Leicester to Secretary 
of State/[Windebanke], 1/11 May 1640, which can be assumed to have been to Windebanke. 
 
59 SP 78/109, fol. 93: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 28 February/9 March 1640. From 
its contents, it is presumed that this letter was to Vane. 
 
60 For the ‘Au Roi’ letter, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 92 and 98-9. For the granting of 
twelve subsidies in return for Charles I giving up ship money, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 
112-6 and Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 119-23. The Short Parliament sat from 13 
April to 5 May 1640. 
 
61 SP 78/109, fol. 170-1: Charles I to Leicester, 11 April 1640; see also Collins, II, 645 (the ‘Au 
Roi’ letter being addressed ‘by Our Traitorous [Scottish] Subiects to Him [Louis XIII] as there 




that, despite the letter, Charles wished to see good relations maintained between the 
two Crowns and to assure him of his master’s affection for him, which he assumed 
Louis would reciprocate. 
 
Windebanke asked Leicester to act as an intelligencer in trying to identify the 
individual who had delivered the ‘Au Roi’ letter to Louis. The ambassador 
undertook this task with enthusiasm, probably in an attempt to justify his continuing 
presence in Paris. Such action also indicated his and Northumberland’s anti-Scottish 
posture and their favouring of an alliance with France as a way of restoring 
England’s prestige in Europe.62 Windebanke asked Leicester, also on 11 April 1640, 
to establish if a ‘John Covill’ was the Scot who had been entrusted with giving the 
Covenanter’s letter to the French King.63 In his reply of the twenty-fifth of that 
month, the ambassador noted that William Colville, John’s brother and a Church of 
Scotland minister, had recently arrived in the city, but that it was not clear if it was 
William who had delivered the letter to Louis.64 Leicester had had an audience with 
the French King, who had denied any knowledge of the letter, and had assured 
Charles of his continued good will towards him. Early in May, the ambassador again 
wrote to Windebanke, reporting that, despite Louis’s denials, it was thought that the 
Colville who had given the French King the letter was not William, but another 
Colville, whom the English already had in custody in the Tower of London.65 He 
could not spirit away William Colville, who was still in Paris, to England without 
 
62 See SP 78/109, fol. 187: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 25 April/5 May 
1640; see also Collins, II, 645-8 and Collins, II, 662: Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640 
for respectively Leicester’s and Northumberland’s distaste for the Scots and the actions of the 
Covenanters. 
 
63 Collins, II, 644: Windebanke to Leicester, 11 April 1640. Collins attributed the letter as 
being from Windebanke, but there is nothing in it to indicate that it was from that source, other than 
its topic – that is, intelligence work – with which Windebanke as Charles I’s spymaster would deal. 
 
64 SP 78/109, fol. 187: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 25 April/5 May 1640; see 
also Collins, II, 645-8. William Colville (d.1675), a Church of Scotland minister and the future 
university principal, acted as an emissary from the Scots to France and the United Provinces in 1640 
tasked with trying to obtain French and Dutch support for the Covenanter’s regime in Scotland. 
 
65 SP 78/109, fol. 206: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 8/18 May 1640; see also 
Collins, II, 653 for an edited version of this letter. It is unclear to which Secretary of State the letter 
was addressed, but, as Collins probably correctly attributed it as being to Windebanke, the companion 
SP 78/109, fol. 204: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 8/18 May 1640 may be considered as 




causing a diplomatic incident with the French. The French also continued to deny 
providing any support to the Scots. Leicester reported later in that month that he had 
asked Bullion if William Colville was in the French King’s service.66 In letters of 
the first week of June to the two Secretaries of State, the ambassador relayed the 
evasive French response to the effect that William Colville was not a criminal in 
their eyes.67 
 
The Short Parliament did not provide Charles with the funds that he sought 
for his war against the Covenanters. Northumberland expressed his doubts on 23 
April 1640 to Leicester regarding a successful conclusion to the Parliament, given 
that the majority of MPs were insisting on the redress of grievances before granting 
supply.68 He thought that the King would peremptorily dissolve the Parliament, 
leaving the earl as Captain General of a royal army and campaign that would lack 
either parliamentary approval or financial support.69 The Short Parliament was duly 
dissolved on 5 May 1640. Northumberland communicated his despair to Leicester at 
this development and Charles’s decision to continue his campaign against the 
Covenanters regardless. The Percy earl wrote on the seventh of that month saying 
that: 
 
The Particulars of the unhappie Breache of the Parlement, your Lordship will 
heare from divers; … Not withstanding this Dissolution, the King intends 
vigorously to pursue his former Designes, and to leavie the same Army of 
 
66 SP 78/109, fol. 208: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 22 May/1 June 1640. It is 
not immediately apparent to which Secretary of State this letter was addressed. However, as SP 
78/109, fol. 226: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 22 May/1 June 1640 could have been 
addressed to Vane, the first letter, given its subject matter, might be regarded as being to 
Windebanke. 
 
67 See SP 78/110, fol. 1: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 5/15 June 1640 and SP 
78/110, fol. 5: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 5/15 June 1640. As Vane is referred to in the 
third person in the first letter and Windebanke in the second, the letters were addressed to 
Windebanke and Vane respectively. For more on the Colville affair, see David Stevenson, The 
Scottish Revolution 1637-44, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 2003), pp. 180, 181, 
184 and 187. 
 
68 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 251-2: Northumberland to Leicester, 23 April 1640. 
For the Short Parliament’s refusal to grant supply to Charles I, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 
112-6 and Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 116-23. 
 
69 For Northumberland’s appointment as Captain General of the army to fight the Scots in 




30000 Foote, and 3000 Horse. About 3 Weekes hence, they are to be drawne 
together; but as yet I can not learne by what Meanes we are certaine to gett 
one Shilling, towards the defraying this greate Expence. What will the World 
iudge of us Abroade, to see us enter into such an Action as this is, not 
knowing how to mentaine it for one Month.70 
 
Northumberland’s remarks were very critical, especially coming from the man who 
was intended to lead Charles’s army in the impending war against the Scots.71 
Worryingly for Leicester, Northumberland’s sister and Leicester’s sister-in-law, the 
dowager countess of Carlisle, in a letter, also of 7 May, to the ambassador, noted her 
previously influential brother’s loss of favour with Charles due to his support for 
Parliament – ‘[m]y brothers giving his opinione against the breking of the Parlement 
is not well taken, and beleevd by sume that it will mutch rest ine the Kings thoughts 
[unfavourably].’72 Northumberland was a key supporter of an alliance with France. 
His loss of favour was, therefore, a further factor that augured badly for the 
conclusion of the Anglo-French treaties. In the same letter, the countess of Carlisle, 
who was Strafford’s confidant, confirmed the importance of the Anglo-Spanish 
negotiations as an alternative source of funds for the English King’s war against the 
Covenanters. She related that ‘[the Earl of Strafford] [was] mutch interesed ine the 
Spanishe afairs [that is, a league with Spain] … [and] … Thay [they] saye we shall 
have mony from them [the Spanish] …’73 
 
How did Northumberland and Leicester reconcile their advocacy of an 
 
70 Collins, II, 652: Northumberland to Leicester, 7 May 1640. 
 
71 In August 1640, Northumberland relinquished his command of the King’s army, being 
replaced by Strafford. The ostensible reason was Northumberland’s illness. And ill health appears to 
have been the cause, as Leicester referred to ‘my Lord Admirall’ and ‘his dangerous sichnes’ in SP 
78/110, fol. 96: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 21/31 August 1640. It is not 
immediately apparent to whom this letter was addressed, but, as it was in Leicester’s own hand, it 
might be thought that the recipient was Windebanke. See also Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 50 and that 
author’s reference to De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 319: Henry Percy to Leicester, 27 August 
1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 86/15 for Northumberland’s illness. This 
evidence does not rule out a psychosomatic and stress-related element for Northumberland’s ill 
health. 
 
72 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 262: countess of Carlisle to Leicester, 7 May 1640; 
see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 87/6. 
 
73 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 262: countess of Carlisle to Leicester, 7 May 1640; 




Anglo-French alliance with possible French support for the Covenanters, which in 
the case of France’s allies, Sweden and the United Provinces, was certain? Both 
earls detested the Scots.74 They also hated the idea of a league with Spain.75 It is 
conceivable that Leicester and Northumberland accepted French assurances that 
they were not aiding the Covenanters, directly or indirectly.76 However, it is unlikely 
that they were that naïve. It is more probable that both hoped that an alliance with 
France would enable continental aid for the Scots to be cut off at source (or, at least, 
controlled). Such a stance would enable them to maintain their backing for an anti-
Habsburg league based on France, and, at the same time, demonstrate that they were 
trying to help to bring Charles’s rebellious northern kingdom to heel. 
 
With the arrival in England of the Spanish ambassadors, Malvezzi and 
Velada, in April 1640, Anglo-Spanish negotiations for a treaty became official and 
supplanted Leicester’s talks with the French in diplomatic and political 
importance.77 Late in that month, the two Spanish negotiators along with Cárdenas 
visited Strafford.78 To the surprise of the Spanish, Strafford immediately asked what 
monies Philip IV could offer Charles. In response, Spain’s representatives 
prevaricated. The composition of the English negotiating party was also discussed. It 
included Northumberland – possibly in an ex officio capacity and, therefore, with 
little involvement in the talks – who, despite his loss of favour with Charles and his 
pro-French alliance sympathies, was a replacement for the even more Francophile 
James Hamilton, third marquis of Hamilton. The English party in addition 
comprised Cottington, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Master of the Court of 
Wards, and Windebanke, both, along with Strafford, members of the Spanish Party. 
 
74 See Collins, II, 662: Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640 and SP 78/109, fol. 187: 
Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 25 April/5 May 1640; see also Collins, II, 645-8. 
 
75 For Northumberland’s opinion on this matter, see, for example, Collins, II, 655: 
Northumberland to Leicester, 25 June 1640. 
 
76 See, for example, SP 78/108, fol. 19: [Coke] to Leicester, 7 June 1639 and SP 78/109, fol. 
206: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 8/18 May 1640; see also Collins, II, 653 for an 
edited version of this letter. 
 
77 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 165. 
 




The Anglo-Spanish negotiations began before the dissolution of the Short 
Parliament on 5 May. Thus, Charles might have summoned the Parliament with little 
hope of obtaining finance from it, and with every intention of dismissing it 
summarily should it fail to prove cooperative.79 
 
Despite the opening of Anglo-Spanish negotiations in London, Leicester 
continued his discussions in Paris on the Anglo-French treaties. In a letter of the first 
of May 1640 to one of the Secretaries of State, the ambassador reported that, at his 
audience with the French King on the ‘Au Roi’ letter from the Covenanters to Louis 
in which the Scots seemingly addressed the King of France as their sovereign, he 
had raised the issue of the treaties.80 Louis had indicated that he wished the 
negotiations to resume. Leicester had contacted Chavigny, who had repeated his 
master’s message. However, as often in the past, Chavigny stated that the French 
would only agree to an offensive and a defensive alliance. The ambassador also 
speculated on the sex of the child that Anne of Austria, the French Queen, was 
carrying, expressing the hope that it was a girl – and, therefore, a possible future 
bride for the Prince of Wales. The French persisted with their revived interest in the 
treaties, and, in mid-May, Leicester reported that Chavigny had approached him 
once more.81 Both sides were stringing the other along – the French to keep the 
English King talking and Charles to encourage the Spanish to negotiate with him. 
The latter action was unnecessary given Spain’s pressing need to reopen 
communications with Flanders. The resumption of the Anglo-French negotiations at 
this time has not been noted in any of the secondary literature on the period – once 
again, all eyes have been on the English King’s pro-Spanish proclivities and 
 
79 I owe this idea to a comment made by Professor John Adamson at a supervisors’ meeting in 
July 2019. 
 
80 SP 78/109, fol. 196: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 1/11 May 1640. On the topic of 
the resumption of the Anglo-French negotiations, Leicester reported Léon le Bouthillier, comte de 
Chavigny, Louis XIII’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1608-52), as stating that ‘he [Louis 
XIII/Chavigny?] desired nothing more, then that a good Treaty might be made between the two 
Kings [Charles I and Louis XIII].’ 
 
81 SP 78/109, fol. 214: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 15/25 May 1640. The most 
likely recipient of this letter is Vane, as there is another letter of the same date, SP 78/109, fol. 217: 
Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 15/25 May 1640, which, given its subject matter, was 






Charles’s lack of funds emphasized the vital importance of obtaining money 
from Spain. Writing to Leicester on 21 May 1640, Northumberland described the 
King’s dire financial straits.82 In a letter of the same date to the ambassador, the 
countess of Carlisle again noted her brother’s loss of favour – ‘[The Earl of 
Strafford] thinks [the King] lesse pleasd with [the Earl of Northumberland] then 
[s]he expreses. [The Queen] speaks lowdly against of [the Earl of Northumberland] 
…’83 In June, the Lord Admiral made known to Leicester his knowledge of, and 
distain for, an Anglo-Spanish alliance and a Catholic match for the Stewart princess: 
 
The procureing a Summe of Money from Spaine, to furnish the presseing 
Occations, hath beene endevored with much Dilligence, and a Marriage 
proposed with some earnestnes, by Madam Chevreux, for our young 
Princesse [Mary]. The first of these I beleeve will not be gained but upon 
such Disadvantage to us, as I trust we shall not assent unto; and for the other 
I can only say, that I have often heard it talked of.84 
 
Northumberland reported the ominous news to Leicester in July 1640 that 
Windebanke, one of their leading opponents in the Spanish Party at court, had been 
talking about the likely termination of the earl’s embassy and his recall to England.85 
In the same month, the ambassador reported that he had been unable to contact any 
of the French negotiators – Claude le Bouthillier, Chavigny’s father and the French 
King’s other surintendant des finances, or Bullion or Chavigny.86 Yet with the 
Prince Elector fast on his way to attaining his full liberty, Leicester was hopeful that 
talks on the treaties with Louis and Richelieu could be resumed. In arguing for a 
league with France, the ambassador was adamant that such an alliance was vital for 
 
82 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 269-70: Northumberland to Leicester, 21 May 1640; 
see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/15. 
 
83 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 270-1: countess of Carlisle to Leicester, 21 May 
1640. 
 
84 Collins, II, 655: Northumberland to Leicester, 25 June 1640. 
 
85 Collins, II, 655-6: Northumberland to Leicester, 10 July 1640. 
 
86 SP 78/110, fol. 64: Leicester to [Secretary of State], 24 July/3 August 1640. It is unclear to 




the recovery of Charles Louis’s dignities and lands, as the fortunes of the French had 
improved in the Thirty Years War and the Franco-Spanish War. France was, 
therefore, in a better position to influence European affairs and assist in the Prince 
Palatine’s restoration than it had been in the past. At the end of July, 
Northumberland again commented on the Paris mission: 
 
So long as the Treaties betwixt us and France, are keept on Foote, I do not 
beleeve you [are], in any Danger of being recalled … but if, by entering into 
a straighter League with Spaine … this French Treatie should be abandoned; 
there is [no] Cause to doubt, that the Officers of the Revenew here, will be 
readie to perswade the King, to save the Charge of keepeing an 
extraordinarie Embassador in France.87 
 
The Lord Admiral clearly grasped that holding high-level talks with France and 
Spain simultaneously was not only politically untenable but also financially 
imprudent. 
 
Why did Charles retain Leicester in Paris? Firstly, he wished to keep his 
options open. Given England’s relatively weak position as a second-rank power, 
foreign nations often engaged him in discussions without any serious intention of 
entering into an alliance. In such circumstances, the King had to use the threat of 
negotiations with one power to pressure another state into entering into meaningful 
talks with him. (Due to Spain’s need to reopen the English Road, such a strategy 
was probably unnecessary in relation to the Anglo-Spanish talks.) There was also 
the small matter that the Prince Elector had not yet been granted his full liberty – he 
would only be freed unconditionally in the late summer of 1640. Leicester’s 
continued presence in Paris was, therefore, necessary.88 Finally, by keeping the door 
open to a possible Anglo-French league, however remote, Charles could hope to 
retain the loyalty of the Northumberland-Leicester circle in the lead up to the 
Second Bishops’ War. 
 
 
87 Collins, II, 657-8: Northumberland to Leicester, 30 July 1640. 
 
88 See SP 78/110, fol. 88: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 14/24 August 1640; SP 
78/110, fol. 100: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 21/31 August 1640; and SP 78/110, fol. 117: 




Following intensive negotiations, terms were agreed between England and 
Spain on 2 August 1640.89 In return for Spanish money, Charles would provide 
naval support to Spain, enter into an offensive and a defensive league with the 
Spanish, and declare war on the Dutch. The latter two provisions were subject to a 
successful outcome of the English King’s war with the Covenanters. The agreement 
on the terms of an Anglo-Spanish treaty indicate a clear divergence of approach 
between France and Spain to an alliance with England in 1640. Louis and Richelieu, 
subject to a major reversal in French diplomatic and military fortunes, were happy to 
keep talking to Charles, with little or no intention of concluding a league with him. 
In their opinion, such a strategy would prevent the English King allying with the 
Habsburgs. In contrast, by the summer of that year, Olivares, given Spain’s urgent 
need to reopen communications with Flanders, was more than willing to commit to 
an agreement with Charles. 
 
In the high summer of 1640, the French, clearly troubled by the Anglo-
Spanish negotiations, approached Leicester about revitalizing the stalled Anglo-
French treaty talks. The ambassador reported on 14 August that he had been visited 
by Bullion, who, hypocritically, had stated that all that the French had got out of the 
English to date was talk and no action.90 Bullion had repeated the French line that an 
Anglo-French league was the best way to restore peace to Christendom, and had 
denied any French involvement in Charles’s Scottish difficulties. He had also 
referred to the Anglo-Spanish discussions of which the French said they were aware: 
 
… we are not so ill informed of what passes in Gr:[eat] Br:[itain] as to be 
alltogether ignorant of [th]e affections of your peoples, and we beleeve that 
if [th]e King of Gr:[eat] Br:[itain] continue to favor [th]e Spaniards, he will 
have more and more troubles at home every day, and that all would be 
quickly appeased, if his Ma[jes]ty would ioyne himself with the bon [the 
French] party. 
 
As at the end of 1638, when the French had reacted with hostility to the English 
King’s talks with Spain in Brussels, they had again responded with a threat to the 
 
89 See O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish Plot’, pp. 441-3. 
 




prospect of an Anglo-Spanish alliance.91 The covert menace behind the French 
words was clear – either join with us, or, at least, stop treating with the Spanish, or 
France would stir up trouble in Scotland. It did not matter whether the French were 
complicit or not in the Covenanter rebellion. The point was that Louis and Richelieu 
were in a position to affect events in Charles’s northern kingdom for better or worse, 
and that was threat enough. Perceptively, given France’s rise to ascendency under 
Louis XIV in the second half of the seventeenth century, Leicester had countered 
Bullion’s argument by speculating on the possibility of France replacing Spain as 
the (over-mighty) power in Europe. He had replied that ‘… how shall we be assured 
that, the bon [the French] Party … will not change itself to [th]e contrary, if it should 
grow as powerfull as that whose [Spain’s] greatnes you would diminish?’ Bullion 
had denied this possibility. The ambassador also reported the French belief that the 
English King was playing them along and would not side with them in their wars 
against Austria and Spain. In France’s eyes, Charles was hoping that the Prince 
Elector would be restored in a general peace that would follow a French victory over 
the Habsburgs. Despite his worries about France becoming over-powerful (or maybe 
because of them), Leicester cautioned that, if this was indeed the English King’s 
plan and the French were aware of it, it would risk them disregarding Charles 
Louis’s interests in any overall peace settlement. 
 
The French continued to ask if Charles had any proposals to make regarding 
the restitution of the Prince Elector to his dignity and lands. These sentiments were 
the essence of Bullion’s enquiry as reported by Leicester in the final days of August 
1640.92 This query again illustrates the bottom line to French policy towards the 
English King – they wanted to keep talking to Charles in the hope that such a 
strategy would prevent him allying with the Habsburgs. It also betrays French fears 
of a possible Anglo-Spanish league. Leicester responded that the English King’s 
involvement with his mutinous Scottish subjects, whom Bullion yet again had said 
that France would not aid, prevented any proposals being made at that time.93 
 
91 See SP 78/106, fol. 374: Leicester to [Coke], 14/24 December 1638. 
 
92 SP 78/110, fol. 108: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 28 August/7 September 1640. 
This letter might be regarded as being addressed to Vane. 
 




Most historians have attached little importance to the Anglo-Spanish 
negotiations that took place between April and August 1640. Gardiner, for example, 
was dismissive of the talks.94 John Elliott at the end of his essay on the negotiations 
states that ‘… the waves were too high, the distance too great, and neither [Olivares 
nor Strafford] stood any real chance of reaching the shore [that is, of concluding an 
Anglo-Spanish alliance].’95 However, Elliott, aside from describing the detailed 
discussions between the two countries, refers to an effusive letter from Strafford to 
Olivares written towards the end of the negotiations.96 Such evidence is indicative of 
the seriousness of the talks, at least, for Strafford. Patrick O’Neill, in his recent 
doctoral thesis, provides a corrective to the view that an Anglo-Spanish treaty was 
always a long-shot.97 He emphasizes the fact that, on 2 August, England and Spain 
reached agreement regarding the terms for a treaty that were realistic and potentially 
game-changing. Indeed, it is likely that, the negotiations were genuine on both sides 
and that, given the pressing need of Charles and Olivares to reach agreement, a 
substantive treaty would have been realized that summer had not events in Britain 
and Spain intervened. Following the diplomatic and strategic revolution brought 
about by the Battle of the Downs, the Anglo-Spanish talks of 1640 had focused on 
providing Spanish men and money to Charles in return for naval assistance in 
reopening the English Road. For once, the shadow of Maximilian was not hanging 
over the negotiations and their successful conclusion had been a very real 
possibility. 
 
Two sequences of events wrecked the opportunity for an Anglo-Spanish 
alliance. The first was Spain’s problems in the Iberian Peninsula. These troubles 
took the form of the rebellion in Catalonia in June 1640 and the revolution in 
 
another reference to Charles I’s Scottish difficulties, this time reportedly made by the French. 
 
94 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 131, 132, 136, 138, 175 and 184. 
 
95 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 181. 
 
96 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 179. 
 




Portugal the following December.98 Leicester first referred to the Catalonian revolt 
in a letter to one of the Secretaries of State, possibly Vane, early in October.99 He 
(rightly) thought that these occurrences ‘may shake that mighty Monarchy of 
Spaine.’100 The rebellion in Catalonia and the Portuguese revolution meant that 
Spain could no longer keep its side of the treaty terms, for with all its resources 
diverted to regaining control in the Iberian Peninsula it did not have any money to 
spare for Charles and his war against the Covenanters. 
 
The other set of developments that ended the prospects of an Anglo-Spanish 
league was Charles’s defeat by the Covenanters in the Second Bishop’s War in 
August 1640 and the undermining of his authority in England by his domestic 
opponents thereafter. Despite failing to obtain funds from the Short Parliament, the 
King had persisted with his preparations for war against the Covenanters. Then 
disaster struck as the northern part of Charles’s divided, ill-equipped and 
underfunded forces were defeated by the Covenanters at the Battle of Newburn, near 
Newcastle, on 28 August.101 Just as damaging, the King was ambushed by his 
 
98 For Spain’s problems at home in 1640, see, in general, Elliott, Olivares, pp. 571-85 and 585-
99 and, in particular, Revolt of the Catalans, pp. 452-88 and 489-522. The murder on the Barcelona 
shoreline of Spain’s viceroy in Catalonia, Dalmau de Queralt, count of Santa Coloma (1593-1640), 
on 7 June 1640 can be taken as a clear indication that Spain’s problems in the Principality were 
serious. It can be assumed that it would take, at least, five to six weeks for this news to reach 
England. For the viceroy’s murder, see Elliott, Olivares, p. 580 and Revolt of the Catalans, pp. 445-9. 
 
99 SP 78/110, fol. 137: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 2/12 October 1640. It is more 
likely that the recipient of this letter was Vane than Windebanke. 
 
100 SP 78/110, fol. 138: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 2/12 October 1640. 
 
101 For descriptions of the Battle of Newburn, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 192-4 and 
Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 142-5. Russell indicated his assessment of the importance 
of the battle by stating that ‘[i]n the internal history of Britain, perhaps only Bannockburn, the Boyne 
and Culloden have settled as much.’ See Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 145. For the 
division of Charles I’s forces, for example, the artillery being at Hull in August 1640, see Mark C. 
Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars: Charles I’s Campaigns against Scotland, 1638-1640 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 58. See SP 78/110, fol. 125: Leicester to [Secretary of 
State]/[Windebanke], 11/21 September 1640; see also Collins, II, 658-9 for Leicester’s reaction to the 
English defeat at the Battle of Newburn. Collins attributed the recipient of this letter to be Vane. 
However, as Leicester had already written, presumably earlier that day, to one of the Secretaries of 
State (see SP 78/110, fol. 123: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 11/21 September 1640), 
whom he described as having gone ‘towards the North’ and as Windebanke had remained in London 
with the Privy Council, Windebanke was probably the recipient of the first letter (an additional 
indication that the addressee was Windebanke is the fact that the letter was written in Leicester’s own 
hand) and Vane that of the second. See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 55 for Windebanke’s whereabouts 




enemies in England when he was presented in September with the Petition of the 
Twelve Peers – a group headed by the earls of Warwick, Bedford and Essex – that 
effectively demanded that he call a new Parliament.102 
 
Leicester was very critical of the Petitioner peers, hinting darkly at collusion 
with the Covenanters. Writing to one of Charles’s Secretaries of State, most likely 
Windebanke, on 18 September 1640, he stated that: 
 
… truly I do not well understand the meaning of those Lords w[hi]ch 
subscribed the petition [of the Twelve Peers] … [and] peradventure it might 
happen by chance rather then by intelligence that … much about the same 
time the Scots sent a like petition from Newcastle to [th]e King …103 
 
The ambassador’s words reveal that, in the autumn of 1640, knowledge of the 
treacherous activities of Warwick’s circle, spurned as it was at court, was 
widespread, having even reached Paris. The criticism also echoed remarks that 
Leicester made in a letter of 21 August, probably again to Windebanke, of those 
who would counsel Charles to compromise with the Covenanters to protect his 
position in England.104 The ambassador had expressed different views in a letter of 
11 September to Vane, when he had suggested that the King should ‘compose the 
differences with his rebellious Scots and give them some contentme[n]t.’105 
 
102 For the Petition of the Twelve Peers, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 198-9 and 201-2; 
Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 149, 153-4 and 384-5; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 
55-62. The Petition was based on a precedent dating back to the Oxford Parliament of 1258 during 
the baron’s rebellion led by Simon de Montfort, the sixth de Montfort earl of Leicester (1208-65), 
against Henry III (1207-72). The ‘Provisions of Oxford’ established a standing baronial council and 
gave power to twelve nobles to call a Parliament. See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 47-8. The Petition 
is reproduced in Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, pp. 134-6, and its signatories are set out in 
Adamson, Noble Revolt, Appendix, pp. 520-1. 
 
103 See SP 78/110, fol. 132: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 18/28 September 
1640; see Collins, II, 659-61 for an edited version of this letter. As Leicester referred to SP 78/110, 
fol. 125: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Windebanke], 11/21 September 1640; see also Collins, II, 
658-9 in the first letter, in disagreement with Collins, that letter was also probably addressed to 
Windebanke. 
 
104 SP 78/110, fol. 96: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 21/31 August 1640. 
 
105 SP 78/110, fol. 124: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 11/21 September 1640. That 
Leicester could harbour more radical views can be seen in an undated entry in his commonplace book 
to the effect that Charles I could resolve his problems north of the border by making one of his 
younger sons King of Scots and then waiting for the Covenanters to make their own enemies before 
destroying them. See Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 124-5 and footnote 162. It is 
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However, Leicester’s advice had fallen far short of giving in to all of the Covenanter 
demands. Almost certainly, he had not yet received news of the Petition of the 
Twelve Peers. He most likely had in mind the views of the letter’s recipient, Vane, 
who wanted to make concessions and merely fight a defensive war, if necessary, 
against the Scots.106 In this context, Leicester’s words indicated a desire to 
normalize affairs in England so as to be able to restart the French negotiations. 
Concluding his letter of the eighteenth of September, the ambassador promised to 
advise the recipient of any military moves on the part of France against England, 
though he thought that such developments were unlikely. Yet again, these 
sentiments reveal a clear division between the Northumberland-Leicester circle and 
Warwick’s unfavoured group. Leicester, Northumberland and their allies were still 
loyal to the King and advocated a league with France.107 By contrast, Warwick’s 
circle had abandoned an Anglo-French alliance in favour of (treasonable) 
collaboration with the Covenanters.108 
 
The Great Council of Peers, summoned by Charles to meet at York on 24 
September 1640, increased pressure on the King to summon a new Parliament – 
which he duly did four days later.109 Charles also lost control of the negotiations 
surrounding the Pacification of Ripon that ended the Second Bishops’ War. Under 
the truce agreed in late October, the King had to pay the Scots 850 pounds a day or 
 
unlikely that Charles I would have appreciated Leicester’s suggestion. 
 
106 For Vane’s opinions at this time, see Scott, Vane, p. 48. 
 
107 For Leicester’s loyalist approach, support for the Anglo-French treaties and his proposal to 
reactivate the talks with France, see SP 78/110, fol. 160: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 30 
October/9 November 1640. As Vane was a more likely recipient of this letter than Windebanke, SP 
78/110, fol. 162: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Windebanke], 30 October/9 November 1640 was 
probably addressed to Windebanke. 
 
108 For collusion between Charles I’s English opponents and the rebellious Covenanters in 
Scotland, see, in general, Gardiner, History of England, IX, 178-81; Russell, Fall of the British 
Monarchies, pp. 60-3, 68-70 and 165-71; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 22-3, 36-40, 44-50, 59, 72-
6 and 83. Donald, ‘New Light on Anglo-Scottish Contacts’, 221-9 and Scott, ‘Hannibal at our Gates’, 
269-93 deal with specific examples of collaboration and co-operation with the Scots in 1640. 
 
109 For the Great Council of Peers, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 208-9, 212 and 215-6 
and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 77-8, 80-2, 84-5 and 88. Charles I’s summons of the Great Council 




25,000 pounds a month.110 There was only one source through which such sums 
could be raised and that was Parliament, which, this time, Charles would not be able 
to dissolve readily. 
 
With the collapse of the projected Anglo-Spanish treaty in August 1640, 
Leicester’s negotiations for an Anglo-French alliance – which had receded into the 
background that spring and summer – came back into focus. In a letter to Vane of 
October, Leicester noted renewed French interest in the treaties.111 He stated that a 
league with France could have advantages for Charles, as: 
 
… some principall ministers here [in Paris] have seemed to be very confident 
that if his Ma[jes]ty did conclude a treaty with this State [France] for [th]e 
publick good of Christendome, it would be an assured meanes to appease his 
troubles and disorders at home, and to bring even [th]e Scots sooner unto 
reason: I must confess that to proove [th]e likelyhood of this some arguments 
have bin alledged, which in my poore opinion are not to be rejected, nor very 
easily refuted …112 
 
The ambassador repeated this message in a later missive of the same month: 
 
… I humbly present this to your consideration, [i]f the opinion of the King’s 
intention to ioyne with France and the other Confederates, for the restitution 
of the Pr:[ince] El[ecto]r. Palatin and the restablishment of the reformed 
religion in Germany, may not be a meanes to sweeten some sharpe humors in 
the Parlament, and to facilitate his Ma:[jes]tie’s affaires.113 
 
Leicester evidently believed that an Anglo-French alliance was still a viable option 
and that it offered an effective means of resolving the King’s problems at home. An 
 
110 For the Pacification of Ripon, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 209-14; Russell, Fall of 
the British Monarchies, pp. 160-3; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 82-5. The amount of 850 pounds 
a day to be paid to the Scots was confirmed to Leicester by Northumberland. See Collins, II, 662: 
Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640. 
 
111 SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 October/2 November 1640. 
As the letter refers to the recipient writing from York, the addressee must have been Vane. 
 
112 SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 October/2 November 1640. 
 
113 SP 78/110, fol. 161: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 30 October/9 November 1640. 
As Windebanke was referred to in the third person in this letter, the recipient was Vane. SP 78/110, 
fol. 162: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Windebanke], 30 October/9 November 1640 is a brief 




alliance with France represented the best prospect in the earl’s eyes of Charles 
striking a blow in the Protestant cause, which would go a long way towards 
conciliating the King’s leading domestic opponents. Again, no historian, not even 
Gardiner in his History of England, has noted that Leicester had remained in Paris 
and was still trying to revive the treaty negotiations with the French in the final 




Starting in September 1639, a number of events undermined the negotiations on the 
Anglo-French treaties of 1637. Wentworth’s arrival in England in that month 
significantly increased the influence of the Spanish Party at the Caroline court.114 
Spain’s defeat at the crucial Battle of the Downs in October 1639 opened up the 
prospect of treaty talks between Madrid and London – negotiations that would not 
run up against the impasse of Maximilian of Bavaria. Also, in October, the French 
arrest of the Prince Elector paused the discussions with France as Charles tried to 
pressure Louis and Richelieu into releasing the Prince Palatine. Wentworth’s 
advancement to the earldom of Strafford and the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland in 
January 1640 were further indications of the King’s movement towards the 
Spanish.115 In April, Charles Louis was partially released by the French, reducing 
the need to placate them by eschewing negotiations with Spain.116 At the same time, 
the two primary Spanish negotiators, Malvezzi and Velada, arrived in England.117 
The tipping point came with the failure of the Short Parliament to provide finance to 
Charles for his war against the Covenanters, forcing the King to seek money and 
troops from Spain. Thereafter, for the next four months to the end of August, and 
despite Spain’s growing problems in Catalonia, the Anglo-Spanish negotiations 
eclipsed any thought of talks with the French. 
 
114 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 73. 
 
115 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 83. 
 
116 See, for example, SP 78/109, fol. 157: Leicester to Roe, 4/14 April 1640. 
 





The crystallization of Spain’s troubles at home and Charles’s defeat at 
Newburn in August 1640 ended any possibility of an Anglo-Spanish league. The 
King’s position was further damaged by the Petitioner peers’ coup d’état against him 
in England. These events compelled him to call the Long Parliament.118 Finally, the 
interim settlement of the Second Bishop’s War in October, which entailed Charles 
paying the Covenanter’s army 25,000 pounds a month, seemingly transferred the 
political initiative to the Scot’s foremost allies at Westminster – that is, the 
Petitioner peers and their confederates in the Commons.119 
 
This new situation augured well for the resumption of the Anglo-French 
treaty talks. Leicester certainly advocated restarting the negotiations with the French 
as a means for Charles to alleviate his domestic problems.120 However, the reformist 
parliamentary leadership was dominated by the earls of Warwick, Bedford and 
Essex and their supporters – a group that had effectively given up on an Anglo-
French alliance in favour of colluding with the Covenanters to end the Personal 
Rule. Would these parliamentary ‘grandees,’ who were now the dominant political 
force in England, be content to advance the anti-Habsburg cause through an alliance 
with Catholic France, or would they pursue a more narrowly Protestant foreign 
policy? And would the Northumberland-Leicester group remain constant in its 
support for the King and a league with France, or would it now, in light of Charles’s 




118 For the Petition of the Twelve Peers, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 198-9 and 201-2; 
Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 149, 153-4 and 384-5; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 
55-62. The Petition is reproduced in Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, pp. 134-6 and its 
signatories are set out in Adamson, Noble Revolt, Appendix, pp. 520-1. For the Great Council of 
Peers, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 208-9, 212 and 215-6 and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 
77-8, 80-2, 84-5 and 88. Charles I’s summons of the Great Council is contained in Gardiner, 
Constitutional Documents, p. 136. 
 
119 For the interim settlement of the Second Bishop’s War in October 1640, see Gardiner, 
History of England, IX, 209-14; Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 160-3; and Adamson, 
Noble Revolt, pp. 82-5. 
 
120 See SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 October/2 November 









Three ambassadors from the United Provinces bound for the Caroline court landed 
at Dover on 27 December 1640. They arrived at Westminster on 1 January 1641.1 
The ambassadors were charged with negotiating a potentially ground-breaking 
Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance. The match involved Prince Willem, the eldest son 
of Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange, the Stadhouder and the effective ruler of the 
United Provinces, and Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of Charles I and Henriette 
Marie.2 The Anglo-French treaties of 1637, which Robert Sidney, second earl of 
Leicester, the English King’s extraordinary ambassador to Louis XIII, had been 
trying to conclude for almost four-and-a-half years, had faced a number of 
challenges to their status as the prime focus of Stuart foreign policy. The most 
serious threat had been the Anglo-Spanish league, which had come close to being 
realized in the summer of 1640.3 This danger had disappeared by the autumn of that 
year. Consequently, Leicester had proposed restarting the talks on the French 
treaties in October.4 The arrival of the Dutch ambassadors presented new 
 
1 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 151 for the arrival of the Dutch ambassadors in England. 
The three ambassadors were Jan van der Francis van Aerssens, heer de Sommelsdyck (1572-
(December) 1641), Jan van der Kerkhoven, heer de Heenvliet (1594-1660) and Johan Wolfert van 
Brederode (1599-1655), all of whom, especially the first, were highly regarded diplomats. For the 
identities of the ambassadors, see Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 956-8, 
footnote 4: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, [18]/28 May 1641. 
 
2 Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange and Stadhouder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Guelders 
and Overijssel (1584-1647), was the effective ruler of the United Provinces and a successful general. 
His eldest son, Willem II (1626-50), would succeed him as Stadhouder in 1647, but died shortly 
afterwards of smallpox in 1650. 
 
3 See London, TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French 
Treaties, 17 February 1637 and Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: Anglo-French 
Auxiliary Treaty, June 1637. For the Anglo-Spanish negotiations over the spring and summer of 
1640, see Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, pp. 166-81 and O’Neill, ‘Charles I and the Spanish 
Plot’, pp. 386-475. 
 
4 See TNA, SP France, SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 
October/2 November 1640 and SP 78/110, fol. 160: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 30 




opportunities for Charles’s opponents (and maybe the King as well) to advance their 
agendas at home and abroad. The question was would the Northumberland-Leicester 
circle support a change of direction in English foreign policy towards the United 
Provinces – a move that could cut across or render obsolete their long-standing plans 
for an anti-Habsburg league with France? 
 
The Long Parliament met on 3 November 1640 in a greatly changed political 
environment. Almost uniquely for an English monarch, Charles was virtually 
without authority.5 This perilous position for the King derived from his defeat by the 
Scots Covenanters at the Battle of Newburn in August and the seizure of power by 
his leading English opponents in September and October. The financial burden 
imposed by the Pacification of Ripon – the truce that ended the Second Bishops’ 
War – meant that he could not readily dissolve the Long Parliament as he had its 
predecessor. 
 
Leicester and Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland, and their 
courtly allies – Philip Herbert, fourth earl of Pembroke, William Cecil, second earl 
of Salisbury, and Sir Henry Vane senior, the King’s senior Secretary of State – could 
still entertain hopes of concluding the Anglo-French treaties. However, given the 
frustration at the failure to realize an alliance with France in 1629 and 1636-7, the 
now dominant group in English politics, centred on Robert Rich, second earl of 
Warwick, might look in other directions in order to advance the Protestant cause in 
Europe.6 Apart from Warwick, the most prominent members of this circle were 
 
5 For the almost unparalleled situation in November 1640 of an English king without power, 
see Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 206-7. 
 
6 For the possibility of an alliance with France in 1629, see John S. A. Adamson, ‘Policy and 
Pomegranates: Art, Iconography and Counsel in Rubens’s Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy of 1629-1630’, 
in The Age of Rubens: Diplomacy, Dynastic Politics and the Visual Arts in Early Seventeenth-
Century Europe, ed. by L. Duerloo and R. Malcolm Smuts (Tourhout: Brepols, 2016), pp. 159-63. 
For the offer of naval assistance to France in 1636 by Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick (1587-
1658), see Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 33, footnote and Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 28. For Warwick’s support for a French alliance in early 1637, see 
CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate, 
16/[26] January 1637. For the support of Warwick and other members of his circle for alternative 
English foreign-policy objectives in the form of an Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, albeit in mid-
1641, see Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 445-6: Warwick to Princess 
d’Orange, May 1641; Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 472: Warwick to Prince 
Willem, [14]/24 May 1641; and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 474-5, 
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Francis Russell, fourth earl of Bedford, and Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex, 
with Warwick’s younger brother, Henry Rich, earl of Holland, as an outrider. The 
circle’s influence was based on their daring, if desperate, gambit of forcing Charles 
to call the Long Parliament, in which they and their confederates in the Commons 
represented the most powerful bloc. Their weakness lay in their lack of presence at 
court and influence with Charles and the Queen. (Holland had lost Henriette Marie’s 
favour by the autumn of 1640.7) By contrast, Leicester and his leading allies all had 
major positions at court. The main losers in domestic politics as a result of the 
King’s defeat in the Second Bishops’ War were the heads of the Spanish Party at 
court – Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, and William Laud, Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Indeed, both men would end the year as prisoners in the Tower on 
charges of treason. 
 
The respective fortunes of the Catholic powers with whom Leicester’s circle 
and the Spanish Party had been engaged in rival treaty negotiations represented a 
stark contrast by the end of 1640. Spain faced significant internal problems in the 
form of the Catalonian revolt and the Portuguese revolution, which had broken out 
in June and December respectively. Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, 
the chief minister of Philip IV of Spain and the prime director of affairs in that 
country, had to concentrate on re-establishing authority at home in the fourth quarter 
of 1640 and throughout 1641.8 Such a strategy would have to be at the expense of 
the reopening of the English Road by way of which men and money could be sent to 
reinforce the Spanish Netherlands. Restoring communications with Flanders was 
important. However, regaining control in the Iberian Peninsula was even more 
imperative if Spain was to have any chance of retaining its position as one of the 
premier powers of Europe. Thus, any thought of an Anglo-Spanish league would 
 
Holland to Frederik Hendrik, [22 May]/1 June 1641. 
 
7 For the loss of favour on the part of Henry Rich, earl of Holland (1590-1649), in 1640 with 
the Queen, Henriette Marie (1609-69), see Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 42-3 and 
‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 33. 
 
8 For Spain’s problems at home in 1640, see John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A 
Study in the Decline of Spain 1598-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 452-88 




have to be abandoned given Spain’s (and England’s) domestic problems. 
 
Louis and Cardinal Richelieu had reason to be pleased with the situation in 
which France found itself in November 1640. Spain’s disaster in the English 
Channel at the Battle of the Downs in October 1639 had been followed by the 
implosion of Philip IV’s authority at home in the second half of 1640. France’s 
strategic position would improve further with the Franco-Swedish victory over the 
Empire and its Bavarian allies at the Battle of Wolfenbüttel in central Germany on 
19 June 1641.9 The French King and the Cardinal would be able to continue to 
negotiate with Charles as Leicester remained in Paris. Louis and Richelieu had even 
worked out how to respond to the rapidly changing situation in the British Isles by 
supporting Parliament in its quarrel with the English King.10 They reasoned that 
Charles was the greater threat to them, and, therefore, decided to back Parliament 
and so undermine the English King’s position. With one of France’s Habsburg 
rivals, Spain, facing domestic rebellion and revolution and a potentially unfriendly 
near neighbour, Charles’s England, in political turmoil, the strategic situation in 
Europe augured well for the French. 
 
But a week could be a long time in France’s to-and-fro contest with its 
Habsburg enemies. Seven days after the Franco-Swedish victory at Wolfenbüttel, on 
26 June 1641, Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, a French prince of the blood, 
who had invaded North-East France with a Habsburg-sponsored army, defeated 
 
9 The Battle of Wolfenbüttel was fought on 19 June 1641 old style (29 June 1641 according to 
the new calendar). The action was between Franco-Swedish forces, led by the French general Jean-
Baptiste Budes, comte de Guébriant (1602-43), and the Swedish commander Johann Christoph van 
Königsmarck (1600-53), on one side, and the combined Imperial-Bavarian army commanded by the 
Austrian Archduke Leopold William, Bishop of Passau (1614-62), the brother of the Emperor, 
Ferdinand III (1608-57), and Octavio Piccolomini, count of Aragona and duke of Amalfi (1599-
1656), on the other. For a description of the Franco-Swedish victory, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 
pp. 629-31. 
 
10 For evidence of this policy, albeit in early 1640, on the part of Louis XIII (1601-43) and 
Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642), see CSPV, XXV, 1640-1642, 13: Giustinian, Venetian Ambassador at 
the Hague to the Doge and Senate, [18]/28 January 1640, in relation to the Short Parliament of April 
and May: ‘Levies of 15,000 infantry and 2,000 horse are being raised in England. This is ascribed to 
some hidden intention against France … the Dutch ambassador in France writes that the French are 
keeping an eye on this and at the opening of parliament they will direct their attention to conciliating 
the goodwill of that body and preventing any accident.’ See also Russell, Fall of the British 




Louis’s forces, led by Gaspard de Coligny, Marshal Châtillon, at the Battle of La 
Marfée outside Sedan.11 This dangerous situation was saved for Louis and Richelieu 
by Soissons’ untimely death shortly after the end of the battle, either assassinated on 
the Cardinal’s orders or killed by accidently shooting himself in the head with a 
pistol that he was using to lift the visor of his helmet.12 The invasion of North-East 
France in the summer of 1641 indicates just how precarious even the apparently 
strongest circumstances of kings and princes could be in the Europe of the early 
1640s. Louis and Richelieu could not afford to turn their backs entirely on even a 
greatly weakened King of England. As they probably realized, they had 
overestimated the strength of their position in the summer of 1640. As a result, the 
French King and the Cardinal had been unable to thwart the Anglo-Spanish talks 
that might have led to a league between the two countries had not Spain’s disasters 




Despite the political turmoil at home and at Charles’s court from the summer of 
1640 onwards, Leicester would remain as ambassador in Paris until October 1641.13 
Writing most probably to Vane, towards the end of October 1640, Leicester noted 
 
11 At that time, Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons (1604-41), was sixth in line to the French 
throne. Gaspard III de Coligny, Maréchal de Châtillon, of the House of Coligny, comte de Coligny 
and seigneur de Châtillon-sur-Loing, then duc de Coligny, marquis d’Andelot (1584-1646), was a 
peer and Marshal of France (1622) and a noted Protestant. The battle was fought on 26 June 1641 old 
style, which was 6 July 1641 under the new calendar. See SP 78/111: fol. 55: Battière to [Leicester], 
2/12 July 1641 for the report of James Battière (dates unknown), the secretary of Robert Sidney, 
second earl of Leicester (1595-1677), on the battle. (Leicester was in England between early May and 
late July 1641.) For Habsburg support for the invasion of Soissons, see A. Lloyd Moote, Louis XIII 
the Just (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 251. 
 
12 For the two interpretations of the death of Soissons, see Moote, Louis XIII, p. 251. 
 
13 The following footnote was inserted with regard to Collins, II, 661-2: Leicester to Vane, 
19/29 October 1640: ‘The Reader may probably expect other Letters of the Earl of Leicester, whilst 
he was in France; but our Troubles and Divisions increasing, his Lordships Negotiations were at a 
Stand; so that this is his last from Paris containing any Thing material.’ See Collins, II, 662, footnote. 
This thesis does not adopt such a view of Leicester’s correspondence. It examines the ambassador’s 
final calendared letters from Paris up to and including SP 78/111, fol. 79: Leicester to [Secretary of 
State]/[Vane], 10/20 September 1641. (Sir Henry Vane senior (1589-1654) was the only possible 
recipient of this letter.) This part of the earl’s correspondence relates to important events, and the 
ambassador makes comments that are relevant to both the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and 




revived French interest in the treaties and argued for a league with France, a 
message that he repeated later that month.14 However, most of the latter 
communication dealt with the problems of English merchants trading in France, with 
the reference to the treaties being at the end. In early November, Leicester’s 
correspondence also primarily dealt with mercantile issues and did not refer to the 
treaties specifically.15 However, he did outline the diplomatic challenge that the 
English King, given his weak position at home, faced with regard to the French in 
stating that: 
 
… I conceive it to be most true, that if his Ma[jes]ty would either be very 
good friends with [th]e French or fall out with them, we might have any 
reason of them, but in this time of doubtfullness they take all advantages, yet 
and little consider either curtesie or iustice.16 
 
In other words, unless Charles was a firm ally of the French or a clear threat to 
France, little could be expected from Louis and Richelieu at that time. 
 
In the late autumn of 1640, Leicester remained faithful to the King, was 
critical of those whom he perceived as being disloyal to Charles, and persisted in 
trying to conclude an alliance with France. The ambassador opposed the (traitorous) 
involvement of Warwick’s circle with the Scots and that group’s support for a 
foreign policy, which, while promoting the Protestant cause abroad, did not 
necessarily back a league with France.17 Thus, at that time, there was still a 
 
14 See SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 October/2 November 
1640 and SP 78/110, fol. 160: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 30 October/9 November 1640. 
 
15 SP 78/110, fol. 164: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 6/16 November 1640. This 
communication refers at fol. 165 to ‘your Honor’s letter of 27. Oct[ober] from Yorck,’ and, therefore, 
the addressee was Vane and not Sir Francis Windebanke (bap. 1582-1646), as the latter had been in 
London throughout the autumn of that year, while Vane had been in York. See Adamson, Noble 
Revolt, p. 55 for Windebanke being in London at the end of August and the beginning of September 
1640 and presumably thereafter. 
 
16 SP 78/110, fol. 164-5: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 6/16 November 1640. 
 
17 For collusion between the English opponents of Charles I (1600-49) and the rebellious 
Covenanters in Scotland, see, in general, Gardiner, History of England, IX, 178-81; Russell, Fall of 
the British Monarchies, pp. 60-3, 68-70 and 165-71; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 22-3, 36-40, 
44-50, 59, 72-6 and 83. Peter H. Donald, ‘New Light on the Anglo-Scottish Contacts of 1640’, 
Historical Research, 62 (1989), 221-9 and David Scott, ‘Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-
Columnist during the Bishops’ Wars: The Case of Yorkshire’, Historical Research, 70 (1997), 269-
93 deal with specific examples of co-operation with the Scots in 1640. 
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considerable distance between the Northumberland-Leicester circle and Warwick’s 
group. The ambassador expressed his allegiance to the King in November, 
simultaneously reserving harsh words for Charles’s enemies: 
 
I most humbly thanke you … for doing me the favour to send me his 
Majestie’s speech [at the opening of the Long Parliament on 3 November 
1640]; for truly in my opinion I never read anything more royall nor more 
gratious, and for my part, if there were any that did not rejoyce at it, I wish 
them at the bottome of the Sea, and them also that will not be abundantly 
satisfyed with [th]e performa[n]ce thereof, which on the King’s part I do no 
more doubt of, the[n] I do of Doomesday:18 
 
He went on to say that: 
 
I hope our businesses in England are not in so ill condition, as some imagine 
and reporte and peradventure wish, but I am confident that by the King’s 
wisedome and [th]e good councells and offices of you his Majestie’s great 
and worthy ministers all will be brought to a happy issue, … 
 
Leicester might have been articulating merely conventional statements of support for 
Charles. However, others in his circle were very critical of the King’s opponents at 
that time. Northumberland, for example, in a private letter to Leicester in October 
1640, referred to the Covenanter forces as ‘this Army of Rebells.’19 Nevertheless, 
the Lord Admiral’s correspondence shows signs of a shift in his stance towards an 
alliance with France. In mid-November 1640, he wrote to Leicester, suggesting 
numerous high offices at court for which he could lobby the King on the 
ambassador’s behalf.20 It seems that Northumberland now believed that Leicester 
would be better employed at court than in continuing his embassy in Paris. 
 
Rather than seek court office, however, Leicester was hoping that affairs in 
England would stabilize so that he could resume talks with the French. Towards the 
 
 
18 SP 78/110, fol. 168: Leicester to [Secretary of State], 13/23 November 1640. It is not clear 
to which Secretary of State, Vane or Windebanke, this letter was addressed. 
 
19 See Collins, II, 662: Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640. 
 
20 See Collins, II, 663-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 November 1640: see also De L’Isle 




end of 1640, the earl tried to revive interest in both London and Paris in an Anglo-
French alliance. In a letter most likely addressed to Vane, the ambassador reported 
that, at the end of November, he had approached Claude de Bullion, one of the 
French King’s surintendants des finances, regarding the latter’s wish ‘that a good 
confederation might be concluded between the two Kings [Charles I and Louis 
XIII].’21 As instructed, Leicester had communicated the English King’s ‘like desire 
and disposition’ to the French King via Bullion. Bullion replied that, as usual, 
France desired ‘a ligue offensive [and] defensive’ with England. He indicated that 
the French had no further propositions to make in respect of an alliance with the 
English, but would consider any proposal that Charles might wish to make regarding 
a league with France. The ambassador requested instructions from Whitehall on how 
to respond. 
 
Leicester was trying hard to revitalize the negotiations, but received little 
help from the French, with Bullion having reiterated his opinion that the English 
King was all talk and no action. In December 1640, the ambassador confirmed that 
he had received instructions as to how to progress the negotiations.22 However, apart 
from saying that he would relay Charles’s response to the French, he did not indicate 
what his new orders were. At the end of that month, Leicester reported that he had 
asked the French King with whom he should liaise following the death of Bullion – 
his primary contact at Louis’s court.23 The French King had replied that the 
 
21 SP 78/110, fol. 179: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 27 November/7 December 
1640. The companion letter in the Calendar, SP 78/110, fol. 180: Leicester to [Secretary of 
State]/[Windebanke], 27 November/7 December 1640, is much shorter and, as Leicester stated that 
he had received no correspondence from that letter’s recipient, it is probable that the first letter was to 
Vane and the second to Windebanke. Leicester’s previous letter, SP 78/110, fol. 174: Leicester to 
[Secretary of State]/[Vane], 20/30 November 1640, which was presumably addressed to Vane, dealt 
exclusively with mercantile matters. 
 
22 SP 78/110, fol. 187-8: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 11/21 December 1640. As 
Leicester stated in this letter that he was aware that Windebanke had left England – ‘Letters came 
from Calais on wednesday last 19/9 [9/19] of this month, w[hi]ch beare that Mr. Secretary 
Windebank was arrived there …’ – its addressee must have been Vane. Windebanke had fled 
England on 3 December 1640. For the date and details of Windebanke’s flight, see Adamson, Noble 
Revolt, p. 111 and Patricia Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 1978), pp. 504-5 respectively. 
 
23 SP 78/110, fol. 191: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 25 December 1640/4 January 
1641. Leicester said in this letter that Windebanke was now in Paris, so again the addressee must 
have been Vane. Claude de Bullion (1569-1640), who was one of Louis XIII’s surintendants des 
finances and dealt with foreign ambassadors in Paris, including Leicester, had died on 12 December 
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ambassador should approach Claude le Bouthillier, Louis’s other surintendant des 
finances, regarding the matters, including the treaties, that had been dealt with by 
Bullion. In contrast to Northumberland, who had apparently given up on the 
negotiations with the French in November, Leicester was still trying to advance the 
conclusion of the treaties.24 Given Louis’s response to the ambassador’s question, 
this position was seemingly true for the French as well. The long shadow cast by the 
Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and the fact that Leicester and the French were still 
talking to each other about them almost four years later has not been noted in any 
account of this period. 
 
At the beginning of 1641, the French were rumoured to be sending a new 
ambassador to England to replace Pomponne de Bellièvre, who had left Charles’s 
court the previous year. Leicester informed Vane that he had heard from Léon le 
Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny, the son of Claude le Bouthillier and Louis’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that ‘Mr. de la Ferté-Imbert of [th]e house of 
Estamper’ was to become the French envoy at the Caroline court.25 In the short term, 
no new French ambassador was appointed, France being represented at the English 
King’s court in 1640-1 by Jean, Monsieur de Montereul, a secretary and chargé 
d’affaires.26 It appears that Louis and Richelieu were up to their old ploy of 
stringing Charles along by feigning continuing interest in the Anglo-French treaties. 
In support of this explanation, Montereul had already written to Chavigny in April 
 
1640 (old style), which was 22 December 1640 (new style). For Bullion’s diplomatic role, see Orest 
A. Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and 
Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu, 1635-1642 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 
pp. 91 and 95. 
 
24 See Collins, II, 663-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 November 1640 (see also De L’Isle 
M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/19); De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 343: Northumberland to 
Leicester, 19 November 1640 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/20); and Collins, II, 
664: Northumberland to Leicester, 26 November 1640 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, 
fol. 85/21) for the suggestions of Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland (1602-68), regarding 
suitable positions at the Caroline court for Leicester, indicating that Northumberland thought that the 
Paris embassy and the negotiations with the French should end. 
 
25 SP 78/111, fol. 1: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 1/11 January 1641. With 
Windebank in Paris, Vane was the only possible recipient of this letter. 
 
26 See Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank’, Appendix F, p. 590 for details of Louis XIII’s 




1640 suggesting that a new French ambassador would signal to the English that 
France was still interested in concluding an alliance.27 The failure by the French 
King and the Cardinal to appoint an ambassador implies a significant downgrading 
of the importance of the treaties on their part. 
 
At the beginning of 1641, Leicester turned away from dealing with the 
Anglo-French treaties to report on European diplomatic developments. In the first 
days of January, he noted that some Catalans, who had arrived in France as 
‘hostages’ and who had then been regarded as ‘Deputies’ so as to be permitted to 
treat with Louis, had been accorded the status of ‘Ambass:[ado]rs’ at the French 
King’s court.28 The Catalans had certainly been welcomed with honour, indicating 
French interest in stirring up trouble for Philip IV in his rebellious province. At the 
end of that month, Catalonia would declare allegiance to Louis. Chavigny confided 
to Leicester that, if other Spanish Habsburg possessions in Europe, for example, 
Aragon in the Iberian Peninsula or Artois in Flanders, sought French aid, assistance 
would be forthcoming. 
 
Leicester’s interest in pursuing the treaty talks with the French seems to have 
waned markedly from early 1641. His letter to Vane of mid-January mainly dealt 
with matters relating to the proposed Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance – he did not 
refer to the Anglo-French treaties at all.29 Apart from a plea for payment of his 
ambassadorial arrears, Leicester’s correspondence with the Secretary in the rest of 
January and all of February related solely to mercantile matters.30 By the end of 
February, it seems, he had finally given up on concluding an alliance with France. 
 
27 TNA, PRO 31/3 (Baschet Transcripts), fols 91-6: Montereul to Chavigny, 12 April 1640; 
see also BnF, MS f. fr. 15995, fols 74-5. 
 
28 SP 78/111, fol. 2: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 1/11 January 1641. 
 
29 SP 78/111, fol. 3, Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 15/25 January 1641. Given that 
Windebanke was then in Paris, this letter must have been addressed to Vane. 
 
30 See SP 78/111, fol. 10: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 22 January/1 February 1641; 
SP 78/111, fol. 13: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 29 January/8 February 1641; SP 78/111, 
fol. 17: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 12/22 February 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 19: Leicester to 
[Secretary of State]/[Vane], 19 February/1 March 1641; and SP 78/111, fol. 24: Leicester to 






From the beginning of 1641, Leicester began angling at court – mainly 
through Northumberland – for Strafford’s former office of Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland, a position that he would attain in June. Given the potential political and 
financial rewards of the Lieutenancy, it is unsurprising that the ambassador lost 
interest in the treaties. Despite the effective ending of the discussions with the 
French, Leicester remained in Paris.31 From the ambassador’s correspondence, it is 
apparent that the French had also ceased to consider the treaties as important. 
Evidently, Charles’s domestic problems had convinced Louis and Richelieu that the 
English King could be disregarded as a diplomatic and military force in respect of 
European affairs. It was, therefore, no longer necessary to talk to him in any 
meaningful way. 
 
Leicester returned to England in the first half of May 1641 to advance his 
candidacy for the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland.32 He would remain in and around 
London until the end of July.33 The ambassador was back in Paris on 6 August, 
when he wrote to Vane.34 Again, there was no mention of the Anglo-French treaties. 
 
31 See SP 78/111, fol. 34: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 12/22 March 1641, in which 
Leicester again noted that Windebanke was in Paris; SP 78/111, fol. 36: Leicester to Secretary of 
State/[Vane], 19/29 March 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 38: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 9/19 
April 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 41: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 9/19 April 1641; and SP 
78/111, fol. 43: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 23 April/3 May 1641. Again, Vane was the 
only possible recipient of these letters. 
 
32 See Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 268, who give the date of Leicester’s 
return as 11 or 12 May 1641, that is, immediately before or on the date of the execution of Thomas 
Wentworth, earl of Strafford (1593-1641). 
 
33 On 22 July 1641, Sir John Temple (1600-77), Leicester’s homme d’affaires, stated that the 
earl had departed from Penshurst on his way to Paris. See De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 404-
5: Temple to Leicester, 22 July 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/21. On 5 
August 1641, Temple referred to Leicester being in France. See De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, 
VI, 407-9: Temple to Leicester, 5 August 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 
114/22. Temple was Leicester’s representative at Charles I’s court in the late 1630s and early 1640s. 
He was made Master of the Rolls in Ireland on 31 January 1641 as part of the advancement of some 
of the supporters of the Northumberland-Leicester circle and the Warwick group at that time. Temple 
played a prominent role in the negotiations, primarily, with Sir Henry Jermyn (1605-84), the 
favourite of Henriette Marie, in his master becoming Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on 14 June 1641, a 
month after the execution of the previous holder of that office, Strafford. 
 
34 SP 78/111, fol. 65: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 6/16 August 1641. Vane was the 




As Leicester had become Lord Lieutenant on 14 June, Charles’s ambassador in Paris 
had no interest in trying to restart the treaty negotiations with the French.35 
 
The Paris embassy ended in the autumn of 1641. In August, Sir John 
Temple, the earl’s homme d’affaires at the Caroline court, informed Leicester that 
Lord George Digby, the eldest son of John Digby, earl of Bristol, was to be the new 
ordinary ambassador in Paris.36 In the end, however, Digby would not take up the 
post. Despite this outcome, Leicester was back in England in early October.37 
 
In the months following the Dutch victory over the Spanish at the Battle of 
the Downs in mid-October 1639, Charles had abandoned trying to conclude the 
Anglo-French treaties in favour of a league with Spain. Nonetheless, Leicester, 
notably in October 1640, had continued to champion the cause of the treaties up to 
the winter of 1640-1, when the acceptable alternative of an Anglo-Dutch marriage 
alliance had first become apparent.38 The negotiations for a marriage alliance with 
the United Provinces had coincided with Leicester’s abandonment of the treaties in 




35 There is a reference in CSPI, 1633-1647, 302, The King to the Lords Justices for the Earl of 
Leicester, 11 June 1641 stating that ‘The Earl is to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland,’ while in CSPD, 
1641-43, 11-2, Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, 14/24 June 1641, The Hague; see also Akkerman, 
Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 966, Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662), Charles I’s sister, noted 
that ‘… and since my Lord of Leicester is Deputy [of Ireland] …’ See again, De L’Isle and Dudley 
Manuscripts, VI, 555, Diary of Events 1636-1650. Both Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, 
p. 269 and Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ also give 14 June 1641 as the date of 
Leicester’s appointment as Lord Lieutenant, which is the date used here. 
 
36 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 409-10: Temple to Leicester, 11 August 1641; see 
also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/24. See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 344 for the 
appointment of Lord George Digby (1612-77), the eldest son of John Digby, earl of Bristol (1580-
1653), as ordinary ambassador to Louis XIII on 8 August 1641. 
 
37 Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 269 give the date of Leicester’s arrival in 
England as 5 or 6 October 1641. 
 
38 See SP 78/110, fol. 150: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 23 October/2 November 







On 11 November 1640, charges of treason were made against Thomas Wentworth, 
earl of Strafford, Charles’s Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.39 He was taken into custody 
that day at the beginning of the proceedings, which would lead to his impeachment 
and attainder. Although he would not be executed until May 1641, his office as Lord 
Lieutenant was up for grabs the moment he was imprisoned on Parliament’s orders 
in the Tower. Around the time that charges were laid against Strafford, 
Northumberland started lobbying for a court position on behalf of his brother-in-law. 
The implication was that, as Leicester would have to return to England, the Paris 
embassy, and, therefore, the Anglo-French negotiations, should be terminated. The 
dowager countess of Carlisle, writing in November 1640 to her sister the countess of 
Leicester stated that their brother, Northumberland, would ‘ernestly ingage himself’ 
on Leicester’s behalf ‘aithere for [the Secretaryship] or [the Lord Lieutenancy of 
Ireland].’40 Leicester would not become Secretary, however, for, as the countess of 
Carlisle reported, Charles regarded the earl as over titled for that position – ‘[The 
Earl of Northumberland] hase spoken to [the King] conserning the [Secretaryship] 
but her [his] answer wase what it hase longe binne, that she [he] will not have any 
body so qualifyd as is [the Earl of Leicester].’41 The countess’s brother confirmed 
that Charles thought that the ambassador ‘was to[o] greate for’ the post of 
Secretary.42 
 
Northumberland noted the King’s weak position and the opportunities for 
advancement that this situation presented to the members of his and Leicester’s 
circle. Writing to the ambassador in November 1640, he stated that: 
 
39 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 101-10 for details of the events surrounding the charging 
and arrest of Strafford on 11 November 1640. 
 
40 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 340: countess of Carlisle to countess of Leicester, 10 
November 1640; see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 159-60 and De L’Isle M.S.S., 
K.A.O., U1475, fol. 129/9. 
 
41 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 340: countess of Carlisle to countess of Leicester, 10 
November 1640; see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, p. 159 and De L’Isle M.S.S., 
K.A.O., U1475, fol. 129/9. 
 





The King is in such a Straight, that I do not know how he will possiblie 
avoide (without indangering the Losse of the whole Kingdome) the giveing 
Way to the Remove of divers Persons, as well as other Things that will be 
demaunded by the Parlament. … If these Designes of Reformation do 
succeede, we shall soudenly see many Changes in this Court. That which is 
wished to 110 [Leycester] by 135 [Northumberland] is the Office of 111 
[Tresorer] 115 [Deputy [of Ireland]] 566 [Secretary] 119 [Cottington 
[Chancellor of the Exchequer and Master of the Court of Wards]].43 
 
The message was that Leicester’s Paris embassy would have to end should the 
ambassador wish to obtain preferment. The wide range and importance of the offices 
(notably, Treasurer and Lord Deputy of Ireland) that Northumberland suggested for 
Leicester in his letter signified that he and his friends at the Caroline court were 
aiming high and lobbying for important positions on behalf of the ambassador. In 
mid-November 1640, Northumberland asked Leicester a second time in which of the 
offices he had mentioned in his letter of earlier that month his brother-in-law was 
interested.44 At the end of November, he repeated his view that the turmoil at 
Charles’s court could work to the ambassador’s advantage, as: 
 
Lord Lieutenant [Strafford], 112 [Lord Archbishop of Canterbury,] 119 
[Lord Cottington,] 121 [Secretarie Windebanke,] are certainely in a very 
great deale of Danger of beeing ruined. 111 [Treasurer [William Juxon, 
Bishop of London]] and some others; in my former Letters named unto your 
Lordship are in no lesse Danger of being removed: If in all these Changes, 
some good Advantage fall not to 110 [Leicester[’s]] Share, I agree with your 
Lordship that his Lucke is desperately ill; …45 
 
Northumberland’s final sentence indicates that the ambassador was beginning to 
heed the Percy earl’s advice to seek his fortune in London rather than in Paris. 
 
The preparations for Strafford’s impeachment and the opportunity for 
 
43 Collins, II, 663-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 November 1640; see also De L’Isle 
M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/19. 
 
44 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 343: Northumberland to Leicester, 19 November 
1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/20. 
 
45 Collins, II, 664: Northumberland to Leicester, 26 November 1640; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 




Leicester to become Lord Lieutenant of Ireland gathered pace at the beginning of 
1641. In January, Sir John Temple – the ambassador’s prime negotiator for the 
Lieutenancy – advised his master that the best way to secure the position in 
succession to Strafford would be to ingratiate himself with Henriette Marie and her 
favourite, Sir Henry Jermyn – the latter by way of his associate, Robert Long.46 At 
the same time, the countess of Carlisle informed her sister, the countess of Leicester, 
that their younger brother, Northumberland, regarded Leicester as best suited to the 
Lieutenancy.47 By contrast, their youngest sibling, Henry Percy, thought that the 
Secretaryship, which was now vacant following Windebanke’s flight to Paris, was 
Leicester’s best option. In the latter case, ‘The Frenshe busnis [that is, the fate of the 
Anglo-French treaties] must of nesecity fall in his [Leicester’s] hands,’ while, the 
Lieutenancy was ‘worth 15 hunderd [probably a mistake for thousand] pownd a 
year.’ The countess of Carlisle had clearly set out the choices before the 
ambassador. By the Secretaryship, he might gain control of Caroline foreign policy, 
but there would be less, though still not inconsiderable, financial reward compared 
to the Lieutenancy. Moreover, the possibility of the successful conclusion of the 
Anglo-French treaties was diminishing rapidly, if not already ended. By contrast, the 
Lieutenancy would enable Leicester not only to establish a power base and 
patronage system in Ireland, but would also furnish him with opportunities for 
substantial personal profit – notably, by way of the farm on the Irish customs duties. 
Disregarding Charles’s opposition to Leicester obtaining the Secretaryship, the 
Lieutenancy was the obvious choice for the ambassador. The implication (yet again) 
was that he should abandon the Paris embassy. 
 
The stakes were high and, as Leicester had competitors for the Lord 
 
46 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 359-60: Temple to Leicester, 14 January 1641; see 
also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/5. Jermyn was a favourite and a confidant of Charles 
I’s Queen, Henriette Marie and particularly influential in the first half of 1641 with regard to court 
and official appointments. Robert Long (c.1602-73), later knighted, was a close political associate of 
Jermyn and a long-standing royal servant, holding, among other minor positions, the Queen’s 
surveyor-general and a gentleman of the chamber in 1641. He appears to have been as corrupt as 
Jermyn. 
 
47 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 361: countess of Carlisle to countess of Leicester, 14 
January 1641; see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 162-3 and De L’Isle M.S.S., 




Lieutenancy – namely, the earls of Essex and Holland and Sir Henry Vane senior –
his success was far from guaranteed.48 While Essex and Holland were associated 
with Warwick’s group, Vane was a member of the Northumberland-Leicester circle. 
This tension demonstrates that there were rivalries not only between, but also within, 
the anti-Spanish groups at Charles’s court. If the ambassador were to become Lord 
Lieutenant, he would gain financially as well as forming a very powerful political 
axis at court with Northumberland, who was still Lord Admiral. In emphasizing the 
financial benefits of the Lieutenancy, Temple told Leicester in February 1641 that 
the office was worth at least ‘8 thousand [pounds] per annum.’49 At the end of April, 
Temple transmitted his optimism regarding Leicester’s candidature, but was 
adamant that the ambassador should return to court because: 
 
if your Lordship should thinke fitt, as you are pleased to intimate in your last 
[letter], to deferr your journey upon any such pretences, you would most 
absolutely ruine your whole businesse [that is, the chance of becoming Lord 
Lieutenant], loose so faire an oportunity as I know not when, if ever, your 
Lordship can expect the like againe ...50 
 
Temple had joined Northumberland in advising Leicester of the need to abandon the 
Anglo-French treaties if he wished to secure the Lieutenancy. The ambassador 
heeded this advice and by February he had forsaken any hope of concluding the 
treaties. 
 
48 See, for example, Collins, II, 665: Northumberland to Leicester, 17 December 1640; De 
L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 346-7: countess of Carlisle to countess of Leicester, 3 December 
1640 (see also Correspondence of Countess of Leicester, pp. 160-1 and De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 
U1475, fol. 129/10); De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 366-8: Temple to Leicester, 21 January 
1641 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/7); De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 
375-6: Temple to Leicester, 4 February 1641 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/9); 
De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 379: Temple to Leicester, 11 February 1641 (see also De 
L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/10); De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 388-9: Temple to 
Leicester, 4 March 1641 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/13); and De L’Isle and 
Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 398-400: Temple to Leicester, 15 April 1641 (see also De L’Isle M.S.S., 
K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/18). See again Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 158. 
 
49 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 379: Temple to Leicester, 11 February 1641; see also 
De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/10. Temple confirmed his assessment of the value of the 
Lord Lieutenancy in De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 382-4: Temple to Leicester, 18 February 
1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/11. 
 
50 De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 402: Temple to Leicester, 29 April 1641; see also De 





Leicester was made Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on 14 June 1641.51 Why did 
he succeed when apparently powerful rivals – notably Essex, Holland and Vane – 
failed? Leicester was in England between May and July to advance his candidacy. 
Temple and Jermyn were also important in the ambassador’s success, especially in 
their negotiations from the beginning of 1641. Jermyn fled abroad in May as a result 
of his involvement in one of the army plots, so he would have had little or no sway 
at the time of Leicester’s appointment.52 But he would have been a positive 
influence on Henriette Marie in favour of the ambassador prior to his flight. Even 
with his power at a low ebb, Charles’s acquiescence to the earl becoming Lieutenant 
was essential. Indeed, it was at the King’s discretion that Leicester’s appointment 
was delayed until after Strafford’s execution.53 Charles probably regarded the 
ambassador as the least objectionable candidate for the post – particularly given that 
Vane and Essex had been heavily involved in Strafford’s impeachment and trial and 
attainder and execution.54 Thus, these individuals would have been unacceptable to 
the King by the early summer of 1641. However, as John Adamson has argued, 
Leicester’s greatest advantage was that Northumberland had retained sufficient 
favour with Charles and had sway with Warwick’s group to be able to lobby 
effectively on behalf of his brother-in-law.55 In support of this view, Temple had 
consistently emphasized that Northumberland and his sister, the countess of Carlisle, 
 
51 There is a reference in CSPI, 1633-1647, 302, The King to the Lords Justices for the Earl of 
Leicester, 11 June 1641 stating that ‘The Earl is to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland,’ while in CSPD, 
1641-43, 11-2, Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, 14/24 June 1641, The Hague; see also Akkerman, 
Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 966, Elizabeth Stuart, Charles I’s sister, noted that ‘… and 
since my Lord of Leicester is Deputy [of Ireland] …’ See again, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, 
VI, 555, Diary of Events 1636-1650. Both Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 269 and 
Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ also give 14 June 1641 as the day of Leicester’s 
appointment as Lord Lieutenant, which is the date used here. 
 
52 See Anthony R. J. S. Adolph, ‘Jermyn [Germain], Henry, earl of St Albans (bap.1605, 
d.1684)’, ODNB for the timing of Jermyn’s flight. 
 
53 See, for example, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 388-9: Temple to Leicester, 4 
March 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/13. 
 
54 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 269-305 for the involvement of Robert Devereux, third earl 
of Essex (1591-1646), and Vane in Strafford’s downfall. 
 
55 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 200-1 and 339 for the influence of Northumberland and 




should promote Leicester for the position of Lord Lieutenant.56 In this context, the 





The possibility of an Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, with its adverse implications 
for the Anglo-French treaties as an alternative focus for English diplomacy, was first 
raised at the beginning of 1640. Charles was the source of the original marriage 
proposal.57 It was then less attractive from the Dutch perspective, and was for Prince 
Willem, the oldest son of Frederik Hendrik, the Stadhouder, to marry the younger 
daughter of the English King and Henriette Marie, Princess Elizabeth. At that time, 
Frederik Hendrik had wanted the eldest daughter of the English royal couple, 
Princess Mary, for his son.58 The Stadhouder’s plan would not come to immediate 
fruition, as Mary was then earmarked by Charles for Balthazar Carlos, the heir to the 
Spanish throne.59 The English King was balancing his diplomatic and domestic 
options by simultaneously negotiating marriage alliances with Spain and the United 
Provinces. The proposals regarding the marriages of his two daughters also meant 
that, up to August 1640, Charles controlled the direction of English foreign policy. 
This position was not the case between September 1640 and October 1641, when the 
 
56 See, for example, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 388-9: Temple to Leicester, 4 
March 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/13. 
 
57 See Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 191: Charles I to Frederik 
Hendrik, [21]/31 January 1640. 
 
58 For confirmation that Frederik Hendrik had wanted Charles I’s and Henriette Marie’s oldest 
daughter, Princess Mary (1631-60), to marry his son, see Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison 
d’Orange, III, 189-90: Frederik Hendrik to Heenvliet, [20]/30 January 1640. However, the 
instructions of Heenvliet of July 1640 confirmed that then the proposal was that Prince Willem 
should marry Princess Elizabeth (1635-50). See Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, 
III, 253-6: Instructions to Heenvliet, July 1640. Given Elizabeth’s young age (five), the marriage 
would have been deferred. See also Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 943: 
Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, [1]/11 December 1640. 
 
59 For the proposal, initially suggested by Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse (1600-72), 
the anti-Cardinal Richelieu and pro-Spanish French conspirator then at the Caroline court, and 
Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645), Spain’s first minister, for Princess Mary to 
marry the heir of Philip IV (1605-65), Balthazar Carlos (1629-46), see Collins, II, 636-7: 
Northumberland to Leicester, 13 February 1640; Gardiner, History of England, IX, 89; and Elliott, 




King’s leading English opponents effectively took over England’s diplomacy. Mary, 
who, from the standpoint of the House of Orange, was preferable, became available 
as a bride for the Dutch prince in the autumn of 1640. The change of matrimonial 
plans resulted from the ending of the proposal to marry Mary to Balthazar Carlos 
following the collapse of the prospect of an Anglo-Spanish alliance. 
 
The marriage of Princess Mary to a member of the Dutch House of Orange – 
a non-royal, nouveau riche, family – was a significant comedown for the English 
King and Queen.60 This was especially so, given that up to the end of August 1640, 
the talk had been of a possible match for Mary with the heir to the Habsburg Spanish 
throne, Balthazar Carlos, a scion of the most prestigious royal dynasty in Europe. 
There is no better illustration of Charles’s loss of influence abroad than the projected 
marriage of his eldest daughter to a Dutch prince. 
 
Leicester’s first involvement with the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance was by 
way of his role as Charles’s ambassador in Paris. Late in December 1640, the earl 
had an audience with Louis at which, as instructed, he had informed the French King 
of the talks regarding the match, and that an extraordinary ambassador from the 
United Provinces would go to England shortly to conclude the marriage treaty.61 In 
raising this matter, Leicester trod very carefully, for the proposed union would 
involve, on the English side, one of Louis’s nieces. However, the ambassador was 
evidently confused at this stage as to which niece, referring to ‘[th]e second daughter 
of England,’ implying that it was Princess Elizabeth, who was to be the Prince’s 
bride and not Mary. Leicester’s confusion probably arose from the fact that at the 
beginning of the year, the initial English proposition had been for the Prince to 
marry the younger Elizabeth. Montereul, the French representative at the Caroline 
 
60 See Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 357: Charles I to Frederik 
Hendrik, [11]/21 February 1641 for confirmation of the agreement to the marriage between Princess 
Mary and Prince Willem. For the displeasure and embarrassment of Charles I and Henriette Marie at 
the lowly marriage for Mary and their refusal to kiss the groom, see Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 640, 
footnote 81. For the opposite effect, that is, a step-up in rank for the House of Orange, see Jonathan I. 
Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 537-8. 
 





court, also reported the same error in a letter to Chavigny of that month.62 
 
Leicester had stated in his letter of December 1640 that superficially, at least, 
Louis appeared to favour the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance. However, the 
ambassador had suggested that this was a facade to hide the French King’s true 
feelings on the matter: 
 
But to tell your honor the truth, I did not perceive very much contentment by 
this King’s [Louis XIII’s] either countenance or words for this intended 
mariage, and some are of [the] opinion that the ministers [Richelieu and/or 
Chavigny?] of this State [France] will not rejoyce to see it concluded.63 
 
The ambassador might have discerned genuine French disquiet at the prospect of an 
Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance. Yet this seems unlikely, given that France was then 
the senior partner in an anti-Habsburg league with the United Provinces. As recently 
as 1636, Louis had signalled the importance he attached to France’s alliance with the 
Dutch by raising the official form of address for Frederik Hendrik from ‘Excellence’ 
to ‘Altesse.’64 It is possible that the Cardinal regarded the Anglo-Dutch marriage 
alliance as having been sprung on him and as a threat to Franco-Dutch relations. 
Montereul, the French representative at Charles’s court, was certainly surprised by 
the proposed marriage and could not decide whether it would be to France’s 
advantage.65 Alternatively, Richelieu may have been annoyed that he had not 
 
62 See PRO 31/3 (Baschet Transcripts), fols 358-64: Montereul to Chavigny, 27 December 
1640; see also BnF, MS f. fr. 15995, fols 167-9. 
 
63 SP 78/110, fol. 192: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 25 December 1640/4 January 
1641. In the context of possible Franco-Dutch tension over the marriage, Frederik Hendrik noted in 
January 1641 that Lodewick van Nassau, heer van Beverweerd (1602-65), had reported that Léon le 
Bouthillier, comte de Chavigny (1608-52), Louis XIII’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had 
raised some objections to the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance. See Prinsterer, Correspondance de la 
Maison d’Orange, III, 324: Frederik Hendrik to Beverweerd, [11]/21 January 1641. Beverweerd had 
responded by saying that the league with England was purely personal, that is, between Prince 
Willem and Princess Mary only, which appeared to have mollified Chavigny. Beverweerd was an 
illegitimate member of the House of Orange, a warrior and an occasional diplomat. At the end of 
1640, he had been sent to Paris as ambassador to advise Louis XIII of the forthcoming marriage 
between Prince Willem and Princess Mary. 
 
64 For the French raising their title for the Dutch Stadhouder from ‘Excellence’ to ‘Altesse’ in 
1636, see Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 537. 
 
65 See PRO 31/3 (Baschet Transcripts), fols 358-64: Montereul to Chavigny, 27 December 




initiated the marriage proposal himself. At the very least, there was some initial 
French unease regarding a (personal) union between the English and the Dutch 
ruling families, something that has not been noted previously by historians. 
 
Leicester’s report of French reservations regarding an Anglo-Dutch marriage 
alliance was probably tinged with regret, perhaps even envy. After all, he had spent 
four-and-a-half years trying to conclude the Anglo-French treaties, which now 
appeared likely to be replaced by a marriage alliance between the Dutch Prince and 
the English Princess. Nevertheless, Leicester’s willingness to perceive problems 
with the proposed marriage may have reflected more than simply annoyance or 
pique on his part. In the first place, he might have been concerned that the primary 
sponsors of the Dutch marriage were Warwick’s circle, recently the target of much 
criticism by the ambassador.66 Secondly, there was the fact that throughout the 
Thirty Years War, the Dutch had avoided conflict with the Empire, just as the 
Imperialists had eschewed fighting the United Provinces, at least directly.67 The 
ambassador might have reasoned that the Dutch would be inferior allies to the 
French in bringing about the restitution of Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector, to his 
dignities and lands. France would be a better partner for this purpose. Unlike the 
United Provinces, it was at war with Austria, and would be more willing and able to 
use force to restore Charles Louis. On the other hand, there had been Dutch reports 
to the effect that Leicester had favoured an Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance in July 
1640 – although, in the then circumstances of a projected Anglo-Spanish league and 
a Spanish match for Princess Mary, the ambassador would likely have backed 
anything that precluded closer ties to Spain.68 Nonetheless, these reports, if true, 
reveal that Leicester was not opposed in principle to forging closer ties between 
England and the United Provinces. 
 
66 See, for example, SP 78/110, fol. 168: Leicester to [Secretary of State], 13/23 November 
1640. 
 
67 In parallel, the Spanish and Swedes tended to avoid fighting each other, the Battle of 
Nördlingen in 1634 being a notable exception. 
 
68 Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 250-1: Heufft to Sommelsdyck, 
between [22 June]/2 July and [29 June]/9 July 1641. From the letter’s contents, M. Heufft (dates 





In preparation for the Prince Willem-Princess Mary marriage, the Dutch 
directed a diplomatic charm offensive at the French in December 1640. This move 
by the United Provinces indicated that there might have been some substance to the 
seemingly adverse French reaction to the marriage noted by Leicester at that time.69 
In December, Frederik Hendrik wrote a letter of introduction for ‘Mr. de 
Beverweert’ – Lodewick van Nassau, heer van Beverweerd, the Dutch soldier and 
sometime diplomat – to Louis.70 The Prince also wrote to Anne of Austria, the 
French King’s Queen, Gaston, duc d’Orléans, Louis’s brother, and Chavigny.71 His 
wife, the Princess d’Orange, sent a note to Richelieu.72 All of these letters were 
conventional missives of introduction for Beverweerd and raised the topic of the 
Anglo-Dutch marriage. However, the number of letters and the high status of their 
recipients does indicate a degree of concern on the part of the United Provinces to 
assuage any French concern at the proposed marriage. The Dutch were probably 
trying to ensure the smooth running of diplomatic relations with France by 
informing Louis and Richelieu that they would be entering into a marriage league 
with a country, England, with which France was not allied. The Dutch made it clear 
to both the English and the French that the marriage represented only a personal 
union between the ruling families of the two countries and not a military and 
political alliance between states.73 Such a league would be more acceptable, and less 
threatening, to the French than a formal pact between England and the United 
 
69 See SP 78/110, fol. 191: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 25 December 1640/4 
January 1641. 
 
70 Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 314-5: Frederik Hendrik to Louis 
XIII, [11]/21 December 1640. See also Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 307-
11: Instructions to Beverweerd, December 1640. 
 
71 Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 315: Frederik Hendrik to Anne of 
Austria, [11]/21 December 1640; Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 315-6: 
Frederik Hendrik to Gaston, duc d’Orléans, [11]/21 December 1640; and Prinsterer, Correspondance 
de la Maison d’Orange, III, 317: Frederik Hendrik to Chavigny, [11]/21 December 1640. 
 
72 Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 316-7: Princess d’Orange to 
Cardinal Richelieu, [11]/21 December 1640. 
 
73 For confirmation of this action on the part of the Dutch, see Prinsterer, Correspondance de 
la Maison d’Orange, III, 335-6: Frederik Hendrik to Ambassadors in England, [January]/February 
1641 and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 336-7: Frederik Hendrik to 






In January 1641, the French King and Queen responded favourably to the 
Dutch letters – it appeared that the diplomatic charm offensive of the United 
Provinces had largely worked.74 At the same time, however, the Dutch 
representatives in Paris questioned Leicester about the French reaction to the 
proposed marriage between Prince Willem and Princess Mary.75 Apparently, the 
Dutch were still seeking reassurance regarding the French reaction to the match.76 
Nevertheless, in January, the ambassador could report to Vane that Beverweerd had 
told him ‘that this King [Louis XIII] and [th]e Cardinal did expresse unto him very 
much contentment for [th]e intended mariage with one of our [England’s] Princesses 
[Mary]…’77 Thus, any initially negative French reaction to the marriage that 
Leicester might have noted at the end of the preceding year had evaporated. 
 
Prince Willem arrived in England on 19 April 1641 to marry Princess 
Mary.78 The ceremony took place on 2 May.79 The match occurred primarily 
because it had the backing both of the Northumberland-Leicester circle at court and 
Warwick and his confederates at Westminster.80 Northumberland and Vane had 
 
74 Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 334: Louis XIII to Frederik Hendrik, 
[23 January]/2 February 1641 and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 330: Anne 
of Austria to Frederik Hendrik, [19]/29 January 1641. 
 
75 See SP 78/111, fol. 3, Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 15/25 January 1641. 
 
76 See, for example, Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 337-8: Frederik 
Hendrik to Beverweerd, [January]/February 1641 for the Stadhouder’s concern that his ambassador 
had not been granted an audience with Louis XIII. 
 
77 SP 78/111, fol. 10: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 22 January/1 February 1641. See 
Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 360: Frederik Hendrik to Beverweerd, 
February 1641 for confirmation of Cardinal Richelieu’s (now) favorable view of the Anglo-Dutch 
marriage alliance. 
 
78 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 342 for 19 April 1641 being the date of Prince 
Willem’s arrival in England. 
 
79 For a description of the marriage ceremony, see Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 280-4. 
 
80 For Warwick’s support for the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, see Prinsterer, 
Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 445-6: Warwick to Princess d’Orange, May 1641 and 
Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 472: Warwick to Prince Willem, [14]/24 May 
1641. For the advocacy of Holland, Warwick’s brother, in favour of the marriage, see Prinsterer, 
Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 474-5, Holland to Frederik Hendrik, [22 May]/1 June 
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been involved directly in the negotiations for the marriage treaty with the Dutch.81 
Leicester, as we have seen, may initially have harboured doubts about the match, but 
these had melted away by the end of January 1641.82 Warwick’s group had always 
been keen on an Anglo-Dutch alliance – all the more so given their adverse 
experience of trying to conclude a league with the French in 1629 and 1636-7.83 It 
was partly on the basis of their support for the marriage alliance – and the 
abandonment of the Anglo-French treaties – that Leicester, Northumberland and 
their friends were able to achieve a political reconciliation with Warwick’s circle 
during the early months of 1641.84 The failure of Warwick and his allies to push 
hard for root-and-branch reform that spring and summer may have been partly by 
way of a quid pro quo to the Northumberland-Leicester circle, which remained 
hostile to abolishing episcopacy.85 Overall, as Adamson states the wedding was ‘the 
Junto’s [that is, the Warwick group’s] diplomatic triumph – crowning, through a 
dynastic union, England’s reorientation away from Spain and towards the 
“Protestant Cause”.’86 
 




81 See Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 306: Vane to Prince Willem, 
11/[21] December 1640 and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 358-60: Vane to 
Frederik Hendrik, [13]/23 February 1641. See also Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 189. 
 
82 See SP 78/110, fol. 192: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 25 December 1640/4 
January 1641 and SP 78/111, fol. 10: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 22 January/1 February 
1641 respectively. 
 
83 For the possibility of an alliance with France in 1629, see Adamson, ‘Policy and 
Pomegranates’, pp. 159-63. For the offer of naval assistance to France in 1636 by Warwick, see 
Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 33, footnote and Smuts, ‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta 
Maria’s Circle’, p. 28. For Warwick’s support for a French alliance in 1637, see CSPV, XXIV, 1636-
1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate, 16/[26] January 1637. 
 
84 For the reconciliation in early 1641 between the Northumberland-Leicester circle and 
Warwick’s group, see Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 132-63. See also Russell, Fall of the British 
Monarchies, pp. 237-73. 
 
85 I owe this idea to a comment made by Professor John Adamson at a supervisors’ meeting in 
July 2019. See also, for example, Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 179-86, 329-31 and 342-3 for the 
implications of the delays to, and Parliament’s ultimate failure to pass, the Root-and-Branch Bill (the 
putative legislation abolishing bishops). 
 




Wittelsbachs, on the one hand, and the Dutch and the Northumberland-Leicester 
circle, on the other. Elizabeth of Bohemia had wanted her son, Charles Louis, to 
marry Princess Mary – an ambition that the Prince Elector himself had shared.87 
They were understandably annoyed with the Dutch, therefore, and particularly with 
Prince Willem – ‘the little Prince of Orenge [sic].’88 In seeking compensation for the 
Prince Palatine’s failure to win Mary’s hand, Elizabeth of Bohemia and Charles 
Louis hatched plans to convert the personal marriage alliance between England and 
the United Provinces into a military and political league. The aim was to obtain 
material assistance from the Dutch to bring about the Prince Elector’s restitution.89 
These moves by the Palatine Wittelsbachs strained relations with the Dutch, who, as 
they were at war with Spain, expressly wished to avoid any Imperial entanglements. 
This situation probably formed the background to the falling-out between Elizabeth 
of Bohemia and Vane, a member of the Northumberland-Leicester group, who had 
been involved in negotiating the marriage alliance.90 Evidence of the quarrel can be 
seen in Elizabeth’s disparaging comments regarding Charles’s Secretary of State in 
her letters of the late summer and early autumn of 1641.91 
 
 
87 See, for example, Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 943, especially 
footnote 1: Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, [1]/11 December 1640 and Akkerman, Correspondence of 
Queen of Bohemia, II, 943-4, especially footnote 3: Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, [23 January]/2 
February 1641. 
 
88 See, for example, Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 952-4, especially 
footnote 2: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, [7]/17 May 1641 (952, ‘the little Prince of 
Orenge’ [sic]) and Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 956-8, especially footnote 4: 
Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, [18]/28 May 1641 (957, ‘the States Ambasssadours & their 
little head [Prince Willem].’). 
 
89 See, for example, Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 949-50, especially 
footnote 8: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, [19]/29 March 1641. 
 
90 For Vane’s involvement in the negotiations for the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, see 
Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 306: Vane to Prince Willem, 11/[21] 
December 1640 and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 358-60: Vane to Frederik 
Hendrik, [13]/23 February 1641. 
 
91 See, for example, Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 989-92, especially 
footnote 18: Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, [16]/26 August 1641 (991, ‘538. [Vanety]’) and 
Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 1003-5, especially footnote 23: Elizabeth of 
Bohemia to Roe, [30 September]/10 October 1641 (1004, ‘vanitie’). The immediate cause of the 
quarrel was Vane’s apparent crossing out of Elizabeth of Bohemia’s full title in Charles I’s 
declaration of support for the Palatine cause. See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, 
II, 984-6: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, [28 July]/7 August 1641. 
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In his desperate circumstances by mid-1641, the English King may have 
sought to capitalize on the union between the Stewarts and the House of Orange. 
Charles had not pursued an alliance with the Dutch during the Personal Rule.92 But, 
by the spring of 1641, he may have regarded the marriage alliance with the United 
Provinces as a useful lever with which to move Frederik Hendrik to provide him 
with the armed forces and the money that the Spanish had not been able to give him 
in 1640.93 Seeking financial and military aid from foreign powers in an effort to help 
resolve his domestic problems was certainly a strategy that he would adopt 
repeatedly in the years that followed.94 
 
Charles’s embracing of an Anglo-Spanish alliance as opposed to an Anglo-
French league in April 1640 together with the dissolution of the Short Parliament the 
following May badly damaged relations with the up to then loyal Northumberland-
Leicester circle.95 The advent of the Long Parliament in November, which the King 
could not dissolve given the money that he had to pay the Scots under the 
Pacification of Ripon, intensified this process. Charles’s inability to dissolve the 
Long Parliament meant that Leicester, Northumberland and their circle could now 
risk an alliance with Warwick’s group, secure in the knowledge that the latter’s 
powerbase at Westminster, and, therefore, their own influence, would be immune to 
the effects of losing royal favour. The opportunity to adopt a Protestant foreign 
 
 
92 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 151. In this context, it is significant that it was only in 1632-
3 that Charles I was represented by (two) diplomats of (extraordinary) ambassadorial rank in the 
United Provinces. At all other times, the English King only had agents at The Hague. See Haskell, 
‘Sir Francis Windebank’, Appendix E, p. 587. 
 
93 For possible financial and military assistance being Charles I’s reasons for agreeing to the 
Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 244, 257-8 and 288-9 and 
Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 250-1. 
 
94 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, X, 188 for Charles I seeking aid from 
Denmark and Dorothy A. Bigby, Phelypeauux de Guenegaud and Delomenie Le Tellier, ‘An 
Unknown Treaty between England and France, 1644’, EHR, 28 (1913), 338 for the same in respect of 
France in the first half of the 1640s. 
 
95 See Collins, II, 655: Northumberland to Leicester, 25 June 1640 for Northumberland’s strong 
distaste for the proposed marriage between Princess Mary and Balthazar Carlos and SP 78/109, fol. 
153: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 3/13 April 1640 and SP 78/109, fol. 196: Leicester to 
Secretary of State/[Vane], 1/11 May 1640 for Leicester’s more muted criticism of the union in the 




policy by way of the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance in the winter of 1640-1 
deepened the estrangement of the Northumberland-Leicester circle from the King. 
For the remainder of 1641, Northumberland, Leicester and their associates allied 
with Warwick’s circle. But the break with Charles was not yet final. 
Northumberland retained sufficient favour with the King to play a key role in 
Leicester being made Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in June.96 Nevertheless, this change 
of allegiance on the part of the Northumberland-Leicester group would play an 




The Anglo-Scottish Union of August 1641 moved English foreign policy further 
away from an alliance with France, as represented by the Anglo-French treaties of 
1637, towards leagues with Protestant powers, notably the United Provinces.97 The 
Union settled the financial, military, political, security and trade issues between 
Charles’s two kingdoms following the Covenanters’ victory in the Second Bishops’ 
War of 1640.98 However, it also contained a provision ‘concerning the not making 
or denouncing war with forraigners without consent of both Parliaments.’99 The 
measure removed the King’s ability to wage war unless agreed to by the English and 
Scottish legislatures. The Anglo-Scottish Union could provide the platform for a 
British Protestant crusade in Europe and the possible restitution of the Prince Elector 
to his dignities and lands. This situation was recognized by Elizabeth of Bohemia in 
her correspondence with her agent, Sir Thomas Roe. Elizabeth communicated to the 
 
96 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 200-1 for the influence of Northumberland in Leicester 
becoming Lord Lieutenant. 
 
97 For the Anglo-Scottish Union, or the Treaty of London, of 25 August 1641, see ‘Charles I, 
1640: An Act for the Pacification between England and Scotland’, Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 
1628-80, John Raithby, ed., s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819, pp. 120-8. For comment on 
the Union, see Gardiner, History of England, IX, 238, 242, 253, 258, 260, 272, 300 and 416; Russell, 
Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 147-205; David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44, 3rd 
edn (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 2003), pp. 214-42; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 82-
4, 93, 108, 127, 134, 145, 147, 316, 337, 340, 342-3, 349, 353-5, 359, 361 and 514-5. 
 
98 See, for example, Anglo-Scottish Union, First, Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Demands, 
and Recitals, 1., 4., 9. and 10. 
 




Caroline diplomat that ‘I ame verie in verie good hope that now something may be 
done for vs being so well assuered of the parliaments good affection to me.’100 In 
particular, she stated: 
 
how much I ame beholding to both the parliaments of England [and] 
Scotland that not a man shall be leauied by anie either France or Spaine till 
your [Roe’s] negotiation [at Regensburg (Ratisbon) and Vienna] shall end or 
till 1 of April [1642].101 
 
Charles Louis was initially more dubious about possible (English) parliamentary 
efforts to aid his restoration. He noted Westminster’s excuse for not immediately 
providing him with aid – ‘since they [Parliament] pretend want of ready Monie for 
to make Warre in Germanie.’102 
 
Charles signed the Anglo-Scottish Union on 25 August 1641.103 The treaty 
was celebrated in London on 7 September.104 In the second half of the 1630s, 
Northumberland, Leicester and the fellow members of their circle had sought to 
bring about an anti-Habsburg campaign in Europe based around the Anglo-French 
treaties of 1637. By the end of the summer of 1641, this aim would centre on the 
Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May and the Anglo-Scottish Union of August. 
The Northumberland-Leicester circle had accepted this reorientation of English 
foreign policy. Indeed, Northumberland and Vane had been involved in concluding 
the marriage alliance with the Dutch as part of the rapprochement with Warwick’s 
group.105 
 
100 See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 947: Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, 
[22 February]/4 March 1641. 
 
101 See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 1004: Elizabeth of Bohemia to 
Roe, [30 September]/10 October 1641. See Robert B. Mowat, ‘The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to 
Vienna, 1641-2’, EHR, 25 (1910), 264-75 for details of the embassy of Sir Thomas Roe (1581-1644) 
to Regensburg (Ratisbon) and Vienna. 
 
102 See Akkerman, Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 962: Charles I Louis to Elizabeth 
of Bohemia, [6]/16 June 1641. 
 
103 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 349. 
 
104 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 353. 
 
105 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 189 for the involvement of Northumberland and Vane in 




The Anglo-Scottish Union held out the prospect of a grand alliance to restore 
the Prince Elector and advance Protestantism on the continent. There was now the 
possibility that England’s new ally-by-marriage, the United Provinces, and 
Covenanter Scotland’s de facto ally, Sweden, could be enlisted in support of a major 
new intervention in the Thirty Years War.106 This projected league might be further 
widened to include Brandenburg following the recent conclusion of an alliance 
between that country and Sweden.107 Had such an anti-Habsburg league 
materialized, it would have included one first rank power (Sweden), an emerging 
top-rank state (the United Provinces), a second level country (England) and two 
small though still militarily significant nations (Brandenburg and Scotland). Such a 
league would exclude Catholic France, and would consist exclusively of Protestant 
powers. 
 
Two expeditions were planned under the Anglo-Scottish Union. The first 
would be to the continent to reclaim the Prince Elector’s dignities and lands.108 The 
other would wage a naval war in the Caribbean against the Spanish.109 The second 
proposal echoed measures contained in all of the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 – 
that is, the provision of a fleet to Charles Louis to attack Spanish shipping and 
territories in the New World.110 This strategy would be agreeable to both the 
Northumberland-Leicester circle and Warwick’s group. The former would regard it 
as fulfilling the provisions of the 1637 treaties; the latter would see it as an 
 
Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 306: Vane to Prince Willem, 11/[21] December 1640 
and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 358-60: Vane to Frederik Hendrik, 
[13]/23 February 1641. 
 
106 See Alexia N. J. Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and 
Ennoblement 1611-1660’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1998) for the close 
links between these two nations at that time. 
 
107 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 365. 
 
108 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 364-5. 
 
109 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 362-4. 
 
110 See SP 103/11, fols 600-2: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 7 of the main 
and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fol. 228: Anglo-French Auxiliary Treaty, June 




opportunity to promote English influence in the West Indies and regain their colony 
of Providence Island, recently lost to Spain.111 Unsurprisingly, at the end of August 
1641, the Prince Elector was ecstatic at such a prospect and with it the possibility of 
his full restitution.112 
 
The optimism surrounding such an anti-Habsburg coalition would have to be 
tempered, however. The policy of the United Provinces was to avoid conflict with 
the Empire and that of Sweden open war with Spain. The Anglo-Dutch marriage 
alliance was only personal in nature. It had also, as noted above, given rise to 
tension between the Northumberland-Leicester circle and the United Provinces, on 
the one hand, and the Palatine Wittelsbachs, on the other. But even supposing such 
obstacles could have been overcome, England’s slide into civil war in 1642 
conclusively killed off all prospect of concerted military action to restore the 




Over the course of 1640 and 1641, the Northumberland-Leicester circle had moved 
from espousing an anti-Habsburg alliance centred on Catholic France to supporting 
a purely Protestant league that was intended to defeat the resurgent Counter-
Reformation. The projected coalition based on the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 
had been overtaken by events – that is, the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May 
1641 and the Anglo-Scottish Union of August of that year – in the same way as 
Charles’s plans for a league with the Spanish had been derailed by his and Spain’s 
domestic problems in 1640. Reflecting his loss of power, the King’s foreign policy 
had been hijacked by Warwick’s group, aided and abetted by the Northumberland-
Leicester circle. The policy was now for a purely Protestant coalition to restore 
England’s standing in Europe and the Americas together with action to effect the 
 
111 The Spanish had captured Providence Island on 25 May 1641. See Adamson, Noble Revolt, 
pp. 363-4 and Karen O. Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 337-8. 
 
112 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 366, citing TNA, SP Domestic, Charles I, SP 16/483, fol. 80: 




restitution of the Prince Elector to his dignities and lands. One inevitable outcome of 
these developments was the ending of Leicester’s five-and-a-half year Paris embassy 










At the beginning of October 1641, Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester – Charles 
I’s erstwhile extraordinary ambassador to Louis XIII – returned to a very different 
country to the one he had left in May 1636.1 In the first half of 1636, the King had 
been in the seventh year of his Personal Rule without Parliament. Charles had 
appeared to be secure in his realms and there appeared to be few, if any clouds, on 
the horizon. Five years later, in the autumn of 1641, all this had changed. Starting in 
1637, the King had become increasingly distracted by, and embroiled in, political 
and religious problems in England and Scotland. This situation had culminated in 
his defeat at the hands of the Covenanters in August 1640 at the Battle of Newburn. 
Shortly after the battle, the Covenanters’ English allies – the group based around 
Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick – had presented the Petition of the Twelve 
Peers to Charles, effectively demanding that he call a Parliament. The failure of the 
Great Council of Peers of September had undermined the King’s position further, as 
had the Peace of Ripon of October – the truce that had ended the Second Bishops’ 
War. Charles had suffered yet another blow in the collapse of the possibility of an 
alliance with Spain as a result of the rebellion in Catalonia in June, followed by the 
revolution in Portugal in December. There would be no Spanish men and money to 
restore him to power in Great Britain. The outcome was that the King had been 
forced to call the Long Parliament, which met on 3 November. 
 
The risk that Warwick’s group had taken in the late summer and autumn of 
that year in forcing the King to summon Parliament continued to pay dividends. 
From the beginning of 1641 in alliance with the Northumberland-Leicester circle, 
that group had continued to dictate events. When Leicester arrived back in England 
 
1 Brennan and Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 269 give the date of the arrival of Robert 





in the autumn of that year, the portents appeared to be good. In particular, following 
the execution of Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, in May, he had been made 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (14 June).2 Thus, Leicester and his brother-in-law, 
Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland and the Lord Admiral, looked set to 
form a formidable axis at the Caroline court. 
 
The hopes of the Northumberland-Leicester circle in concluding an anti-
Habsburg league based on the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 had ended in the winter 
of 1640-1.3 Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of advancing the Protestant cause on 
the continent, which Northumberland, Leicester and their allies at court had tried to 
realize by way of the treaties, still seemed to be attainable – especially as the now 
powerful group associated with Warwick remained committed to this agenda. Given 
the distrust of France on the part of Warwick and his circle – that is, the 
impossibility, in their view, of concluding an alliance with Louis and Cardinal 
Richelieu – their focus was no longer on a league with that country. Rather, 
European Protestantism was to be championed initially through a (personal) Anglo-
Dutch marriage alliance. As a result of the rapprochement between Warwick’s group 
and the Northumberland-Leicester circle at the beginning of 1641, members of the 
latter group, notably Northumberland and Sir Henry Vane senior, Charles’s senior 
Secretary of State, were involved in the negotiations for the marriage treaty.4 The 
 
2 There is a reference in CSPI, 1633-1647, 302, The King to the Lords Justices for the Earl of 
Leicester, 11 June 1641 stating that ‘The Earl is to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland,’ while in CSPD, 
1641-43, 11-2, Elizabeth of Bohemia to Roe, 14/24 June 1641, The Hague; see also Akkerman, 
Correspondence of Queen of Bohemia, II, 966, Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662), the elder sister of 
Charles I (1600-49), noted that ‘… and since my Lord of Leicester is Deputy [of Ireland] …’ See 
again, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 555, Diary of Events 1636-1650. Both Brennan and 
Kinnamon, Sidney Chronology, p. 269 and Atherton, ‘Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester’ also 
give 14 June 1641 as the date of Leicester’s appointment as Lord Lieutenant, which is the date used 
here. 
 
3 See London, TNA, SP Foreign, Treaty Papers, SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French 
Treaties, 17 February 1637 and Paris, BnF, MS fonds français 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-
French Treaty, June 1637. 
 
4 For the involvement of Algernon Percy, tenth earl of Northumberland (1602-1668), and Sir 
Henry Vane senior (1589-1655) in the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May 1641, see Prinsterer, 
Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 306: Vane to Prince Willem, 11/[21] December 1640 
and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, III, 358-60: Vane to Frederik Hendrik, 23 





alliance was realized by way of the wedding on 2 May of Prince Willem, the oldest 
son of Frederik Hendrik, the Stadhouder and the effective ruler of the United 
Provinces, and Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of the King and his Queen, 
Henriette Marie.5 
 
The policy of aligning England more closely with the Protestant cause in 
Europe and the wider world was expressed further in the Anglo-Scottish Union of 
25 August 1641. The Union finalized the financial, military, political, security and 
trade issues between Charles’s two kingdoms following the Covenanters’ victory in 
the Second Bishops’ War of 1640.6 It potentially involved military action in Europe 
and a naval war against Spain in the Caribbean.7 Yet more propositions supporting a 
Protestant foreign policy were advanced around that time. On 31 August 1641, Sir 
Richard Cave, the parliamentary agent of Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector 
Palatine, suggested the formation of a West India Company to take advantage of 
Spain’s perceived weakness across the Atlantic.8 In the autumn of the same year, 
Samuel Vassall, the godly member of Parliament for London, introduced a proposal 
in the Commons for the creation of just such a company.9 In late 1641, therefore, the 
 
5 For the Anglo-Dutch alliance, celebrated by the marriage of the fourteen-year old Willem II 
(1626-50), the eldest son of Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange, and Stadhouder of Holland, Zeeland, 
Utrecht, Guelders and Overijssel (1584-1647), to the nine-year old Princess Mary (1631-60), the 
eldest daughter of Charles I and Henriette Marie (1609-69), on 2 May 1641, see Gardiner, History of 
England, IX, 244, 257-8, 262, 288-9 and 342 and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 172, 178, 189, 250 and 
281-3. 
 
6 For the Anglo-Scottish Union of 25 August 1641, see ‘Charles I, 1640: An Act for the 
Pacification between England and Scotland’, Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, John 
Raithby, ed., s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819, pp. 120-8. For comment on the Union, see 
Gardiner, History of England, IX, 238, 242, 253, 258, 260, 272, 300 and 416; Russell, Fall of the 
British Monarchies, pp. 147-205; David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44, 3rd edn 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 2003), pp. 214-42; and Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 82-4, 
93, 108, 127, 134, 145, 147, 316, 337, 340, 342-3, 349, 353-5, 359, 361 and 514-5. 
 
7 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 364-5 for the proposed military action in Europe and pp. 
362-4 for the projected expedition to the Caribbean. 
 
8 Sir Richard Cave (d.1645) was the agent of Charles I Louis, Prince Elector Palatine (1617-
80) and his mother, Elizabeth of Bohemia. He became a member of Parliament in August 1641. Cave 
was on very good terms with another supporter of the Palatine cause, Sir Thomas Roe (1581-1644), 
the well-known Caroline diplomat. For Cave’s advocacy of a West Indies Company, see Mary F. 
Keeler, The Long Parliament, 1640-1641: A Biographical Study of Its Members (New York: Literary 
Licensing, LLC, 2011), p. 129. 
 




forces pushing for greater commitment to the Protestant cause were very much to 




The main findings of this thesis can now be presented. Firstly, it has been 
demonstrated that forging an Anglo-French alliance lay at the heart of Caroline 
foreign-policy and diplomatic efforts in the period 1636-9 and not the securing of a 
league with either of the Habsburg powers, Austria or Spain. This conclusion is new, 
and contradicts much of the established historiography of the period, which has 
placed greater emphasis on Charles’s continuing interest in securing an alliance with 
either the Imperialists or the Spanish. It also answers the question of whether the 
King’s foreign policy was primarily pro-French or pro-Spanish in the second half of 
the 1630s. 
 
In the nineteenth century and for most of the twentieth, historians regarded 
Charles’s foreign policy throughout the 1630s as pro-Spanish. This was the position 
held by S. R. Gardiner.10 More recently, Simon Adams and Lawrence Reeve typified 
the King’s diplomacy as predominately favouring-Spain in these years.11 However, 
starting in the final quarter of the twentieth century, a new orthodoxy emerged, as 
advanced initially by Malcolm Smuts and then by Caroline Hibbard, Kevin Sharpe 
and Richard Cust.12 These historians are more optimistic about the possible 
 
(bap.1586-1667) was a prominent London politician and merchant with interests in, among other 
places, the Americas, who sat for the City in the Long Parliament. For Vassall, see Keeler, Long 
Parliament, p. 371. 
 
10 See, for example, Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 162. 
 
11 See Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, pp. 89-90, 93 and 101 and Reeve, Road to 
Personal Rule, pp. 4 and 181-4. 
 
12 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Anthony Milton, Catholic 
and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 507-8 and Andrew D. Thrush, ‘The Navy Under 





conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance, but only up to mid-1637, or 1638, when all 
four see the potential for a league with France ending. All four also view Charles as 
reverting to his pro-Spanish stance from, at the latest, 1638. 
 
The conclusions of this thesis dispute all of these interpretations, and indicate 
that, in the second half of the 1630s, English diplomacy was pro-French and not pro-
Spanish. For three-and-a-half years between May 1636 and October 1639, Charles 
tried to conclude a league with France. More than this, starting in February 1637 and 
ending in October 1639 – a period in excess of two-and-a-half years – the King’s 
primary foreign-policy aim was to finalize the Anglo-French treaties of 1637. Thus, 
from May 1636 to February 1637, Charles moved towards France, while, between 
February 1637 and October 1639, his diplomacy favoured the French and not the 
Spanish. This interpretation is supported by several major pieces of evidence. The 
King gave Leicester three sets of instructions for the Paris embassy between April 
1636 and April 1639 – Charles evidently took Leicester’s mission seriously; the earl 
was not left to his own devices in Paris.13 There were four closely-negotiated and 
variously-amended Anglo-French treaties in 1637 – the so-called main and the 
auxiliary treaties of February and the French versions of these treaties of June.14 The 
King demonstrated his commitment to an Anglo-French alliance by switching tactics 
several times in an effort to make it happen. He initially showed considerable 
willingness to compromise – for example, by accepting the French versions of the 
treaties of June 1637.15 He then resorted to a more aggressive approach – for 
instance, in supporting the return of Marie des Médicis, the French Queen Mother, 
 
13 See TNA, SP France, SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636 (see also 
Collins, II, 374-6) (according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s 
instructions, 9 May 1636, these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636); SP 78/101, fols 35-9: 
Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636 (see also Collins, II, 376-7); and SP 78/107, fol. 154: 
Additional instructions for the earl of Leicester, 28 April 1639. The latter were Charles I’s orders to 
Leicester to restart the stalled Anglo-French treaty negotiations in 1639. 
 
14 See SP 103/11, fols 595-605: main and the auxiliary Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 
1637 and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fols 226-32: auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty, June 1637. 
 
15 For Charles I’s acceptance of the French version of the auxiliary Anglo-French treaty of 






to France in the autumn of the same year, to entice, or compel, Louis and Richelieu 
into agreeing to the Anglo-French treaties.16 During the Battle of the Downs in 
September and October 1639, when the Dutch first confronted and then defeated a 
Spanish armada in the English Channel, Charles again offered terms to the French 
King and the Cardinal that were similar to those in the Anglo-French treaties of 
1637.17 
 
Demonstrably, the King’s diplomatic efforts in the period 1636-9 were 
aimed at realizing an alliance with France. He kept Leicester in Paris between 1636 
and 1641 to negotiate with Louis and Richelieu. He dispatched Sir Thomas Roe, the 
noted Caroline diplomat, to Hamburg as his representative in 1638-40 to discuss the 
conclusion of the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 with France and its confederates, 
Sweden and the United Provinces. Thus, throughout the second half of the 1630s, 
Charles deployed his two ablest diplomats – Leicester and Roe – in trying to secure 
an anti-Habsburg league with the French. 
 
These serious efforts to conclude a French alliance were in stark contrast to 
the either low-level or diplomatically inactive English representation at the Spanish 
Habsburg courts in Brussels and Madrid and at the Emperor’s court in Vienna. 
Following the failure of the mission of Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, 
to Vienna in late 1636, the King’s pursuit of a Habsburg alliance was limited or 
effectively non-existent. Only John Taylor was left as Charles’s representative in 
Vienna, and he was a diplomatic lightweight.18 The same can be said of the English 
agent in Brussels, Sir Baltazar Gerbier, in relation to the talks with the Spanish in 
that city between 1637 and 1638.19 Had the King been serious about the discussions 
in Brussels, he would have replaced Gerbier or strengthened his representation in the 
 
16 For Charles I supporting the return of Marie des Médicis (1575-1642) to France, see, for 
instance, SP 78/104, fol. 210: Secretary of State/[Windebanke] to Leicester, 22 September 1637; see 
also Collins, II, 4[5]17. 
 
17 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 63 and 67. 
 
18 See, for example, Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 527-45. 
 





city with a more senior diplomat. Neither man was authorized to commit Charles to 
a league with either Habsburg power. Indeed, Taylor was recalled home in disgrace 
in 1639 for apparently attempting just such a transgression and imprisoned in the 
Tower of London. There was also little or no activity regarding treaty negotiations 
on the part of the King’s representatives in Madrid in the second half of the 1630s – 
Lord Walter Aston, the ambassador between 1635 and 1638, and Sir Arthur Hopton, 
who succeeded Aston.20 
 
Secondly, this thesis has established that Charles was very serious about 
concluding an Anglo-French alliance in 1637. Some historians, notably Jonathan 
Scott and Thea Lindquist, have dismissed the chances of concluding an Anglo-
French alliance in 1636-7.21 Refuting such views, the King had the main and the 
auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February drawn up, signing and ratifying both 
treaties.22 On 18 February, Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior Secretary of State, 
informed Leicester of these developments and just how far, in his opinion, the King 
had gone towards meeting the French: 
 
And if therin Hee [Charles I] goeth further than was expected on that side 
[the French]: they have cause to acknowledg not only the sense hee hath 
therin of his own honor, but also the great affection hee beareth to his brother 




20 Charles I’s agents in Madrid, had been granted ‘full powers to treat and conclude an 
alliance’ in 1635, but no treaty emerged. See Ian J. Atherton, ‘John, 1st Viscount Scudamore (1601-
71): A Career at Court and in the Country, 1601-43’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Selwyn College, 
University of Cambridge, 1993), p. 170. See also Ian J. Atherton, Ambition and Failure in Stuart 
England: The Career of John, First Viscount Scudamore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999), p. 179. 
 
21 See Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic 1623-1677 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 75 and Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 479-88. 
 
22 See SP 103/11, fols 595-605: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637. For Charles I 
signing and ratifying the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 102: 
Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-located). 
 






Coke went on to state that: 
 
Now both these [the main and auxiliary] treaties [of 17 February 1637] thus 
ordered [and] accorded by his Maj[esty] and paraphed as you may see in the 
drawghts now sent unto you [Leicester]: that the final dispatch therof may 
proceed w[it]hout delay his Maj[esty] hath now sent you … his ratification 
under the broade seale w[hic]h upon like ratification under the seale of that 
[the French] crown [and] signed by that king [Louis XIII] you may deliver 
unto them according as the treaties themselves do severallie direct. And the 
performance now resting on your hands: wee shal expect like expedition, 
…24 
 
The Anglo-French treaties of February 1637 entailed the King agreeing in 
effect to an offensive alliance with France and a significant risk of war with Spain. 
Article 3 of both the main and the auxiliary treaties committed Charles to providing 
a substantial naval force – thirty large warships from his ship-money fleet – and 
instigating a maritime blockade of (presumably) Flanders.25 This provision indicates 
the lengths to which the King was willing to go in seeking an Anglo-French league. 
The ship-money fleet was important to Charles – it was the only major permanent 
military force that he had at his disposal. It had also cost him dear – its imposition 
had occasioned political protest and resistance to its payment in England. The King 
confirmed to Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth, that ‘… I have professed, 
that all my Warfare must be by Sea and not by Land.’ However, he went on to state 
that ‘[w]hat Likelihood there is, that upon this, I should fall foul with Spain, you 
now may see as well as I ...’26 The implication of the last sentence is that Charles 
anticipated conflict with the Spaniards – itself a sign of the seriousness of his 
commitment to an alliance with France.27 The King was also confident that the 
 
24 SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 537 (mis-
located). 
 
25 See SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 of the main and 
auxiliary treaties. 
 
26 Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 February 1637. 
 
27 The combination of the terms of SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 
1637, article 3 of the main and auxiliary treaties together with Charles I’s statement to Thomas 
Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth (1593-1641) in Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 
February 1637, undermines Atherton’s contention that by way of the treaties the English King was 




French would ratify the main and the auxiliary treaties of February, again indicating 
his attachment to an Anglo-French league. As he confided to Wentworth, ‘the 
Treaties are not yet ratified by France, but I make no question of their ratifying of 
them.’28 In other words, Charles was negotiating with the French in good faith and 
not merely on the assumption that they were simply stringing him along, and that 
there would be no end-product. His genuine commitment to an alliance with France 
was confirmed when he agreed to the French versions of the treaties of June 1637.29 
It was the absence of French and not English willingness to proceed that was the 
main stumbling block to bringing about an anti-Habsburg Anglo-French league. 
 
These findings are ground-breaking and challenge much of the traditional 
historiography of the period. Few historians have considered the provisions of the 
three (extant) Anglo-French treaties of 1637 and then only briefly. Gardiner limited 
himself to a short – one page – summation of the terms of the treaties of February.30 
Elmer Beller outlined the contents of the February treaties but only superficially and 
in a single paragraph.31 To his credit, Ian Atherton does comment on the provisions 
of the treaties of February and June.32 Smuts restricted his comments to the French 
version of the auxiliary treaty of June and ignored the two earlier treaties.33 The 
implication of these various analyses is that the treaties of 1637 were of relatively 
little import and that Charles did not take their ratification that seriously. Thus, 
 
commitment on Charles I’s part. In other words, under the treaties of 1637, Charles I would not have 
been able to avoid committing himself to war against the Habsburgs. See Atherton, Ambition and 
Failure in Stuart England, pp. 196-8. 
 
28 Knowler, II, 53: Charles I to Wentworth, 28 February 1637. 
 
29 For Charles I agreeing to the French versions of the treaties of June 1637, see, for example, 
SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1. 
 
30 Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 210. 
 
31 Beller, ‘Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg’, 61-2. See also the very 
brief description of the terms of the Anglo-French treaties of February 1637 in Parker, Thirty Years’ 
War, p. 149. 
 
32 Atherton, ‘Viscount Scudamore’, pp. 201-203, especially p. 202, footnote 107 and Ambition 
and Failure in Stuart England, pp. 193-6. See also the (very) brief references in Parker, Thirty Years’ 
War, p. 149 and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, p. 594. 
 





Smuts, Hibbard, Sharpe and Cust, who ascribe weight to the negotiations with 
France in the first half of 1637, all still underestimate the extent of the King’s 
personal involvement with, and commitment to, the treaties thereafter.34 Charles had 
had the main and the auxiliary treaties of February drawn up, signed and ratified.35 
He had annotated Coke’s draft letter to Leicester informing the ambassador of the 
existence of the treaties, and the actions that he had taken in respect of them.36 And 
he had agreed to the French versions of the treaties of June.37 
 
In downplaying the King’s commitment to the treaties, successive 
generations of historians have ignored the considerable risk that Charles took in 
signing and ratifying the treaties of February 1637 and agreeing to the French 
versions of the treaties of June.38 The King had placed the ball firmly in the French 
court. Had Louis and Richelieu taken up his offer and signed and ratified the 
February treaties or accepted his agreement to the French versions of the treaties of 
June and started the ratification process regarding the latter treaties, Charles could 
well have found himself in a politically difficult position had he then reneged on his 
commitment to an Anglo-French alliance. For example, the King would have been 
unable to portray himself to the Northumberland-Leicester circle in the summer of 
1637 as having tried his best to secure a league with France. Such a situation would 
have risked alienating that group at a crucial time when he needed to retain their 
 
34 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 
525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also Milton, Catholic and 
Reformed, pp. 507-8 and Thrush, ‘The Navy Under Charles I’, p. 13. 
 
35 For Charles I’s involvement in drawing up, signing and ratifying the main and auxiliary 
treaties of February 1637, see SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 536-7 (mis-located). 
 
36 See Charles I’s hand written comment ordering Leicester to look after the interests of 
English merchants in France in SP 78/103, fol. 102: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also 
Collins, II, 537 (mis-located and not identified as written in the King’s hand). 
 
37 For Charles I agreeing to the French versions of the treaties of June 1637, see, for example, 
SP 78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1. 
 
38 For Charles I signing and ratifying the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637, see 
SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 (mis-located). 
For Charles I agreeing to the French versions of these treaties of June 1637, see, for example, SP 





support during the religious crisis of June and July of that year involving the 
convictions before Star Chamber of William Prynne, John Bastwick and Henry 
Burton, the Puritan polemicists, and John Williams, Bishop of Lincoln and the 
former Keeper of the Great Seal and Lord Chancellor. Charles might have harboured 
doubts that the French King and the Cardinal would sign and ratify the treaties – 
though his words to Wentworth suggest otherwise – but he could not know this for 
certain, and could not control their actions. Thus, the risks that the King took in 
relation to the Anglo-French treaties of 1637 are in themselves an indication of the 
sincerity of his efforts towards securing an Anglo-French alliance at that time. 
 
The third finding of this thesis is that it has shown that Charles’s foreign-
policy decisions made sense not only strategically and financially in terms of the 
resources available to him but also in relation to the realities of, and disparities 
within, the European state-system. Such a conclusion contests the long-standing 
opinion of Gardiner that the King’s diplomacy was confusing and directionless – 
‘Futile Diplomacy’ being the title of an entire chapter of that historian’s History of 
England for the period 1629-35.39 The same could be said of Gardiner’s view of the 
King’s foreign policy in the second half of the 1630s. The findings of this thesis do 
not support such an interpretation, however. 
 
England’s diplomatic position in the 1630s was weak, but Charles devised a 
strategy to address this problem. If the King had an advantage compared to foreign 
rulers, it was that his realms were relatively secure from invasion in being separated 
from the continent by the English Channel and the North Sea. This situation 
reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat from Europe. No continental country was 
in such a (relatively) favourable situation. In the seventeenth century, England was 
invaded five times by land from Scotland over its sole land frontier but only twice 
from Europe by sea.40 Nevertheless, Charles faced an obvious disadvantage in his 
 
39 See Gardiner, History of England, VII, 169-219. 
 
40 That is, in 1640, 1644, 1648, 1651 and 1660 from Scotland by land and in 1685 and 1688 





dealings with the continental nations – his realm’s status as a second rank power. 
The major European countries, France and the Empire and Spain, were happy to 
engage the English King in discussions about an alliance with no serious intention of 
entering into a league with him – what was important to them was that England 
should remain neutral or at least on the sidelines of continental conflicts. This 
position was adopted by Louis and Richelieu throughout the 1630s and in the early 
1640s and up to the game-changing Battle of the Downs in October 1639 by Gaspar 
de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, Philip IV’s chief minister and the effective 
ruler of Spain.41 Charles’s (obvious) response was to negotiate with two powers 
simultaneously, being a stratagem driven not so much by duplicity as by the need to 
encourage, cajole or threaten foreign nations into talking to him in earnest. The 
King’s tactic of negotiating with more than one country at the same time was a 
necessity brought about by England’s (weak) strategic position rather than a 
reflection of a supposedly duplicitous tendency on his part to pursue multiple 
foreign-policy initiatives instead of engaging in good faith with a single potential 
ally. 
 
The findings of this thesis do not support Atherton’s interpretation that 
Charles was trying to strike a balance between Bourbon France and Habsburg Spain 
and keep diplomatic channels open to both, with the aim of exploiting any 
contingencies that might arise to effect Charles Louis’s restoration.42 Such a view 
implies that the English King was more in control of circumstances than was 
actually the case. There were two groups at court – one based around 
Northumberland and Leicester and the other on Warwick, albeit the latter very much 
on its fringes – that wanted to see a resolution of the Prince Elector’s situation that 
would protect the Protestant cause in Europe. The balancing position of a Habsburg 
option was almost non-existent. The negotiations in Brussels would only have 
 
41 See, for example, Bienassis, ‘Richelieu and Britain’, p. 133. See also John H. Elliott, 
‘England and Europe: A Common Malady?’, in The Origins of the English Civil War, ed. by Conrad 
Russell (London: MacMillan, 1973), p. 246, who regards this aim as a secondary objective of 
Cardinal Richelieu and Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645). 
 
42 Atherton, ‘Viscount Scudamore’, pp. 241-5 and Ambition and Failure in Stuart England, pp. 





produced a limited restitution of the Prince Palatine – the left bank of the Lower 
Palatinate. And while Charles’s representatives in Madrid, had been given ‘full 
powers to treat and conclude an alliance’ in 1635, nothing had come of this 
initiative.43 A more plausible interpretation of Caroline foreign policy in the 1630s, 
as advanced in this present study, is that the English King was forced, through the 
absence of a credible Habsburg alternative, to put as much pressure on Louis and 
Richelieu as possible to conclude an Anglo-French league. Hence Charles’s drawing 
up, signing and ratifying of the February 1637 treaties and his agreement to that of 
June of the same year.44 Hence also his advocacy of the return to France of the 
French Queen Mother, Marie des Médicis, and the wife of the Cardinal’s enemy, 
Madame de La Vieuville, welcoming Richelieu’s arch-opponent, Marie de Rohan, 
duchesse de Chevreuse, to the English Court and the Prince Rupert-Mademoiselle de 
Rohan marriage alliance. It may have been a risky policy, but it was all that the 
English King had in his diplomatic arsenal in the period from the failure of 
Arundel’s Vienna mission at the end of 1636 to the revolution effected by Spain’s 
defeat at the Battle of the Downs in October 1639. 
 
In 1636, Charles had a clear idea of what he wanted to achieve 
diplomatically, and how he might go about realizing these ends. At the beginning of 
that year, the King’s most pressing foreign-policy concern was the recovery of the 
Palatine dignity and lands for his nephew, Charles Louis, the Prince Elector. 
Charles’s sense of honour demanded such a course of action.45 Politically, it would 
have been a step too far for him to abandon the Prince Palatine. Such a policy would 
 
43 Atherton, ‘Viscount Scudamore’, p. 170. See also Atherton, Ambition and Failure in Stuart 
England, p. 179. 
 
44 For Charles I signing and ratifying the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637, see 
SP 78/103, fol. 101: Coke to Leicester, 18 February 1637; see also Collins, II, 536-7 (mis-located). 
For Charles I agreeing to the French versions of these treaties of June 1637, see, for example, SP 
78/103, fol. 375: Coke to Leicester, 12 June 1637; see also Collins, II, 500-1. 
 
45 For the importance of honour in relation to politics for Charles I, see, for example, John S. 
A. Adamson, ‘Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England’, in Culture and Politics in Early 
Stuart England, ed. by Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (London: MacMillan, 1994), pp. 161-97 and the 
numerous comments in Cust, Charles I: Political Life, for instance, at p. 466: ‘Another constant was 





have alienated Protestant groups at the Caroline court, notably the powerful loyalist 
Northumberland-Leicester circle and the (much) less influential group based around 
Warwick. But, by this time, the King’s commitment to the Palatine cause was more 
circumspect than it had been in the second half of the 1620s when he had been 
fighting for his then heirs – his sister Elizabeth of Bohemia and her offspring.46 The 
birth of two sons to Charles and Henriette Marie, the future Charles II and James II 
in 1630 and 1633 respectively, greatly changed the English dynastic landscape.47 In 
the mid-1630s, the King was no longer engaged on behalf of his immediate 
successors, and could take a more dispassionate view of European diplomatic 
affairs. 
 
What Charles probably wanted in 1636 was for the problem of the Palatinate 
to go away – that is, to be resolved by the (partial) restoration of the Prince Palatine 
to his Electoral dignity and lands.48 Such a restitution would be acceptable to him 
and, most likely, the majority of the Protestants at his court and in the country in 
general. However, if Charles Louis or his successors did not regain the Electoralship 
and some of the Palatine lands, that form of restoration might not be agreeable to 
many of the King’s subjects. To this end, in 1636, as he had in 1635, Charles 
prepared his ship-money fleet and, given its potential to control the English Channel 
and the maritime route to Flanders, aimed to use it to try to obtain concessions from 
 
46 See, for example, Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 125. 
 
47 Charles II (1630-85) was born on 26 May 1630, followed by the future James II (1633-
1701) on 14 October 1633, ensuring that Charles I’s line was secure. 
 
48 Sir Francis Windebanke (bap. 1582-1646), Charles I’s junior Secretary of State, stated in a 
letter of 11/21 April 1636 to Walter Aston, Baron Aston of Forfar (1584-1639), the King’s 
ambassador at the Spanish court in Madrid, that Charles I was disinterested in the Palatinate – ‘setting 
aside the bond of consanguinity, which seldom sways when reason of state or private interest 
intervene, the Palatinate itself is as remote from his [the King’s] interests as it is from his dominions.’ 
However, aside from the fact that this represented Windebanke’s personal, pro-Spanish, opinion 
regarding the Palatinate, the Secretary’s comments disregarded the very adverse implications that 
abandoning Charles I Louis would have for Charles I with regard to Protestant opinion both within 
and without the court. Windebanke’s views were also stated to the English ambassador at a Habsburg 
court, and, therefore, may have been intended for the ambassador’s, and maybe Spanish, ears only. 
See Patricia Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 1978), p. 188, citing Bodl. IL., Clar. MS. 9, f. 23v, 





either, or even both, the Empire (and Spain) and France regarding the Palatinate.49 
Next, in the spring of 1636, he initiated a two-pronged diplomatic offensive in the 
form of Arundel’s embassy to the Emperor, Ferdinand II, in Vienna in April, 
followed by that of Leicester to Louis in Paris in May.50 The King hoped that, by 
playing off two major European powers against each other, he would be able to 
attain Charles Louis’s restoration, at least, in part. Nonetheless, as a result of the 
limited (non-parliamentary) finance available to him – that is, primarily ship money 
– any alliance with either the French, or the Austrian (or Spanish) Habsburgs, would 
have to be limited to naval assistance, with no commitment of land forces to the 
continent. 
 
The King was aware that Duke Maximilian I of Bavaria was the prime 
obstacle to any effective restoration of the Prince Elector and acted realistically in 
trying to circumvent this problem. The duke possessed the Electoral title and all of 
the Upper Palatinate and the right bank of the Lower Palatinate, none of which, with 
the possible exception of the latter, he was willing to relinquish. Given the dynastic, 
financial, military and political dependency of the House of Austria on Maximilian, 
and as Louis and Richelieu were courting Bavaria as an ally, the duke had the 
diplomatic means to ensure that he could retain the Palatine Electoralship and most 
of its possessions. Leicester’s correspondence with Charles’s Secretaries of State 
during his embassy indicated that the King would have known about this situation.51 
 
49 See Cust, Charles I: Political Life, pp. 128-9 for Charles I employing this strategy. 
 
50 For the background to Leicester’s mission to Louis XIII (1601-43), see SP 78/101, fols 31-4: 
Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 (according to a note on the page 
following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636, these instructions were drawn up 
on 28 April 1636) and SP 78/101, fols 35-9: Leicester’s additional instruction, 9 May 1636; see also 
Collins, II, 376-7. Leicester’s instructions make clear both the emphasis that he was to place on the 
preparation of Charles I’s ship-money fleet to Louis XIII and on the fact that the English King had 
also dispatched Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel (1585-1646), to the Emperor, Ferdinand 
II (1578-1637), in Vienna, trying to pressure the French King and Cardinal Richelieu into making 
concessions. For comment and original documentation on Arundel’s embassy to the Emperor, see 
Francis C. Springell, Connoisseur and Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel’s Embassy to Germany in 1636 
as recounted in William Crowne’s Diary, the Earl’s letters and other contemporary sources with a 
catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Holler (London: 
Maggs Bros. Ltd, 1963). See also Lindquist, ‘Politics of Diplomacy’, pp. 348-409 and 410-63 for a 
favourable interpretation of Arundel’s mission. 
 
51 See SP 78/101, fol. 399: Leicester to [Coke], 8/18 August 1636 (see also Collins, II, 402-6); 




Thus, any approach to the Austrian Habsburgs directly, or indirectly via Spain, 
would run up against the barrier of Maximilian – as proved to be the case with 
Arundel’s abortive embassy to Vienna in 1636. France’s position was less 
circumscribed, as the French King and the Cardinal only sought the duke as a 
confederate, and were not militarily dependent on Maximilian.52 Consequently, an 
alliance with France to restore the Prince Palatine might just be feasible, as opposed 
to being effectively impossible by way of a league with either of the Habsburg 
powers. Charles, therefore, realistically pursued the French option in the second half 
of the 1630s. 
 
The King’s problem was that Louis and Richelieu were balancing the 
advantage of having his ship-money fleet (thirty or so vessels) on their side against 
the benefit of the neutrality of the forces of the Catholic League (controlled by 
Maximilian) in the Thirty Years War – the latter being the likely outcome of a 
Franco-Bavarian detente.53 In other words, the French King and the Cardinal had to 
decide which was France’s better option with regard to cutting Spain’s links with 
 
and SP 78/109, fol. 152: Leicester to Secretary of State, 27 March/6 April 1640. In SP 78/108, fol. 
164-5: Leicester to [Coke], 22 November/2 December 1639; see also Collins, II, 619, Leicester stated 
that ‘the house of Austria is in effect as unable to restore the two [the Lower and the Upper] 
Palatinats, without [th]e consent of [th]e Duke of Baviere, who certainly would not be content to 
relinquish that, for which he hath taken so much paines these many yeares …’ and that any attempts 
by the Austrian Habsburgs to restore Charles I Louis to his dignities and lands would only drive 
Maximilian I of Bavaria (1573-1651) towards the French, ‘who without question would receive him a 
bras ouverts [with open arms] …’ 
 
52 See, for example, the secret Franco-Bavarian Treaty of Fontainebleau of May 1631, 
applying up to 1638 when French forces came into conflict with those of the Catholic League, which 
was controlled, in effect, by Maximilian I of Bavaria, at the Battle of Rheinfelden of February/March 
of the latter year. For the Treaty of Fontainebleau, see Parker, Thirty Years’ War, p. 108 and Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, p. 465. It is not apparent if Charles I was aware of the treaty. However, the treaty 
only had a limited effect on Leicester’s embassy of May 1636 to October 1641, as, for most of the 
period of its existence, both sides regarded it as unenforceable and it ceased to have any operative 
implications in early 1638, only a year and a half into the earl’s mission, when hostilities broke out 
between France and the Catholic League led by Bavaria. For the Battle of Rheinfelden, fought in 
South-central Germany between 18/28 February and 21 February/2 March 1638, in which an army in 
the pay of France, led by the German Protestant mercenary, Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1604-
39), defeated the forces of Bavaria and the Empire, see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 602-6. 
 
53 For the former, see SP 103/11, fol. 598: Anglo-French Treaties, 17 February 1637, article 3 
of the main and the auxiliary treaties and BnF, MS f. fr. 15993, fol. 227: auxiliary Anglo-French 
Treaty, June 1637, article 3. For the latter, see Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of 





Flanders – the possibility of closing the maritime English Road (with the help of 
England’s navy), which the powerful fleet of France’s ally, the United Provinces, 
might be able to do in any event, or the potential to keep the land-based Spanish 
Road blocked (aided by the inaction of the army of the Catholic League). Charles’s 
difficulty was that Louis and Richelieu consistently chose the latter option over the 
former between 1636 and 1641. 
 
Favouring an Anglo-French alliance in the late 1630s made sense from the 
perspective of Caroline court politics. Smuts has demonstrated that, in 1636-7, 
Henriette Marie pushed for a league with France.54 So, for Charles, seeking an 
alliance with the French at that time had the advantage of keeping his politically 
very influential wife happy. However, there were further benefits for the King in 
pursuing an Anglo-French league. Promoting an anti-Habsburg alliance with France 
meant that Charles could ensure the vital support of the loyalist Northumberland-
Leicester circle from 1636 right up to the autumn of 1640. This period covered the 
First and Second Bishop’s Wars of 1639 and 1640 when the King desperately 
needed the backing of those of his senior courtiers committed to advancing the 
Protestant cause on the continent. As this thesis has argued, the support that 
Northumberland, Leicester, Vane senior and Coke gave to Charles’s Scottish policy 
in the later 1630s may well have owed much to the goodwill he had accrued with 
them in seeking an Anglo-French alliance, and the likely benefits to the Protestant 
cause that this promised. Northumberland, despite the beginnings of his 
estrangement from the King following the dissolution of the Short Parliament in 
May 1640 and Charles’s seeking of an Anglo-Spanish alliance thereafter, remained 
loyal to the King until November of that year, when he began to encourage Leicester 
to abandon the Anglo-French treaties, and seek advancement at court.55 The Lord 
Admiral’s break with Charles occurred over the winter of 1640-1, when he aligned 
 
54 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 37-40 and ‘Religion, European Politics 
and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9. 
 
55 See, for example, Collins, II, 663-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 November 1640: see 
also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/19 for the ending of Northumberland’s hopes in 





himself with the group surrounding Warwick, as evidenced by his involvement in 
the negotiations for the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance.56 Leicester remained aloof 
from the King’s domestic opponents for longer – that is, until roughly February 
1641 – when he too gave up on the treaties, and followed Northumberland’s advice 
to seek preferment at court by advancing his candidacy for the Lord Lieutenancy of 
Ireland.57 
 
Fourthly, this thesis has argued that the Battle of the Downs was a turning 
point in relation to English foreign policy that has not been fully appreciated in 
accounts of the Personal Rule. Most historians have concentrated on the actual or 
potential English domestic fallout from the defeat of a Spanish armada by Dutch 
naval forces off the Kent coast in October 1639, and have disregarded the very 
significant diplomatic implications of the battle.58 For example, writing in the 
nineteenth century, Gardiner stated that ‘[d]amaging as was the true story of the 
fight in the Downs to Charles’s reputation, it was concealed from the eyes of his 
subjects.’59 At the end of the twentieth century, Bernard Capp described the victory 
 
56 See Adamson, Noble Revolt, p. 189. Nevertheless, Northumberland’s break with Charles I 
was not yet final. The Lord Admiral retained some credit with the King in 1641, being instrumental 
in obtaining the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland for Leicester in June. (See Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 
200-1 and 339.) The final break only came at the end of June 1642 when Northumberland ceased to 
be Lord Admiral – his commission was revoked by Charles I on 28 June 1642 – being replaced by 
Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick. (See George A. Drake, ‘Percy, Algernon, tenth earl of 
Northumberland (1602-1668)’, ODNB and Sean Kelsey, ‘Rich, Robert, second earl of Warwick 
(1587-1658)’, ODNB.) 
 
57 See, for example, SP 78/111, fol. 3: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 15/25 January 
1641; SP 78/111, fol. 10: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 22 January/1 February 1641; SP 
78/111, fol. 13: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 29 January/8 February 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 
17: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 12/22 February 1641; and SP 78/111, fol. 19: Leicester 
to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 19 February/1 March 1641 for Leicester giving up on the Anglo-
French treaties of 1637, that is, the earl’s missives do not refer to the treaties. For Leicester’s interest 
in the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland at the beginning of 1641, see, for instance, De L’Isle and Dudley 
Manuscripts, VI, 379: Temple to Leicester, 11 February 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., 
U1475, fol. 114/10 and De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 382-4: Temple to Leicester, 18 
February 1641; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 114/11. 
 
58 Haskell is an exception in ascribing some, though insufficient, diplomatic importance to the 
Battle of the Downs: ‘The last year of Windebank’s Secretaryship witnessed a tentative 
rapprochement with Spain, following the decisive defeat of Oquendo’s armada in the Downs in 
October 1639.’ See Haskell, ‘Sir Francis Windebank’, p. 188. 
 





of the United Provinces as ‘a humiliating blow to [English] national as well as royal 
[Charles I’s] honour.’60 More recently, Cust has stated that ‘embarrassingly, there 
was nothing the [English] navy could do to prevent a Spanish fleet from being 
annihilated by the Dutch in English waters at the battle of the Downs in 1639.’61 
 
The foreign-policy implications of the Battle of the Downs were far more 
important than Charles’s wounded pride. England’s weak diplomatic position as a 
second rank power meant that the King was vulnerable to foreign nations 
negotiating with him with no serious intention of entering into an alliance. Such was 
the consistent policy of Louis and Richelieu through-out the second half of the 
1630s and the early 1640s. Olivares adopted the same approach between May 1636 
and October 1639. The battle fundamentally changed this situation. Following 
Spain’s defeat, Charles could entertain hopes of obtaining men and money from the 
Spanish with which to supress his rebellious subjects in Scotland – and perhaps in 
England as well, should the occasion arise. This opportunity for the King emerged 
as a result of Spain’s desperate need, following the battle, to reopen the English 
Road via the Channel, which was by then the only way of sending reinforcements 
and funds to the Spanish Netherlands – the land-based Spanish Road between North 
Italy and Flanders having been cut in 1634. Thus, Spain’s chief minister would be 
eager to conclude a league with England to use the latter’s fleet to reinstate the 
maritime route to the Spanish Netherlands. For neither England nor Spain was 
Maximilian of Bavaria an insuperable barrier to meaningful negotiations. 
Admittedly, he remained the main obstacle to the restitution of the Prince Elector. 
However, both Charles and Olivares had more pressing problems to deal with than 
settling their differences in the Rhineland. 
 
Supporters in England, in Spain, and even in France, of an Anglo-Spanish 
 
60 Bernard Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, in The Civil Wars. A Military History of Scotland, 
Ireland and England 1638-1660, ed. by John P. Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 157. 
 
61 Cust, Charles I: Political Life, pp. 191-2. See also Thrush, ‘The Navy Under Charles I’, p. 





alliance had been in a minority in the late 1630s, but they had not vanished. Indeed, 
Marie de Rohan, duchesse de Chevreuse, the French courtesan and arch-opponent of 
Richelieu, had suggested a marriage between Princess Mary and Balthazar Carlos, 
then Spain’s heir apparent, in 1638, but her proposals carried little weight.62 
Following Spain’s defeat in the Battle of the Downs, an altogether more serious plan 
for an Anglo-Spanish league, although one that again would be cemented by a 
Carlos-Mary marriage, emerged between October 1639 and August 1640. In the 
autumn of 1639, Wentworth, Charles’s pro-Spanish Lord Deputy of Ireland, 
returned to England.63 In January 1640, he was made earl of Strafford, and shortly 
afterwards was promoted to Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.64 These events indicated 
Strafford’s growing influence with the King, and greatly improved the chances for a 
league with Spain. That likelihood increased dramatically with the arrival in April of 
two high-powered Spanish negotiators – Don Antonio Sancho Dávila y Toledo, 
fourth marques of Velada, and the marques Virgilio Malvezzi. These comings meant 
that, together with the resident agent, Alfonso de Cárdenas, there were now three 
Spanish representatives at the Caroline court.65 The result was the settlement of the 
terms for an Anglo-Spanish alliance within four months on 2 August.66 The speed of 
the finalization of these arrangements, which derived from the imperative of both 
England and Spain for a league between the two countries, contrasted with 
Leicester’s, by then, more than four years of negotiations with the French in Paris. 
The outcome was a diplomatic revolution that could have had profound effects had 
not rebellion broken out in Catalonia in June 1640 followed by revolution in 
Portugal in December. With Spain unable to spare money or troops to assist Charles 
against the Covenanters, he was thrown back on his own – as it proved – inadequate 
military and financial resources. 
 
62 See, for example, Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 41 and ‘Religion, 
European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, p. 30. 
 
63 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 73. 
 
64 See Gardiner, History of England, IX, 83 for Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth, 
being made earl of Strafford and for his then being promoted to Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
 
65 See Elliott, ‘Year of Three Ambassadors’, p. 165. 
 






The fifth conclusion of this thesis is that it has revealed that the outbreak of 
the Covenanter rebellion in 1637-8 occasioned a breach between the 
Northumberland-Leicester circle and that surrounding Warwick, which was not 
bridged until the winter of 1640-1. Traditionally, historians have not distinguished 
between the two groups, a position adopted, for example, by Smuts.67 However, 
such an interpretation disregards the evidence that this thesis has uncovered 
concerning the political trajectory of Northumberland, Leicester and their closest 
court allies during the later 1630s. Until 1637, both circles supported an alliance 
with France.68 In that year, tensions emerged between the two groups. Warwick and 
his political associates opposed ship money.69 Northumberland as admiral of the 
ship-money fleet, Leicester for whom the fleet was the key bargaining counter in his 
negotiations with the French and Vane senior all supported the imposition.70 In 
1638, with the emergence of opposition to Charles in Scotland, the Northumberland-
Leicester circle remained faithful to the King. Leicester stayed in Paris, and was 
happy to take instructions from Charles to restart the negotiations with the French in 
April 1639 as part of royal efforts to protect England’s southern flank from attack 
from the continent during the projected invasion of Scotland of that year.71 For most 
of 1640, Northumberland and Leicester remained loyal to the King. In September, 
 
67 See Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’ and ‘Religion, European Politics and 
Henrietta Maria’s Circle’. Adamson is a notable exception to this train of thought. See John S. A. 
Adamson, ‘Of Armies and Architecture: The Employments of Robert Scawen’, in Soldiers, Writers 
and Statesmen of the English Revolution, ed. by Ian J. Gentles, John S. Morrill and Blair Worden 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), who at pp. 40-1 states that ‘By 1639, the 
households of [Frances Russell, fourth earl of] Bedford [(bap.1587, d.1641)] and [Algernon Percy, 
tenth earl of] Northumberland represented polar opposites in British politics …’. 
 
68 See CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge 
and Senate, 16/[26] January 1637 for Warwick, for almost the last time, supporting an anti-Habsburg 
alliance with France. 
 
69 For Warwick’s opposition to ship money, see CSPV, XXIV, 1636-1639, 124-5: Correr, 
Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate, 16/[26] January 1637 and Kelsey, ‘Rich, 
Robert, second earl of Warwick’. 
 
70 For Vane senior’s support for ship money, see History of Parliament Trust, London, 
unpublished article on Vane (Fane), Sir Henry I (1589-1655) for 1640-60 section by David Scott, pp. 
37-47. I am grateful to the History of Parliament Trust for allowing me to see this article in draft. 
 





Leicester was very critical of both the Scots and their (English) allies – that is, 
Warwick’s circle.72 Northumberland referred to the Covenanter soldiers as ‘this 
Army of Rebells.’ in October.73 Warwick and his allies took a very different line 
with regard to the Covenanters, entering into treasonous talks with them by the 
spring of 1640 at the very latest.74 Different reactions to Charles’s Scottish problems 
from 1638 onwards were, therefore, at the heart of the break between the two sets of 
Protestant courtiers. 
 
The anti-Spanish groups at court were able to reconcile in 1640-1 because 
they shared fundamentally the same objectives in terms of foreign policy. Charles 
began the process of alienating the Northumberland-Leicester circle by dissolving 
the Short Parliament and seeking an Anglo-Spanish alliance between April and 
August 1640.75 Agreement between the two groups was possible because the Anglo-
French treaties of 1637, the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May 1641 and the 
Anglo-Scottish Union of August of that year were all expressions of the same policy 
– that is, support for the Protestant cause in Europe. The Anglo-Dutch marriage of 
May 1641 was evidence of this new and closer relationship, as Northumberland and 
Vane senior worked closely with members of Warwick’s circle in the preparatory 
talks for the wedding.76 Both groups and Frederick Hendrik, the Dutch Stadhouder, 
also regarded the marriage alliance as a stepping stone to greater things. 
Confirmation of this position can be seen in the comments of November 1641 made 
 
72 See SP 78/110, fol. 132: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Windebanke], 18/28 September 
1640; see Collins, II, 659-61 for an edited version of this letter. 
 
73 See Collins, II, 662: Northumberland to Leicester, 22 October 1640. 
 
74 See, for example, Peter H. Donald, ‘New Light on the Anglo-Scottish Contacts of 1640’, 
Historical Research, 62 (1989), 221-9. 
 
75 For Northumberland’s distaste for both an Anglo-Spanish alliance and marriage, see Collins, 
II, 655: Northumberland to Leicester, 25 June 1640. For Leicester’s more muted criticism of an 
Anglo-Spanish league, see SP 78/109, fol. 153: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 3/13 April 
1640 and SP 78/109, fol. 196: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 1/11 May 1640. 
 
76 For the involvement of Northumberland and Vane senior in the negotiations regarding the 
Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May 1641, see Prinsterer, Correspondance de la Maison d’Orange, 
III, 306: Vane to Prince Willem, 11/[21] December 1640 and Prinsterer, Correspondance de la 
Maison d’Orange, III, 358-60: Vane to Frederik Hendrik, [13]/23 February 1641; and Adamson, 





by Jean de Montreuil, the French representative in London.77 France’s agent 
reported that Frederik Hendrik wanted to strengthen the links between the House of 
Orange and the House of Stuart still further by marrying his eldest daughter, 
countess Louise Henriette of Nassau, to one of the elder sons of Charles and 
Henriette Marie, Charles, Prince of Wales, or James, duke of York. 
 
In the lead-up to the outbreak of the English Civil War, Parliament presented 
its demands of Charles for a settlement of the differences between them in the 
Nineteen Propositions of 1 June 1642.78 The seventeenth Proposition represented a 
continuation of the Protestant foreign policy based on the Anglo-French treaties of 
1637, the Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance of May 1641 and the Anglo-Scottish 
Union of August of that year: 
 
That your Majesty will be pleased to enter into a more strict alliance with the 
States of the United Provinces, and other neighbouring princes and states of 
the Protestant religion, for the defence and maintenance thereof, against all 
designs and attempts of the Pope and his adherents to subvert and suppress 
it; whereby your Majesty will obtain a great access of strength and 
reputation, and your subjects be much encouraged and enabled, in a 
Parliamentary way, for your aid and assistance, in restoring your royal sister 
and her princely issue to those dignities and dominions which belong unto 
them, and relieving the other Protestant princes who have suffered in the 
same cause.79 
 
The initial words of the seventeenth Proposition – ‘That your Majesty will be 
pleased to enter into a more strict alliance with the States of the United Provinces,’ 
which were aimed at reinforcing the existing Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance – are 
 
77 See TNA, PRO 31/3 (Baschet Transcripts), fols 629-30: despatch to de Laferté Imbaut, 13 
November 1641; see also BnF, MS f. fr. 15995, vol. 48, fol. 408. 
 
78 For the text of the Nineteen Propositions of 1 June 1642, see Gardiner, Constitutional 
Documents, pp. 249-54. For comment on the Nineteen Propositions (the seventeenth Proposition, in 
particular), see Gardiner, History of England, X, 196-8; Anthony Fletcher, The Outbreak of the 
English Civil War (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 261-3 and 273-9 (p. 262); Russell, Fall of the 
British Monarchies, pp. 514-7 (p. 516); Colin Tyler, ‘Drafting the Nineteen Propositions, January-
July 1642’, Parliamentary History, 31 (2012), 263-312, (282); and Richard Cust, Charles I: Political 
Life, pp. 348-9, 357, 360 and 371 and Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625-1642 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 284-7, 289 and 294. 
 





key. The group surrounding Warwick and the Northumberland-Leicester circle 
wanted to take the marriage alliance further, as did Frederik Hendrik. The link 
between Leicester’s embassy, with its objective of the restitution of the Prince 
Elector, and Proposition seventeen can also be seen in the aim of the latter of 
‘restoring your royal sister and her princely issue to those dignities and dominions 
which belong unto them.’ 
 
The middle section of Proposition seventeen is particularly pertinent to 
Leicester’s mission. These words read ‘whereby your Majesty will obtain a great 
access of strength and reputation, and your subjects be much encouraged and 
enabled, in a Parliamentary way, for your aid and assistance …’ In other words, 
Charles might recover his popularity and power in England if he were to adopt a 
foreign policy that supported the cause of European Protestantism. This statement 
resonates with the terms of the threat – and the implied reward – made by the French 
in the summer of 1640 in response to the King’s negotiations with the Spanish: 
 
… we are not so ill informed of what passes in Gr:[eat] Br:[itain] as to be 
alltogether ignorant of [th]e affections of your peoples, and we beleeve that 
if [th]e King of Gr:[eat] Br:[itain] continue to favor [th]e Spaniards, he will 
have more and more troubles at home every day, and that all would be 
quickly appeased, if his Ma[jes]ty would ioyne himself with the bon [the 
French] party;80 
 
The significance of the words ‘he will have more and more troubles at home every 
day, and that all would be quickly appeased, if his Ma[jes]ty would ioyne himself 
with the bon [the French] party,’ though reportedly said by Claude de Bullion, one 
of Louis’s surintendants des finances, in the context of the talks regarding an Anglo-
French alliance, lies in the fact that they were relayed by Leicester. This action by 
the ambassador implies his endorsement of that statement. Similar phrasing was 
used by the earl in October 1640 when he tried to persuade Charles to resume the 
stalled Anglo-French treaty negotiations: 
 
 





… I humbly present this to your consideration, [i]f the opinion of the King’s 
intention to ioyne with France and the other Confederates, for the restitution 
of the Pr:[ince] El[ecto]r. Palatin and the restablishment of the reformed 
religion in Germany, may not be a meanes to sweeten some sharpe humors in 
the Parlament, and to facilitate his Ma:[jes]tie’s affaires;81 
 
Leicester, like the French, appreciated the link between meaningful Caroline support 
for the Protestant cause and the strengthening of royal authority at home – a 
connection that was given further expression in the seventeenth of the Nineteen 
Propositions.82 
 
The Anglo-Dutch marriage alliance, the Anglo-Scottish Union and 
Proposition seventeen built on the foundations laid by Leicester’s embassy to Louis. 
All were examples of support for the Protestant cause in Europe. The earl’s mission 
kept the issue of recovering the Palatinate at the forefront of the crown’s diplomacy 
and the foreign-policy agenda of both the Northumberland-Leicester circle and 
Warwick’s group.83 The embassy helped to sustain a common purpose between the 
two circles, making it easier for them to reunite at the beginning of 1641 and to 
continue to work together thereafter. It also provided Leicester with the credentials 
 
81 SP 78/110, fol. 161: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 30 October/9 November 1640. 
 
82 It is impossible to prove that Leicester had direct input into Proposition seventeen, but the 
phrasing of the second part of its middle section and the words used by the earl in his correspondence 
are comparable. In this regard, Russell stated that the seventeenth Proposition was one of five added 
by a ‘small committee’ of the House of Commons ‘from which [John] Pym inevitably reported.’ (See 
Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, p. 516.) Given that the opponents of Charles I in the first half 
of 1642 were to be found in both the Commons and the Lords, it cannot be ruled out that the wording 
of the seventeenth Proposition was derived originally from members of the Upper House. In relation 
to this possibility, Tyler notes that Leicester was included in the committee on Irish affairs, which 
considered what were to become the Nineteen Propositions, and in the committee appointed by the 
Lords on 23 May 1642 to work on them. (See Tyler, ‘Nineteen Propositions’, 268, footnote 24 and 
275.) As Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the earl’s inclusion in these committees is neither surprising and 
possibly not significant. Nevertheless, both of the quotations from Leicester’s letters cited – the 
French assertion made in the context of a threat (and a reward) and the earl’s own later statement 
regarding a putative solution to the King’s problems with Parliament – draw attention to the potential 
advantage for Charles I in leading Protestant action in Europe, that is, regaining popularity at home. 
 
83 For the restitution of the Prince Elector and the proposed mutual exchange of the Duchy of 
Lorraine and the left bank of the Lower Palatinate by France and Spain respectively in relation to 
Leicester’s mission to Louis XIII in 1636, see SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 
1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 (according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: 
Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636, these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636) and SP 





to make him a viable replacement for Strafford as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in the 




This thesis answers a number of further questions. To begin with, why did the King 
choose Leicester for the French embassy? Diplomatically and politically, the earl 
was the natural choice for the mission to France. He was an experienced envoy, 
having undertaken an embassy for Charles to Christian IV of Denmark in 1632.84 By 
using Leicester and Arundel in 1636, the King was employing the same two titled 
senior diplomats that he had used in 1632 – in November of that year, Arundel had 
been sent to the United Provinces to transmit Charles’s condolences to his sister, 
Elizabeth of Bohemia, on the death of her husband, Frederick V. Consequently, the 
English King’s choice of ambassadors sent a clear signal to the French King and the 
Emperor – negotiate with him or risk England siding with the other power. Leicester 
was a favourite of Henriette Marie.85 He was also a prominent member of an 
influential anti-Spanish group at court – the Northumberland-Leicester circle – 
which had close ties to the Queen in the mid-1630s. The earl was the appropriate 
individual to ensure that this group’s desire for an alliance with France and the 
furthering of support for Protestantism in Europe were strongly represented in the 
negotiations with Louis and Richelieu. Thus, in addition to pleasing Henriette Marie, 
Charles’s despatch of Leicester to Paris in May 1636 had the added advantage for 
him of gratifying and further binding to his interests a powerful section of the 
English political nation. 
 
Secondly, why did the earl accept the mission to Paris? He was the most 
qualified diplomat in the Northumberland-Leicester circle, as noted, having led an 
 
84 For Leicester’s Danish embassy of 1632, see Reginald Cant, ‘The Embassy of the Earl of 
Leicester to Denmark in 1632’, EHR, 54 (1939), 252-62. 
 
85 For Leicester being a favourite of Henriette Marie, see, for example, Smuts, ‘Puritan 





embassy to Denmark.86 Leicester was well placed to try to obtain a prime objective 
of that group – that is, advancing the Protestant cause against the Austrian and 
Spanish Habsburgs. In particular, by way of an Anglo-French alliance, the earl could 
hope to realize the restitution of the Prince Elector to his dignity and lands.87 The 
mission would also conform to the earl’s belief in the balance of power in Europe 
and of supporting the apparently weaker state, which, in 1636, appeared to be 
France, against the seemingly stronger Habsburg Austria and Spain.88 Though a 
committed Protestant, Leicester was open in his approach to religion, and was 
willing to countenance an alliance with a Catholic power, France, which was anti-
Habsburg.89 This flexibility on his part with regard to foreign affairs contrasted with 
that of other leading Caroline diplomats – notably, Sir Thomas Roe, who believed 
that England should only ally with Protestant nations, such as Sweden and the 
United Provinces, and not Catholic countries like France.90 
 
Personally, the embassy would have monetary and political disadvantages 
for Leicester. It would strain the earl’s finances at a time when he was building 
Leicester House in London.91 And, as the careers of his grandfather, Sir Henry 
 
86 For Leicester’s Danish embassy of 1632, see Cant, ‘Embassy of the Earl of Leicester to 
Denmark’. 
 
87 For the restitution of the Prince Elector and the proposed mutual restoration of Lorraine and 
the left bank of the Lower Palatinate by France and Spain to Charles IV (1604-75,), duke of Lorraine, 
and Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine, respectively in relation to Leicester’s mission to 
Louis XIII, see SP 78/101, fols 31-4: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 374-6 
(according to a note on the page following SP 78/101, fol. 40: Leicester’s instructions, 9 May 1636, 
these instructions were drawn up on 28 April 1636) and SP 78/101, fols 35-9: Leicester’s additional 
instruction, 9 May 1636; see also Collins, II, 376-7. 
 
88 See, for example, SP 78/110, fol. 88: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 14/24 August 
1640. See also Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, p. 75. 
 
89 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, pp. 9-10 for comment on the ability of those with an open 
religious mind, of whatever faith, to co-operate with each other. See also, Russell, Fall of the British 
Monarchies, p. 521 for an indication of Leicester’s personally broad approach to religion. 
 
90 For Roe’s views on foreign policy, see Hibbert, Popish Plot, pp. 31-2. 
 
91 See Lenard W. Cowie, ‘Leicester House’, History Today, 23 (1973), 30-7. See also, for 
example, De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI, 59-61: Countess of Leicester to Leicester, 25 
October 1636; see also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 82/3 and Correspondence of Countess 






Sidney, in Ireland, and his father, the first earl, at Flushing, had demonstrated, 
absence from court had its drawbacks in a potential loss of preferment. Nevertheless, 
these disadvantages might be more than offset by the gratitude of Charles and the 
prospect of further advancement that Leicester could expect on a successful 
completion of his mission. 
 
The third further question addressed by this thesis is how successful was 
Leicester’s embassy? Ultimately, the earl failed in his mission. He was unable to 
conclude the anti-Habsburg Anglo-French alliance that, out of necessity, Charles 
sought, and that he and his fellow members of the Northumberland-Leicester circle 
desired. But it would be wrong to dismiss the ambassador’s chances of success from 
the very outset, as, for example, Gardiner did and Jonathan Scott does, or view the 
possibility of an Anglo-French league as ending in the summer of 1637 or in 1638 at 
the latest as do Smuts, Hibbard, Sharpe and Cust.92 Particularly in the first half of 
1637 and again in 1639, there were opportunities for a successful conclusion of an 
alliance. Northumberland up to the end of 1640 and Leicester to the beginning of 
1641 still entertained hopes of finalizing the Anglo-French treaties.93 The principal 
obstacle to an agreement between England and France was always the French who 
consistently preferred the Bavarian option to the very real opportunity that Charles’s 
ship-money fleet offered them of closing the English Road to their Spanish enemies. 
 
Fourthly, what does the earl’s mission reveal about the geo-political and 
diplomatic realities of the Thirty Years War (and the concurrent Franco-Spanish 
 
92 See Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 160-4, 204-5, 210 and 217 and Scott, Algernon 
Sidney and the English Republic, p. 75; and Smuts, ‘Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria’, 36-40 and 
‘Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle’, pp. 28-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp. 74-5; 
Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 525-36 and 825-34; and Cust, Charles I: Political Life, p. 129. See also 
Milton, Catholic and Reformed, pp. 507-8 and Thrush, ‘The Navy Under Charles I’, p. 13. 
 
93 See, for example, Collins, II, 663-4: Northumberland to Leicester, 13 November 1640: see 
also De L’Isle M.S.S., K.A.O., U1475, fol. 85/19 for the ending of Northumberland’s hopes in 
respect of the Anglo-French treaties of 1637. See, for instance, SP 78/111, fol. 3: Leicester to 
Secretary of State/[Vane], 15/25 January 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 10: Leicester to Secretary of 
State/[Vane], 22 January/1 February 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 13: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 
29 January/8 February 1641; SP 78/111, fol. 17: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 12/22 
February 1641; and SP 78/111, fol. 19: Leicester to [Secretary of State]/[Vane], 19 February/1 March 





War) during the second half of the 1630s? From an English perspective, the primary 
inference is that the country’s problems in intervening effectively in European 
conflicts between 1625 and 1630 were replicated in the second half of the 1630s, 
though to a lesser extent. In 1625-30, Charles and his commanders had encountered 
crippling difficulties with both a lack of finance and of experience and knowledge in 
mounting successful campaigns.94 The King’s reaction to these failures was to 
downgrade his commitment to the Thirty Years War in 1636-41, restricting his 
military undertakings to the deployment of his ship-money fleet in the English 
Channel. Such involvement was much more limited than his actions in the second 
half of the 1620s – for example, the ambitious amphibious operations at Cádiz 
(Spain) in 1625 and La Rochelle (France) in 1627-8, as well as land-based 
intervention on the continent in financing the mercenary army of Peter Ernst, graf 
von Mansfeld, in 1625-6.95 This restricted commitment from 1636 onwards gave 
rise to difficulties for Leicester in Paris, as the offer of Charles’s ship-money fleet 
was insufficient to tempt Louis and Richelieu into abandoning the Bavarian option. 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, one of the more unfortunate contingencies 
that Leicester’s embassy in Paris had to contend with is that, from the autumn of 
1636 onwards, France and its allies were broadly successful in the Thirty Years War 
and related conflicts. Major military victories for France and its confederates 
included the Battles of Wittstock (Sweden) in late September 1636, Rheinfelden 
(France and Sweden) and Wittenweier (France), both in 1638, and Wolfenbüttel 
(France and Sweden) in 1641. In December 1638, the key Fortress of Breisach was 
captured by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, the German soldier of fortune in the pay of 
France. Significantly, apart from Wittstock and Wolfenbüttel, these victories were 
concentrated along the route of the land-based Spanish Road to Flanders, which 
remained closed. The pivotal victory of the Dutch fleet over a Spanish armada at the 
 
94 See Alan G. R. Smith, Emergence of a Nation State: The commonwealth of England 1529-
1660, 2nd edn (London: Pearson Education, 1997), pp. 271-2 for the problems that the Anglo-
Spanish War (1625-30) and the Anglo-French War (1627-9) occasioned for Charles I. 
 
95 Peter Ernst, graf von Mansfeld (c.1580-1626), was a Catholic German mercenary who 
fought unsuccessfully for Charles I on the continent during 1625 (at the siege of Breda in the United 





Battle of the Downs in October 1639 blocked the maritime English Road to the 
Spanish Netherlands via the Channel. The result was the final severing of all of 
Spain’s links with Flanders, which was now completely cut off from Spanish funds 
and reinforcements. There were some reverses for France, notably at the siege of 
Fuenterrabía in 1638 in the Franco-Spanish War and at the Battle of La Marfée in 
1641 following a Habsburg-sponsored invasion of North-East France by Louis de 
Bourbon, comte de Soissons. However, these defeats did not alter the trend of 
French and allied success at the expense of the Empire and Spain. The general 
prospering of France’s cause meant that Louis and Richelieu were happy to keep 
Charles talking by way of Leicester in Paris, for, in spite of the occasional set-back, 
France was not seriously threatened after 1636. 
 
The fifth additional question answered by this thesis relates to the 
contribution of the Anglo-French negotiations of 1636-41 to the political breakdown 
that occurred in England in 1640-2. The most obvious, and, perhaps, the most 
surprising, conclusion is that, as Charles pursued what was a realistic pro-French 
foreign policy between 1637 and 1639, to some extent he can be absolved from fault 
in respect of the failure of his diplomacy. It was Louis and Richelieu who denied the 
English King success by refusing to sign and ratify the Anglo-French treaties of 
1637. 
 
Charles’s inability to secure an anti-Habsburg alliance with France and his 
switch to pursuing an Anglo-Spanish league from October 1639 – the latter to the 
great displeasure of the Northumberland-Leicester circle – were crucial in alienating 
powerful, and previously loyal, members of his court.96 This estrangement had 
important political consequences. Northumberland and other close court allies – 
notably William Cecil, second earl of Salisbury, Philip Herbert, fourth earl of 
Pembroke, and Sir Henry Vane senior – would all side with Parliament in the 
 
96 For Northumberland’s distaste at both an Anglo-Spanish alliance and marriage, see Collins, 
II, 655: Northumberland to Leicester, 25 June 1640. For Leicester’s more muted criticism of a 
potential Anglo-Spanish league, see SP 78/109, fol. 153: Leicester to Secretary of State/[Vane], 3/13 





English Civil War. Leicester would remain neutral in that conflict, and would deny 
Charles his full support at a crucial juncture in royal affairs. The move away from 
the King by senior figures within his government – a development closely linked to 
his diplomatic realignment towards Spain from late 1639 – was a key element in a 
trend whereby a substantial minority of his nobility, around forty per cent, either 
resisted him or did not give him their active backing in the Civil War.97 The failure 
of Charles’s foreign policy in the second half of the 1630s was, therefore, a 




It had been a long journey from May 1636, when Leicester set off on his Paris 
embassy to Louis XIII of France, to October 1641, when the earl’s mission finally 
ended. There were many diversions and dead ends along the way. Nonetheless, 
some themes are evident. Charles was more pro-French in this period than historians 
have recognized. He pursued a realistic foreign policy in these years – if he were not 
to enter into an alliance with the Habsburg powers, a league encompassing France 
was the only other option that might secure the restitution of the Prince Palatine. 
This pursuit of clear and realistic diplomatic objectives contrasts with the 
impracticality and disorganization that informed the implementation of his policies 
regarding his contemporaneous difficulties in Scotland.98 The King also came closer 
to realizing an anti-Habsburg Anglo-French alliance than has been appreciated 
hitherto. Thus, Charles demonstrated a greater understanding of the nuances of the 
European diplomatic and strategic scene in the second half of the 1630s than he has 
been credited with. 
 
97 See Cust, Charles I and the Aristocracy, pp. 5, 296, 302-3 and 311-2 and Appendix 2, pp. 
320-5, who estimates the proportion of the English nobility supporting Charles I in the Civil War at 
sixty per cent, meaning that forty per cent either opposed or failed to back the King. 
 
98 See Peter H. Donald, An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-
1641 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 320-7; Mark C. Fissel, The Bishops’ 
Wars: Charles I’s Campaigns against Scotland, 1638-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 287-99; Allan I. Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 
1625-41 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1991), pp. 204-5; and Stevenson, Scottish 
Revolution, pp. 310-5 for trenchant criticism of Charles I’s actions and policies towards Scotland in 






Given such a conclusion, this thesis has been able to present a more balanced 
view of the King and his policies. It supports the implications of Conrad Russell’s 
observation that Charles was not an unremittingly incompetent monarch – had he 
been so, he would likely have been deposed, as were Edward II, Richard II and 
Henry VI.99 Alternatively, he would have failed to gather the army that enabled him 
to fight the Civil War. The interpretation of Charles presented here does not 
whitewash the King. The new manuscript evidence regarding Charles’s foreign 
policy set out in this thesis – principally, the three (extant) Anglo-French treaties of 
1637 and Leicester’s 500 letters of diplomatic correspondence – indicates that the 
King was capable of being a shrewd operator in the area of foreign policy, but 
perhaps in that sphere only. Finally, although not entirely Charles’s fault, the failure 
of his pro-French diplomacy of 1636-9 and the pursuit of an Anglo-Spanish alliance 
from October 1639 onwards cost him dear in the loss of the support of the 
influential, and previously faithful, Northumberland-Leicester circle. This move 
away from the King by important courtiers greatly undermined his position in the 
critical years between 1640 and 1642. 
 
 
99 For this implication, see Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 209: ‘The comparison with Edward II, Richard II, and Henry VI 





Developments regarding the Anglo-French Treaties of 1637 – May 
1636 to June 1637 
 
Date1 Developments regarding the Anglo-French Treaties of 1637 
8/[18] April 1636 Thomas Howard, fourteenth earl of Arundel, sets off on his 
embassy to Vienna to negotiate with the Emperor, Ferdinand II. 
28 April/8 May 1636 Instructions for Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, Charles 
I’s extraordinary ambassador, for his embassy to Louis XIII 
drawn-up. 
9/19 May 1636 Leicester’s additional instruction for the embassy to Louis 
compiled. 
12/22 May 1636 Leicester leaves London for Paris on his embassy to Louis. 
24 May/3 June 1636 Leicester arrives in Paris. 
30 May/9 June 1636 Leicester has his first, formal, audience with Louis. 
16/26 June 1636 Leicester reports optimistically to Sir John Coke, Charles’s senior 
Secretary of State, regarding the potential for negotiations with 
the French. 
20/30 June 1636 Leicester has his second, substantive, audience with Louis. 
9/19 July 1636 The French offer to restore Charles I Louis, the Prince Elector 
Palatine, to his dignity and lands in return for an offensive and a 
defensive league against Austria and Spain. 
[The French proposals of July 1636] 
20/30 July 1636 Coke instructs Leicester that he is not to commit Charles to war, 
but the French may levy troops in the English King’s lands and 
have the assistance of his fleet. Leicester is no longer to press for 
the mutual exchange of the Lower Palatinate and Lorraine by 
Spain and France respectively. 
22 July/1 August The French draw up the first draft for an Anglo-French treaty. 
 
1 Dates are cited using both the old (Julian) and the new (Gregorian) calendars, with the old 





1636 Leicester suggests minor amendments. 
[The draft French treaty of July 1636] 
8/18 August 1636 Leicester speculates that to facilitate an alliance with England the 
French might end their attempts to detach Maximilian I, duke of 
Bavaria, from the Habsburgs. 
15/25 August 1636 The Spanish capture Corbie in Picardy (North-East France). 
16/26 August 1636 Leicester notes that Charles is unhappy with the French proposals 
for an Anglo-French treaty. 
23 August/2 
September 1636 
Leicester seeks power to conclude a treaty with France. 
30 August/9 
September 1636 
Coke instructs Leicester not to agree to an offensive and a 
defensive league with the French, but Charles is willing to 
conclude a general treaty of neutrality with France and the United 
Provinces. Coke confirms the English King’s offer to the French 
to allow them to levy troops in his realms and of naval assistance. 
In return, France may not make peace without informing Charles 
and securing the position of the Elector Palatine. 
30 August/9 
September 1636 
The French respond to Charles’s proposals, but insert additional 
(unspecified) provisions into the potential treaty, insisting on a 
formal league. Leicester informs the French that the English King 
will not agree to their amendments. 
5/15 September 
1636 
Coke confirms that Charles does not approve of the French 
proposals. The English King grants Leicester the power under the 
Great Seal of England to treat with France, but his authority is 




Victory of Sweden, France’s ally, over the Empire and Saxony at 
the Battle of Wittstock in North Germany. 
30 September/10 
October 1636 
Coke comments on the provisions of the draft French treaty. 
Leicester is not to commit Charles to war and any aid to France is 
to be limited. 
1/11 October 1636 Leicester reports the repeated French offer for an offensive and a 
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defensive league, but has told the French that Charles will not 
commit to such an alliance. 
8/18 October 1636 Claude de Bullion, one of Louis’s surintendant des finances, 
shows Leicester a copy of a draft treaty prepared by the French. 
Leicester has numerous objections to the French treaty, especially 
to the (unspecified) fourth article. 
[The draft French treaty of October 1636] 
Leicester informs the French that he has the power to treat with 
them under the Great Seal. 
18/28 October 1636 Coke relays Charles’s comments on the draft French treaty of 
October 1636 to Leicester: 
(1) The preface has been shortened. 
(2) First article: no withdrawal of English nationals from 
Habsburg lands, as this would be a declaration of war. 
(3) Second article: the number of troops that the French can 
raise in the English King’s realms limited to 6,000. First 
reference to the restricted number of soldiers that Charles 
will allow the French to recruit in his lands. 
(4) Third article: shortened to prevent it being a declaration of 
war. 
(5) Fourth article: rephrased, as the English King is not at war 
with the Habsburgs. 
(6) Fifth article: deleted, as Charles has not fallen out with the 
United Provinces. 
(7) Sixth article: deleted, as cutting the Spanish and the 
English Roads would be equivalent to war with Spain. 
[The draft English treaty of October 1636] 
23 October/2 
November 1636 
Leicester states that he has been careful not to commit Charles to 
war and that he is aware that any assistance given to the French 
must be limited. He suggests amendments to: 
(1) Third and fourth articles: to reduce any potential threat to 
England from the French fleet. 
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(2) Sixth article: to prevent any aid given to the French to 
conquer territory in Flanders being at the expense of help 
for the Elector Palatine. 
Leicester says that he has conformed to his instructions. He 
makes it clear that he favours an alliance with France and that the 




Leicester reports that Bullion is pressing for a response to the 
draft French treaty of October 1636. 
4/14 November 
1636 
Leicester confirms receipt on 22 October/1 November 1636 of the 
draft English treaty of October 1636, together with the related 
letter, as sent by Coke. 
5/15 November 
1636 
French recapture Corbie in North-East France from the Spanish. 
8/18 November 
1636 
Coke responds to Leicester’s letter of 23 October/2 November 
1636 criticizing Leicester for exceeding his instructions in 
negotiating with the French. 
11/21 November 
1636 
Bullion raises the following two points regarding the draft 
English treaty of October 1636: 
(1) How many warships can Charles provide? Leicester 
replies between eighteen and twenty. 
(2) The French want Charles to pay part of the cost of the 
troops to be levied by France in Charles’s realms. 
Leicester replies that this is unacceptable. 
18/28 November 
1636 to 14/24 
January 1637 
Two-month lull in negotiations possibly caused by a political 
crisis in France involving Louis and Cardinal Richelieu, on one 
side, and Gaston, duc d’Orléans, and Louis de Bourbon, comte de 
Soissons, on the other. 
December 
1636/January 1637 
Arundel returns empty handed from his Vienna embassy to the 
Emperor. 
14/24 January 1637 Bullion presents the following three items to Leicester and John 




(1) The (previous) draft English treaty of October 1636, to 
which the French now agree. 
(2) The English King’s reversal letter (possibly regarding 
Maximilian of Bavaria). 
(3) A French proposal for an offensive and a defensive 
league. 
Leicester says that Charles will not accept an offensive and a 
defensive alliance. Bullion responds that such a league is only in 
case of necessity. Leicester forwards the three items to Charles 
and Coke. 
[The draft French treaties of January 1637] 
16/26 January 1637 
[date reported] 
Confrontation at court between Robert Rich, second earl of 
Warwick, and Charles regarding the putative treaty with France. 
Warwick promises support for the English King if he will enter 
into such an alliance and go to war with the Habsburg powers. 
27 January/6 
February 1637 
Leicester says that Bullion is asking for Charles’s reply to the 
draft French treaties of January 1637. 
3/13 February 1637 Leicester reports further pressure from Bullion for an English 
response to the draft French treaties of January 1637. 
17/27 February 1637 Charles draws up Latin versions of the so-called main and the 
auxiliary Anglo-French treaties of February 1637. The provisions 
of the main treaty include: 
(1) Article 3: naval assistance to be provided to France close 
to an offensive and a defensive alliance on the English 
King’s part. 
(2) Article 2: the French to be allowed to raise 6,000 troops in 
Charles’s kingdoms. 
(3) Articles 5, 6, 13 and 14: Sweden and the United 
Provinces, together with Denmark and Savoy, to be 
invited to join the alliance. 
(4) Articles 5 and 14: a conference to be held at Hamburg for 
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France’s allies, Sweden and the United Provinces, to sign 
the treaties. 
(5) Article 1: the English King not to aid the Habsburg 
powers. 
(6) Article 8: Maximilian of Bavaria to be allowed to retain 
the Electoral title in his lifetime if he peacefully accepts 
the Anglo-French proposals, if not, the offer is to be 
withdrawn. 
(7) Overall: numerous references to both the Elector Palatine 
and Bavaria. 
[The main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637] 
18/28 February 1637 Coke states that: 
(1) The main treaty of February 1637: 
- Charles has signed and ratified the treaty under the 
‘broade seale’ and expects Louis to do the same. 
- Preface: broadly as compiled by the French. 
- First five articles: unchanged. 
- Sixth article: provisions on the naval assistance to be 
provided to the Prince Elector, the English fleet not to 
be sent out until war is declared and any fortified 
places captured in Flanders to be assigned to the 
Prince Palatine. 
(2) The auxiliary treaty of February 1637: 
- Also signed and ratified by Charles. 
- Intended to be an offensive and a defensive league. 
Coke indicates that the French might think that the English King 
has gone further than they may have expected regarding the main 
and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637. 
3/13 March 1637 Leicester states that Bullion objects to the following in the main 
and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637: 
(1) Provision regarding the handing over of places in Flanders 
by the French. 
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(2) The lack of assistance in Europe promised to France. 
(3) The time that Charles indicates would be needed to 
finalize the main and the auxiliary treaties of February 
1637. 
Leicester reports that he has confirmed Coke’s view to the French 
that they might think that the English King has gone further than 
they may have anticipated regarding the main and the auxiliary 
treaties of February 1637. 
17/27 March 1637 Leicester informs Coke that the French are now saying that 
Sweden and the United Provinces will have to agree to the main 
and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 before France will 
sign the treaties. He says that he has refuted this interpretation. 
26 March/5 April 
1637 
Coke implicitly instructs Leicester and Scudamore to threaten to 
abandon the negotiations if the French persist with their (new) 
demands. 
29 March/8 April 
1637 
Leicester reports that the French have problems with the main 
treaty of February 1637 regarding: 
(1) The preface. 
(2) Sweden and the United Provinces would have to agree to 
any new commitments to the Prince Elector. 
(3) The timing of Charles’s break with the Habsburg powers. 
(4) The position of the Prince Palatine. 
14/24 April 1637 Leicester states that Père Joseph, Richelieu’s confident, says that 
the Cardinal approves of the main and the auxiliary treaties of 
February 1637. 
21 April/1 May and 
29 April/9 May 1637 
Leicester notes that Charles has the following issues with the 
French position: 
(1) The Prince Elector has not been given his full title. 
(2) Continuing French insistence on the prior approval of the 
main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 by 




(3) The main and the auxiliary treaties of February 1637 
should be in Latin and not in French. 
6/16 May 1637 Coke instructs Leicester and Scudamore: 
(1) To ask the French if they will sign the treaties of February 
1637 and, if so, Leicester is to agree to the treaties on 
Charles’s part. 
(2) Alternatively, if the French still insist on the Hamburg 
conference involving Sweden and the United Provinces 
before the treaties are concluded, Leicester is to agree to 
that requirement. 
26 May/5 June 1637 Leicester relays Richelieu’s comments on articles 13 and 14 of 
the main treaty of February 1637 to Coke. He speculates that the 
delays on the French side were due to another political crisis 
involving Soissons. 
2/12 June 1637 Leicester sends the following four items to Coke: 
(1) The French versions of the main (which does not survive) 
and the auxiliary treaties of June 1637. 
[The French versions of the main and auxiliary 
treaties of June 1637] 
(2) A secret letter (contents unknown). 
(3) A commission for the Prince Elector. 
June 1637 The provisions of the French version of the auxiliary treaty of 
June 1637 (as found in the papers of Henri de la Ferté Nabert, 
marquis de Senneterre, the French extraordinary ambassador to 
Charles, 1635-7) are as follows: 
(1) Articles 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 generally the same as in 
the auxiliary treaty of February 1637, but articles 2, 4, 5, 7 
and 13 differ. 
(2) Preface: German Princes to be restored to their dignities 
and lands as at 1616. 
(3) Additional article 14: provisions regarding France’s allies 




(4) Article 2: no limit to the number of troops that the French 
can raise in England (restricted to 6,000 in the auxiliary 
treaty of February 1637). 
(5) Secret article: no peace without full agreement of France’s 
allies, confirmation of the English King to assist actively 
in providing a fleet to the Prince Elector and Charles 
Louis to be granted his full title. 
(6) Charles to make demands of the Empire, which if not 
satisfactorily answered, will result in the English King 
signing an offensive and a defensive league with France 
and its allies. 
(7) Overall: nine references to an offensive and a defensive 
league. 
(8) Only four references to the Elector Palatine, with all other 
references to Charles Louis being to Charles’s 
‘descendent’ or ‘nephew.’ 
6/16 June 1637 Leicester notes the following regarding the French version of the 
auxiliary treaty of June 1637: 
(1) The restoration date of 1616 regarding the German 
Princes. 
(2) The use of ‘Serenissma’ as the title of Elizabeth of 
Bohemia. 
(3) The implications of the use of the French word 
‘conclurre’ (to conclude) rather than ‘traiter’ (to treat). 
(4) No limit to the number of troops that France can raise in 
Charles’s lands – not a declaration of war in Leicester’s 
opinion. 
(5) The lack of the consistent use of the Elector Palatine’s 
title. 




(7) Details of the arrangements for the conclusion of the 
auxiliary treaty and the offensive and defensive league. 
12/22 June 1637 Coke advises Leicester that Charles accepts the French versions 
of the main and auxiliary treaties of June 1637 and: 
(1) Sweden and the United Provinces are to be invited to the 
Hamburg conference. 
(2) Anglo-French agreement to the French versions of the 
main and auxiliary treaties of June 1637 to be 
communicated to Sweden and the United Provinces. 
(3) Charles to appoint an agent to attend the Hamburg 
conference and to arrange matters regarding the demands 
to be made of the Emperor. 
18/28 June 1637 Coke confirms: 
(1) Charles’s acceptance of the French versions of the main 
and auxiliary treaties of June 1637. 
(2) Second part of the secret article to be deleted, as this 
would be a declaration of war. 
(3) Arrangements for the conclusion of the French versions of 
the main and auxiliary treaties of June 1637. 
21 June/1 July 1637 Charles (via Coke) demands: 
(1) Transfer of the conference to The Hague. 
(2) France not to conclude a treaty with the Austrian and 
Spanish Habsburgs at the Papal-brokered Cologne 
conference. 
June 1637 Coke in a letter annotated and corrected by Charles: 
(1) Again, confirms the English King’s acceptance of the 
French versions of the main and auxiliary treaties of June 
1637. 
(2) Latin rather than French to be used in the treaties. 
(3) That part of the secret article committing Charles to aid 
the Prince Elector to be deleted, as it could be 
misunderstood as a declaration of war. 
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(4) Provisions regarding the handing over of places captured 
in Flanders to be restored. 
(5) Detailed instructions regarding the Hamburg conference. 
(6) Finalization of the demands to be made of the Austrian 
Habsburgs. 
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The So-called Main and the Auxiliary Anglo-French Treaties of 17 
February 1637 – Latin Typescript Versions 
 
The Auxiliarie Treatie sent into France 
wherein they have omitted or altered what 
here is underlyned. 
The [so-called Main] Treatie returned out of 
France wherein they have added or changed 
what here is underlyned. 
Rex Christianissimus belli contra Austriacos 
suscepti rationes suas publice exposuit: nec 
aliud se instituisse professus est, quam ut sibi, 
et confaederatis omnibus nullo excluso tutam 
pacem conciliaret, qua Principes oppressi: ac 
prae alijs Elector Palatinus in auitas 
haeriditates dignitatisq[ue] restituerentur. 
Etiam Magnae Brittaniae Rex quamvis in 
presentiarum pacem cum omnibus colat, nec 
ullaad res novandas obligatione se teneri sciat: 
huius tamen tam excelsi gloriosig[ue] incepit, 
se promotorem et assertorem semper fuisse et 
esse libenter profitetur. Ambo igitur Reges his 
nixi fundamentis, optimum factu iudicant, 
fadere et iungere arctiori; quo sanctissme 
testantur, neutri propositum esse vel ditiones 
suas extendere vel alienas occupare. Sed quod 
iustum est et regium: propria tueri imperia: 
Christiano orbi pacem: Germanicae 
libertutem; et oppressis Principibus: praecipue 
Electori Palatino, sua iura reddere, unde in 
articulos seguentes unanimes consenserunt. 
 
Rex Christianissimus belli contra Austriacos 
suscepti rationes suas publice exposuit, nec 
aliud se instituisse professus est, quam ut sibi, 
et Confaederatis omnibus, nullo excluso tutam 
pacem conciliaret qua Principes oppressi, per 
domum Austriacam et ei adhaerentes, in avitas 
haereditates dignitatesq[ue] restituerentur; 
Etiam Magnae Brittanniae Rex quamvis in 
presentiarum pacem cum omnibus colat, nec 
ulla alia ad res novandas obligatione se teneri 
sciat; huic tamen tam excelso gloriosoq[ue] 
operi adlaborare idq[ue] pro virili promovere 
se paratum profitetur. Ambo igitur Reges his 
nixi fundamentis optimum factu iudicant, 
faedere se iungtre arctiori, quo sanctissime 
testantur neutri propositum esse aliud quam 
propria tueri imperia, Christiano orbi pacem, 
Germaniae libertatem, et oppressis Principibus 
per dictam domum Austriacam et adhaerentes 
suos sua jura reddere, et specialiter nepotibus 
magnae Brittanniae Regis, seu sororis ejus 
filijs unde ambae majestates in articulos 
sequentes unanimes consenserunt; de quibus 
convenerunt vi mandatorum subsinem hujus 
tractatus insertorum, qui ab utroq[ue] Rege 
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ratificabitur quam primum. Regina et Corona 
Sueciae, et Status Belgij Confaederati in 
eundem tractatum consenserint, sicuti inferius 
exprimetur. 
1. 
Magnae Brittaniae Rex, nec Imperatori, nec 
Hispano, aut Bavaro, aut illorum socijs, 
directe vel indirecte auxiliabitur: neq[ue] 
pecunias, arma, comeatum aut munitionum 
genus ullum, ad eorum aliguos deferet, aut 
deferri quantum in se est patietur. Neq[ue] 
militum delectum, in Anglia Scotia aut 
Hybernia illorum causa fieri sinet. 
1. 
Magnae Brittaniae Rex, neq[ue] Domui 
Austriacae neq[ue] Bavaro, aut illorum socijs 
directe vel indirecte auxiliabitur, neq[ue] 
pecunias, arma commeatum aut munitionum 
genus ullum ad eorum aliquos deferet, aut 
deferri per suos subditos, aut alios sub eorum 
nomine qui morantur in euis dominijs patietur, 
neq[ue] militum delectum, in Anglia, Scotia 
aut Hybernia illorum causa fieri sinet. 
2. 
Idem Magnae Brittaniae Rex, Regi 
Christianissimo concedet, in supra nominatis 
Regnis delectum sex legionum, id est sex 
mille militum et copiam etiam; centuriarum 
numeros, implendi, quoties in hoc bello pro 
communi causa gesto deficuint aut minuuntur. 
2. 
Idem Magnae Brittanniae Rex, Regi 
Christianissimo concedet in supra nominatis 
regnis delectum sex legionum, id est sex mille 
militum quorum delectus fiet, si Majestas ejus 
Christian. ma ijs se credit opus habere quam 
primum hic p[re]sens tractatus signabitur et 
ratificabitur, tum etiam copiarum supradictus 
numerus implebitur, quoties hoc durante bello 
deficiet aut minuetur. 
3. 
Idem magnae Brittaniae Rex, Classem instruet 
navium bellicarum, ad minimum triginta, a 
trecentis ad nongentas vel mille tonnas (ut 
vulgo vocant) Eaq[ue] non portus solu, et 
littora, utriusq[ue] Regni, custodiet et tuebitur; 
Sed (quantum potest) impediet, nec milites 
peciniae, commeatus, bellica quaevis 
3. 
Idem magnae Brittaniae Rex, mari instruet 
classem navium bellicarum ad minimum 
triginta a trecentis ad nongentas vel mille 
tonas (ut vulgo vocant) eaq[ue] non portus 
solum [et] littora utriusq[ue] Regni custodiet 
et tuebitur, sed etiam impediet, ne milites, 
pecuniae comeatus, bellica quaevis 
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instrumenta aut munitiones, ad quoscunq[ue] 
transvehantur, qui causae huic communi, aut 
Electoris Palatini restitutioni se opponant. 
instrumenta, aut munitiones ad quoscunq[ue] 
transvehantur, qui causae huic comuni, aut 
dictorum Nepotum restitutionis se opponent. 
4. 
Rex Christianissimus, nullam omnino 
tractatum instituet, cum Imperatori, Hispano 
aut Bavaro, aut eorum adhaerentibus nisi 
consulto, et consentiente Magnae 
Brittananniae Rege: neq[ue] de pace, vel 
inducijs, aut armorum suspensiones quicquam 
vel aget, vel statuet, nisi Magnae Brittanniae 
Regis Nepotum restitutio, in integrum, et 
conservatio in posterum: comprehensafuerint, 
et stipulata. Similiter Magnae Brittanniae Rex, 
nec in praesens nec post bellum inter ipsum et 
quemvis predictorum coortum, de pace, aut 
inducijs, aut suspensione armorum non 
consulto et consentiente Rege Christianissmo 
quovis modu tractubit. 
4. 
Rex Christianissimus nullum omnino 
tractatum instituet in prejudicium huius 
tractatus cum domo austriaca, Duce Bavariae, 
aut eorum adhaerentibus, neq[ue] de pace, vel 
inducijs, aut armorum suspensione tractabit 
absq[ue] consensu magnae Brittanniae Regis, 
et nullo modo pacem concludet, nisi dictorum 
Magnae Brittanniae Regis Nepotum restitutio 
in integrum et conseruatio in posterum 
comprehensa fuerit [et] stipulata. Similiter 
magnae Brittanniae Rex in Statu, in quo nunc 
est nullam omnino tractatum instituet in 
p[re]judicium hujus tractatus cum domo 
Austriaca, et ejus adhaerentibus, et postquam 
bellum caeperit nullam tractatum pacis 
jnduciarum, aut suspensionis armorum inibit 
absq[ue] consensu Regis Christianni. 
5. 
Reges nulla interposita mora, confestim 
Legatos aut internuntios, ad amicos p[re]cipue 
ad Regem Daniae, Reginam et Regni Suecici 
Administratores, et unitarum provinciarum 
ordines, maturabunt, ut omnes moveant et 
hortentur, ut huic confaederationi quam 
primum consentiant: qua Christiani orbis pax, 
Germaniae Libertas, et Principum spoliatoru 
nominatum Electoris Palatini restititio 
continentur; Et ut suos Commissarios, sine 
5. 
Ambo Regis absq[ue] ulla mora, et quam 
primum fieri poterit, mittent Legatos aut alios 
Deputatos ad amicos, specialiter ad Reginam 
ei Regni Sueciae administratores, et ad Status 
generales Belgij confaederatos per quos 
moueant et hortentur, ut huic confaederationi 
consentiant [et] se adjungant, quae eo fine 
instituta est, quo christiano orbi, pax 
concilietur, Germaniae Libertas salua sit et 
integra, et ut Principes [et] alij status Imperij 
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Hamburgum, siue Hagam Comitis, intra tres 
ad plurimum menses, post inscriptionem 
praesentium; accelerent; ubi quid quisq[ue] de 
communi causa sentiat, et quid velit, Regibus 
notum faciat: ut consilio omnium, singulorum 
pretensiones, sic temporari possint, ut aequae 
fidaeq[ue] pacis conditiones communibus 
votis respondeant. Quo facto, Reges et tot 
confaederatorum qui huic tractatui se iungent, 
statuent de spatio temporis, Imperatori, ac 
reliquis p[re]scribendo; quo articulos pacifici 
tractatus, vel probent, vel reijciant. 
 
Quos articulos conclusos, signatosq[ue] 
magnae Brittanniae Rex, nomine 
confaederatorum, Imperatori, et socijs 
proponendos in se recipiat. Et si statutu 
tempore dictus Imperator, et qui euis sunt 
partium eos non recipiant: et assensum suum 
confaederatis significare, vel recusent, vel 
disserant; tunc magnae Brittanniae Rex, 
tractatum de faedere offensivo, ac defensivo 
signabit; Iillum scilicet qui interea, et in 
presenti concludetur, per appostius 
Legatorum, et Comissariorum utriusq[ue] 
Regis finientes notus: et se praestiturum ea 
modo quo supra conuentum exscripto illo 
continetur, verbo Regio nunc se obstringet. 
qui suis ditionibus, dominijs et libertatibus 
spoliti sunt per domum Austriacam, [et] ejus 
adhaerentes, et nominatum dicti nepotes, 
magnae Britannniae Regis integrum 
restituantur, ut quamprimum suos Comissarios 
Hamburgum mittant, per quos significaent 
Legatis et alijs Deputatis utrorumq[ue] 
Regum, qui etiam quam primum comparebunt 
indicta urbe, quid quisq[ue] de communi causa 
sentiat et ut simul possint conferre et eo 
collaborare amicabiliter, ut de eorum 
p[re]tensionibus inter se conueniant, quo 
perveniri possit, ad aquum et securum pacis 
tractatum qui communibus votis respondeat. 
Quo facto dicti Deputati utrarumq[ue] 
Regiarum. Magestatum et earum 
Confaederatorum conuenient de spatio 
temporis infra quod Rex Hispaniae, Rex 
Hungariae, [et] Dux Bavariae admonebuntur 
per magnae Brittaniae Regem, ut satisfaciant 
petitionibus et pretensionibus et quibus dicti 
Deputati inter se convenerint eas proponere 
sicuti dictum est; Et ne res ni longum 
extrahatur, dictum tempus intra quod Rex 
Hispaniae Rex Hungariae [et] Dux Bavariae 
quo declarabunt suam voluntatem, quoad 
predicta non protrehetur ultra mensem aut sex 
septimanas postqua ejs dictae p[re]tensiones 
significatae fuerint. Post quod tempus si illi 
aut eorum adhaerentes recusent aut disserant 
valide et scripto promittere, et satisfacere tam 
magnae Brittanniae Regi, quam alijs 
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Confaederatis qui comprehendentur in hoc 
faedere super ijs quae eis proponentur sicuti 
dictum est Tunc et absq[ue] mora Deputati 
magnae Brittanniae Regis signabunt tractatum 
faederis offensiui ac defensivi, eadem forma 
qua nunc collatum est cum originali sub notis 
dictorum Deputatorum. Utriusq[ue] Regis 
infra scripturam appositis; Et Rex magnae 
Brittanniae obligat se nunc verbo regio exegui 
dictum tractatum faederis offensiui et 
defensiui absq[ue] ulla mora sicuti 
collationatum et supra conuentum est. 
 6. 
Rex Daniae eidem modo invitabitur, ut huic 
tractatus consentiat, et se adjungat, et eo fine 
mittat suos deputatos Hamburgum et Lutetiam 
Parisiorum infra tempus inferius designatum 
et idem fiet quoad ducem Sabaudiae. 
7. 
Insuper conventum et stabilitum est, ut Rex 
uterq[ue] arma parata habeant, quibus hostem 
confestim aggredi possint, eo quo pactum est 
modo et quemadmodum in faedere offensiuo 
defensivoq[ue] erit constitutum. Interia autem 
Magnae Brittanniae Rex Nepoti suo permittet 
ut duodecem vel quindecem Navium, 
ducentarum ad minimum tonnarum, classem 
bene armatam sibi comparet, qua pas sua 
causa promovenda, simulq[ue] Regis 
Christianissimi, tentare aliquid possit. Haec 
autem classes Electoralis, ad primum 
insequentis Maij, aut citius (si fieri potest) [et] 
7. 
Insuper conventum et stabilitum est ut Rex 
uterq[ue] arma parata habeat quibus hostem 
confestim aggredi possit eo quo pactum est 
modo, et quemadmodum in faedere offensiuo 
defensivoq[ue] est constitutum. Interea 
magnae Brittanniae Rex Nepoti suo permittit 
ut quatuordecem vel quindecem navium 
classem bene armatam sibi comparet, quarum 
quatuor erunt ad minimum quadringentarum 
tonnarum singulae, et religuae ducentarum ad 
minimum, qua classe pro sua causa 
promouenda, simulq[ue] pro bono Regis. 
Christianissimi tentare aliquid possint; Et haec 
 
307 
mari se comittere, et vela dare debet. Durabit 
autem haec Regis premissio usq[ue] ad 
tempus, Imperatoris responso datum. Hoc 
insuper constituto, ut omnia qua classis istius 
ope per Electorem capta fuerint illius comodo 
cedant: et pro euis arbitrio libere disponantur. 
Etiam si quae interea loca, durante hoc 
auxuilio Rex christianissimus in Flandria 
ceperit, ea continuo in manus Electoris 
tradantur: et in ijus possessione mutuis Regum 
auxilijs tantisper conserventur, donec in avitas 
ditiones et dignitates, pleno jure restituatur 
Postea Regi christianissimo qui eo primum 
ceperit cedent. 
classis mari se comittet, et vela dare debet, 
quamprimum p[re]sens tractatum signabitur et 
ratificabitur. Durabit autem haec Regis 
permissio usq[ue] ad tempus Hispaniae Regis 
Hungariae regis, et ducis Bavariae responso 
datum, quo tempore, aut pax generalis, 
concludetur, aut Rex magnae Brittanniae 
aperte bellum geret, sub conditionibus in hoc 
praesenti tractatu, ut et in tractatu faederis 
offensiui et defensivi comprehensis. Hoc 
insuper constituto, ut omnia quae Classis istius 
ope per dictum Nepotem capta fuerint illius 
comodo cedant, et pro eius libere arbitrio 
disponantur. 
8. 
Concurdatum quoq[ue] et conclusum est, ut si 
Imperator, Hispanus et Bavarus, conditiones 
tractatus pro pace universali, amplectentur et 
recipiant: ita ut magnae Brittanniae regi 
necessitas non incumbat, ad arma veniendi: 
Ejus Majestas assensum praebet ut Bavariae 
dux, Electoratum durante vita, retineat potius 
quam Christiani orbis pax, in eo haerere 
debeat. Sin ad arma ventum fuerit: hac 
conditione non tenebitur, Sed contra Reges de 
Bavaro et descendentibus penitus excludendis, 
paciscuntur. Sin pax conclusa fuerit ut supra 
ponitur; nepotes Regij, Catholicos Romamos 
ditionum suarum incolas, suam colere et 
exercere religionem libere patientur. 
8. 
Concordatum quoq[ue] et conclusum est quod 
si Rex Hispaniae, Rex Hungariae, et Dux 
Bavariae conditiones dicti tractatus pro pace 
universali amplectentur [et] recipiant, sicuti 
continetur in quinto articulo superius expresso, 
ita ut magnae Brittaniae Regi necessitas non 
incumbat ad arma veniendi, Ejus Majestas 
assensum praebet ut Bavariae Dux dignitatem 
Electoralem durante vita retineat potius quam 
Christiani orbis pax in eo haerere debeat; Sin 
ad arma ventum fuerit hac conditione non 
tenebitur; sed contra Regis de Bavaro, et 
descendentibus ab hoc Electorali dignitate 
penitus excludendis paciscuntur. Interia 
conuenit inter Reges, ut Nepotes Magnae 
Brittaniae Regis liberum catholicae Romanae 
religionis exercitium subditis suis aut alijs in 
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suis ditionibus degentibus concedant. 
9. 
Portus et littora regnorum utriusq[ue] 
regi[illegible] apperientur omnibus illorum 
subditis: ut libere et sine impedimento, cum 
suis Nauibus, nautis mercibus (portorijs 
telonijsq[ue] solutis) et accedere et recedere 
possint, omnesq[ue] veteres et boni tractatus 
inter Coronas facti p[re]cipue de mercatura 
libera terra mariq[ue], excercenda; et 
ratihabendi, et obseruandi sunt. 
9. 
Portus et littora regnorum utriusq[ue] Regis 
aperientur omnibus illorum subditis, ut libere 
et sine impedimento cum suis nauibus, nautis 
mercibus (portorijs telonijsq[ue] solutis) et 
accedere et recedere possint, 
omnesq[ue]veteres et boni tractatus inter 
coronas facti p[re]cipue de mercatura libere 
terra, mariq[ue] exercenda obseruanui sunt. 
10. 
Si Christianissimi Regis armis, loca aliqua 
capiantur, ad Electorem Palatinum 
iurepertinentia: ea confestim in manus 
Magnae Brittanniae Regis, in usum euisdem 
Electoris tradentur: Rege Christianissmo, ut 
conseruentur opem conferente tanguam hujus 
confaederationis fructus et effectus. 
10. 
Si Christianissmi Regis armis loca aliqua 
capiantur ad Nepotes supra dictos Majestatis 
magnae Brittanniae pertinentia, ea confestim 
in manus dictae euis Majestatis in usum 
dictorum Nepotum tradentur; et Rex 
Christianiss[us] ope sua et fauore eorum 
conseruationi studebit hujus presentis faederis 
gratia. 
11. 
Rex Christianissimus nullam invitationem 
admittet ad conuentum quemcunq[ue] de pace 
publica tractandi causa, alia ratione quam inter 
Reges conuentum est vel fuerit, Et Similiter 
Brittaniarum Rex pro partesua idem promittit 
et stipulator. 
11. 
Ambo Regis nullam invitationem admittent ad 
conuentum quemcunq[ue] de pace publica 
tractandi causa alia ratione quam inter eos 
conuentam est vel fuerit. 
12. 
Quo haec confaederatio inter Reges et eorum 
subditos, sit magis integra et perpetua; 
utrinq[ue] fidem faciunt, non esse se passuros 
(quantum in eis erit) piratas quoseunq[ue] sine 
12. 
Quo haec confaederatio inter Reges, et eorum 
subditos sit magis integra et perpetua 
utrinq[ue] fidem faciunt non esse se passuros 
Liratas quoscunq[ue] siue Turcas, siui 
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Turcas sivi Barbaros, in eorum regnis, 
portubus facis maritimis, vel aquis dulcibus: 
Vel praedas agere, vel stationnem habere, vel 
ullo modo commorari: Sed contra (pro viribus) 
omnes piraticam exercentes et expulsuros et 
prosecuturos. 
Barbaros in eorum regnis portibus, locis 
maritimis, vel aquis dulcibus, vel praedas 
agere, vel stationem habere vel ullo modo 
commorari, sed contra omnes Piraticam 
exercentes, et expulsuros et prosecuturos. 
13. 
Rex uterq[ue] statuit presentes articulos pro 
conclusis habere, et protalibus per Ligatos 
suos et Comissarios signari et subscribi ante 
primum diem Martij stili Anglicani proximi 
jam requentis. 
13. 
Rex uterq[ue] statuit presentes articulos pro 
conclusis haberi, et pro talibus per legatos 
suos et Comissarios subsignatem iri, 
quamprimum Regina et Corona Sueciae et 
Status Confaederati Belgij generales 
conuenerint inter se huic tractatui 
consentiendi, et quod ad eum affectum 
miserint mandata, et ratificationes eorum 
Legatis aut Deputatis Lutetiam Parisiorum 
secundum tenorem articuli sequentis. 
 14. 
Et quandoquidem eorum Magestates 
judicarent conuenire ad id inducti ea 
existimatione et amore quo feruntur erga 
eorum Confaederatos et fideles amicos, et 
nominatim erga Reginam Regnumq[ue] 
Sueciae, et Status Generales Belgij 
Confaederati eos inuitare, et adjungere huic 
tractatui, conuenerunt et consenserunt, quo 
magis eis appareat decorum supradicta 
intentione, se omni diligentia adhibita 
missuros ad Regnum Sueciae [et] dictos Status 
eos hatari ut mittant mandatu sua cum plena 
potestate Hamburgam ad suos Deputatos 
quibus declarent suum animum super dicto 
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tractatu Deputatis eorum Magestatum qui illie 
reperientur, Et quo casu dictum Regnum 
Sueciae, et Status generales huic tractatui 
consentient, relinguetur judicio dicti 
conventus Hamburgensis conueniendi quid 
fieri debeat de locis Belgij sub dominio Regis 
Hispaniae constututis qui capientur ab uno aut 
altero dictorq[ue] Confaederatorum abeo 
tempore quo hic tractatus confaederationis ad 
auxilium ferendum signabitur, et ratificabitur 
per dictos Confaederatos, et cum executus 
fuerit Rex magnae Brittanniae quousq[ue] 
dictus Rex faederi offensiuo [et] defensivo 
suum assensum praebuerit. Quibus sic 
conuentis, et concordatis dictus Coruentus id 
notum faciet quamprimum et significabit 
deputatis dictarum Magestatum, et dictorum 
Confaederatorum qui erunt Lutetiae 
Parisiorum, ut hic tractatus conjunctim 
signetur abeis, et illius ratificatio respectiue 
dabitur per omnes confaederatos in dicta urbe 
Lutetia infra decimum quintum diem mensis 
Augsti anni milessimi sexcentessimi trigesimi 
septimi, et consequentes supradicti Deputati 
Hamburgenses operam dabunt ut executioni 
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Le Roi très chrétien, ayant déjà publié ses raisons pour la guerre qu’il a entreprise 
contre la maison d’Autriche, et témoigné n’avoir pour but que de pouvoir parvenir à 
une sûre paix pour lui et pour tous ses confédérés sans nulle exception par le moyen 
de laquelle Les Princes opprimés par la maison d’Autriche et ses adhérents soient 
rétablis en leurs anciens biens et dignités qu’eux et leurs devanciers possédaient. 
L’an 1616 auparavant cette guerre, et le Roy de la G.B. bien qu’à présent il soit en 
paix avec un chacun et ne se sente nullement obligé de faire aucunes innovations 
déclarant volontiers d’avoir toujours été et d’être prêt d’avancer une si haute et 
Loyale entreprise, Ces deux rois sur cela ont trouvés bon de se joindre en une 
Alliance plus étroite par laquelle ils témoignent très religieusement l’un et l’autre 
n’avoir aucun autre dessein que de défendre leurs propres couronnes, redonner la 
paix à la Chrétienté, la Liberté à l’Allemagne et aux Princes opprimés par ladite 
maison d’Autriche et ses adhérents. Leurs droits particulièrement à la société et aux 
XXX dudit Roy de la Grande Bretagne dont leurs Majestés sont demeurées d’accord 
suivant les articles suivants passés en vertu des pouvoirs insérés à la fin de ce 
présent Traité, lequel sera respectueusement ratifié par les deux Rois incontinent que 
la couronne de Suède et les Etats généraux y seront entrés comme il est dit ci-après. 
 
1 
Le Roi de la Grande Bretagne n’assistera directement ni indirectement la maison 
d’Autriche, Le Duc de Bavière ni leurs adhérents, et ne leur fournira, ni souffrira 
leur être fourni par ses sociétés ou autres sous leur nom demeurant en pays de son 
obéissance, argent, armes, ni vivres, ni aucune sorte de munitions, et ne leur 
 
1 Transcription by Dr Cédric Ploix, the University of Oxford: 
(a) words that are unclear in the manuscript are italicized; and 




permettra de faire aucunes levées dans ses Etats d’Angleterre, Ecosse ni Irlande. 
 
2 
Sa Majesté de la Grande Bretagne permettra au Roi très chrétien de faire Lever dans 
ses Royaumes jusque a nombre hommes dont la levée se fera si sa Majesté très 
chrétienne juge en avoir besoin incontinent après que le présent Traité aura été signé 
et ratifié et sera ladite levée rafraichie de recrues à mesure, qu’elle viendra à 
demeurer en ce service. 
 
3 
Le roi de la Grande Bretagne mettra en mer une flotte composée pour le moins de 30 
vaisseaux de guerre depuis trois cents tonneaux, jusqu’à neuf cents ou mille 
tonneaux chacun, pour conserver et défendre non seulement les ports et côtes des 
deux Royaumes, mais aussi pour empêcher qu’aucun homme, argent, vivres, armes 
ni munitions de guerre n’y soient transportés à ceux qui s’opposeront à cette cause 




Le Roi très chrétien ne fera aucun Traité de paix trêve ni de suspension d’arme avec 
le Roi d’Espagne, le roi de Hongrie, le Duc de Bavière ou leurs adhérents sans le 
consentement du Roi de la Grande Bretagne, et ne conclura point la paix sans que 
l’entière restitution et conservation pour l’avenir des XXX de sa Majesté de la 
Grande Bretagne y soient compris et promis. Et pareillement le Roi de la Grande 
Bretagne, en l’état qu’il est présentement ne traitera en aucune façon avec la Maison 
d’Autriche et ses adhérents. Et après avoir commencé la guerre ne fera aucun Traité 
de paix Trêve ou suspension d’arme sans le consentement du Roi très chrétien. 
 
5 
Les deux Rois dépêcheront sans aucun délai et le plutôt que faire se pourra des 
Ambassadeurs ou autres ministres, vers leurs amis et particulièrement la Reine et 
administrateur de Suède, et vers les SXXX Les Etats généraux des provinces unies 
des Pays-Bas pour les exhorter d’entrer en cette Ligue faite pour la restitution de la 
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paix en la Chrétienté, de la liberté l’Allemagne et des Princes et Etats de l’Empire 
qui ont été spoliés de leurs états, seigneuries et libertés, par la maison d’Autriche et 
leurs adhérents nommément de la XXX et des XXX de sa Majesté de la Grande 
Bretagne afin qu’ils envoient leurs commissaires au plus tôt à Hambourg pour y 
faire entendre aux Ambassadeurs et autres Ministres des deux Rois qui seront 
pareillement au plus tôt au ledit Lieu de Hambourg leurs sentiments touchant la 
cause commune, et qui tous ensemble puissent conférer et travailler à régler 
amiablement leurs prétentions pour parvenir à un Traité de paix équitable assuré et à 
leur contentement. Après quoi lesdits Députés de leurs Majestés et de leursdits 
confédérés conviendront d’un temps dans lequel le roi d’Espagne, le roi de Hongrie 
et le Duc de Bavière seront requis par le Roi de la Grande Bretagne de satisfaire aux 
demandes et prétentions que lesdits députés seront demeurés d’accord de proposer 
comme dit est. Et afin que les choses n’aillent en longueur, ledit temps dans lequel le 
Roi d’Espagne, le Roi de Hongrie et le Duc de Bavière auront à déclarer leurs 
volontés sur ce que dessus ne pourra être que d’un mois ou six semaines après la 
signification qui leur en sera faite. Après lequel temps si eux et leurs adhérents 
refusent ou délaient de promettre valablement et par écrit de donner contentement 
tant au Roi de la Grande Bretagne qu’aux autres confédérés en cette Ligue sur les 
choses qui leurs auront été proposés comme il est dit ci-dessus, alors et sans délai les 
députés du Roi de la Grande Bretagne signeront ledit Traité de ladite ligue offensive 
et défensive en la même forme que dès maintenant elle sera paraphiée par les 
Ambassadeurs et Commissaires de l’un et l’autre Roi, et le Roi de la Grande 
Bretagne s’oblige dès à présent en foi et en parole de roi d’exécuter dans aucun 
retardement ledit Traité de Ligue offensive et défensive ainsi qu’il sera paraphé et 
qu’il est convenu ci-dessus. 
 
Le Roi de Danemark sera pareillement invité d’entrer en ce traité et d’envoyer pour 
cet effet des Députés à Hambourg et à Paris dans ledit temps et l’on fera de même 
envers son Altesse de Savoye. 
 
7 
De plus il a été convenu et accordé que les deux rois tiendront leurs forces prêtes 
pour agir incontinent contre leurs ennemis, selon qu’il a été promis et selon qu’il est 
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déclaré en laditte ligue offensive et défensive, et cependant sa Majesté de la Grande 
Bretagne permet à son RXXX de préparer une flotte bien armée de 14 ou 15 
vaisseaux dont il y en aura 4 de 400 tonneaux ou plus, et les autres de 200 pour le 
moins pour l’avancement de son propre intérêt et pour l’avantage du roi très 
chrétien. Et cette flotte fera voir incontinent après que le présent traité aura été signé 
et ratifié. Mais cette permission du Roi de la Grande Bretagne ne durera que 
jusqu’audit temps donné au roi d’Espagne, d’Hongrie et au Duc de Bavière pour leur 
réponse auquel temps, ou la paix générale se conclura, ou le Roi de la Grande 
Bretagne entrera en rupture ouverte suivant les conditions de ce traité et celui de la 
ligue offensive. Etant au préalable que toutes les prises que ledits XXX de sa 
Majesté par cette flotte seront à son profit pour en disposer selon sa volonté. 
 
8 
A été aussi conclu et arrêté qu’au cas que le Roi D’Espagne, Le Roy d’Hongrie et le 
Duc de Bavière acceptent les conditions du traité de la paix générale conformément 
à l’article cinq ci-dessus, en sorte que le Roy de la Grande Bretagne ne soit pas 
obligé d’entrer en guerre, sa Majesté consent que le Duc de Bavière retienne 
l’électorat durant sa vie pour ne pas empêcher par la paix de la Chrétienté. Et si 
sainte Majesté entre en guerre, elle ne sera pas obligée à cette condition. Au 
contraire, les deux rois demeurent d’accord que le Duc de Bavière et ses descendants 
en soient entièrement exclus. Cependant il a été convenu que les XXX de sa Majesté 
de la Grande Bretagne donneront liberté aux catholiques Romains, leurs sociétés ou 
autres qui demeurent en leurs pays, d’y jouir de l’exercice de leur religion. 
 
9 
Les Ports et côtes des royaumes des deux rois seront ouvertes à tous leurs sociétés 
afin d’y entrer et sortir librement et sans empêchement avec leurs vaisseaux 
mariniers et biens en payant les coutumes, et tous les Anciens et bons traités faits 
entre les deux couronnes, et particulièrement ceux qui regardent la liberté du 






Si les armés du roi très chrétien prennent quelques places appartenant aux XXX de 
sa Majesté de la Grande Bretagne, elles seront mises aussitôt sous mains de sa sa 
majesté pour le bien de ses saint XXX, et le Roi Très chrétien aidera et favorisera la 
conservation d’icettes en considération de cette Alliance. 
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Les deux Rois n’entendront à aucune invitation qui leur puisse être faite pour 
quelque assemblée que ce soit où l’on traite de la paix générale que conformément à 
ce qui est ou sera convenu entre eux. 
 
12 
Et afin que cette alliance entre les deux rois et leurs sociétés soit tant plus ferme et 
durable, il a été convenu entre eux de ne souffrir que nuls Pirates, Tures ou Barbares 
mènent aucunes prises, aient retraite ou séjournent en leur Royaume, Ports, hautes 
Places maritimes et rivières. Aussi au contraire ils chasseront et poursuivront tous 
ceux qui s’adonnent à la Piraterie. 
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Les deux rois demeurent d’accord que ces présents articles seront dès maintenant 
tenus pour conclus et comme tels signés et souscrits par leurs Ambassadeurs et 
Commissaires Incontinent après que la couronne de Suède et leurs Etats généraux 
seront demeurés d’accord d’entrer en ce traité et qu’ils auront envoyé pour cet effet 
leurs pouvoirs et ratifications à leurs Ambassadeurs ou Ministres à Paris 
conformément à l’article suivant. 
 
14 
Et doutant que leurs majestés ont jugé être convenable pour l’estime et amitié 
qu’elles ont vers leurs Alliés et bons amis, et notamment vers la couronne de Suède 
et les Etats généraux, de les inviter de se joindre au présent Traité, elles ont convenu 
et accordé pour leur donner une marque plus certaine de ce que dessus, qu’elles 
dépêcheront en toute diligence vers ladite Couronne de Suède et lesdits états les 
XXX d’envoyer plein pouvoir à leurs ministres à Hambourg afin de déclarer leur 
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résolution sur celui-ci aux ministres qui y seront de la part de leurs sainte Majesté. 
Et, en cas que la couronne de Suède et les Etats généraux entrent en ce présent 
Traité, il sera remis au jugement de l’assemblée à Hambourg de convenir au même 
temps de ce qui sera fait des places de Flandres qui pourraient être prises par les uns 
ou par les autres des susdits confédérés, depuis le temps que le présent traité de 
Ligue auxiliaire aura été signé et ratifié par les susdits alliés, et exécuté par le roi de 
la Grande Bretagne jusqu’à ce que ledit Roi entrera en Ligue offensive et défensive, 
desquelles résolutions ainsi prises, ladite assemblée donnera prompt avis aux 
ministres de leurs sainte Majesté et desdits confédérés à Paris pour y signer 
conjointement le présent traité. La ratification duquel sera ensuite respectivement 
donnée par tous lesdits confédérés à Paris dans la fin du mois de Juillet 1637. 
Ensuite de quoi les députés qui seront assemblés à Hambourg travailleront à 
l’exécution du cinquième Article ci-dessus. 
 
Procédant des Articles de ligue offensive et défensive entre le roi très chrétien et le 
roi de la Grande Bretagne, leurs royaumes et sociétés pour leur conservation, pour la 
paix générale et pour l’entier rétablissement de leurs Alliés, opprimés par la maison 
d’Autriche et spécialement du Prince Electeur Palatin ,contre ladite maison 
d’Autriche, le Duc de Bavière et leurs adhérents, par lesquels l’Allemagne a été 
ruinée, plusieurs Princes et peuples opprimés, dépouillés et chassés de leurs terres et 
pays. 
 
Tous les Précédents traités entre les couronnes qui ont à présent leur force et vertu 
sont entièrement confirmés excepté en ce qui y peut être changé par celui-ci. 
 
Par ce présent traité, les deux rois veulent tant eux que leurs Royaumes, peuples et 
sociétés être obligés à ladite ligue offensive et défensive et à une déclaration et 
continuation de guerre ouverte par mer et par terre contre ladite maison d’Autriche, 
Le Duc de Bavière et contre tous leurs adhérents, leurs royaumes, terres, domaines, 
leurs sociétés, vassaux, et tous autres qui leur obéissent. 
 
Tous rois, Princes, républiques, Etats et Villes libres seront conviés d’entrer en cette 
Ligue qui ne se fait à autre fin que pour obtenir la paix universelle, l’ancienne 
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Liberté des Allemands et le rétablissement des Princes et principalement de 
l’électeur Palatin en leurs états et dignités, à quel effet deux rois ont résolus 
d’envoyer sans délai leurs Ambassadeurs ou Ministres. 
 
Le plus tôt qu’il se pourra et au moins après la ratification et signature de la ligue 
entre les deux Rois et ceux qui s’y joindront, chacun des rois aura ses forces prêtes 
afin que si le Roy d’Espagne, Le Roy d’Hongrie et le Duc de Bavière refusent des 
articles de paix qui leur seront offerts comme il a été convenu ou qu’ils laissent 
passer le temps prescrit sans les accepter, incontinent ils attaquent par guerre la 
maison D’Autriche et le Duc de Bavière ensemble leurs Etats, Terres, sociétés et 
tous ceux qui leur avèreront en quelque sorte, qui ne sont entre les collègues, et pour 
cet effet lesdits rois donneront pouvoir à tous leurs société de faire des campagnes 
entre eux pour des entreprises et expéditions de guerre ou aux Indes ou en 
l’Amérique ou en quelques autres endroit que ce soit par mer ou par terre, ainsi qu’il 
leur semblera plus commode pour eux et la cause commune. Et outre cela lesdits rois 
donneront Secours et assistance aux Alliés ainsi qu’il semblera plus commode. 
 
Le roi de la Grande Bretagne entretiendra une flotte de 30 vaisseaux du guerre de 3 à 
9 cents ou 1000 tonneaux bien pourvus de toutes choses, avec laquelle non 
seulement il défendra les côtes et Ports des deux royaumes vers l’océan, mais aussi il 
fermera le passage autant qu’il se pourra aux Ennemis, afin qu’ils ne puissent 
transporter en Flandres des gens de guerre armés, vivres, munitions et argent, ni 
autres garnisons de guerre, même s’il combattra, prendra et ruinera tous navires et 
vaisseaux de quelque sorte que ce soit appartenant à la maison d’Autriche, Duc de 
Bavière, et à leurs adhérents et sociétés. Lesdits rois prendront soin que toutes les 
voies de communication de l’Espagne aux Indes ou en L’Amérique et en Flandres, 
et d’Italie en Allemagne soient fermées à quelle fin les vaisseaux du roi de la Grande 
Bretagne tiendront la mer selon qu’il sera besoin. Et pour ce qui est du passage 
d’Allemagne en Italie, le Roi très chrétien agira et traitera avec les cantons de suisse 
et autres alliés. 
 
Les deux rois promettront réciproquement, et en vertu de cette Ligue, s’obligeront 
de ne traiter en façon quelconque de la paix Trève ou suspension d’armes que d’un 
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commun avis et consentement. 
 
Il sera délibéré entre les confédérés avant que le traité soit signé comment il sera 
disposé des lieux qui seront pris en Flandres et autres terres appartenant au roi 
d’Espagne dans les Pays-Bas, et de ceux qui seront en conséquence de cette Ligue. 
Mais quelques lieux et places qui seront prises par qui que ce soit de cette Ligue qui 
se trouveront appartenir à la sœur unique dudit roi de la Grande Bretagne à cause de 
son dot et douaire ou à son fils l’Electeur Palatin par droit de succession, elles seront 
mises en leur pouvoir, et les confédérés s’obligeront de leur conserver en l’entière et 
paisible possession d’icelles. 
 
Le commerce s’exercera librement et équitablement entre les sociétés des deux rois 
et sera permis aux uns et aux autres pour leur argent d’acheter et d’enlever en payant 
les coutumes tout ce qui sera nécessaire pour fournir des munitions et vêtements aux 
soldats. Le commerce est entièrement défendu aux sociétés des deux rois avec les 
ennemis en quelque bien que ce soit. 
 
Article Secret 
Les deux rois sont convenus entre eux par cet article secret de ne conclure aucune 
chose avec la maison d’Autriche, le Duc de Bavière ou leurs adhérents au XXX des 
traités auxiliaires et de ligue offensive et défensive projetés entre leurs majestés 
jusqu’à ce que les Ministres des confédérés qui y doivent entrer soient assemblés à 
Paris et qu’ils aient avec ceux de leursdittes majestés signé et paraphé les susdits 
traités, ce qui s’effectuera dans la fin du mois de juillet 1637. Et encore que par le 
septième Article du traité auxiliaire, il soit dit que le roi de la Grande Bretagne 
permet à son neveu de préparer une flotte de xm ou XXX vaisseaux. Néanmoins le 
roi de la Grande Bretagne promet au roi très chrétien son très cher frère et s’oblige 
d’armer ladite flotte, de la munir de toutes les choses nécessaires et de l’entretenir à 
ses dépenses autant de temps qu’il est porté par ledit traité auxiliaire. 
 
Le Roi très chrétien promet aussi quand on signera le traité auxiliaire d’y donner le 
titre d’Electeur au P. Palatin comme sa Majesté fait présentement au traité de Ligue 




The Anglo-French Treaties of 1637 – Modern English Translations 
 
Modern English Translation of the Latin Version 
of the so called Main Anglo-French Treaty of 17 
February 16371 
Modern English Translation of the Latin Version 
of the Auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty of 17 
February 1637 
Modern English Translation of the French 
Version of the Auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty of 
June 16372 
The Treatie returned out of France wherein they 
have added or changed what here is underlyned. 
The Auxiliarie Treatie sent into France wherein 
they have omitted, or altered what here is 
underlyned. 
Auxiliary Treaty 
The Most Christian king explained publicly his 
reasons for undertaking the war against the 
Austrians; and he did not declare that he had 
begun anything [for any other reason] other than 
for gaining a safe peace for himself and all 
The Most Christian king explained publicly his 
reasons for undertaking the war against the 
Austrians: and he did not declare that he had 
begun anything other than for gaining a safe 
peace for himself and all the confederates, 
The Most Christian King, having already 
published his reasons for the war he undertook 
against the House of Austria, and testified that 
his only object was to be able to reach an assured 
peace for himself and for all his confederates 
 
1 English translations of the Latin versions of the main and auxiliary Anglo-French Treaties of 17 February 1637 by Simon Neal, the University of Oxford. 
 
2 English translation of the French version of the auxiliary Anglo-French Treaty of June 1637 by Dr Cédric Ploix, the University of Oxford: 
(a) words that are unclear in the manuscript are italicized; and 
(b) words that are illegible in the manuscript are indicated by XXX. 




confederates, without excluding anything, so that 
the princes, who had been oppressed by the 
Austrian house and those adhering to it, might be 
restored into ancestral inheritances and ranks. 
The king of Great Britain also, although he 
cultivates peace at present with all men, and does 
not know that he is being held by any other 
obligation to revolt; nevertheless, he willingly 
declares that he is ready to take pains in so lofty 
and glorious a work and to move this forward to 
the utmost of his ability. Therefore, both kings 
have pressed forward with these foundations, and 
judge that the best thing to do is to join 
themselves to a firmer treaty; by which they bear 
witness most holily that neither of them intends 
anything else apart from protecting their own 
empires, peace for the Christian world, and 
liberty for Germany; and to hand over their rights 
to the princes, who have been oppressed by the 
without excluding anything, so that the 
oppressed princes, and before others the Palatine 
Elector, might be restored into their ancestral 
inheritances and ranks. The king of Great Britain 
also, although he is cultivating peace at present 
with all men, and does not know that he is being 
bound by any obligation to revolt: nevertheless, 
he willingly states that he always been and is a 
promotor and assertor of this so lofty and 
glorious undertaking. Therefore, both kings have 
pressed forward with these foundations, and 
judge that the best thing to do is to unite 
themselves to a firmer treaty; by which they bear 
witness most holily that neither intends to extend 
their dominions or occupy those belonging to the 
other; but to do what is just and regal: to protect 
their own empires: peace for the Christian world: 
liberty for Germany: and to hand over their rights 
to the oppressed, especially the Palatine Elector, 
without any exception, by means of which the 
Princes, oppressed by the House of Austria and 
its members, are restored to their former property 
and dignities which they and their predecessors 
possessed the year 1616 before this war. And the 
King of Great Britain although now is at peace 
with everyone and feels no obligation to make 
any innovations, willingly declaring to have 
always been, and to be, ready to advance such a 
high and loyal enterprise. These two kings on 
this have found it good to join in a closer 
Covenant by which they both very religiously 
testify to have no other purpose than to defend 
their own crowns, to restore peace to 
Christendom, liberty to Germany and to the 
Princes oppressed by the House of Austria and 
its members. Their rights especially to the society 
and to the said King of Great Britain, whose 
Majesties have remained in agreement according 
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said Austrian house and its adherents, and 
especially to the nephews of the king of Great 
Britain or the sons of his sister; whereupon both 
majesties have unanimously agreed to the 
following articles, about which they have 
assembled by force of the mandates inserted at 
the end of this treaty, which will be ratified by 
both kings, as soon as the queen and crown of 
the Sweden and the confederated states of 
Belgium have agreed to the same treaty, just as 
will be expressed below. 
whereupon they unanimously agree to the 
following articles. 
to the following articles passed under the powers 
inserted at the end of this Treaty, which shall be 
respectfully ratified forthwith by the two Kings 
that the Crown of Sweden and the States-General 
will have entered as it is said hereinafter. 
1. 
The king of Great Britain will not aid the house 
of Austria or Bavaria or their allies directly or 
indirectly, and not bring money, arms, supplies 
or any type of munitions to any of them, or allow 
these to be brought by his subjects or any others 
under their name, who live in his dominions, and 
1. 
The king of Great Britain will not aid either the 
emperor, nor Spain or Bavaria, or their allies 
directly or indirectly: and not bring money, arms, 
supplies or any type of munitions to any of them, 
or allow these to be brought, as far as is in his 
power. Nor will he allow the recruiting of 
1 
The King of Great Britain will not directly or 
indirectly assist the House of Austria, the Duke 
of Bavaria or their members, and will neither 
provide nor suffer them to be provided by his 
societies or others under their name remaining in 
the land of his command, money, arms, food, or 
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he will not allow the levying of soldiers to be 
done in England, Scotland or Ireland for the sake 
of those men. 
knights to be done in England, Scotland or 
Ireland for the sake of those men. 
any kind of ammunition, and will not permit 
them to levy in England, Scotland, or Ireland. 
2. 
The same king of Great Britain is to grant to the 
Most Christian king the levy of six legions in the 
above-named kingdoms, that is 6,000 soldiers, of 
which a levy is to be made, if his Most Christian 
majesty believes he has need of them, as soon as 
this present treaty will be signed and ratified; 
then also the above-said number of the troops is 
be filled up, however many are lacking or 
diminishing during this war. 
2. 
The same king of Great Britain is to grant to the 
Most Christian king the levy of six legions in the 
above-named kingdoms, that is 6,000 soldiers 
and also a multitude to fill up the numbers of 
troops, however many are lacking or diminishing 
in this war, which is being waged for the 
common cause. 
2 
His Majesty of Great Britain will allow the Most 
Christian King to levy in his kingdoms a number 
of men, and whose levy will be conducted if his 
Most Christian Majesty judges he needs it 
immediately after the present Treaty has been 
signed and ratified, and the said levy will be 
recharged with recruits to measure, that it will 
come to remain in this service. 
3. 
The same king of Great Britain is to draw up on 
the sea a fleet of warships, at least thirty, ranging 
from 300 to 900 or 1,000 tonnes (as they 
commonly call them), and this fleet is to guard 
3. 
The same king of Great Britain is to draw up a 
fleet of warships, at least thirty, ranging from 
300 to 900 or 1,000 tonnes (as they commonly 
call them). And this is to guard and protect not 
3 
The King of Great Britain shall put at sea a fleet 
of not less than 30 warships, from 300 tons, up to 
900 or 1,000 tonnes each, to preserve and defend 
not only the ports and coasts of the two 
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and protect not only the ports and shores of both 
kingdoms, but also to prevent soldiers, money, 
supplies, any instruments of war or munitions 
from being transported to anyone, who opposes 
this common cause or the restitution of the said 
nephews. 
only the ports and shores of both kingdoms, but 
also (as far as is possible) to prevent soldiers, 
money, supplies, any instruments of war or 
munitions being transported to anyone, who 
oppose this common cause or the restitution of 
the Palatine Elector. 
kingdoms, but also to prevent any man, money, 
food, weapons, or war ammunition from being 
transported to those who oppose this common 
cause or the restitution of the said society and the 
descendant* of His Majesty of Great Britain. 
4. 
The Most Christian king is to not in any way 
draw up any treaty to the prejudice of this treaty 
with the Austrian house, the duke of Bavaria or 
their adherents, and not to discuss peace or truces 
or the suspension of arms without the consent of 
the king of Great Britain, and is not to conclude 
any peace in any way, unless the restitution of 
the said nephews of the king of Great Britain in 
entirety and their conservation in the future will 
have been comprehended and stipulated. 
Similarly, the king of Great Britain is not at all to 
4. 
The Most Christian king is to not in any way 
draw up any treaty with the emperor, Spanish or 
Bavarian, or their adherents, without consulting 
the king of Great Britain and gaining his 
agreement, and he is not to do or decree anything 
about peace or truces or suspensions of arms, 
unless the restitution of the nephews of the king 
of Great Britain in entirety and their conservation 
in the future will have been comprehended and 
stipulated. Similarly, the king of Great Britain, 
neither in the present nor after the war has arisen 
4 
The Most Christian King will make no peace 
treaty or suspension of arms with the King of 
Spain, the King of Hungary, the Duke of Bavaria 
or their members without the consent of the King 
of Great Britain, and will not conclude peace 
without the full restitution and preservation for 
the future of the XXX of His Majesty of Great 
Britain be included and promised. And likewise 
the King of Great Britain, in the state he 
currently is, will not in any way deal with the 
House of Austria and its members, and after 
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draw up any treaty in the state, in which it is now 
is, to the prejudice of this treaty with the 
Austrian house and its adherents. And after the 
war has begun, he will not enter into any treaty 
of peace, truces or suspension of arms without 
the consent of the Most Christian king. 
between himself and any of the aforesaid rulers, 
will deal in any way about peace or truces or the 
suspension of arms without consulting the Most 
Christian king and gaining his agreement. 
starting the war will make no Truce Peace Treaty 
or suspension of weapon without the consent of 
the Most Christian King. 
5. 
Both kings, without any delay, and as soon as it 
can be done, are to send ambassadors or other 
deputies to friends, especially to the queen and 
administrators of the kingdom of Sweden, and to 
the general confederated states of Belgium, by 
whom they may move and encourage them to 
agree and join themselves to this confederation, 
which has been instituted for this end: so that 
peace is gained for the Christian world, the 
liberty of Germany may be safe and intact, and 
so that the princes and other states of the empire, 
5. 
The kings, without allowing any delay, will 
immediately despatching ambassadors or 
mediators to friends, especially to the king of 
Denmark, the queen and administrators of the 
kingdom of Sweden, and the orders of the united 
provinces, so that they move and encourage 
everyone to agree to this confederation as soon 
as possible: so that the peace of the Christian 
world, the liberty of Germany and the restitution 
of the princes who had been robbed, namely the 
Palatine Elector, are supported; and so that they 
5 
The two Kings will dispatch without delay and at 
the earliest convenience ambassadors or other 
ministers to their friends, and particularly the 
Queen and administrator of Sweden, and to the 
States General of the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands to exhort them to enter into this 
League made for the restitution of peace in 
Christendom, the liberty of Germany and the 
Princes and States of the Empire who have been 
robbed of their states, lordships and liberties, by 
the House of Austria and their members, namely 
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who were deprived of their rules, dominions and 
liberties by the Austrian house and its adherents, 
and namely the said nephews of the king of 
Great Britain are restored in entirety; so that, as 
soon as they send their commissaries to 
Hamburg, by whom they may signify to the 
ambassadors and other deputies of both kings, 
who also, as soon as they will appear in the said 
city, [are to make known] what each one feels 
about the common cause; and so that at the same 
time they can come together and collaborate 
about this amicably, with the result that they 
come to an agreement between themselves about 
their pretensions, by which the matter can be 
brought to a fair and secure treaty of peace, 
which is to answer to common prayers. 
 
Once this has been done, the said deputies of 
both royal majesties and their confederates are to 
hurry their commissaries either to Hamburg or 
The Hague within at least three months after the 
writing of these presents; where each one is to 
make known to the kings its feelings about the 
common cause and what each of them wants: so 
that with the council of all men, the pretensions 
of every single person can be so tempered so that 
the conditions of a fair and faithful peace 
respond to common prayers. Once this has been 
done, the kings and as many of their confederates 
as are joining them in this treaty are to decide 
about the space of time to be prescribed to the 
emperor and the rest of them; in which they are 
to either approve or reject the articles of a 
peaceful treaty. 
 
Once these articles had been concluded and 
signed, the king of Great Britain, in the name of 
the confederates, is to take upon himself what is 
the sister and descendant of His Majesty of Great 
Britain, so that they may send their 
commissioners as soon as possible to Hamburg 
to be heard by the Ambassadors and other 
Ministers of the two Kings, who will be similarly 
at the earliest to the said Place of Hamburg their 
feelings about the common cause, and all 
together can confer and work to amicably settle 
their claims to achieve a just Treaty of Peace 
assured and their contentment. After which the 
said Deputies of their Majesties and their said 
confederates will agree a time in which the King 
of Spain, the King of Hungary and the Duke of 
Bavaria will be required by the King of Great 
Britain to satisfy the demands and claims that the 
said deputies will remain in agreement to 
propose as said. And so that things do not go 
long, the said time in which the King of Spain, 
the King of Hungary and the Duke of Bavaria 
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agree about the space of time within which the 
king of Spain, the king of Hungary and the duke 
of Bavaria will be warned by the king of Great 
Britain to make satisfaction to the petitions and 
pretensions, about which the said deputies agree 
among themselves to propose them, just as it is 
said. And in order that the matter is not drawn 
out too long, the said time within which the king 
of Spain, the king of Hungary and the duke of 
Bavaria, in which they will declare their will as 
regards the aforesaid matters, is not to be 
prolonged beyond a month or six weeks after the 
said pretensions were signified to them. After 
which time, if they or their adherents refuse or 
disagree strongly and by writing to promise and 
make satisfaction both to the king of Great 
Britain and to the other confederates, who are to 
be included in this treaty, about those things, 
which are proposed to them, just as it said, then 
to be proposed to the emperor and his allies. 
And, if at the established time the said emperor 
and those who are his parties do not accept them 
or either refuse or do not agree to signify their 
assent to the things that are being covenanted, 
then the king of Great Britain will sign a treaty 
about an offensive and defensive compact; 
namely one, which in the meantime and in the 
present is being concluded by suitable marks of 
the ambassadors and commissaries of both kings 
who are completing this; and to show himself in 
the manner, as the agreement is contained above 
according to that writing, and he is to now bind 
himself to the royal word. 
will have to declare their wishes on what can 
only be a month or six weeks after the service 
that will be done to them. After which time, if 
they and their members refuse or decline to 
promise validly and in writing to give 
contentment to both the King of Great Britain 
and the other Confederates in this League about 
the things that have been proposed to them as 
stated above, then, and without delay, the 
deputies of the King of Great Britain will sign 
the aforesaid Treaty of the said offensive and 
defensive league in the same form as from now 
on it will be signed by the Ambassadors and 
Commissars of the one and the other King, and 
the King Great Britain is now obliged in faith 
and word of the king to execute in any delay the 
aforesaid offensive and defensive League Treaty 




and without delay the deputies of the king of 
Great Britain will sign the treaty of an offensive 
and defensive compact in the same form, by 
which is it now collated with the original under 
the marks of the said deputies of both kings, 
appended below the writing. And the king of 
Great Britain is to bind himself now on his royal 
word to execute the said treaty of an offensive 
and defensive compact without any delay, just as 
it is collated and agreed above. 
The King of Denmark will likewise be invited to 
enter this treaty, and to send deputies for that 
purpose to Hamburg and Paris at that time, and 
the same will be done to his Highness of Savoy. 
6. 
The king of Denmark will be invited in the same 
manner to agree to this treaty and join himself to 
it, and for this end he is to send his deputies to 
Hamburg and Paris within the time designated 
below, and the same is to be done as regards the 
duke of Sabaudia. 
  
7. 7. 7 
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In addition, it is agreed and established that both 
kings are to have ready arms, with which they 
can immediately attack the enemy, in the 
manner, by which it is covenanted and by how it 
has been constituted in the offensive and 
defensive compact. In the meantime, the king of 
Great Britain is to permit his nephew to assemble 
a well-armed fleet of fourteen or fifteen ships, 
four of which will be at least 400 tonnes each, 
and the rest 200 at least; with which fleet they 
can attempt anything for promoting their cause 
and for the good of the Most Christian king at the 
same time. And this fleet ought to commit itself 
to the sea and set sail, as soon as the present 
treaty will be signed and ratified. Moreover, this 
permission of the king will last until the time 
given for the response of the king of Spain, the 
king of Hungary and the duke of Bavaria, at the 
time, when either a general peace is concluded or 
In addition, it is agreed and established that both 
kings are to have arms prepared, with which they 
can immediately attack the enemy, in the 
manner, by which it is covenanted and by how it 
will be constituted in the offensive and defensive 
compact. In the meantime, however, the king of 
Great Britain is to permit his nephew to assemble 
a well-armed fleet of twelve or fifteen ships of at 
least 200 tonnes, by which he can attempt 
anything for promoting his cause and that of the 
Most Christian king at the same time. Moreover, 
this electoral fleet ought to commit itself to the 
sea and set sail on the first day of the following 
May or sooner (if it can be done). Moreover, this 
permission of the king will last until the time 
given for the response of the emperor. In 
addition, once this has been constituted, they are 
to yield to the profit of that man everything 
which will have been taken by the elector by the 
Moreover, it has been agreed and granted that the 
two kings shall keep their forces ready to act 
immediately against their enemies, according to 
what has been promised, and according to it 
being declared in the said offensive and 
defensive league, and yet his majesty of the 
Great Britain allows its descendants to prepare a 
well-armed fleet of fourteen or fifteen vessels of 
which there will be four of 400 tons or more, and 
200 at least for the others, for the advancement 
of his own interest and for the benefit of the 
Most Christian king. And this fleet will be seen 
immediately after the present treaty will have 
been signed and ratified. But this permission of 
the King of Great Britain will only last until the 
said time given to the King of Spain, Hungary 
and the Duke of Bavaria for their response; time 
during which either the general peace will be 
concluded, or the King of the Great Britain will 
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the king of Great Britain openly wages war, 
under conditions contained in this present treaty, 
as and in a treaty of the offensive and defensive 
compact. In addition, once this has been 
constituted, everything which will have been 
taken by the said nephew by the might of that 
fleet is to fall to the benefit of that man, and is to 
be arranged freely according to his arbitration. 
might of that fleet: and these things are to be 
disposed of according to his arbitration. Also, if 
the Most Christian king takes any places in the 
meantime during this aid in Flanders, these are to 
be immediately handed over into the hands of the 
elector; and to be kept in his possession by 
mutual aids of the kings for so long, until they 
are restored by full right into ancestral rules and 
ranks. Afterwards they are to fall to the Most 
Christian king, who will have taken them first of 
all. 
break open under the terms of this treaty and that 
of the offensive league, being established in 
advance that all the seizes that the descendant of 
his Majesty by this fleet will be for him to be 
disposed of according to his will. 
8. 
It is also concorded and concluded that, if the 
king of Spain, the king of Hungary and the duke 
of Bavaria embrace and accept the conditions of 
the said treaty for universal peace, just as it is 
contained in the fifth article, expressed above, in 
such a way that necessity does not fall upon the 
8. 
It is also agreed and concluded that, if the 
emperors, Spanish and Bavarian, embrace and 
accept the conditions of the treaty for universal 
peace, in such a way that necessity does not fall 
upon the king of Great Britain to come to arms, 
his majesty will give his assent to the duke of 
8 
It was also concluded and adopted that in the 
event that the King of Spain, the King of 
Hungary and the Duke of Bavaria accept the 
terms of the Treaty of General Peace in 
accordance with article five above, so that the 
King of Great Britain is not obliged to go to war, 
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king of Great Britain to come to arms, his 
majesty will give his assent to the duke of 
Bavaria retaining the electoral rank during his 
life, rather than the peace of the Christian world 
having to hang on this. But if it comes to arms, 
he will not be held by this condition, but on the 
contrary the kings are to covenant about 
completely excluding Bavaria and the 
descendants from this electoral rank. In the 
meantime, it is agreed between the kings that the 
nephews of the king of Great Britain are to grant 
free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion to 
their subjects or others living in their dominions. 
Bavaria retaining the electorate during his life, 
rather than the peace of the Christian world 
having to hang on this. But if it comes to arms, 
he will not be held by this condition, but on the 
contrary the kings are to come an agreement 
about completely excluding Bavaria and the 
descendants. But if peace will be concluded, as it 
is put above, the royal nephews are to freely 
allow Roman Catholic inhabitants of their 
dominions to live there and exercise religion. 
his Majesty consents that the Duke of Bavaria 
retain the electorate during his life so as not to 
prevent by the peace of Christendom. And if his 
Majesty goes to war, he will not be obliged to 
this condition. On the contrary, both kings agree 
that the Duke of Bavaria and his descendants are 
completely excluded. However, it has been 
agreed that the descendant of His Majesty of 
Great Britain will give freedom to Roman 
Catholics, their societies or others who live in 
their countries, to enjoy the exercise of their 
religion. 
9. 
The ports and shores of the realms of both kings 
are to lie open to all their subjects, so that they 
can both go forward and back freely and with 
impediment with their ships, sailors and 
9. 
The ports and shores of the realms of both kings 
are to be open to all their subjects, so that they 
can both go forth and withdraw freely and with 
impediment with their ships, sailors and 
9 
The ports and coasts of the kingdoms of the two 
kings will be open to all their societies in order to 
enter and leave freely and without impediment 
with their vessels and goods by paying the 
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merchandize (discharged from duties and tolls), 
and all old and good treaties that have been made 
between crowns, especially about exercising 
trade freely by land and sea, are to be observed. 
merchandize (discharged from duties and tolls), 
and all old and good treaties that have been made 
between crowns, especially about exercising free 
trade by land and sea, are to be ratified and 
observed. 
customs, and all the old and good treaties made 
between the two crowns, and especially those 
who see to the freedom of land and sea trade, 
will be observed. 
10. 
If any places of the Most Christian king, 
pertaining to the above-said nephews of the 
majesty of Great Britain, are taken by arms, these 
are to be immediately handed over into the hands 
of his said majesty to the use of the said 
nephews. And the Most Christian king will take 
pains for their conservation by his help and 
favour for the sake of this present compact. 
10. 
If any places of the Most Christian king, 
pertaining by right to the Palatine Elector, are 
taken by arms, these are to be immediately 
handed over into the hands of the king of Great 
Britain to the use of the same elector, so that they 
are kept by the Most Christian king, giving help, 
as if the fruits and effects of this confederation. 
10 
If the armies of the Most Christian King take 
some places belonging to the descendants of his 
Majesty of Great Britain, they will be 
immediately put under the hands of his majesty 
for the good of his said descendants, and the 
Most Christian King will help and promote the 
conservation of the said in consideration of this 
Alliance. 
11. 
Both kings are not to admit any invitation to any 
assembly for the sake of discussing public peace, 
by any reason other than is agreed or will be 
11. 
The Most Christian king is to admit no invitation 
to any assembly for the sake of discussing public 
peace by any reason other than is covenanted or 
11 
The two kings will not hear any invitation that 
may be made to them for any assembly 
whatsoever in which the general peace is dealt 
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agreed between them. will be covenanted between the kings. And 
similarly, the king of the Britains is to promise 
and stipulate the same on his behalf. 
with except in accordance with what is or will be 
agreed between them. 
12. 
So that this confederation between the kings and 
their subjects may be more entire and 
everlasting, both of them are to give their word 
that they will not allow any pirates or Turks or 
Barbarians to make plunders or have a station or 
in any way stay in their kingdoms, ports, 
maritime places or fresh waters; but on the 
contrary they will expel and prosecute all those 
practising piracy. 
12. 
So that this confederation between the kings and 
their subjects may be more entire and 
everlasting, both of them give their word that 
they will not allow (as far as is in their power) 
any pirates or Turks or Barbarians to make 
plunders or have a station or in any way stay in 
their kingdoms, ports, maritime places or fresh 
waters; but on the contrary (according to their 
strength) they will expel and prosecute all those 
who are practising piracy. 
12 
And so that this alliance between the two kings 
and their societies be so firmer and more lasting, 
it was agreed between them to act so that no 
Pirates, Turks or Barbarians make any seize, 
have a retreat or a stay in their Kingdom, Ports, 
sea regions, and rivers. On the contrary, they will 
hunt down and chase all those who devote 
themselves to Piracy. 
13. 
Both kings are to decree that the present articles 
are to be regarded as concluded, and to be going 
to be undersigned by their ambassadors and 
13. 
Both kings are to decide to regard the present 
articles as concluded, and to be signed and 
subscribed by their ambassadors and 
13 
 The two kings remain in agreement that these 
present articles will from now on be held 
concluded and as such signed and subscribed by 
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commissaries as such, as soon as the queen and 
crown of Sweden and the general confederated 
states of Belgium agree among themselves to 
consent to the treaty, and have sent mandates and 
ratifications to this effect to their ambassadors or 
deputies at Paris according to the tenor of the 
following article. 
commissaries as such before the first day of 
March of the English style now next following. 
their Ambassadors and Commissioners 
immediately after the crown of Sweden and their 
States-General have remained in agreement to 
enter this treaty and that they will have sent for 
this purpose their powers and ratifications to 
their Ambassadors or Ministers in Paris in 
accordance with the following article. 
14. 
And since their majesties, having been induced 
to this by that esteem and love, which they bear 
towards their confederates and loyal friends, and 
namely towards the queen and realm of Sweden, 
and the general confederated states of Belgium, 
judge that it is suitable to invite them to join this 
treaty, they have agreed and consented, as their 
above-said intention is all the more clear to them, 
that they will apply all diligence and send to the 
kingdom of Sweden and the said states 
 14 
And doubting that their majesties have judged 
appropriate for the esteem and friendship they 
have towards their Allies and good friends, and 
particularly towards the crown of Sweden and 
the States-General, to invite them to join this 
Treaty, they have agreed and granted to give 
them a more certain mark of what is above, that 
they shall dispatch diligently to the said Swedish 
Crown and the said XXX [Dutch] States to send 
full powers to their ministers in Hamburg to 
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[instructions] to encourage them to send their 
mandates with full power to Hamburg to their 
deputies, in which they are to declare their 
intention concerning the said treaty to the 
deputies of their majesties, who are to be found 
there. And in case the said kingdom of Sweden 
and the general states agree to this treaty, it is to 
be left to the judgement of the said assembly of 
Hamburg to agree as to what ought to be done 
about the places of Belgium that have been 
appointed under the rule of the king of Spain, 
which are to be taken by one or the other of the 
said confederates from that time, at which this 
treaty of confederation to bring help will be 
signed and ratified by the said confederates, and 
when it will have been executed, until the said 
king of Great Britain gives his assent to the 
offensive and defensive compact. Once these 
things have been so agreed and concorded, the 
declare their resolution on this to the ministers 
who will be there on behalf of their holy majesty. 
And, in the event that the Crown of Sweden and 
the States-General enter this present Treaty, it 
will be submitted to the judgment of the 
Assembly at Hamburg to agree at the same time 
as to what will be done with the places of 
Flanders which might be taken by some or the 
others of the aforesaid Confederates, since the 
time of the present Auxiliary League Treaty will 
have been signed and ratified by the aforesaid 
allies and executed by the King of Great Britain 
until the said King enters the offensive and 
defensive League, from which resolutions thus 
taken, the said assembly shall give prompt notice 
to the ministers of their holy majesty and the said 
confederates at Paris, to sign together the present 
treaty. The ratification of which will then be 
respectively given by all the said Confederates in 
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said assembly is to make this known, as soon as 
it will be signed, to the deputies of the said 
majesties and of the said confederates, who will 
be at Paris, so that this treaty is jointly signed by 
them, and the ratification of this will be 
respectively given by all the confederates in the 
said city of Paris by the fifteenth day of the 
month of August in the year 1637. And 
consequently, the above-said deputies of 
Hamburg will give assistance so that the above-
said fifth article is committed to execution. 
Paris in the end of July 1637. After which the 
deputies who will be assembled in Hamburg will 
work to the execution of the fifth Article above. 
 
Proceeding offensive and defensive league 
articles between the Most Christian King and the 
King of Great Britain, their kingdoms and 
societies, for their preservation, for the general 
peace and for the entire re-establishment of their 
Allies oppressed by the House of Austria, and 
especially of the Prince Elector Palatine, against 
this house of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria and 
their members, by whom Germany was ruined, 
several Princes and peoples oppressed, stripped 
and driven from their lands and countries. All the 
precedent treaties between the crowns which 
now have their strength and virtue are fully 




By this present treaty, the two kings want both 
their kingdoms, peoples and societies to be 
obliged to the said offensive and defensive 
league and to a declaration and continuation of 
open war by sea and by land against the said 
house of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria and 
against all their members, their kingdoms, lands, 
domains, their societies, vassals, and all others 
who obey them. All kings, princes, republics, 
states and free cities will be invited to enter this 
league which is done for no other purpose than to 
obtain universal peace, the old freedom of the 
Germans and the restoration of the Princes, and 
mainly of the Elector Palatine in their states and 
dignities, to which effect two kings have 
resolved to send without delay their 
Ambassadors or Ministers. 
 
As soon as possible and at least after the 
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ratification and signature of the league between 
the two Kings and those who will join, each of 
the kings will have his forces ready so that if the 
King of Spain, the king of Hungary and the Duke 
of Bavaria refuse some articles of peace which 
will be offered to them as has been agreed or, if 
they allow the prescribed time to pass without 
accepting them, immediately they attack by war 
the house of Austria and the Duke of Bavaria 
together their states, lands, societies and all those 
who will support them somehow, who are not 
between the colleagues, and for this purpose the 
said kings will give power to all their society to 
make campaigns between them for undertakings 
and expeditions of war in India or in America or 
in some other place either by sea or by land, as it 
will seem to them more convenient for them and 
the common cause. And besides that, the said 
kings will give rescue and assistance to the Allies 
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as it will seem most convenient. 
 
The king of Great Britain will maintain a fleet of 
30 ships of the war of 300 to 900 or 1,000 barrels 
[tonnes] well provided with all things, with 
which he will not only defend the coasts and 
ports of the two kingdoms towards the ocean, but 
also he will close the passage as far as possible to 
the Enemies, so that they cannot carry in 
Flanders armed men of war, food, ammunition 
and money, nor other garrisons of war, even if he 
will fight, take and ruin all ships and ships of 
some sort belonging to the house of Austria, 
Duke of Bavaria, and to their members and 
societies. The said kings will take care that all 
the ways of communication from Spain to India 
or America and Flanders, and from Italy to 
Germany are closed for what purpose the ships 
of the King of Great Britain will hold the sea 
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according to which he will need. And as for the 
passage from Germany to Italy, the Most 
Christian King will act and deal with the cantons 
of Switzerland and other allies. 
 
The two kings will mutually promise, and by 
virtue of this League, will oblige themselves to 
treat in any manner of peace truce or suspension 
of arms only by mutual accord and consent. 
 
It will be deliberated between the Confederates 
before the treaty is signed how it will be 
disposed of the places to be taken in Flanders 
and other lands belonging to the King of Spain in 
the Netherlands, and of those who will be 
accordingly of this League. But some regions 
and places that will be taken by any one of this 
League who will be to belong to the unique sister 
of the King of Great Britain because of his 
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dowry and dower or to his son the Elector 
Palatine by right of succession, they will be 
placed in their power, and the Confederates will 
oblige themselves to preserve them in the whole 
and peaceful possession of these. 
 
Trade will be free and fair between the societies 
of the two kings, and both will be allowed for 
their money to buy and to pay for the customs all 
that will be necessary to provide ammunition and 
clothing to the soldiers. Trade is entirely 
forbidden to the societies of the two kings with 
the enemies in any way whatsoever. 
  Secret Article 
The two kings agreed among themselves by this 
secret article to conclude nothing with the House 
of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria or their members 
at the XXX of the auxiliary treaties and offensive 
 
358 
and defensive league projected between their 
majesties until that the Ministers of the 
Confederates who are to enter are to be 
assembled in Paris, and that they have, with 
those of their majesty, signed and initialled the 
aforesaid treaties, which will be enacted at the 
end of July 1637. And, again, that by the seventh 
Article of the auxiliary treaty, it is said that the 
King of Great Britain allows his descendant to 
prepare a fleet of XXX or XXX vessels. 
Nevertheless, the King of Great Britain promises 
his very dear brother to the Most Christian king 
and obliges himself to arm the fleet, to equip it 
with all the necessary things and to maintain it 
for its expenses as long as it is used by the said 
auxiliary treaty. The Most Christian King also 
promises when the auxiliary treaty is signed to 
give the title of Elector to P. Palatine as his 
Majesty is currently making the offensive and 
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